¶1concurring and dissenting.
¶2To my knowledge this is the first instance in the history of American jurisprudence where the concept of protecting the rights of an accused has been so distorted as to result in the award of a new trial because a directed verdict of not guilty of one of the charges was entered. If the fallacy of their logic is not readily apparent from the absurdity of the result reached in this case, any further attempt to persuade the *563majority to reconsider its position would obviously be an exercise in futility. See generally my dissent in Commonwealth v. Garcia, 474 Pa. 449, 378 A.2d 1199.
¶3I would affirm the judgment of sentence for both the weapons offense convictions and the voluntary manslaughter conviction.
¶4Today’s result grants an appellant a new trial because the trial judge directed the jury to find the accused not guilty of the crime of involuntary manslaughter. I can think of no better illustration of the absurd results that we may continue to expect if the majority persists in the present course as to when a charge for involuntary manslaughter is required. See generally Commonwealth v. Garcia, 474 Pa. 449, 378 A.2d 1199 (1977) (Dissenting Opinion, Nix, J.).