¶1dissenting.
¶2Appellant, whose entire defense was that he was insane at the time of the crime, was not permitted to introduce into evidence a statement which tended to prove his insanity. This statement, made to a psychologist who was treating appellant, revealed appellant’s belief that his wife and friends had been under the control of the victim. The majority holds that the trial court did not err in excluding this evidence as too remote. I cannot agree.
¶3Statements made by the accused may reveal his mental condition. J. McCormick, Evidence § 249, at 593 (2d ed. 1972). Statements made by the accused before or after *21the crime are relevant to the issue of insanity at the time of the crime. Id. at 592-93, 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 233 (3d ed. 1940). Professor Wigmore reasons:
“A condition of mental disease is always a more or less continuous one, either in latent tendency or in manifest operation. It is therefore proper, in order to ascertain the fact of its existence at a certain time, to consider its existence at a prior or subsequent time.”
¶42 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 233, at 25 (3d ed. 1940).
¶5The trial court may exclude such evidence if it is too remote to the issue whether the accused was insane at the time of the crime. 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 233 (3d ed. 1940). In the exercise of this discretion, however, the court must be guided by the principle that broad latitude must be given to allow presentation of evidence which may have a bearing on the sanity of the accused. As Judge (now Mr. Justice) Blackmun stated in Pope v. United States, 372 F.2d 710, 736 (8th Cir. 1967): “[W]e expect a trial judge, in a case involving criminal responsibility, to be free in his admission of all possibly relevant evidence . . ..” Accord, United States v. Hartfield, 513 F.2d 254 (9th Cir. 1975) ; United States v. Brawner, 153 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 471 F.2d 969 (1972). This principle must be carefully observed when the evidence is offered by the accused, as the accused must not be deprived of the right to present relevant evidence. See generally Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973); Commonwealth v. Boyle, 470 Pa. 343, 368 A.2d 661 (1977).
¶6While being treated for his mental condition, appellant told his psychologist that he believed the victim was controlling his wife and friends. From this statement, a clear inference arises that this was appellant’s belief at the time of the crime. I believe that the trial court erred in excluding this statement, made eighteen months after the killing, as too remote. Cf. Robinson v. United States, 144 F.2d 392 (6th Cir. 1944), aff’d, 324 U.S. 282, *2265 S.Ct. 666, 89 L.Ed. 944 (1945) (letter written by the accused nearly two years after crime was properly admitted when sanity was at issue.) Remoteness is not simply a question of how long after the crime the statement was made. Rather, remoteness involves a determination whether various factors make the probative value of the evidence to the issue of the accused’s insanity at the time of the crime unduly speculative. Not only the lapse of time between the crime and the statement must be considered, but also the nature of the evidence offered and the possible effect of intervening events. Here, the excluded statement dealt with appellant’s beliefs concerning the circumstances existing at the time of the crime, and his reasons for committing the crime. This evidence bears a close relation to appellant’s state of mind when he killed the victim, and there is little reason to fear that appellant’s beliefs reflect events which occurred after the killing, rather than his state of mind at the time of the killing.
¶7Moreover, appellant’s statement was offered as part of the testimony of his psychologist. The psychologist’s ability to explain the relevance of the statement to the issue of appellant’s insanity at the time of the crime removes any danger that the relation between the evidence offered and the issue of insanity was too remote or speculative.
¶8It was particularly important to appellant that this evidence be admitted at trial, as appellant exercised his privilege against self-incrimination and thus did not testi*23fy at trial as to his state of mind at the time of the killing. Because of the close relation appellant’s belief that the victim was controlling his wife bears on his state of mind when he killed the victim, the admission of other evidence of insanity does not render this evidence cumulative.
¶9Nor can I conclude that, because the psychologist who relied on appellant’s statement was allowed to testify as to appellant’s sanity, it was harmless error to exclude this statement. That we allow the jury to reject the conclusions of this expert makes plain the need to have him explain the basis of his opinion :
“The chief value of an expert’s testimony in this field . . . rests upon the material from which his opinion is fashioned and the reasoning by which he progresses from his material to his conclusion; ... it does not lie in his mere expression of conclusion.”
¶10Carter v. United States, 102 U.S.App.D.C. 227, 252 F.2d 608, 617 (1957); see United States v. Smith, 507 F.2d 710 (4th Cir. 1974). Precisely because appellant’s statement formed the basis for the opinion of this expert, it was important that this statement be admitted into evidence. Unless the psychologist was allowed to testify about this evidence, and explain why it indicated that appellant was insane, appellant had little hope of persuading the jury to adopt the conclusions of this expert.
¶11For these reasons, I cannot agree with the majority that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence relevant to the issue of insanity, appellant’s only defense. I dissent and would grant appellant a new trial.
¶12. Several other statements made by the appellant were also excluded as too remote. These included statements concerning appellant’s preoccupation that others were trying to kill him, and two letters sent by appellant to a psychiatrist. Because I believe it was reversible error to exclude appellant’s statement that the victim was controlling his wife and friends, it is unnecessary to decide whether the exclusion of any of these statements also requires that a new trial be granted.
¶13. Indeed, if appellant had explicitly stated that this was his belief at the time of the crime, there would be no remoteness problem at all. Instead, the question would be whether this statement, dealing with appellant’s past state of mind, was admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule. See generally Meany v. United States, 112 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1941) (per Hand, J.) (hearsay exception for statements made to treating physician includes statements relating to past condition); Fed.R.Evid. 803(4); J. McCormick, Evidence § 292 (2d ed. 1972).
¶14dissenting.
¶15Because the majority erroneously decides two of the issues presented by appellant in this appeal — each of which entitles him to a new trial — I dissent.
¶16*24Initially, the majority concludes that the trial court committed no abuse of discretion when it refused to allow questioning of prospective jurors as to their views of a criminal defendant’s constitutional right not to testify in his own behalf and of the prosecution’s burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. I disagree. As the majority correctly notes, we seek jurors whose minds are “. . . sufficiently conscious of [their] sworn responsibilit [ies] and [who are] willing to attempt to reach a decision solely on the facts presented, assiduously avoiding the influences of irrelevant factors.” (At p. 1296 quoting from Commonwealth v. Johnson, 452 Pa. 130, 136, 305 A.2d 5, 8 (1973)). The majority, acknowledging that it would be impermissible to seat a juror who believed that the accused should be required to testify on his own defense, then states, “[t]here is not a scintilla of evidence in this record to suggest that any of the jurors harbored a reservation [as to the defendant’s right to remain silent] that would prevent the discharging of their duty in accordance with their oath.” Of course there is no evidence! The trial court refused to allow defense counsel to ask any questions which might have uncovered the existence of any such “reservations.” That refusal was an abuse of discretion, and on that basis appellant should be given a new trial.
¶17The voir dire examination should be conducted in a manner calculated “. . . to discover the state of mind of the juror with respect to the matter at hand or any collateral matter reasonably liable to unduly influence him . . .” 47 Am.Jur.2d, Jury, § 201. See generally, 47 Am.Jur.2d, Jury, §§ 195, 200, 201.
¶18For these reasons, the courts have held that racial, religious, economic, social, or political prejudice of prospective jurors are proper subjects of inquiry on voir dire examination in criminal cases. See generally, Annotation, 54 A.L.R.2d 1204, and cases cited therein. Likewise, beliefs regarding the death penalty are proper subjects of *25inquiry in capital cases. See Annotation, 48 A.L.R.2d 560, and cases cited therein.
¶19The allocation of the burden of proof in criminal cases and the right of an accused to remain silent in the face of criminal charges are two of the most misunderstood concepts in the criminal law. Being untrained in the law, jurors not only have difficulty comprehending these principles, but often come to the jury selection process saddled with misconceptions as to what these concepts mean. See e. g., Commonwealth v. Rolison, 473 Pa. 261, 374 A.2d 509, (filed June 3, 1977) (dissenting opinion of Manderino, J.). The record in Rolisonrevealed that a substantial percentage of the prospective jurors questioned as to their understanding of these fundamental concepts were unable to lay aside their misconceptions about them and accept the instructions of the trial judge as to their proper application to the case. Certainly, those whose beliefs are at odds with these principles would properly be challenged for cause, and the refusal to grant such a challenge would be an abuse of discretion and reversible error. But a challenge for cause cannot be made if there is no opportunity to discover the prospective juror’s fixed misconception. Furthermore, allowing questions such as those requested here would give defense counsel the opportunity to obtain the information necessary for an intelligent exercise of the right of peremptory challenge. The numerous peremptory challenges that a criminal defendant is allowed are of little practical value if counsel is unable to obtain sufficient knowledge about the prospective jurors to enable an intelligent exercise of those challenges. See, ABA Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Trial by Jury, Approved Draft, 1968, § 2.4:
“A voir dire examination should be conducted for the purpose of discovering bases for challenge for cause and for the purpose of gaining knowledge to enable intelligent exercise of peremptory challenges.” (emphasis added).
¶20*26Secondly, I would reverse appellant’s judgment of sentence and grant a new trial because the trial court should have' granted appellant’s request that the jury be instructed on the elements of the crime of voluntary manslaughter. See Commonwealth v. Hilliard, 471 Pa. 318, 370 A.2d 322 (1977) (opinion by Roberts, J.) and Commonwealth v. Cain, 471 Pa. 140, 369 A.2d 1234 (1977) (opinion in support of reversal by Roberts, J. and opinion in support of reversal by Manderino, J.).