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48 Cal. 436

People v. Freel

California Supreme Court

Decided July 1, 1874

California Supreme Court · decided 1874-07-01

The defendant was indicted for the crime of murder, alleged to have been committed at San Francisco, on the first day of November, 1873, by killing one Edward W. Allen. Allen kept a saloon, and a crowd of persons having collected there so as to obstruct his doorway, he went from his place behind the bar with a cane or stick to clear the passage-way. A difficulty took place, during which he was killed.

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“although the intent to kill exists, it is not that deliberate and malicious intent which is an essential element in the crime of murder.”

quoted by 2 later decisions, including 23 Cal. 4th 101 - People v. Lasko, 28 Cal. 2d 121 - People v. Valentine

“`the unintentional result of a sudden heat of passion, or of an unlawful act committed without due caution or circumspection.'”

quoted by 1 later decision, including 23 Cal. 4th 101 - People v. Lasko

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1874-07-01

How this case has been cited

Cited by 28 later decisions — most recently June 2013 · most notably 28 Cal. 2d 121 - People v. Valentine (1946), 23 Cal. 4th 101 - People v. Lasko (2000)

22 state decisions

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Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

By the Court, Niles, J.:

¶1The Court instructed the jury as follows: “ You will also observe that the difference between murder and manslaughter is, that in manslaughter there is no intention whatever either to kill or to do bodily harm. The killing is the unintentional result of a sudden heat of passion, or of an unlawful act committed without due caution or circumspection.”

¶2This is clearly erroneous. Whether the homicide amounts to murder or to manslaughter merely, does not depend upon the presence or absence of the intent to kill. In either case there may be a present intention to kill at the moment of the commission of the act. But when the mortal blow is struck in the heat of passion, excited by a quarrel, sudden, and of sufficient violence to amount to adequate provocation, the law, out of forbearance for the weakness of human nature, will disregard the actual intent and will reduce the offense to manslaughter. In such case, although the intent to kill exists, it is not that deliberate and malicious intent which is an essential element in the crime of murder.

¶3Under the circumstances of this case, as shown by the testimony, it was important that the distinctions between the several grades of homicide should be correctly stated to the jury. They could hardly fail to be misled by the erroneous instruction we have noticed.

¶4Several other points were made by the counsel for defendant, which we do riot deem it necessary to discuss.

¶5Judgment and order reversed, and cause remanded for a new trial.

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