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479 So. 2d 146

479 So.2d 146

10 Fla.L.Weekly 2435

Docket No. 85-4.

Bowling v. State

Everett Lee BOWLING, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Decided October 31, 1985.

Rehearing Denied December 9, 1985.

District Court of Appeal of Florida · decided 1985-10-31

Cited by 7 later decisions — most recently May 1998

7 state decisions

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“The damages were the result of the theft as they resulted directly from petitioner's actions which were necessary to perpetrate his crime. The hole in the boat's bottom resulted from a seat being removed from the boat, and all the wires were cut in order to facilitate the theft of engine parts. These actions were undertaken so that items could be stolen and were necessary for the theft to occur. Without these acts of destruction, some items simply could not have been stolen. It is not necessary that the offense charged describe the damage done in order to support a restitution order but only that the damage bear a significant relationship to the convicted offense.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including 505 So. 2d 478 - Williams v. State

Relies on Gulfstream Park Rac. Ass'n v. Dept. of Bus. Reg. · 444 So. 2d 407 - Marty v. State · 347 So. 2d 1021 - Fresneda v. State

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1985-10-31

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Lucinda H. Young, Asst. Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for appellant.

¶2*147 Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Margene A. Roper, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellee.

¶3COWART, Judge.

¶4This case involves the question of whether restitution for injuries may be imposed as a condition of probation where the injuries were not directly related to the offense for which probation was ordered.

¶5Appellant was involved in an automobile accident and charged with two counts of failure by one involved in an accident to stop and render aid to an injured person. (§§ 316.062(1), 316.027(1) and (2), Fla. Stat.) As a result of plea negotiations, appellant pled no contest to one count of failure by one involved in an accident to stop and render aid to an injured person, and was subsequently placed on probation. As a condition of probation, probationer was ordered to make restitution for the injuries sustained by the persons in the accident. On appeal he asserts that the restitution condition was improper because the injuries were not directly related to the offense for which he was placed on probation as one may be guilty of failing to stop and render aid to an injured person even though that person did not cause the injury.

¶6In J.S.H. v. State,472 So.2d 737 (Fla. 1985), the supreme court held that the damage for which restitution is ordered must bear a significant relationship to the convicted offense, but need not be a necessary element of the offense. This court has likewise held that conditions of probation involving restitution are not limited to damage or loss having a direct relationship to the offense which results in probation. See Roberts v. State,467 So.2d 439 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985); Rose v. State,434 So.2d 1014 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983), rev. den.444 So.2d 418 (Fla. 1984); M.A.R. v. State,433 So.2d 29 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983), rev. den.441 So.2d 632 (Fla. 1983). In this case, there was no question that the probationer caused the accident and injuries as a result of his reckless driving. Cf. Fresneda v. State,347 So.2d 1021 (Fla. 1977) (where the record did not clearly establish that defendant's car caused the injuries).

¶7AFFIRMED.

¶8DAUKSCH and SHARP, JJ., concur.

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