¶1concurring and dissenting.
¶2I concur on the ground that Firemen’s promise to pay “all interest accruing after the entry of judgment” in its context is ambiguous. As such it is construable against the insurer and can readily mean all interest due and owing after the entry of judgment. A strict interpretation that the phrase means interest only on the judgment produces the undesirable conclusion that procrastination by the insurer after the *541verdict and payment prior to judgment enables it to have the use of the money without any payment of interest.
¶3The judgment included interest on the verdict and, to the extent of that interest and the interest due thereafter, it is all accruable in the sense of being owed after the entry of judgment. I see no need in this case to conclude that Hafer v. Schauer, 429 Pa. 289, 239 A.2d 785 (1968) was wrongly decided. As the majority opinion points out, it dealt with the situation where no judgment had ever been entered.
¶4I dissent from the holding that Medical Protective is liable for any interest. It made no promise to pay any interest and, in the context of its stated obligation, I do not agree that by interpretation “interest” should be equated with “costs.”