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472 P.3d 195

Taylor (Donald) Vs. State

Nevada Supreme Court

Decided September 18, 2020

Nevada Supreme Court · decided 2020-09-18

Applies NV 171 § 171.010 · NV 200 § 200.035 · NV 220 § 220.110 · NV 220 § 220.120 · NV 220 § 220.170

Relies on Strickland v. Washington · United States v. Wade · Moore v. Illinois

Decided 2020-09-18

        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA


DONALD TAYLOR,                                          No_ 79218
Appellant,
vs.
THE STATE OF NEVADA,
                                                                MEL)
Respondent.
                                                               SEP 1 2020
                                                               myik,spowm
                                                           cu
                                                          BY
                                                               - DEPUTY CLERK
                        ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE
            This is an appeal from a district court order denying a
postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Eighth judicial District
Court, Clark County; William D. Kephart, Judge. Appellant Donald Taylor
argues that he received ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel.
The district court denied the petition after conducting an evidentiary
hearing. We affirm.
            To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner
must show that counsel's performance was deficient in that it fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness and that prejudice resulted in that
there was a reasonable probability of a different outcome absent counsel's
errors. Strickla.nd v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668, 687-88
 (1984); Warden v.
Lyons, 
100 Nev. 430, 432-33
, 
683 P.2d 504, 505
 (1984) (adopting the test in
Strickland); see also Kirksey v. State, 
112 Nev. 980, 998
, 
923 P.2d 1102, 1113
(1996) (applying Stricklan.d to claims of ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel). The petitioner must demonstrate the underlying facts by a
preponderance of the evidence, Means v. State, 
120 Nev. 1001, 1012
, 
103 P.3d 25, 33
 (2004), and both components of the inquiry must be shown,
Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 697
. For purposes of the deficiency prong, counsel
is strongly presumed to have provided adequate assistance and exercised



                                                                2_0 - '34 410
reasonable professional judgment in all significant decisions. 
Id. at 690
.
We defer to the district court's factual findings that are supported by
substantial evidence and not clearly wrong, but review its application of the
law to those facts de novo. Lader v. Warden, 
121 Nev. 682, 686
, 
120 P.3d 1164, 1166
 (2005).
           Taylor first argues that trial counsel should have moved to
suppress the evidence obtained following his traffic stop on the basis that
he was detained for more than one hour without probable cause. He argues
that the show-up identification that took place within that one-hour period
could not provide probable cause because it was unreliable. The record,
however, shows that probable cause had been established before the show-up identification. The victim's phone showed text messages and calls to and
from "D" shortly before the killing; the text messages depicted an agreement
where the victim would sell a large quantity of marijuana; witness A.
Chenault told the police that the shooting took place after the buyers
arrived, pulled guns, and stated that they were stealing the marijuana; and
"Ds phone number was associated with Taylor in other police records. A
challenge to Taylor's initial detention on a probable-cause basis would have
failed. See Doleman v. State, 
107 Nev. 409, 413
, 
812 P.2d 1287, 1289
 (1991)
("Probable cause to conduct a warrantless arrest exists when police have
reasonably trustworthy information of facts and circumstances that are
sufficient in themselves to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe
that an offense has been or is being committed by the person to be
arrested."). Taylor accordingly has not shown deficient performance or




                                      2
prejudice in counsel's omitting this challenge. The district court therefore
did not err in denying this claim.'
             Taylor next argues that trial counsel should have retained an
investigator to interview Chenault about her changing description of the
shooter. Specifically, he argues that an investigation could have developed
evidence that Chenault's identification of Taylor as the shooter was
influenced by a booking photo texted by the investigating detective to
Chenault's daughter and shown to Chenault after the show-up. The
discrepancies in Chenault's descriptions are well-documented in the record,
and counsel cross-examined Chenault on this issue and argued it
extensively. As Taylor has not alleged that anything would be uncovered
that was not already known and available to be argued, he has not shown
deficient performance or that he was prejudiced. The district court
therefore did not err in denying this claim.
            Taylor next argues that trial counsel should have retained an
eyewitness-identification expert, specifically Dr. Deborah Davis, who had
been retained by Taylor's codefendant but did not testify after the
codefendant pleaded guilty. Substantial evidence supports the district
court's finding that counsel made a strategic decision to challenge
Chenault's identification by cross-examination rather than an expert
witness, as counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing that he identified
the eyewitness identification as a significant issue and considered retaining
an expert and the record shows that counsel challenged the identification

      iTaylor argues that the district court denied this and other claims
without an evidentiary hearing. The record belies this contention, as an
evidentiary hearing was held and postconviction counsel had the
opportunity to ask trial counsel about this omission or any other claim
raised in the pleadings.


                                     3
through pretrial motions, cross-examination, and closing argument. Taylor
has not shown extraordinary circumstances warranting a challenge to
counsel's strategic decision and thus has not shown deficient perfortnance.
See Lara v. State, 
120 Nev. 177, 180
, 
87 P.3d 528, 530
 (2004). Further,
Taylor has not shown prejudice. Davis testified at the evidentiary hearing
that her testimony would have addressed limitations on the accuracy of
eyewitness identiftcations. Counsel, however, argued these issues and the
facts undermining the reliability of Chenault's identification at trial, such
that we cannot say that otnitting Davis testimony undermines our
confidence in the jury's verdict. See Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 694
 CA
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in
the outcome.").
          Taylor next argues that appellate counsel should have better
argued that Chenault's identification was irreparably tainted by the
suggestive photograph of Taylor, shown to her by her daughter after the
detective sent it by text message to the daughter. Appellate counsel argued
briefly that Chena ult's in-court identification was tainted by both the
suggestive show-up identification and the photograph, such that the in-court identification should have been suppressed. We deterrnined on appeal
that the brief statement of the issue was not supported by cogent argument
or relevant authority. Taylor v. State, 
132 Nev. 309
, 320 n.6, 
371 P.3d 1036
,
1043 n.6 (2016). Here, however, Taylor does not proffer the cogent
argument or relevant authority that appellate counsel omitted, stating
merely that counsel should have established that the photograph was overly
suggestive and that Chenault's in-court identification was based on the
photograph. We concluded that Chenault's in-court identification had an
adequate independent basis in her observation of the suspects in her


                                      4
apartment before the shooting. 
Id. at 322
, 371 P.3d at 1045. Taylor has not
argued how the photograph compromised this independent basis. Insofar
as Taylor relies on United States v. Wade, 
388 U.S. 218, 240
 (1967), and
Moore v. Illinois, 
434 U.S. 220, 225-26
 (1977), such reliance is misplaced, as
those authorities are relevant only for the general proposition that an in-court identification may be tainted by a suggestive pretrial lineup.
Appellate counsel did not perform deficiently and Taylor was not prejudiced
by counsel's omitting authorities supporting this general proposition. The
district court therefore did not err in denying this claim.
            Taylor next argues that trial and appellate counsel should have
challenged references to cellular-service-company custodians of records as
,c
   experts." Taylor has not shown that either a trial or appellate challenge
had merit, as testimony of a cellular-service-company record custodian is
expert testimony and thus the references accurately described the
testimony. See Burnside v. State, 
131 Nev. 371
, 384, 
352 P.3d 627
, 636-37
(2015). Taylor accordingly has shown neither deficient performance nor
prejudice in the omission of rneritless claims. The district court therefore
did not err in denying this claiin.
            Taylor next argues that trial counsel should have challenged
the State's failure to notice the record custodian testimony as expert
testimony.2 Taylor has not provided the State's witness lists, and this claim
is accordingly a bare claim unsupported by the record. See Riggins v. State,
107 Nev. 178, 182
, 
808 P.2d 535, 538
 (1.991) (concluding that materials
omitted from the record on appeal "are presumed to support the district
court's decision"), rev 'd on other grounds by Riggins v. Nevada, 
504 U.S. 127


      2Tay1or does not argue that appellate counsel should have raised a

claim on this basis.


                                      5
                   (1992); see also Thomas v. State, 
120 Nev. 37
, 43 n.4, 
83 P.3d 818
, 822 n.4
                   (2004) (Appellant has the ultimate responsibility to Provide this court with
                   portions of the record essential to determination of issues raised in
                   appellant's appear (internal quotation marks omitted)). Even if the State
                   failed to notice the record custodians as experts, Taylor has not shown that
                   trial counsel performed deficiently in omitting a challenge, as we settled
                   that expert witness notice was required in these circumstances two years
                   after Taylor's trial. See Burnside, 131 Nev. at 384, 352 P.3d at 636-37.
                   "[C]ounsel's failure to anticipate a change in the law does not constitute
                   ineffective assistance of counsel." Nika v. State, 
124 Nev. 1272, 1289
, 
198 P.3d 839, 851
 (2008). The district court therefore did not err in denying this
                   claim.
                               Taylor next argues that trial counsel provided ineffective
                   assistance when his lead counsel David Phillips had his license suspended
                   and could not appear at several pretrial hearings and that this suspension
                   deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Taylor was
                   represented at these hearings by his second attorney John Rogers. Phillips'
                   error in allowing his license to be suspended for failing to subrnit his CLE
                   certification does not constitute deficient performance. See United States v.
                   Mouzin, 
785 F.2d 682, 698
 (9th Cir. 1986) (observing that suspension does
                   not per se constitute ineffective representation and looking instead to
                   counsel's trial performance). Taylor has not specifically alleged how Rogers'
                   representation at the hearings was deficient or how Phillips presence at
                   these hearings would have led to a reasonable probability of a different
                   outcome. Insofar as he argues that counsel effectively abandoned his
                   representation by being suspended, Taylor was not abandoned by counsel
                   because Rogers was able to represent him. See United States v. Cronic, 466

SuPREme Gown'
      or • •
    NevAoA
                                                         6
01 047A       .
          -411AD
U.S. 648, 656 (1984) C[T]he adversarial process protected by the Sixth
Amendment requires that the accused have counsel acting in the role of an
advocate." (internal quotation marks omitted)). And Taylor's argument
that he was denied his counsel of choice fails, as he was not entitled to
counsel of his choice where counsel was appointed.3 See Young v. State, 
120 Nev. 963, 968
, 
102 P.3d 572, 576
 (2004) (recognizing that "[a] defendant's
right to substitution of counsel is not without limit:). And to the extent that
Taylor argues that appellate counsel should have raised these issues on
appeal, he has not identified a basis that would support a meritorious
appellate claim, as he had counsel at all critical stages, and thus has not
shown deficient performance or prejudice. The district court therefore did
not err in denying these claims.
           Taylor next argues that trial counsel should have waived the
penalty phase. Substantial evidence supports the district court's finding
that counsel made a strategic decision to decline to waive the penalty phase
when asked before trial. Taylor has not shown extraordinary circumstances
warranting a challenge to that decision and thus has not shown deficient
performance. See Lara, 
120 Nev. at 180
, 
87 P.3d at 530
. Moreover, Taylor
has not shown how waiving the penalty phase would have led to a
reasonable probability of a different outcome. The district court therefore
did not err in denying this claim.
             Taylor next argues that trial counsel did not properly prepare
for the penalty phase. The record belies Taylor's contention that trial
counsel failed to present a mitigation case, as the jury was presented with
photographs of Taylor's girlfriend and children and evidence regarding his

      3Tay1or did not contemporaneously object to Rogers representation
while Phillips was unavailable_


                                       7
efforts to turn his life around through employment and education, and
counsel argued in favor of Taylor's character and that he should be given an
opportunity to rehabilitate himself and reenter society. Contrary to
Taylor's contention, it was not objectively unreasonable for counsel to
refrain from arguing that Taylor's criminal history was not significant, as
this was false, the State extensively argued regarding that history, and
counsel reasonably avoided calling attention to it. The record repels
Taylor's contention that his mother would have testified in mitigation, as
counsel reported contemporaneously that Taylor did not want to subject his
mother to that. And contrary to Taylor's contention, it was not objectively
unreasonable for counsel to decline to request a jury instruction on
mitigating evidence pursuant to NRS 200.035, as that statute concerns
mitigating circumstances to weigh against aggravating circumstances in
capital penalty phases and Taylor's was not a capital trial. See Lisle v.
State, 
131 Nev. 356
, 366-67, 
351 P.3d 725
, 733 (2015) (discussing mitigating
evidence pursuant to NRS 200.035 in capital proceedings). Accordingly,
Taylor has not shown deficient performance. The district court therefore
did not err in denying this claim.
             Taylor next argues that trial and appellate counsel should have
investigated and challenged evidence during the penalty phase as to
Taylor's charge for a 2001 murder in Pomona, California, that was
dismissed without explanation. Taylor argues that investigation would
have revealed that another suspect was culpable. Taylor, however,
disregards that there were two suspect shooters in the 2001 drive-by
shooting—proffering a second suspect would not preclude Taylor's
participation. Taylor has not shown deficient performance by trial counsel,
who argued strenuously that this evidence was impalpable and highly


                                     8
suspect. Further, he has not shown prejudice regarding trial counsel's
performance, as evidence of a second suspect would not itself render the
Pomona inurder evidence impalpable or highly suspect. See Nunnery v.
State, 
127 Nev. 749, 769
, 
263 P.3d 235, 249
 (2011) ("[Evidence of uncharged
crimes] is relevant because a sentencing determination should be based on
the entirety of a defendant's character, record, and the circumstances of the
offense, but it may be excluded from a capital penalty hearing if it is
impalpable or highly suspect." (internal citation and quotation marks
omitted)). And Taylor has not shown deficient performance or prejudice
regarding appellate counsel's omission, as an appellate claim lacked merit
where the jury considered other evidence, including victim-impact
testimony, Taylor's prior convictions, and evidence of Taylor's past domestic
violence, such that his sentence did not rest solely on the Pomona murder.
See Denson v. State, 
112 Nev. 489, 492
, 
915 P.2d 284, 286
 (1996) (reversing
"a sentence if it is supported solely by impalpable and highly suspect
evidence" (emphasis original)). The district court therefore did not err in
denying this claim.
            Taylor next argues that trial and appellate counsel should have
challenged prospective juror 121 for cause because she was unwilling to
consider all possible punishments in a penalty phase. While prospective
juror 121 stated that she believed that murder warranted "the ultirnate
punishment," she assented that she would consider all possible
punishments and follow the court's instructions. Taylor accordingly has
shown neither deficient performance nor prejudice regarding trial counsel's
omitting a meritless challenge for cause on this basis. See Leonard v. State,
117 Nev. 53, 65
, 
17 P.3d 397, 405
 (2001) (providing that a prospective juror
should be removed for cause if her "views would prevent or substantially


                                     9
impair the performance of [her] duties as a juror in accordance with [her]
instructions and [her] oath" (internal quotation marks omitted)). Further,
Taylor has not shown that an appellate claim on this basis had merit and
thus has not shown deficient performance or prejudice in that regard. Cf.
Blake v. State, 
121 Nev. 779, 796
, 
121 P.3d 567, 578
 (2005) (recognizing that
the right to an impartial jury is not violated unless a juror empaneled was
unfair or biased). The district court therefore did not err in denying this
clai tu.
                   Taylor next argues that Carpenter v. United States, 
138 S. Ct. 2206
 (2018), applies retroactively and that the seizure of his cell site
location information without a warrant violated the Fourth Amendment.4
Carpenter was decided after Taylor's conviction became final, and Taylor
argues that it clarified existing law, rather than announcing a new rule of
constitutional procedure. We disagree. Carpenter announced a new rule,
as it overruled a line of authority permitting warrantless seizure of cell site
data under certain circumstances. See United States v. Carpenter, 
819 F.3d 880, 887
 (2016) (citing circuit court decisions declining to apply Fourth
Amendment protections to cell site rnetadata), rev'd, 
138 S. Ct. 2206
; United
States v. Yang, 
958 F.3d 851, 864
 (9th Cir. 2020) (Bea, J., concurring in the
judgment) (recognizing that Carpenter set forth a new rule); United States
v. Goldstein, 
914 F.3d 200, 201-02
 (3d Cir. 2019) (same); see also Bejarano
v. State, 
122 Nev. 1066, 1075
, 
146 P.3d 265, 272
 (2006) ("[A] rule is new
when it overrules precedent, disapproves a practice sanctioned by prior
cases, or overturns a longstanding practice uniformly approved by lower


            Carpenter decision was entered after Taylor's conviction had
           -iThe
become final, and thus, his claim based on Carpenter could not have been
raised on direct appeal. See NRS 34.810(1)(b), (3).


                                           10
                    courts."). And as Carpenter's extension of the warrant requirement to cell
                    site location data did not "establish that it is unconstitutional to proscribe
                    certain conduct as criminal or to impose a type of punishment on certain
                    defendants because of their status or offense or "establish a procedure
                    without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously
                    diminished," it does not apply retroactively. See Bejarano, 
122 Nev. at 1074
-
                    75, 
146 P.3d at 271
. The district court therefore did not err in denying this
                    claim.
                                Taylor next argues that trial and appellate counsel should have
                    challenged the constitutionality of the legislative processes leading to the
                    codification of the Nevada Revised Statutes. He argues that the 1951
                    statute that created a statute revision commission to revise and coinpile
                    Nevada's laws—of which Supreme Court justices would be three members—
                    violated a constitutional provision barring justices from holding another
                    nonjudicial office. He also argues that this deprived the trial court of subject
                    matter jurisdiction and violated the separation of powers. Taylor has not
                    demonstrated deficient performance or prejudice because Taylor did not
                    show that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. See Nev. Const.
                    art. 6 § 6; NRS 171.010. Taylor further did not show that justices of the
                    Nevada Supreme Court violated the constitution by serving in a nonjudicial
                    public office because he did not show that participating in the commission
                    "[i]nvolve[d) the continuous exercise, as part of the regular and permanent
                    administration of the governinent, of a public power, trust or duty." Nev.
                    Const. Art. 6, § 11; NRS 281.005(1) (defining "Public officee); 1963 Nev.
                    Stat., ch. 403, preface, at 1011 (providing that the act serves to abolish the
                    statute revision commission and to assign its duties to the Legislative
                    Counsel Bureau). Moreover, the Legislature enacts the actual laws of

SURFtETAE COURT
       OF
   NEVADA
                                                          11
  84,11A    AWOL,
Nevada, while the Legislative Counsel Bureau—which succeeded the
statute revision commission—codifies and classifies those laws as the
Nevada Revised Statutes, grouping laws of similar subject matter together
in a logical order, but not itself exercising the legislative function. See NRS
220.110; NRS 220.120(3); NRS 220.170(3); 1963 Nev. Stat., ch. 403, preface,
at 1011. Taylor accordingly has not shown that the statute revision
commission improperly encroached upon the powers of another branch of
government, violating the separation of powers. See Comm'n on Ethics v.
 frardy, 
125 Nev. 285, 291-92
, 
212 P.3d 1098, 1103
 (2009) (The purpose of
the separation of powers doctrine is to prevent one branch of government
from encroaching on the powers of another branch."). The district court
therefore did not err in denying this claim.
            Lastly, Taylor argues cumulative error. Even assuming that
multiple deficiencies in counsel's performance may be cumulated to
demonstrate prejudice in a postconviction context, see McConnell v. State,
125 Nev. 243, 259
, 
212 P.3d 307, 318
 (2009), Taylor has not demonstrated
multiple instances of deficient performance to cumulate.
            Having considered Taylor's contentions and concluded that
they do not warrant relief, we
            ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.



                         Parraguirre


                           , J.                                        , J.
Hardesty                                    Cadish




                                       12
cc:   Hon. William D. Kephart, District Judge
      Gaffney Law
      Attorney General/Carson City
      Clark County District Attorney
      Eighth District Court Clerk




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