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47 N.J.L. 154

Teets v. Weise

Supreme Court of New Jersey

Decided March 15, 1885

Supreme Court of New Jersey · decided 1885-03-15

<p>Under a devise of lands to A for her life, and at her death to her children who may be living at the time of her decease, no estate vests in a child who dies before A.</p>

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Decided 1885-03-15

How this case has been cited

Cited by 6 later decisions — most recently May 2006

1 federal appellate · 4 state decisions

301885189019001910192019301940195019601970198019902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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¶1The opinion of the court was delivered by

Parker, J.

¶2This action was brought by Rebecca EL Teets against Edward Weise, to recover possession of the equal undivided one-fifth part of certain lands in the county of Hunterdon. It appears that in the year 1846, George Trimmer died seized of the lands in question, leaving a will by which he devised the lands in controversy as follows, viz.; “Fourth. I give and devise unto my daughter, Julian Ver Noy, wife of Nathan Ver Noy, without the same being in any wise subject to the debts, engagements or liabilities whatsoever of her said husband, Nathan Ver Noy, all that house and eight acres of land where the said Julian Ver Noy now lives, situate in the township of Tewksbury, in the county of Hunterdon, on the south side of the branch, adjoining the farm I intend hereinafter to devise to my daughter, Elizabeth Hann, the said house and eight acres of land to be held by her, my said daughter Julian, during her life; and at her death I give and devise the same to all her children and any issue of any deceased child or children of my said daughter, Julian Ver Noy, that may be living at the time of her decease, equally to be divided between them, share and share alike, per stirpes and not per capita, to them, their heirs and assigns forever. Fifth. I do give and devise further unto my daughter, Julian Ver Noy, *155without the same being in any wise subject to the debts, engagements or liabilities whatsoever of her said husband, Nathan Ver Noy, all that farm I purchased of Jesse Gray, situate in the township of Lebanon, in the county of Hunter-don, containing seventy-four acres, be the same more or less, to the use and benefit of my said daughter, Julian Ver Noy, during her natural life, and from and after the decease of my said daughter Julian, I do give and devise the said farm to all her children and the issue of any deceased child or childdren of my said daughter, Julian Ver Noy, that may be living at her decease, to them, their heirs and assigns forever, equally to be divided between them, share and share alike, per stirpes and not per capita, that is, the issue of any deceased child to take the share the parent, if living, would have taken.”

¶3At the time the testator died his daughter Julian was alive and had five living children, to wit, Richard M. Johnson Ver Noy, Angelina Weise, Elizabeth Sliker, Phoebe Weise and Mary Welsh. Richard died several years before his mother, and without children, leaving a will in which he devised the lands in question to the plaintiff in this suit. The other four children of Julian Ver Noy survived her, and took possession of the property. After the death of their mother they conveyed the lands to the defendant.

¶4The only question presented for decision is whether Richard, who died before his mother, took, under the will, a vested or a contingent estate in the lands. The plaintiff claims through a devise from Richard, and if he did not have a vested estate the plaintiff must fail in this action.

¶5It is true that in the construction of wills the courts favor the vesting of estates where it can be done consistently with the language used. In ascertaining the intention of the testator we are to look, in the first place, to the language of the will, and if it be ambiguous and susceptible of different meanings, or if carried out would conflict with the scope of the will, the language must give way, but if the language be plain it must govern.

¶6What is the language employed in this will ? The phrase*156•ology of the two paragraphs making the devise differs slightly, but the effect is the same. The language plainly signifies the intention of the testator to have been that the lands devised to his daughter for life should not vest in any of her children who did not survive her. The language employed is as follows, viz.: “And at her death I give and devise the same to her children that may be living at the time of her •death, to the use and benefit of my said daughter during her natural life, and from and after the decease of my said daughter Julian, I do give and devise said farm to all her children that may be living at her decease.”

¶7The language of this will is too plain to admit of doubt. The estate of Richard, through whom the plaintiff claims, was contingent, and depended upon his outliving his mother.

¶8The evident intention of the testator harmonizes with this construction of the language. He intended-to keep the estate in those children and grandchildren of his daughter who survived her, and not to put it in the power of any of her children who should die before her, without children, to pass the title to a stranger to his blood. The language limiting the estate .to the children and grandchildren of his daughter who might be living at the time of her death, is of the substance of the devise, and does not refer to the time of enjoyment. When the event specified is annexed to the devise itself, the estate does not vest unless the event happens. In this case the event did not happen. Richard was not alive when his mother died.

¶9It is not necessary to cite numerous authorities to prove a principle so well settled. In Vanderburgh v. Hollinshead, 1 McCarter 32, Chancellor Green said that when the limitation over of the estate upon the death of a devisee is to the surviving children of such devisee, a contingent estate is created, and if a child should die before the devisee for life, the estate passes to the survivors. Perhaps the principle is more clearly stated in the syllabus to that case, prepared by the Chancellor, viz.: The rule is that where an interest is given to one for life, and after his death to his surviving children, they only *157can take who are alive at the time the distribution takes place, and the estate is therefore contingent.”

¶10The conclusion is that Richard did not have a vested estate in the lands in question, and therefore the plaintiff took no-title by his will.

¶11The judgment is affirmed.

¶12For affirmance — The Chancellor, Depue, Dixon,. Knapp, Magie, Parker, Reed, Scudder, Van Syckel,. Brown, Cole, Paterson, Whitaker. 13.

¶13For reversal — Hone.

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