Volume 48 — Federal Reporter

<p>At Law. Motion to set aside service of process.</p>

<p>Removal oe Cause — Paeties—Cancellation oe Judgments.</p> <p>When a judgment is recovered by a bank against an independent school-district, and the latter issues orders for the payment thereof, which orders the bank transfers to a third person, the transferee claiming to be the owner, the bank, as well as the transferee, is a proper party defendant to a bill to cancel the judgments, and, when a resident of the same state with the plaintiff, the cause is not removar ble to the federal courts.</p>

<p>In Equity. Motion to remand.</p>

In Equity. Bill by Morgan and others, as assignees of certain heirs at law of Eilev Garrett, to restrain II. H. Huggins, his administrator, from selling or otherwise disposing of the property of the estate, and praying an accounting. On exceptions to the report of the special master.

In Equity. This is a suit to settle a controversy as to the title to certain lands situated near Anacortes, in this state, arising out of the following facts: in the year 1878, the complainant, being then the owner of the lands, as .security for a loan of §2,000, gave a promissory note and a mortgage covering said lands, which were then within the county of Whatcom, and are now in the comity of Skagit. Said mortgage also included real estate situated in Thurston county.

<p>- In Equity. Suit by J. J. Robinson, trustee, to foreclose a trust-deed given by the Alabama & Georgia Manufacturing Company to secure certain bonds.</p>

<p>In Equity. Bill to foreclose railroad mortgage. On petition of intervention-.</p>

In Equity. Suit to recover the second assessment upon the stock of the National Express & Transportation Company. As to the suits for the first assessment, see 23 Fed. Rep. 695, and 24 Fed. Rep. 536. On motion for new trial.

Suit by Regina Jafitee and Helena Jafiee against Annie W. Jacobson and others for the speciüe performance of a contract made by her husband, Eugene P. Jacobson. Bill dismissed. Statement by Tiiayek, J. In this case the circuit court for the district of Colorado sustained a general demurrer both to an original and amended bill of complaint, and subsequently dismissed the cause, complainants having declined to plead further.

In Equity. Bill by the Merchants’ & Farmers’ Bank against Richard W. Austin, as receiver of the First National Bank of Sheffield, and others, to recover the proceeds of a draft collected by the latter bank for the former. Heard on submission for final decree.

<p>Receiver or Railroad Compart — Purchase op Hollino Stock.</p> <p>Where the property of a railroad company is placed in the hands of a receiver, and rolling stock is found on the railroad, placed there by another corporation, the principal stockholders in which are also controlling stockholders in the railroad company, and the rolling stock is claimed by the corporation placing the same on the road, and no contract of sale is shown, held, that the receiver should be authorized to purchase the same and pay the value of the rolling stock when the property went into the receiver’s hands.</p>

<p>1. Action to Set Asimi Dbiid — Want op Equity-Demurrer.</p> <p>A bill to compel defendants to roconvey to plaintiff land whicli formerly belonged to him Is not demurrable for want of equity from the mere fact' that it shows that plaintiff conveyed the land to 0., who then conveyed to defendants, where plaintiff seeks relief on the ground that defendants secretly employed and paid C. to purchase the land, knowing at the time that he was plaintiff’s agent to sell, and that plaintiff relied on him for information and advice as to the value of the land.</p> <p>2. Same — False Representations.</p> <p>The hill alleged that the land was of great value for the phosphate therein; that, defendants stated to G. that they did not want to buy the land for phosphate purposes, which statement G. repeated to plaintiff; and that defendants knew this statement was not true, but their object in making it was to deceive plaintiff as to the trne value of the land. Meld, that these allegations are sufficient, as against a demurrer, to show that defendants know of C.’s statements to plaintiff, and caused them to he made.</p> <p>8. Same — Diligence in Bringing Suit.</p> <p>There is no lack of diligence shown on plaintiff’s part when the bill alleges that those transact ions did not come to his knowledge until October, and the suit is brought in November.</p> <p>4. Same — Tender—Excusing Failure.</p> <p>Failure to allege tender of the purchase money before suit is not fatal to such bill, where it does allege that tender was not made because plaintiff believed it would be unavailing, and that he is ready to repay the money with interest upon the execution of a deed to him by defendants.</p> <p>5. Parties — Nox-Joinmu—Inhabitants op Another District.</p> <p>The bill is not demurrable for non-joinder of the agent, C., who is a resident of a different district from defendants. .Rev. St. § 787, provides that non-joinder of parties who are not inhabitants of nor found within the district shall not constitute matter of abatement, though the judgment rendered shall not conclude them, and Equity Rule 47 authorizes the court to proceed, without parties, otherwise necessary, who cannot be joined because they are out of the jurisdiction of the court.</p>

<p>At Law. On motion to set aside service of the summons.</p>

<p>At Law. Action for trespass on land..</p>

<p>Assignee.</p> <p>Tinder the act of 1887, (24 St. SOS,) the assignee of a claim against the United States may sue thereon in his own name.</p> <p> (,Syllabus by the Court.) </p>

<p>At Law. In the matter of the suggestion of counsel for D. H. Chamberlain, receiver, against James F. Hart, Esq.</p>

At Law. These actions wore submitted to the court together, without the intervention of a jury, upon an agreed state of facts.

<p>1. Carriers — Interstate Commerce Law — Lone and Short Hauls — Joint Tariff Rates.</p> <p>A railroad company eannot justify itself in charging a greater compensation for a shorter than for a longer haul, under substantially similar conditions, contrary to the provisions of the interstate commerce law, (Act (long. Feb. 4,1887, § 4,) oh the ground that the rate is fixed by a joint tariff agreement with other roads.</p> <p>2. Same — Computation of Rates.</p> <p>Nor can it do so because the result comes about by reason of the selection of different points on the line as a basis for computing ral es, so as to charge one rate over one part of the road and a different rate over another part.</p> <p>3. Same — Powers of Commission.</p> <p>Under the interstate commerce law the power of determining whether a railroad company is relieved from the operation of the long and short haul clause lies solely with the interstate commerce commission; and in an action for damages in a federal oov.it t'or a violation of that clause, when no authority from the commission is shown, the company cannot claim that it was justified in so doing by reason of the existence of a secret cut rate among competing roads, whereby a large part of the traffic naturally tributary to it was diverted.</p> <p>4. Same — “Similar Circumstances and Conditions” — Province of Jury.</p> <p>Whether the “circumstances and conditions” under which a railroad company has charged a greater compensation for a shorter than for a longer haul over the same line were “substantially similar, ” within tho moaning of the fourth section of the interstate commerce law, is a question for the jury.</p> <p>5. Same — Measure of Damages.</p> <p>In an action by a shipper against a railroad company for charging a greater compensation for a shorter than for a longer haul, in violation of section 4 of the interstate commerce law, the measure of damages is the excess in the rate charged for the shorter haul over that for the longer haul, multiplied by the number of hundred pounds shipped by the plaintiff.</p> <p>6. Same — Damacf,s—Who Liarle — Action of Tost.</p> <p>As the right of action given by the law is one for damages, as for a tort, anyrail-road company which makes the overcharge is liable for the full amount of tho damages, notwithstanding that it has shared the illegal freight with another road under a joint tari.fi agreement.</p> <p>7. Same — Interest—-Pnovnsrcii oj? Jtjbt.</p> <p>It is the province of the jury, under the act, to determine whether interest shall be allowed on the amount of the overcharge which they have found.</p>

Action by Mary A. Wilson against the'Atchison, Topelra & Santa Fe Railroad Company for the death of her husband, a section hand in defendant’s employ. There was judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error.

<p>1. Master and Servant — Defective Structure — Sufítcienoy cm Evidence.</p> <p>Ia making a railroad fill, a trestle was built beyond the end of the fill to carry out the dirt-cars for dumping, each car containing a cubic yard of dirt. The trestle was made of bents, consisting of two poles with a cross-piece spiked to the top, the feet being held together by cross-bi-acing. Six bents, varying from 21 to 24 feet high, had been erected beyond the end of the dump, and stringers had been run across the first 5, but were not secured unless by a small rope tied round the cap. The tops of the bents inclined slightly towards the fill, and they were not braced against each other, or supported longitudinally in any way. Under the direction of the foreman, plaintiff and others were engaged in running out a stringer, which was 32 feet long, to reach the last bent, which was about 26 feet away, and just as they lowered thé end of it onto the cap the whole structure fell, injuring plaintiff. Several civil engineers testified that such a structure was unsafe. Held, sufficient evidence to warrant the jury in finding that the structure was not built with a due regard to the safety of those working upon it.</p> <p>2. Same — Vice-Principal—Foreman of Railway Construction.</p> <p>A foreman who is in charge of a gang of workmen engaged in construction work on a railroad, with full power to hire and discharge men arid direct them when and whore and how to work, is a vice-principal, notwithstanding that he occasionally lends a hand in the actual manual labor.</p> <p>8. Res Adjudicata — Dismissal after Pi.aintiee Rests.</p> <p>St. Minu. c. 66, § 262, subd. 3, provides that a civil action maybe dismissed by the court without a final determination on the merits, “where, upon the trial and before final submission of the case, the plaintiff ® * * fails to substantiate or establish his claim or cause of action, ” etc. Held, that, under the decisions of the state courts as shown in Cramer v. Christian, 34 Minn. 397, 26 N. W. Rep. 8; Andrews v. FchoolrDUt., 35 Minn. 70, 27 N. W. Rep. 303; and Conrad v. Bauldwvn, 44 Minn. 406, 46 N. W. Rep. 850, — a dismissal on defendant’s motion, after plaintiff has rested, on the ground that he has failed to establish a cause of action, is not a judgment on the merits such as will prevent the bringing of a new suit.</p> <p>Hallett, J., dissenting.</p>

This is a motion to strike the bill of exceptions from the record for the alleged reason that it was not filed in time to become a part of the record. The case appears to have been tried at the January term, 1891, of the circuit court for the third division of the district of Minnesota. 44 Fed. Rep. 855. The verdict was returned on February 11, 1891, and on the same day judgment was entered on the verdict according to the usual practice in that district.

<p>1. Circuit Court or Appeals — Habeas Corpus — Extraterritorial Jurisdiction.</p> <p>A circuit court of appeals has no jurisdiction, in the absence of a statute expressly authorizing it, to award a writ of habeas corpus to be served outside of tho circuit for which it sits, to secure the releaso of a person there held in custody.</p> <p>• 2. Same — Appellate Jurisdiction — Territorial District Courts.</p> <p>The court is not authorized to award such writ on the ground that its appellate jurisdiction is invoked therein to revise the decision of the district court of a territory within its circuit under whoso process petitioner was confined; for by section 15, Act Cong. March 3,1891, creating the circuit courts of appeals, their appellate jurisdiction over territorial courts is limited to the supreme courts of tho territories.</p>

On Habeas Corpus to release R. II. Conway from imprisonment under a warrant issued by a justice of the peace for obstructing a highway.

At Law. At the October term of the United States circuit court for the northern district of Georgia, the grand jury returned an indictment under sections 6508, 5509, Ilev. St. IT. S., against the above-named defendants, for conspiring to injure and oppress a citizen of the United States in the exercise of civil rights, and for murder of said citizen.

<p>In Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern Judicial District of Missouri.</p> <p>Action against S. C. Edgar to recover the penalty prescribed by Act Cong. Feb. 26, 1885, § 3, (23 U. S. St. 332,) for aiding in the importation of alien laborers under contract. A demurrer to the petition wa*s sustained, and a judgment entered for defendant.</p> <p>Statement. This is an action instituted in the court below by the plaintiff in error against defendant in error for an alleged violation of what is commonly called the “Alien Contract Labor Law,” by assisting and encouraging the migration and importation of two aliens and foreigners, Isaac Boyce and Fred Dorosalski, into the United States from Bristol, England, to Philadelphia, in the United States, by prepaying their transportation, they being then under contract and agreement; to perform labor or service for said defendant in error in the United States. The petition is in two counts, stating and reciting all of the facts, and each count asks judgment for the statutory penalty of §1,000. The counts are the same, except as to the name of the alien imported, and the alleged contract is contained in fV; two letters and the acts done in pursuance of them, as set out in iff; two counts. The letters were transmitted and received by mail, as addressed, the first to the manager or agent of the defendant in error, who delivered it to the latter, who thereupon answered it. The letters are as follows :</p> <p>“Ho. 16 Aiken St., Barton I-Iill, Bristol, April 11, 1890.</p> <p>“From Mr. I. Boyce to Mr. Gray, the Manager — Dear Sir; I have heard that you are in wont of men to work on the spilter furnaces. I and one of my fellow-workmen would like to come out hear, as the works hear is very slack; if it would be convenient for you to send us a pass each, we would come out as soon as possible. IVe iiave both worked in the spelter works for many years. Would you oblige us by writing back to let us now, and oblige, [Signed] “I. Boyse,</p> <p>“No. 16 Aiken street, Barton Hill, Bristol, England.</p> <p>“The name of my fellow-workman, Fred Dorosalski.”</p> <p>“[S. C. Edgar, Lessee Glendale Zinc-Works, Manufacturers and Iteiiners of Spelter.]</p> <p>“South St. Louis, 1st July, 1890.</p> <p>“J. Boyse, No. 16 Aiken Street, Barton Hill, Bristol, England — Dear Sir: Your letter of April 11th has just been'handed me, and I have this day bought two tickets for you and Fred Dorosalski from St. Louis agent of American line, and all you have todo is to take .this letter to Iticardson, Spence & Co., No. 17 Water street, Liverpool, and get tickets through to St. Louis. We can give you steady work, and have places for about six or eight more smelters if they want to come. I run fourteen Belgium furnaces. Tickets will not be good after July 18th. Yours, truly,</p> <p>[Signed] “S. C. Edgar.”</p> <p>The facts are that, immediately upon receipt of the latter letter, it was presented as therein directed, tickets received for passages to St. Louis, that were paid for by defendant in error, and the parties named thereupon took passage on a vessel from England for Philadelphia, intending to come to 8t. Louis and perform service and labor for defendant in error in pursuance of said contract. They arrived at Philadelphia on August 5th following the date of the latter letter, and the special agent of the treasury department and immigrant inspector, under the direction of the collector of customs there, examined into their condition, and found that they had been imported into the United States by the defendant in error in violation of said alien contract labor law as above set forth, and refused to permit them to land from said vessel, and they wore accordingly sent back to England. The defendant in error demurred to each count in the petition on the grounds that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action; that the correspondence did not constitute a contract; and the aliens did not land in the United States. The court sustained this demurrer, and the plaintiff in error declined to plead further, and final judgment was rendered for defendant in error.</p>

<p>1. Foiieigh Consuls — Effect of Revolution — Duty of Courts.</p> <p>A vice-consul oí a foreign nation, who possesses an unrevoked exequatur issued by the president of the United States, must still be recognized by the courts as the accredited representative of his country, entitled to all the privileges appertaining to that office, notwithstanding that the government which sent him has been overthrown, and an apparently successful revolutionary government established in its place.</p> <p>2. Same — Rights and Privileges — Exemption from Suepcena as Witness — Violation of Neutrality Laws.</p> <p>In a prosecution against private individuals for violating the neutrality laws of the United States hy fitting out a warlike vessel to aid a rebellion against a foi'-eign power, the vice-consul of that power cannot bo compelled by legal process to attend as a witness in behalf of the United States, when it appears that the insurgent party has been successful, and the government established by it has been recognized by the United States.</p>

<p>1. Neutsamty Laws — Furnishing Aiímk to Foreign INsukghst — “Fittiks oüt” Vessel.</p> <p>Rev. St. XT. S. § 5383, prescribing a punishment for any person who is in any way concerned in “furnishing, fitting out, or arming" any vessel with intent that she shall be employed in the service of any foreign state or people, to cruise or commit hostilities against any foreign state or people with whom the United States are at peace, does not cover the act of purchasing arms and munitions of war, and putting them on board a vessel sent to receive them, with intent that they shall be, carried to a party of insurgents in a foreign country, to bo used in carrying on war against the government thereof, but which are not designed to constitute any part of the fittings or furnishings of the vessel herself.</p> <p>2. Same — Setting ox Foot Expedition — What Constitutes.</p> <p>When a party of insurgents, already organized and carrying on war against the government of a foreign country, send a vessel to procure arms and ammunition in the United States, the act of pm-chasing such arms and ammunition, and placing them on board the vessel, is not within the scope of Rev. St. IX. S. § 5388. prescribing a punishment for every person who, within the limits or jurisdiction of the United States, begins or sets on foot, or provides or prepares the means for, any military expedition or enterprise, “to be carried on from thence. ”</p>

<p>Patents bob. Inventions — Combination—Oit.-Oaks.</p> <p>Letters palent lío. 216,306, issued June 17,1879, to M, C. Brown, for an improvement in cars, consisting in a division oí the car into two or more parts, some of which shall be constructed as tanks for carrying oil, while others are fitted for ordinary merchandise, the object being to carry such merchandise on the return trip, and thus obviate the necessity lor haul ng empty oil-cars for long distances, are void for want of patentable combination.</p>

<p>In Equity. Suit for infringement of patent.</p>

<p>In Admiralty. Suit to recover ship-brokers’ commissions.</p>

<p>In Admiralty. Libel in personam.</p>

<p>1. Carriers — Damage to Cargo — Unexplained Damage.</p> <p>Under the ordinary bill oí lading, tho burden being on the carrier to show that damage to cargo arises from an excepted peril, the carrier is liable when he has received cargo in good condition, and delivered it damaged, and is unable to explain how the damage occurred.</p> <p>2. Same — Peace op Deijverv — Tea Cargoes — Custom.</p> <p>Tea cargoes consigned to the ‘‘port of Hew York” are, by custom, discharged ou the Hew York side of the Bast river. Tt has also been customary, when there is difficulty in procuring a berth in Hew York, for the ship to give notice thereof to the consignees of the tea, that they may have opportunity of finding the ship a berth in How York. The ship Maseotto, with tea and other cargo, arrived in the port of Hew York and was entered at the custom-house at 10 o’clock Monday, and could havo begun to discharge 18 hours after. At half past 1 on Wednesday, no berth having been found for her in Hew York by her agents, she was sent to Brooklyn; two consignees of other parts of the cargo of same tea assenting thereto. Shortly aft-erwards her agents were notified of a berth in Hew York. Ho notice of her inability to find a berth in Hew York was given to the principal consignees of tho tea. Held, that the ship should bear the extra expense to the consignees of tea caused by transporting the cargo from Brooklyn to New York. The Port Adelaide, 88 Bed. Eep. 153.</p>

<p>Saiwa&k — Standi mí by Vessel Aorouxd.</p> <p>A steamer ran aground in 1lie East river, near- Hell Gato, early in the evening, during a douse fog. Her master signaled for liolp, and libelant’s tug went to her as - sistance, and lay by her all night, most of the tiriie pumping to keep down the water in her hold. No other tugs appeared during the night, though distress signals were occasionally sounded. It was important for the steamer to have aid at hand during the night, in case of emergency, and to keep down the water in her hold, in the morning, when the fog lifted, other tugs came, and all together took, the steamer off the rooks to a place of safety. The valuó of the steamer and her cargo was about @38,000. Yield, that the service of the tug was a salvage service, and she was allowed (the other claims being settled) an award of 8750.</p>

<p>Principal and Agent — Scope op Authority — Purchase Through Brokers.</p> <p>A Wilmington firm empowered certain New York brokers to purchase a cargo of “refuse salt” equal to a sample received from the latter, the cargo then being in transit from Canada. The purchase having been made, the sellers billed the article to the purchasers as “salt-cake, ” which is an entirely different article. The latter notified their brokers of the mistake, who presented the matter to the sellers. The latter assured them that the salt was like the sample, which representation they telegraphed to the purchasers. The cargo having arrived in New York, the purchasers requested the brokers to examine it, which the latter refused to do, becauss they were ignorant of the difference between the two articles. Thereupon the purchasers wrote them that the matter appeared to be straight, and ordered thorn to secure a boat, and forward the salt in it, which was done; but ou its arrival the article was found to be salt-cake, and the purchasers refused to receive it. Held, that the brokers acted within their authority, and an injury having resulted to the boat from the acids in the salt-cake, in consequence of the delay caused by the refusal to receive it, the purchasers were liable therefor, as well as for freight and demurrage.</p>

<p>Collision — Steam and Sail — Duty of Steameb.</p> <p>A steamer meeting a sloop on a river at night, where there is ample room, must presume that the latter will maintain its course, and must keep out of the way: and, if she attempts to pass so near as to cause apparent danger of collision, she is solely in fault, although the sloop, under stress of excitement, commits an error bv suddenly changing its course.</p>

<p>Moktgagee in Possession — Accountability pok Rents.</p> <p>■\V..i?pe a mortgagee in possession oí an undivided half interest in a milling property lorms a partnership with another to carry on the business, she will be charged, on an accounting in equity, with the fair rental value of the half interest, notwithstanding that the business resulted disastrously.</p>

<p>1. Federal and State Practice — Lis Pendens — Partition.</p> <p>Rev. St. Ohio, § 5035, providing that, “when the summons has been served or publication made, the action is pending, so as to charge third persons with notice of its pendency, and, while pending, no interest can be acquired by third persons in the subject-matter thereof as against plaintiff’s title,” is a rule of procedure, and Dot a rule of property, so as to be binding upon the federal courts in suits for partition brought in Ohio.</p> <p>8. Lis Pendens — Partition—Effect of Making New Parties.</p> <p>A suit for partition is lis pendens, from the time of serving the subpoena, as to ' all the interests in the lands as they shall be determined in the final decree; and the fact that new parties come in and establish a right to part of the interest claimed by the original complainants gives no ground of complaint to third persons who purchased after service of the subpoena, and before the new parties intervened.</p> <p>8. Partition — New Parties Defendant — Answers and Cross-Bills.</p> <p>When, in a suit for partition brought by persons out of possession claiming by heirship a certain interest in the lands, other persons claiming part of such interest are made parties defendant, these latter may set up their claim by way of answer, and cross-bills are unnecessary; therefore any cross-bills filed for this purpose will be considered as answers, and the defendants in possession are not entitled to service of subpoena issued thereon.</p> <p>4. Same — Compensation for Improvements — Cross-Bill—Following State Prac-</p> <p>tice.</p> <p>When, in a partition suit in a federal court, title to an interest in the lands is established by persons not in possession, and the defendants wish to claim compensation for improvements, such claim must be set up by cross-bill, although the state statutes prescribe a different practice, since the federal courts do not follow the state practice in suits in equity.</p> <p>5. Same — Decree—Reciting Findings.</p> <p>When, in a partition suit, persons not in possession have established title to a certain interest in the lands by proving heirship to a remote owner, the court may permit the findings as to their pedigree to be recited in the decree, when it deems such a course probably necessary to prevent further question as to the rights of the parties, notwithstanding that equity rule 86 declares that neither any part of the pleadings, “nor the report of any master, nor any prior proceedings shall be recited or stated in the decree. ”</p> <p>6. Equity Practice — Objections not Raised at Hearing — Waiver.</p> <p>In a partition suit, mere formal and technical objections to testimony will not be allowed as taken at the hearing, when in fact they were not then taken, but were first raised as to part thereof in a brief submitted after the hearing, and as to the remainder when the settlement of the decree was under discussion. All such objections will be considered as waived.</p>

<p>1. Kailkoad Mobtgages— Kokeolosubk —■ Sale fob Debt Due — Pbesekvation op IjIisn oe TInhatuked Rabí.</p> <p>In a proper case, a court of equity has the power so to mould its decree as to order a sale of mortgaged promises to satisfy that part of the mortgage debt which is due, and preserve the lien upon the mortgaged premises in the hands of the purchaser as to the unmalurod part of the debt.</p> <p>2. Same — Bonds—Collection of Coe eons — Remedies.</p> <p>Company A. negotiated its coupon bonds, secured by a mortgage upon its railroad, etc., each bond having an indorsement by Company P., binding it to purchase at maturity the bond and each interest coupon, at par, “ and, when so purchased, each and all of said bonds and coupons are to be held by the said company, with all the rights thereby given, and with all the benefit of every security therefor. ” Company P., having been obliged to purchase coupons, filed a bill before the maturity of the bonds. IIeld, that the contract of purchase is to be so construed as to per-serve to the bondholders their mortgage lion until Company P. shall have fully performed its obligations according to the tenor of its indorsement, and that in the mean time its remedies upon purchased coupons must be kept within such limits as will effect that object.</p> <p>8. Same.</p> <p>The equities of all the parties in interest being' best subserved by a sale of the railroad, etc., under and subject to the lien of the said mortgage as to" the principal of the bonds thereby secured, and the interest payable after the making of the sale, it was so decreed.</p>

<p>1. Attorney's Lien — Services Rendered in State Courts.</p> <p>In South Carolina an attorney’s lien is limited to his disbursements and the costs taxed; and therefore a federal court sitting in that state cannot declare a lien on the fruits of its judgment for services rendered in the state courts ¡in litigation concerning the samo subject-matter.</p> <p>2. Same — Nature and Extent — Services Rendered in Other Suits.</p> <p>An attorney’s lien upon the fruits of a suit is limited to the services rendered therein; and, although a number of separate suits involve the same questions, and are argued and determined together, the fruits of one are not subject to a lien for services rendered in the others.</p> <p>3. Same — Prospective Services.</p> <p>Nor will the lien extend to prospective services in the hearing of an appeal.</p> <p>i. Same — Rights op Several Attorneys.</p> <p>When several attorneys have rendered services for the complainant in a suit, they are equally entitled to a lien for compensation on the fruits of the judgment, and, if one of them has obtained an assignment of such fruits, his possession cannot be disturbed in favor of another.</p>

<p>t. Summons — Amendment to Conporm to Complaint.</p> <p>Under Mansf. Dig. Ark. § 5080, which by Act Cong. May 9,1890, § 81, was extended over the Indian Territory, it is proper to allow a summons to be amended by changing the name of the plaintiff therein from P. B. Jones to P. R. James, so as to conform to the complaint.</p> <p>2. Same — Sufficiency—Statement op Cause op Action.</p> <p>Under Mansf. Dig. Ark. § 4968, it is no objection to a summons that it fails to set forth the cause of action stated in the complaint. .</p> <p>8. Juries — Summoning and Impaneling — Lists—Striking op Names,</p> <p>Mansf. Dig. Ark. § 4013, relating to jurors, which by Act. Cong. May 9, 1890, was extended over the Indian Territory, provides that, if either party shall desire a panel, the court shall cause the names of 24 competent jurors to be placed in a box from which the names of 18 shall be drawn and entered on a list. Section 4014 provides that each party shall be furnished with a copy of this list, from which each may strike the names of three jurors, and the 12 names remaining shall constitute the jury. Held, that the refusal of the court to furnish the parties, on request, with such list of 18 jurors is reversible error.</p>

<p>1. Assignment por Benefit op Creditors — Validity—Inventory.</p> <p>Mansf. Dig. Ark. § 805, provides that before an assignee for the benefit of credit, ors shall be entitled to take possession of or in any wise control the assigned property he shall file a complete inventory of the property, and a bond in double its estimated value. JETeld. that a provision in the deed of assignment that the assignee shall not take possession until he files the required' bond is surplusage, and will not be construed as authorizing him to take possession before he files an inventory, in, violation of the terms of the statute.</p> <p>& Same — Unprefbrred Creditors — Schedule.</p> <p>Where a deed of assignment prefers certain creditors, and provides that the balance of the fund shall be paid to all the remaining creditors pro rata, its validity is not affected by the failure to give in the deed or in any schedule attached thereto the names of the unpreferred creditors, or the amounts due them.</p> <p>8. Bame — Time op Application op Proceeds.</p> <p>Nor is the validity of such assignment affected by failure to fix a limit of time for the assignee to apply the proceeds of the assigned property.</p> <p>4. Statutes — Construction—Adoption op State Laws by Congress. '</p> <p>Since Act Cong. May 3,1890, (36 U. S. St. c. 183, § 31,) adopts and puts in force in the Indian Territory the body of the statutes of the state of Arkansas, it will be presumed that the construction and interpretation placed on these statutes by the supreme court of the state prior thereto were adopted at the same time.</p> <p>5. Assignment fob Benefit op Creditors — Validity—Inventory.</p> <p>The failure of an assignee for the benefit of creditors to file an inventory of the assigned property, as Mansf. Dig. Ark. § 305, requires him to do before he takes possession of or in any wise controls the assigned property, will not invalidate the deed of assignment as against an attachment levied after it was executed. Following Clayton v. Johnson, 36 Ark. 406. ..._</p> <p>6. Same.</p> <p>Where such attachment is levied before the assignee is able to make an inventory, and the property is sold by the marshal as being perishable, an inventory by the assignee, which adopts the description under which the property was sold by the marshal, is sufficient.</p> <p>7. Attachment — Claims by Third Persons — Witnesses—Examination.</p> <p>Where an attachment is levied on the ground that defendants have disposed of their property in fraud of creditors, and a third person intervenes, claiming the attached property under an assignment for the benefit of creditors, it is within the discretion of the court, on the trial of the intervention, to refuse to allow plaintiff to put leading questions to the assignors.</p> <p>8. Same — Intervention—Petition—Sufficiency.</p> <p>The failure of the intervener to file the deed of assignment under which he claims is not ground for a demurrer to his petition, but only for a motionfor a more specific statement.</p> <p>ft. Same — Evidence—Preferences—Relevancy.</p> <p>On an issue as to the validity of this assignment, evidence that the assignors — a partnership — preferred and provided for the payment of an individual debt of one of them, is irrelevant where there is no allegation that the assignee knew of or participated in this arrangement.</p> <p>10. Same — Instructions—Harmless Error.</p> <p>Where the only objection to the assignment is that the assignee failed to conform to the requirements of the statute, an instruction that it is the duty of a failing debtor to assign all his property for the benefit of his creditors is harmless error.</p> <p>1L Same — Trial—Right to Open and Close.</p> <p>Where plaintiff in the attachment denies the validity of the assignment under which the intervener claims, the burden of showing its validity is thrown on the intervener, and he has the right to open and close.</p>

At Law. During November and December of the year 1887 the plaintiff made six importations from Halifax, England, into the port of New York, of certain merchandise invoiced as Daghestan rugs and Dag. flag. rugs.

<p>Customs Laws — Tea viílíjtg Kk¡>. ....</p> <p>.... Traveling rugs which were imported during the year 1888, and winch are articles generally used ior wrapping about the legs or the body oí a person when traveling, and as coverings Xor lounges and beds, or for throwing over the body oí a person when lying on a loung-e or a bed, are not duitable under the provisions for rugs contained in paragraph 378 of tile act of March 8,1883, (22 U. 8. St. 488.)</p>

<p>Ill Bankruptcy.</p> <p>This was a petition by A. J. and J. L. Long to set aside certain orders in bankruptcy proceedings against Carrier & Baum. The opinions of the court on former questions arising in the same proceedings are reported in 46 Bed. Eep. 850 and 47 Fed. Rep. 438.</p>

<p>At Law.</p> <p>Petition by Charles D. Nichols lor a writ ol naocas corpus to release him from imprisonment for violating an ordinance of the city of Titus-ville, Pa., by canvassing for books without a license. Prisoner discharged.</p>

<p>At Law.</p> <p>Petition by William Tyerman for a writ of habeas corpus to release him from his imprisonment for violating an ordinance of the city of Titus-ville, Pa., by delivering books sold by a book canvasser. Prisoner discharged.</p>

<p>Immigeation — ConteactLaboe—Habeas Coeposto Review Commissioneb’s Decision.</p> <p>On preliminary inquiry by the inspection officers, certain immigrants stated that their passage was paid for them, and that they came under an engagement to work on % railroad in Ohio for 7 francs a day; but on a subsequent special inquiry they retracted these statements. Held, that there was competent evidence tending to show that they had come in violation of the restriction act, and the court had no jurisdictiento review by habeas corpus the commissioner’s decision ordering them to be taken back.</p>

<p>Patents pop. Isvextioji'S- — Ixpbiniíemext—"Prior State op Art — Ekginb IjUbbicat-oits.</p> <p>Letters patent No. ¿14.589, issued April 22,1879, to Nicholas Seibert, were for a new and improved feed indicator and reducing plug attachments for oil-cups, used for oiling the steam-chest and cylinder of engines, so as to produce a uniform fltfw of oil. the speeifteaUons show that the discharge pipe of the oil-cup is connected directly with the steam-chest, and that, owing to the varying pressure in the chest, due to the opening and closing of the ports, the backward pressure of the steam in the oil-cup would vary, and thus cause an unequal flow of oil, and that the invention is designed to equalize this pressure by inserting in the discharge pipe, between the cup and the chest, a plug with an opening so small that steam could not pass through rapidly enough to communicate the rapid changes in the chest. Claim 2 is for “the reducing plug, constructed and operated as and for the purposes described. ” Held that, in view of the prior state of the art, this claim must bo re-strieted to the purpose described, and it is not infringed by the patent of April 29, 1886, to William H. Craig, in which the pressure is made uniform by an “ equalizing" pipe, ” opening into the discharge pipe and connecting with the’ steain-pipe at a point where the pressure is constant, and also having an obstruction in the discharge pipe, with a small opening, fitted with a spindle valve, since it appears that this latter device was for the purpose of maintaining an equal pressure as against the suction produced by shutting off the steam from the steam-chest when the locomotive was running down grade.</p>

<p>In Admiralty. Li bol by the owners of the schooner Florence against the steamer Parthian for damages for a collision.</p>

At Law. Action by J. W. Conn against the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company for overcharges in freight, the claims having been assigned to him by the original owners. On plea in abatement to the jurisdiction and the evidence thereon.

<p>In Equity. Suit by John L. Young against Lyman P. Sigler to set aside a judgment at law on the ground of fraud in procuring it. On de^ xnurrer to bill.</p>

<p>In Equity. Bill for accounting, discovery, and other relief. On exceptions to answer.</p>

<p>In Equity.</p> <p>Suit by the Finance Company of Pennsylvania against the Charleston, Cincinnati & Chicago Railroad Company to foreclose a mortgage. Mr. D. H. Chamberlain was appointed permanent receiver of the road February 25, 1891. See 45 Fed. Rep. 486. The hearing is-now upon interventions by the Pocahontas Canal Company, Atlanta Rubber Company, Westinghouse Air-Brake Company, Fairbanks, Morse & Co., Smith & Courtney, Hermann Baruch, the Mecklenburg Ice Company, Wm. Bird & Co., and others, claiming superior liens for supplies, etc., furnished prior to the receivership.</p>

Iii Equity. Bill by the Johnson Steel Street-Rail Company against the North Branch Steel Company for infringement of a patent. Heard upon a rule for attachment of John Fulton for contempt in refusing to obej’’ a subpoena dvees tecum,.

<p>Witness — Scbecent Drciw Tecum.</p> <p>The president oí a corporation which is a party to a suit in equity may bo compelled, by nuhpcena duces tecum, to produce drawings oí the company material to the issue.</p>

<p>Sur Rule for Attachment of George Hamilton for contempt.</p>

<p>Sale — Breach of Warkantv — Waiver—Acceptance of Goods.</p> <p>In an action for the urice of goods, where the seller claims damages for breach of warranty, it is a question for the jury whether he waived his claim for damages by accepting the goods after he had the opportunity to inspect tuem and discover their defective condition.</p>

<p>1. Insurance — Construction of Policy — “Explosion and Accident.”</p> <p>A policy of insurance upon a sugar refinery provided lor indemnity against loss by “explosion and accident, ” and, by a condition on the back thereof, declared that the term “explosion” included only a “rupture of the shell or flues of the boiler or boilers, caused by the action of steam. ” Held, that where, in an attempt to extinguish a blaze originating in a starch kiln heated by steam-pipes, a cloud of starch dust was stirred up, which came in contact with the flame and exploded, this was an “ accident, ” within the meaning of the policy, and the insurer was liable for damage to the property caused directly by the explosion, and by a Are which resulted therefrom, notwithstanding a further provision that no claim should be made for “any explosion or loss caused by the burning of the building, ” or “for any loss or damage by fire resulting from any cause whatever. ”</p> <p>2. Same — Insurance against Liability for Person.il Injuries.</p> <p>Under a clause insuring against “personal injury and loss of human life, ” for which the assured is liable in damages, and “which shall be caused by said boilers, or any machinery of whatever kind connected therewith and operated thereby, ” the insured could recover the amount it has paid out for loss of life and injuries caused by the explosion, since the kilns were heated by steam-pipes connected with th'G boilers.</p>

At Law. Action for damages for personal injuries by Elmer L. Van Dresser against the Oregon Railway & Navigation Company, the Oregon Short Line & Utah & Northern Railway Company, and the Union Pacific Railway Company. On pleas to the jurisdiction.

<p>At Law. On motion for judgment on demurrer.</p> <p>Action by the Ohio & Mississippi Railway Company against the Press Publishing Company for libel. Defendant demurred to the complaint, on the ground that “it appears on the face of the complaint that the said complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” Plaintiff moved for judgment on the demurrer as frivolous.</p>

<p>1. Juimímknts — Death op Party- -Ubvivob — .Joint Dbfioxdants.</p> <p>Gen. St. Kan. § 4528, declares that on the death oí a deiendant pending an action ■wherein the right survives against his personal representatives, revivor shall be had against them; and section 4595 provides that, ií a deiendant dies after judgment and before satisfaction thereof, his personal representativos may be made parties in the same manner as is prescribed for reviving actions before judgment. Held, that under those sections, where one of several joint defendants has died after judgment, the judgment may be revived against his personal representative without joining the other defendants, for section 1101 provides that in all cases of joint obligations suit may be brought against any one or more of those liable.</p> <p>2. Limitation op Actions — Tkmpus Non Oooukrit Hugh.</p> <p>Where the U tilled States has recovered judgment against several defendants, its right to revive the judgment against the executor of one of them, since deceased, is not affected by Gen. St. Kan. § 2890, providing that actions against executors and administrators shall be commenced within three years from the time of notice of appointment and giving bond, and that otherwise the claim shall be forever barred.</p>

<p>At Law. Indictment of Thomas J. Reynolds for receiving excessive fees for procuring a pension. On motions in arrest of judgment and for a new trial.</p>

<p>1. Conspiracy to Defraud the United States — Transporting IIaii.s — Indictment.</p> <p>Rev. St. U. S. § 5410, provides that “if two or more persons conspire, either to commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States in any manner, or for an}1' purpose, and one or more of such parties do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, all the parties to such conspiracy shall be liable, ” etc. Rev. St. U. S. §4002, provides that railway companies shall be paid for carrying the mails upon a basis of the average weight carried; such weight to be ascertained by actually weighing the mail carried during a certain number of days, to be fixed by the postmaster general. Held, that an indictment charging railway ofdcials with conspiring to deceive the postal officers and defraud the United States by-sending over the line a large amount of old newspapers, etc., in order to increase the mails at a time when they were being weighed, is sufficient, under section 5440, since it describes a conspiring to commit the “offense against the United States, ” which is defined by Rev. St. U. S. § 5438, providing a punishment for any persons combining to defraud the United States by “obtaining, or aiding to obtain, the payment of any false or fraudulent claim. ”</p> <p>2. Same.</p> <p>It was not necessary that the indictment should aver that the contemplated fraud was successful, or the fraudulent mail matter of sufficient weight to entitle the railway company to increased compensation, or that the forwarding of the-matter would not be continued beyond the period fixed for weighing the mails.</p> <p>8. Same.</p> <p>An indictment of railway officers for conspiring to defraud the United States, by “deceiving the officials” having charge of the mails as to the amount of mail matter carried over the line, need not aver what particular officer was intended to be deceived.</p>

<p>1. Copyright op Photograph — Inekixgemext—Pleabixg.</p> <p>In a bill for an injunction against infringing the copyright of a photograph, an allegation that complainant “is the author, inventor, designer, and proprietor of a certain photograph and negative thereof, known and entitled ‘ Photograph No. 23 of Lillian Russell, by B. J. Falk, N. Y.,’ ” is sufficient without giving a detailed description of the method of producing the photograph, or attaching a copy thereof to the bill.</p> <p>2. Same — Inscribed Notice.</p> <p>It is sufficient if the notice of copyright inscribed on a photograph reads, “ 1889. Copyrighted by B. J. Falk, New York, ” instead of “ Copyright, 1889, by B. J. Falk, ” as required by the literal directions of the statute.</p>

<p>In Equity. Suit to restrain infringement of copyright. On demurrer to hill.</p>

<p>Patents sob Inventions — License to Sbli. — Rights ov Assignee — Suit yob In-EEINGEMENT — PASTIES.</p> <p>An Ohio corporation owning an electric light patent gave another company an exclusive license to sell the patented article in New England. Afterwards a Connecticut corporation owning other electric light patents obtained a controlling interest in the stock of the licensor. Held, that the licensee, in a suit in the district of Connecticut against the Connecticut corporation for selling an infringing article within its territory, had prima, facie implied authority, by virtue of the license, to Join the licensor as a party plaintiff against the latter’s will; especially as the latter, being out of the jurisdiction of the court, could not be served as a party defendant.</p>

<p>1. Patento for Inventions — Invention—Book and Index.</p> <p>Rotters patent No. 888,548, issued May 30, 1888, to Robert M. Rigby, for a combined book and index so arranged by uniting one edge of the cover leaf oí tbe index to the outer edge of one of the leaves of the book, that the index may be withdrawn from between the covers of the book and again returned to its place, without turning' the pages o£ the book or losing the reader’s place, involved a patentable invention, and not a mere mechanical adaptation.</p> <p>2. Same — Construction op Claim — Infringement.</p> <p>The claim was for “the combination, with a book provided with a leaf, C, free of the book-cover, to its rear edge, ” of an index united by its cover-leaf to the leaf. G. In the specifications the patentee says: “The book will preferably be provided with a special leaf of considerable strength, and bound or united firmly to the book cover, B, at the point, A, or at such a point distant from the edge of the cover, B, as will piT)vide room enough to receive the index when folded there between.” lie!(I, that the claim should he construed to mean that the leaf, G, should be free of the book-cover to the leaf’s rear edge, and not to the book-cover’s rear edge; and hence an index connected with a leaf which is united to the book-cover some distance from the cover’s roar edge constitutes an infringement.</p>

<p>In Equity. Suit by George W. McGill against the Universal Paper-Eastener Company and others for infringement of a patent.</p>

<p>In Equity. Bill for infringement of patent.</p>

<p>In Equity. Bill by William L. Coop and others against tlie Dr. Savage Physical .Development Institute, Limited, for infringement of a patent. ()n exceptions to answer.</p>

<p>1. Witnesses — Sides and Mileage in Admeami Cashs.</p> <p>In admiralty causes in the eastern district oí Pennsylvania, mileage will not. be allowed to witnesses brought from beyond the district, except as to 100 miles of the distance.</p> <p>2. Same — Pees and Mileage of Party.</p> <p>A party is not entitled to either witness fees or mileage when his presence has not been required by the opposite party.</p>

<p>At Law. Action by William H. Richmond against Wilmot W. Brook-ings, commenced by process of foreign attachment. O n motion to dis miss.</p>

In Equity. Bill by Y. E. McBee and others against the Marietta & North Georgia Railway Company, the Central Trust Company of New York, and others, setting up certain lions upon a railroad, and opposing the foreclosure of a mortgage thereon, as injurious to their rights. On motion to dismiss the bill.

<p>In Equity. Bill by William P. Rend against the Venture Oil Company to restrain it from drilling a well through his coal mine. On motion for preliminary injunction.</p>

In Equity. Bill for discovery and to set aside fraudulent conveyances. claimed in his argument that complainant was a contract creditor, or creditor at large, and as such “shall have an equal right, with a creditor having a lien through the aid of a court of equity, to reach property, subject to the payment of debts which have been fraudulently transferred.” Code Ala. 188(5, §§ 8544, 3545. Lehman v. Meyer, 67 Ala. 396; Evans v. Welch, 63 Ala. 256.

<p>Quieting Title — Evidence.</p> <p>Prior to 1869, two brothers, A. and B., were speculating in Iowa lands, and A., becoming indebted to bis father, who lived in Ohio, conveyed' one tract to him. The father paid taxes on the land, and treated it as his own until his death in 1884, when he devised itto hisdaughter. A few days after his death there Was recorded a quitclaim deed from him and his wife to B., purporting to have been made in 1870; and shortly afterwards B. conveyed the land to strangers for a small fraction of its value. The daughter sued to quiet title, alleging that the quitclaim deed was a forgery. B. testified that before 1869 A. had repaid the debt- to his father, and that shortly thereafter he had bought the land from A., who sent him the quitclaim deed by mail; also that A. thereafter disappeared, and was believed to be dead. The deed was not produced, and the mother, and the justice before whom it purported to have been acknowledged, denied that they ever signed such a deed. B. lived in Iowa, in indigent circumstances, during alltiie time he claimed to have owned the land, but never occupied it, or attempted to sell or derive any revenue from it, until after his father’s death. Held, that the weight of the evidence was in favor of the daughter’s right, and she was entitled to a decree quieting title.</p>

<p>Patents tor Inventions — Infringement—Res Judicata — Effect of Interlocutory Decree.</p> <p>Ir a suit for infringement of Iettei’s patent there was a dee.ree for plaintiffs, awarding an injunction, and for an account, and a reference to a master. The defendants quit using the device so held to infringe, substituting a different device, which was openly used by other persons, and as to which there had been no adjudication. Then, pending the reference before the master, the plaintiffs brought a new suit in the same court, against the same defendants. The answer therein not only denied infringement, but alleged that one G-., and not the patentee, was the original and first inventor of the patented device, which- defense was not set up in the first suit. Held, that the decree was interlocutory', and did not, in the second suit, preclude inquiry into the validity of the patent.</p>

<p>1.- Gopybight — Ixebixgemest—Notice oe Gopybight — Photographs.</p> <p>In an action for the infringement of a copyright for a photograph, in order to sustain the defense that the copy which defendant reproduced was without the ' statutory notice of copyright, it is not sufficient that it was without the statutory-notice when it came into defendant’s possession, but it must be shown that it lacked such notice when it left plaintiff’s possession.</p> <p>& Same — Publication—Delay.</p> <p>, ,A delay of the publication of a photograph for two months and eighteen days after the title was filed with the librarian of congress, as required by the copyright law, is not unreasonable. ,</p> <p>8. Same — Fob What Allowed — Piiotogkaphs.</p> <p>The facts that a photographer arranged the light, background, and other details for a photograph, and posed the subject so as as to produce an artistic and pleasing picture, are sufficient to sustain a copyright for such photograph.</p>

Jit Law. Action commenced by attachment bv Olive B. Fisher against Sophia S. Secrist upon an affidavit alleging that the debt was fraudulently contracted. Heard on motion to quash the writ.

At Law. Action by Samuel Coulter against John A. Stafford for the recovery’ of land sold for taxes. Jury waived, and trial by the court.

Action by the National State Bank of Elizabeth against Waldo Dan-forth and Seth. B. Ryder. The court directed a verdict for the plaintiff for the whole amount of its claim, and from the judgment thereon defendants bring error.

<p>At Law. Action by the National Bank of Commerce against the town of Granada, Colo., upon interest coupons of municipal bonds. Tried by the court without a jury.</p>

At Law. On appeal from the decision of the board of general appraisers. On January 13. 1891, the collector of customs for tbe collection district of Saluria seized'at Eagle Pass, in the state of Texas, certain five car-loads of lead and silver ores, consigned to E. H. Chichester, as forfeited to the United Beatos, by reason of certain alleged attempted false and fraudulent entries of said ores as imported goods.

At Law. Application under section 15 of the act of Juno 10, 1890, entitled “An act to simplify the laws in relation to the collection of the revenue,” (20 1J. S. St. at Large, 131,) by Salomon and Phillips, importers, for a review of the decision of the United States general appraisers, affirming the decision of the collector of the port of blew York, as to the rate and amount of duty assessable upon certain merchandise imported by them per steamship Wieland, August 23, 1890.

At Law. This action was brought by the plaintiffs against the defendant, collector of the port of blew York, to recover the amount of an alleged overpayment of duties on certain merchandise imported by the plaintiffs into the port of New York in the montli of April, 1889, which was invoiced to the plaintiffs from Vera Cruz as “196 blocks marble,’’and was classified for duty by the defendant collector as “marble in blocks,” at 65 cents per cubic foot, under Tariff Ind.

<p>1. Custom^ Duties — Oonstkuctioaí of Statutes.</p> <p>Construction of a statute should not1 be resorted to when the statute bears its meaning plainly on its face, but should he reserved for a statute expressed in doubtful language.</p> <p>2. Same — Dandelion Root.</p> <p>Dandelion toot, imported while the tariff act of March 8, 1883, (22 (T. S. St. 483,) was in force, which was not edible, and was in a crude state, and not advanced in value or condition by refining or grinding; or by other process of manufacture, and which was not used or intended to be used as coffee or as a substitute therefor, but was used for medicine, and in medicinal preparation, was not dutiable under the provision for “acorns and dandelion root, raw or prepared, and all other articles used or inr,ended to be used as coffee; or as substitutes therefor, ” contained in paragraph 290 of tho aforesaid tariff act, but was free of duty, under the provision for “drugs. * * roofs, * * * any of tho foregoing of which are not edible, and are in a crude state, and not advanced in value or condition by refining or grinding, or by other process of manufacture, ” contained in paragraph 080 of the same act.</p>

<p>1. Patents fob Inventions — Jurisdiction.</p> <p>Where a manufacturer has his factory and place oí residence and business in one district, and also sells by an agent resident in another dist rict, manufactured articles claimed to infringe, ho does not become an inhabitant of the district in which the articles are sold by the agent, and suit for infringement of letters patent cannot be • brought against him in that district, by service on the agent.</p> <p>2. Same — Preliminary Injunction.</p> <p>Where an inventor and others have manufactured and sold articles prior to the grant of design letters patent therefor, and the only proof of infringement, since tne grant of the patents, relates to a single sale, made s jortly after the grant of the patents, but prior to tlic establishment, of their validity, and prior to notice of the patents, the articles not being marked patented, a preliminary injunction should be denied.</p>

<p>In Equity.</p> <p>Suit by William Zinsser and August Zinsser against Gottfried Krueger for infringement of patent. Decree declaring the patent void because •of anticipation and dismissing the bill. 45 Fed. Rep. 572. Plaintiffs appeal.</p>

<p>In Equity. Bill by the Pacific Contracting Company against the Southern California Bituminous Paving Company and others, for infringement of patents.</p>

<p>1. Patents'fob Inventions — Extent of Claim — Pbiok State of Art — Infringement.</p> <p>Claim 3 of letters patent No. 245.634, issued August 16. 1881, to Thomas J. Jenne ■and Charles S. Harmon, for an improvement in lifting-jacks, describes the combination, among other things, of “the standard, A, provided with the arms, v, * * ® collar, C, having the trunnions, o, working in journals at the tops of the arms, v. ” Held that, in view ’of the prior state of the art, the claim is limited to the specific ■ elements named, and is not infringed by a jack-having acollar integral-with the standard, and incapable of any movement.</p> <p>% -Same — Extent of Claims.</p> <p>Claims cannot be enlarged by construction.</p>

<p>1. Patents fob Invention — Patentability—Clasps and Buckles.</p> <p>Letters patent No. 251,246, granted December 20, 1881, to Theodore E. King and Joseph Hammond, Jr., arc for an improvement in glove-fasteners, shoe-bnckles, and similar articles, which consist of a tongue-plate, a tongue or lever pivoted to the tongue-plate, and a slotted catch-plate, with which the tongue can bo engaged, and by which the two parts of the buckle are drawn together and securely fastened. The improvement consisted in dispensing with the spring element usually found in pre-existing devices, which operated on the tongue, and held it in an open or closed position. Held, that this patent is void, for letters patent granted November 9, 1880, to Charles F. Littlejohn, were for the same device as applied to carriage boot-flaps; and it involved no invention to apply it to wearing apparel.</p> <p>2. Same — Extent oe Claim — Pkiob State oe Aht.</p> <p>In letters patent No. 301,884, granted July 15,1884, to the same persons, for an improvement in similar buckles, the tengue-plate was a single piece oí metal, doubled upon itself, and forked at its rear end next the catch-plate. The tongue swung’ in this bifurcation, its pivot being located underneath the tongue-plate. Indentations in the under-fold of the tongue-plate partially embraced the ends of the pivot-pin, which was held between the two folds. The object of this construction was to cause the tongue-plate, or a portion of it, to extend rearward of the tongue, forming there a hearing surface for the catch-plate. The first claim was: “In combination, the catch-plate, the tongue pivoted directly to the tongue-plate, and the tongue-plate extending rearward of the pivot and in contact with the catch-plate when the parts are engaged. ” Held that, as the claim was merely for an improved clasp, which had many predecessors, it must be so limited that the tongue should be not only pivoted directly to the tongue-plate, but below its face, and between its bifurcated ends.</p> <p>3. Same — Infuingement—Buckles.</p> <p>This patent is infringed by a buckle which is composed of two plates riveted together, the lower being provided with projections in which the pivots of the tongue turn, and which fit into openings in the upper plate when the two lie together; and the upper and spring-plate being bifurcated, and extending on both sides of the tongue rearward, to afford a bearing surface for the catch-plate, though the lower plate has no such extension.</p>

<p>1. Patents tor Inventions — Prior State or Art — Cot-Buttons.</p> <p>Letters patent No. 319,997, issued June 10, 1885, to George D. Paúl and Cyrus E. Vreeland, covered an improvement in cuff-buttons, whereby they are provided with a separable shoe, “ consisting o£ a spring'-metal ring, formed with a flaring opening, a, through which the post or shank is passed, and with a yielding central portion, curved outwardly, forming a seat, c, in which the post or shank rests, ” and “ adapted to be secured to the shank between its outer end and the fabric through which the shank is inserted. ” Held that, in view of the prior state of the art, and of the fact that broader claims were originally made and rejected, the patent must be restricted to the specific device described, and is not infringed by letters patent No. 382,342, issued May 8,1888, to. Egbert Alsdorf and George 1). Paid.</p> <p>2. Same — Assignment—Estoppel.</p> <p>The fact that the inventor and patentee of an improvement in an article sells and assigns the patent to a third person does not, in the absence of misrepresentations as to the scope of the patent, estop him from obtaining a patent for another and different improvement thereon.</p>

<p>In Admiralty. Libel by J. J. Hitchcock against the steamer St. Louis, owned by the St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Company, for wages. Decree for libelant for costs only.</p>

In Admiralty. Libel by Myers & Co. against the steamer Unionist upon a charter-party. ■ The facts fully appear in the following statement by IlirtuiKS, J.: The conceded facts of this case are as follows: On the 12th day of September, 1889, the owners of this steamei4, through their agents, Messrs. Simpson, Spence & Young, of New York, chartered the steamer to the libelants, Myers & Co., of Norfolk. The charter, or a copy thereof, is annexed to the libel.

<p>Foreign Waters — Towage—Foreign Tug-Boats.</p> <p>The boundary between the United States and Great Britain in the Strait of Juan de Fuea is fixed by treaty on a line following the middle of the strait, the northern part of the strait being British water, the southern, American; but by the same treaty the entire strait is free and open to botli countries for purposes of navigation. Held, that no part of the strait is “foreign waters, ” within Rev. St. U. ¡8. § 4370, which excepts, from the penalty therein denounced against foreign tugboats towing United States vessels between domestic ports, oases where the towing is in whole or in part on foreign waters.</p>

<p>In Admiralty. Suit to recover salvage.</p>

<p>1. Collision — Vessel at t>ieu — Eog-Kiunals.</p> <p>A vessel moored for the night, according to her custom, aloug-side a well-known dock, and not projecting beyond the wharf into the channel, and run into by a steamer passing in the fog. is not in fault because she had no lights sot, and sounded no signals.</p> <p>2. Same — Navigation" in Fog — Narrow Channel — Soundings.</p> <p>The Express, going east, met a thick fog at night at Little Hell (date, and continued her navigation in a narrow and winding channel, without using the lead, until she ran into the E. E., tied ap, as usual, at a well-known pier on North Brothers’ island. A fog-hell on the Island, near the course of the Express, was rung frequently. Held, that the E. was solely to blame for the collision, it being her duty to use the lead.</p>

<p>Coij.iston — Vksbkt. at Pier — Wind—Inevitable Accident — Inattention.</p> <p>The steam elevator O., having a large surface exposed to the wind, in attempting to moor along-sido certain barges at Twenty-Fourth street and North river, struck and sunk one of them. The elevator claimed that the collision was an inevitable accident, due to a sudden gust of wind. The evidence showed that the wind was strong on the New York side; that the elevator left the less exposed side of the river and crossed, at Hoboken, where the wind in the lee was light, with the wind nearly astern, to.the more exposed side, where the barges lay, and where especial care in a strong wind was necessary. Held that, though inevitable accident may arise from sudden gusts of wind, the evidence showed that this collision arose from lack of sufficient caution, and inattention of the pilot, and that the C. was liable.</p>

<p>In Ad tniralty. Suit to recover damages caused by collision.</p>

<p>In Admiralty. Suit for damage by collision.</p>

<p>In Admiralty. On libel for collision.</p>

<p>At Law. On motion to remand to the state court.</p>

<p>At Law. On motion to remand. Action by the Los Angeles Farming & Milling Company against Hoff and others.</p>

In Equity. Suit by the Campbell Printing-Press & Manufacturing Company against the Manhattan Elevated Railway Company for infringement of a patent. ' On motion for an injunction pendente lite and for a decree for an accounting. The patent in question in this case is No. 401,680, issued April 16, 1889, to Edward S. Boynton, assignor of the complainant, for an improvement in'valves for pneumatic pipes or tubes.

<p>In Equity. Suit by the J. L. Molt Iron-Works against the Standard Manufacturing Company. Heard upon motion to compel the filing of depositions.</p>

<p>In Equity. Suit to foreclose a mortgage.</p>

<p>1. Injunction — Doubtful Question — Demurrer.</p> <p>A bill sought to enjoin an inspection oí flour about to be made under Laws La. Ex. Sess. 1870, p. 156, upon the ground that the statute was unconstitutional because the inspection provided for was confined to flour coming to New Orleans “ for sale; ” thus discriminating in favor of those who bought for their own use, and in favor of resident merchants, as against merchants residing in other states, contrary to the interstate commerce clause of the federal constitution. Hold, that as the question was a doubtful one, and it seemed probable that the court would be aided by proof of the manner in which the statute operated, a demurrer to the bill would be overruled.</p> <p>2. Constitutional Law — Interstate Commerce.</p> <p>The fact that the statute applied only to the port of New Orleans, and that no penalty was provided for its violation, were matters for the consideration of the legislature alone, and did not goto the question of its validity under the federal constitution.</p>

<p>In Equity.</p> <p>Petition of Thomas Cochran, John S. Barbour, Frederick Fralej’', William Sellers, Clement M. Biddle, N. Parker Shortridge, James M. Robb, Edward T. Steel, John Wanamaker, Amos II. Little, Thomas H. Dudley, Edwin H. Fitter, William V. McKean, John Baird, Henry D. Welsh, W. W. Justice, Joel J. Bailey, John Cummings, John Gor-ham, Abram S. ITewitt, William L. Strong, John B. Drake, George Bain, and A. T. Goshorn, officers and directors of the Centennial Board of Finance, setting out that it had fully discharged its duties; that it had on hand two funds, one $4,960.03, the amount still unclaimed from two dividends, and a general fund, $8, 630.87. This latter fund would paya dividend of between two and three cents a share. The shares were widely scattered. Prayer that the petitioners be relieved from further custody of the fund, and that the court should appoint a suitable custodian of it, after certain payments had been made. The Centennial Board of Finance was incorporated by act of congress of June 1, 1872, as “a body corporate, to be known by the name of the ‘ Centennial Board of Finance,’” and section 10 of the act provided:</p> <p>“That as soon as practicable after the said exhibition shall have been closed it shall be the duty of said corporation to convert its property into cash, and, after the payment of all its liabilities, to divide its remaining assets among its stockholders pro rata, in full satisfaction and discharge of its capital stock. And it shall be the duty of the United States Centennial Commission to supervise the closing up of the affairs of the said corporation, to audit its acceounts, and submit, in a report to the president of the United States, the financial results of the Centennial Exhibition.”</p>

In Equity. Petition by W. M. Giles, who was appointed receiver of the East Line & Red River Railroad, in a proceeding in the state court of Texas to forfeit its charier, to obtain possession of the road as against receivers appointed by the federal court.

<p>1. United States Commissioners — Fees—Res Judicata.</p> <p>• The rejection by a district court of a United States commissioner’s claim for fees because of a supposed want of jurisdiction is no bar to a subsequent suit therefor, when the circuit, court, in a similar case, has held in favor of the jurisdiction.</p> <p>2. Same — Docket Fees — Retroactive Legislation.</p> <p>The clause in the deficiency act of August!, J88G, (24 St. 274,) which declares that United States commissioners shall receive no docket foes, being general legislation, intended as an amendment to Rev. St. U. S. § 847, that clause must be held prospective only In its operation, and docket fees earned prior to its passage must be allowed.</p> <p>3. Sami: — Pruuminart Examination op Oppexders — Fees pok Recognizances.</p> <p>Rev. St. ? 1014. declares that the examination of persons charged with offenses against the U nitéd St ates is to be conducted agreeably to the usual mode of process in the state. Rev. St. ÍVTe. c. 133, 10, 11, provide for taking the recognizance of an offender upon any adjournment of the examination. Held, that a United States commissioner examining offenders in Maine is entitled to fees for taking their recognizances Irom day to day.</p> <p>4. Same — Length op Recognizances.</p> <p>Fees for such recognizances must be allowed, although the instruments exceett the length arbitrarily fixed by the comptroller as sufficient, when, upon inspection, they disclose no unnecessary verbiage.</p> <p>5. Same — Length op Complaints — Charging Different Oppensbs.</p> <p>Persons arrested upon a complaint charging one offense cannot be held thereunder if the examination discloses a different offense, and therefore complaints cannot be objected to as too long because of charging more than one offense.</p> <p>6. Same — Pek Diem Fees.</p> <p>Commissioners are entitled to their per Cl iem fees pending the preliminary examination of an offondor, even though no witnesses are examined and no arguments heard on some of the days. XT. S. v. Jones, 10 Sup. Gt. Rep. 615,184 U. S. 483, and XT. S. v. E'Wukj, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 743, 140 U. S. 142, followed.</p> <p>7. Same — Fees pop. Recognizances op Witnesses.</p> <p>Commissioners conducting preliminary examinations are entitled to fees for recognizances of witnesses frtfm day to day, and for final appearance at court, as well as ices for the. acknowledgements thereto, but only for one recognizance in each instance for all the witnesses; and the length of such recognizances must be left to the commissioners’ discretion.</p> <p>8. Same — Returns and Commitments.</p> <p>Commissioners are entitled to fees for entering returns of warrants and suin- ■ mons, for filing complaints and warrants for commitments from day to day, and for the return of proceedings t o court, and copies thereof, the same not being unnecessarily prolix.</p> <p>9. Same — Warrants.</p> <p>When a prisoner is transferred from state to federal custody, a now warrant is necessary, and the commissioner is entitled to a fee therefor.</p>

<p>At Law. Action by tlie Springfield Fire & Marine Insurance Company against the Richmond & Danville Railroad Company. Heard on the petition of the Savannah Fire & Marine Insurance Company to be made a party plaintiff, and to have the Petzer Manufacturing Company also joined as plaintiff.</p>

<p>At Law. Action by the John V. Farwell Company against John Matheis, and Theodore Draz, garnishee. On motion to discharge the garnishee.</p>

<p>Immigration — Amen Contract Labor Law.</p> <p>A railroad company which knowingly employs at its office in New York, near the Canadian border, a person who resides in Canada, and cornos daily to his work in the United States, is not engaged in assisting or encouraging the “importation or migration” of an alien, within the meaning of the alien contract labor law. Act Cong. Feb. 2i>, 1885, §</p>

At Law. This was a consolidated action, brought by the United States government to recover the penalties upon two transportation bonds given by the defendants as principals and surety.

<p>At Law. Appeal from a decision of the board of general aDpraisers.</p>

<p>1. PaTUXTS LOE INVENTIONS— CONSTRUCTION 03? CLAIM — JSíjECÍTHIO-XjTGIITING- GtAS-JiURXEKS.</p> <p>la letters patent is o. 230,590, issued July 27, 1880, to George F. Pinkham, as as-signee of Jacob P. Tirrell, the claim is for. “in an electric-lighting gas-burner, a magnet for turning the gas-cock by one electric impulse, combined with a fixed electrode. a', and a movable electrode, c\ normally In contact, and mechanism connecting the armature with the movable electrode, to break the contact between a! and o' the instant after the gas is turned on, and create a spark for ignition, substantially as described. ” In the drawings a' designated a 'platinum point on the fixed arm, and o' a small bent arm normally in contact with the fixed electrode. Held, that the word "electrode” generally, and especially as used in the patent, means the platinum or other metal points constituting the poles of the circuit.</p> <p>2. Sami; — 1 .vfkixsemi: nt.</p> <p>The mechanism being otherwise substantially the same, the fact that defendant’s apparatus has a horizontal armature, which moves in á vertical direction, while the patented apparatus lias a vertical armature, which moves in a horizontal direction, does not prevent infringement.</p> <p>3. Sami; — Past Xxfi’.íxííiqihxts — Dquí'iy Jurisdiction.</p> <p>■When a patent has been assigned, together with all claims for past infringements, the fact that a person sued by the assignee has not sold any of the infringing articles since the assignment, and testifies that ho intends-to sell no more, is not sufficient to exclude equitable jurisdiction, when it appears that he still has them in stock, and has published a catalogue offering them for sale, and that in his answer he assorts a right to sell them.</p>

<p>In Equity. Suit by Alonzo Gerard against the Diebold Safe & Lock Company for infringement of patent. On demurrer to the bill.</p>

<p>Bill in Equity by Michael Haughey to enjoin Lee & Sons from infringement of patent granted to complainant for interfering device for horses.</p>

<p>In Equity. Suit to recover certain shares of stock of the Colt’s Patent Fire-Arms Manufacturing Company.</p>

<p>1. Judgment — Evidence op Satisfaction — -Delay in Enforcement.</p> <p>Ia a suit to cancel a judgment rendered for the balance of a debt after foreclosure of a mortgage, the mortgagor alleged an agreement that he should turn over the land to the mortgagee in full payment, but that, being unable to make a good title because of pending suits against him, an amicable foreclosure was had, and the judgment for the excess was left unsatisfied, by neglect or oversight. Held that, the evidence being doubtful on this point, the fact that no attempt to enforce the judgment was made for IT years would turn the scale in the mortgagor’s favor.</p> <p>3. Powers op Attorney — Coxstiu'ctiox—Ubxhral and Special Terms.</p> <p>A power of attorney expressly authorising the agent to sell, convey, or mortgage the principal's lands in Iowa, and collect the price thereof, and constituting him “our general attorney iu fact to transact any or all business for us, * * * of any kind whatsoever, in the state of Iowa; to ront houses, * * * and satisfy any mortgages made or to be made to us, ” etc., — confers power to agree to take certain lands, covered by a mortgage, in full satisfaction of the debt secured thereby.</p> <p>3. Mortguif.s — Agreement to Satisfy — Consider «ton.</p> <p>An agreement to give up all the land covered by a mortgage, by an amicable foreclosure suit, is a sufficient consideration for an agreement to accept the land in full satisfaction of the debt, including any deficiency that might remain after the foreclosure sale.</p>

<p>Assignment foe Benefit of Grbditobs — What Passes — Mistake.</p> <p>The First National Bank was directed by the Mastín Bank, with which it had a miming account, to deposit what was due'the latter with a third bank. Through a mistake in its accounts, the National Bank placed more money to the Mastín Bank’s credit than was actually due it. The Mastín Bank made a' general assignment, and its assignee demanded and received irom the third bank all of said money. Held, that the excess could be recovered from him, as he possessed only the ecplities of his assignor.</p>

<p>At Law. Application by Alexander II. Brown for a writ of habeas corpus to release him from imprisonment, because of a failure to comply with the requirements of the revenue act of North Carolina. Hoard at chambers.</p>

<p>1. Patents for Inventions — Infringement—Wooo-Working Machinery.</p> <p>Letters patent No. 259,958, granted Juno 20, 1882, to Baxter D. Whitney for improvements in wood-planing machines, were for a pressure-bar supported and guided by curved levers projecting from its ends, and working in curved grooves concentric with the journals of the cutter cylinder, with an elastic plate or pad, forming a supplemental flexible foot and distributive pressure regulator; the pressure-bar being arranged on the rear or incoming side of the eutter cylinder for the purpose of bearing upon the lumber, and holding it firmly to the bed-plate. 3eld, that this is infringed by a machine which has a pressure-bar with curved guides engaging with grooves formed concentrically round the journal boxes of the cutter cylinder; a yielding presser-foot consisting of an elastic plate, having a bearing surface adapted to regulate the pressure to correspond with the varying thicknesses of the wood; and the combination of a flexible pad with auxiliary support to prevent undue deflection.</p> <p>2. Same — Suit for Infringement — Interlocutory Decree.</p> <p>Where a suit for the infringement of a patent is brought against the users of a single machine who purchased it from the manufacturers, and who have nothing to do with its construction, the interlocutory decree for plaintiff will he for an account only.</p>

<p>1. Patents for Inventions — Reissue—Enlargement of Claim.</p> <p>The claim of the original patent was: “As a new article of manufacture, a nonconducting covering composed of layers or wrappings of paper saturated with adhesive material, and compressed while being formed into tubular sections of a thickness of one-half inch or more, substantially as shown and described. ” In the reissue the words, “of a thickness of one-half inch or more,” were omitted; but it appeared that a covering for the designated purpose, of less thickness than one-half inch, would lack the non-conducting property, and would beinoperative and useless; that in the practice of the invention the covering is always of greater thickness, and must be; and the infringing article exceeded that thickness. Held that, as the omission did not really enlarge the patentee’s rights, the change was immaterial, and did not avoid the patent.</p> <p>2. Same.</p> <p>In the claim of the reissue, the words “or coated” were inserted after the word “ saturated. ” Held, that the two words were used evidently as alternative expressions, to denote the same thing', and the claim was not broadened.</p>

<p>In Equity. Suit by the executors of Albert Northrop against Rasner and Dinger for infringement of a patent.</p>

<p>In Equity. Bill by Balance & Grosjean Manufacturing Company against Julius E. Mosheim for infringing a patent. Heard on demurrer to the hill.</p>

<p>In Equity. Motion to attach for a contempt in violating an injunction.</p>

<p>1. Patents pok Inventions — Tnekingemext—Metallic Ceilings.</p> <p>Rotters patent No. 158,881, issued January 19,1875, to Henry Adler, are for a metallic ceiling composed of panels ot eold rolled sheet-iron with turnod-up edges, fitted into squares formed of furring strips nailed to the joists, and resting loosely upon fastenings attached to these strips, the edges being covered by a broad cap fastened to the strips. The specifications state that it is the object of the invention to provide for the expansion and contraction of the panels, and that, theretofore, metallic panels had been fastened rigidly 1 o the furring strips. Held, that the patent was not infringed by a ceiling composed of panels with fiat edges, which were nailed rigidly to the strips, and covered by a cap-piece secured by nails passing between the edges of the panels.</p> <p>2. Same — Patentarle Invention — Mechanical Adaptation.</p> <p>Letters patent No. 830,915, issued November 24,1885, to Albert Northrop, claim: “In a metallic ceiling, the combination, with corrugated sheet-metal panels arranged to form an intervening space between their adjacent sides, and thereby allow of their expansion and contraction in all directions, of a moulding strip overlapping the adjacent edges of the panels and devices passing through the moulding strip between the edges of the panels for securing the strip and panels to the ceiling. ” Held, that this was a mere mechanical adaptation of the Adler invention to the use of corrugated panels, and the patent is therefore void.</p>

<p>In Equity. Suit by the National Fertilizer Company 'to restrain W. P. Lambert and others from interfering with its rights under the “dead animal contract” of San Francisco.</p>

<p>In Admiralty. Libel by the charterers of the brig Giles Loring against her owner, and cross-libel by the latter.</p>

<p>In Admiralty. Libel by D. O. Blackburn against the steam-sliip Wellington, her freight and cargo, upon a contract for towage.</p>

<p>In Admiralty, label lor salvage.</p> <p>The steam-boat Anderson, while coming down the Mobile river, bad a part of the cargo, consisting of cotton in bales, to catch fire. An effort was made by the officers and crew of the vessel to extinguish the tire while the cotton was still on board. Being unsuccessful the master had the burning bales thrown overboard into the river, and ordered one of his officers and five or six members of his crow to take to the small boats, with proper appliances, and to endeavor to save the cotton from burning, and to secure and keep it until lie could go with his steamer to Mobile, (some 20 miles distant,) and send up a tug-boat for it. The steam-boat went on without delay to Mobile. The libelant was at the time a passenger on said steam-boat. He voluntarily left the boat, abandoned for the time Ids trip to Mobile, and, with the crew left by the master, joined in the effort to save the cotton. Most of the cotton was saved, but some of it in a damaged condition.</p>

<p>In Equity. Suit by Charles Head, as administrator of'William S. Smoot, against Samuel W. Porter, master armorer at the Springfield armory, for infringement of a patent. Heard on plea to the jurisdiction.</p>

<p>In Equity. Suit by the executors of Calvin Giddings, appointed in Ohio, against A. B. Green and others, to assert a vendor’s lien on lands situated in Virginia. On plea that the complainants cannot sue because they have not procured letters testamentary in Virginia.</p>

<p>1. Jurisdiction or Circuit Courts — Equity Rule 90.</p> <p>Equity rule 90, providing that, where the rules prescribed by the supreme or circuit courts do not apply, the practice of the circuit courts shall be regulated by the present practice of the high court of chancery of England, etc.-, affects the practice only of the circuit courts, and does not apply in determining questions of jurisdiction.</p> <p>2. Creditors’ Bill — Jurisdiction or Federal Courts — Fraud.</p> <p>By virtue of the jurisdiction attaching to courts of equity in cases of fraud, and independent of any statute giving the right to maintain a creditors’ bill, a federal court may entertain a bill alleging the return of an execution nulla bona, and that the debtor, pending the suit, has converted part of his property into cash, and is engaged in disposing of and concealing the remainder, or is about to carry it out of the state, all with the declared intent of so “fixing” his property that it cannot be seized to satisfy judgment.</p> <p>8. Ne Exeat — Jurisdiction oe Federal District Courts.</p> <p>Under Rev. St. U. S. § 716, providing that the supreme court and the circuit and district courts shall have power to issue writs of scire facias, and “all other writs not specifically provided for by statute, which may be necessary for the -exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the usages and principles of law,” the district courts have power to issue writs of ne exeat repubMca.</p> <p>4. Same — When Granted.</p> <p>The writ of ne exeat república is not a mere provisional remedy, in the sense that it can only bo issued pending the suit, and must expire with the rendition of judgment; on the contrary, its issuance may be provided for in the final decree, and it will continue in force until dissolved by the court, or until the decree is satisfied.</p>

<p>1, Compromise — Action to Set Aside. .</p> <p>O. took a contract in his own name to build a railroad; the remuneration being certain bonds oí the railroad company, thereafter to be issued, and also all funds or property which could be obtained as a bonus from people living along the proposed route. B. and several others, however, had certain interests in the profits of the contract, and C. constituted B. his attorney in fact to manage the construction, and all other matters connected with the enterprise. After the road had been built. C. pressed B. for an accounting and settlement, which B. delayed, assigning various reasons. Finally, C. constituted an attorney his attorney in fact and agent, with full powers to obtain a complete settlement. The attorney thereupon called upon B., presented his power of attorney, and the two then made a writing, reciting the transactions in which B. had been engaged, and agreeing’ to meet at a certain date for a settlement of all these matters. They accordingly did meet; B. accompanied by his attorney, and another person interested in the contract. Some papers in the nature of accounts were presented, but these covered less than half the transactions in dispute. Propositions and counter-propositions were made for full settlement, and ail or two days of negotiation a full settlement was-effected, the papers executed, and a release in full oí all claims growing out of the transactions given to B. Held, that this was not a mere accounting of an agent to his principal, in which any mistake or fraud in the a ccounts rendered would bea ground for opening the settlement, but was a compromise, in which each yielded something oí what he considered his rights, and hence chancery would not set it aside.</p> <p>2. Same — Tendekixo Baok Deeds.</p> <p>B. having made a deed to C. of all his interest in the lands acquired along’ the route, as part of the settlement, O. could not maintain a bill to sot aside the settlement without tendoring a reconveyance of this property.</p>

<p>In Equity. On petition for rehearing.</p>

At Law. Action by the First National Bank of Danville, Ill., against J. A. Cunningham upon a judgment rendered against him bj' a state court of Illinois. Heard on demurrer to the answer.

<p>Ill Equity. Bill supplementary to an action in ejectment, for the purpose of ascertaining the value of betterments and improvements.</p>

At Law. Action by the National Water-Works Company against School-District No. 7 of Kansas City, to recover compensation for water used in the school buildings. On motion to set aside a nonsuit.

<p>At Law. Action by tbe commissioners of the sinking fund of Louisville j Ky., against Lewis F. Buckner, as executor of James F. Buckner, and others, to recover taxes alleged to have been illegally collected by James F. Buckner, as collector of internal revenue for tbe United States. Heard on deinurrer to the bill.</p>

<p>AtLaw. Action by S. D. Hicks against tlie administratrix of William James, deceased, to recover taxes alleged to have been illegally collected by him as Rnited States internal revenue collector, at Richmond. Va.</p> <p>Upon the subject of refunding taxes, Act Cong. July 13, 1866, c. 184, as now embodied in Rev. St. U. S. § 3220, provides, among other things, that “the commissioner of internal revenue, subject to regulations prescribed by the secretary of the treasury, is authorized, on appeal to him made, to remit, refund, and paj’ back all taxes erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, all penalties collected without authority, and all taxes that appear to be unjustly assessed or excessive in amount or in any manner wrongfully collected.” Section 19 of the same act, as amended by the act of June 6, 1872, c. 815, § 44, (Rev. St. U. S. § 3226,) provides, in substance, that no suit shall be brought to recover taxes illegally or erroneously collected, unless an appeal has first been taken to the commissioner of internal revenue, and a decision thereon had by him: provided, that a suit may nevertheless be brought if his decision is delayed more than six months, hut that no suit shall be brought more than a year after a claim is rejected.</p>

<p>Customs DtiTrES — CuAssrpic-vriox—Sufficiency of Protest,</p> <p>The collector classified certain “shank steel, ” used in the manufacture of boots and shoes, under paragraph i-lti of the tariff act of October 1,1890, and also imposed an additional duty of one-quarter of a cent per pound on the goods, as “cold-rolled” steel, under paragraph 152. The importer protested against the additional duty, and on appeal the board of general appraisers hold that the original classification was wrong, and that the goods should have been entered under paragraph 140, as “other steel, ” etc. They also found that they were not subject to the additional duty, but that the protest was insufficient, because it failed to point out tho proper classification. Held that, as the objection was made only to the additional duty, and not to the original classification, the importer was not bound to point out the error in the latter, and the protest was sufficient.</p>

At Law. Appeal by the collector of customs at New York from the decision of the general appraisers concerning certain merchandise imported by Schilling, Stollwerck & Co.

<p>At Law. Proceeding in garnishment.</p>

<p>Immigration — Destitute Aliens — Stowawaa's Enrolled as Sailors — Duty of Master.</p> <p>Where a stowaway, found uDon a British vessel soon after leaving Liverpool, is in good faith regularly enrolled as a member of the crew for the voyage to New Orleans and return, his status is thereby fixed as a British sailor, and he cannot be regarded as a destitute alien immigrant, so as to charge the master, upon arrival at New Orleans, with the duties and penalties imposed by Act Cong. March 3, 1891, in respect to the immigration and importation of aliens; and the fact that such sailor deserts while in port does not affect the master’s responsibility.</p>

<p>Presentment- of J. C. Baird for obstructing an officer of the customs in attempting to arrest a Chinaman.</p>

<p>I. Patents for Inventions — Patentarle Novelty — Design for Rubber Mats.</p> <p>The third claim of letters patent No. 11,208, issued May 27,1879, to the New York Belting & Rubber Company, as assignee of George Woffenden, is for a “design for a rubber mat, consisting of a series of parallel corrugations, the general line of direction of the corrugations in one section making angles with or being deflected to meet those of the corrugations in the contiguous or other sections; ” the object being to produce kaleidoscopic, mosaic, and mo ire effects. Held that, as to the specific design, the claim possesses patentable novelty, as the effects produced by the design as a whole have never been realized or approached by any previous arrangement of corrugations.</p> <p>3. Same — Infringement.</p> <p>Although the patent shows a square mat having a square central panel traversed by diagonal lines, it is infringed by an oblong mat possessing substantially the same features, excepting that in the central panel, which is also oblong, the diagonal lines are not run from corner to corner, to form acute and obtuse angles, but merely form a right angle in each end of the panel; it being apparent that this was merely a mechanical change necessary to adapt the design to an oblong mat.</p> <p>3. Same — Assignment Pendente Lite — Pleading and Proof.</p> <p>When, pending a suit for infringement, the patent is assigned, with a reservation of past damages, and on proof thereof the cause is retained for the purpose of recovering such damages, a subsequent reassignment to the complainant cannot be proved under the original bill.</p>

<p>Patents fob Inventions — Infringement—State Statute of Limitations.</p> <p>As the constitution of the United States and the legislation of congress have given the national government exclusive control of the subject of patents, state statutes of limitations do not apply to suits for infringement, even in the absence of any national statute of limitations applicable thereto.</p>

<p>1. Patents for Inventions — Infringement—Paper-Bag Machinery.</p> <p>In letters patent No. 337,965, issued March 16,1886, to Lorenz and Honiss for an improvement in paper-bag machinery, designed to manufacture continuous tucked paper tubing into paper blanks, with diamond-folded ends, the claim for a reciprocating carriage to support the tubing, and, by its forward and backward movement, to co-operate in regulating the working of other parts of the mechanism, is not infringed by a machine in which the same function is performed by a revolving carriage.</p> <p>3. Same.</p> <p>The claim for pivoted lingers, combined with a coiled spring to distend them, the fingers being designed to enter, while distended, the forward end of the tube,</p> <p>• and then move upward and backward through an arc of 180 degrees, carrying the upper fold to a flat table, and completing tbe diamond-shaped fold, is not infringed by a machine with fingers which, while closed, enter the tube, arid then operate merely to lift up the upper fold thereof, while the side folders press in the sides of the tube to the proper shape.</p>

<p>In Admiralty. Libel by Nathaniel C. Scott against the steam-ship Parthian for damages for a collision with the schooner Ayr, and cross-libel by the Boston &'Philadelphia Steam-Ship Company as owners of Parthian against the Ayr. Decree in the district court for Scott against the Parthian. The steam-ship company appeals.</p>

In Admiralty. Libel by the Boston & Philadelphia Steam-Ship Company against the coal-barge Albany for salvage services. Decree by the district court for $4,000. 42 Fed. Rep. 64. Aaron Post, claimant, appeals.

<p>In Admiralty. Libel by John Wood against the canal-boat Wilmington.</p>

<p>1. Maritime Contract — What Constitutes— Lacs carrjift Stranded Vessel.</p> <p>A contract lor launching a vessel, where the vessel has Leen carried a quarter of a mile up the beach by a storm, is a maritime cont ract, lor which the vessel is liable in rem. ’</p> <p>1 Contracts — J)ei.ay in Performing — When Uneeasonaelh.</p> <p>A schooner of 100 tons having been carried about a quart or of a mile up the beach by a storm, the master, on September 1st, contracted with a landsman experienced in moving houses to launch her ior $1,000, to bo paid when the launching was completed, and not before. The contractor promply began work, but in several weeks had only moved her about twice her length. He then abandoned this plan, and hired a dredge to dig a canal up to her, which worked at intervals for some time, and then quit. On December 5th the dredge was again hired, and by December 22d had finished the canal up to the schooner’s stern. After an unsuccessful effort, at launching, nothing- more was done until January 4th, when the master notified the contractor that, unless the work was completed in one week, he would terminate the contract. On the expiration thereof, notice was given that-other persons had been engaged to finish the job. With the new employes the master succeeded in launching the schooner by March 9th. Held that, in view of the timo consumed by the latter, the delay of the original contractor was not unreasonable, and he was entitled to recover the reasonable value of his services.</p> <p>3. Same — F IIkpresentations.</p> <p>The fact that the contractor agreed to “launch the schooner. ” and to “furnish all materials, labor, and implements necessary to launch” her, did not imply that ho was an experienced wrecker, or that he possessed the machinery, dredges, etc. that might be found necessary.</p> <p>4. CONTKAOT FOK SALVAGE — LlBEL IN REM.</p> <p>An express contract for salvage services does not bar a libel in rem, for compensation.</p>

<p>In Admiralty.</p> <p>Libel by Victor H. Muller, master of the steam-ship Eugenie, against Claus Sprockels to recover freight. The gross freight was 87,587.72, which bad been paid less tbe following deductions: Entrance fee, $5; custom-house fees, $1.40; tug-boat services delivering orders, $2: wharf-age, $225; stevedore, $1,421.61; advertising, $5.95; stationery, etc., $10; “attendance” fee, $50; commission, $190.82; short delivery, §12.07.</p>

<p>In Admiralty. Libel in ran by the Union Dry-Dock Company against the F. E. 8pinner.</p> <p>The libel alleges that on September 17, 1885, the libelant furnished and delivered 1,480 feet of steel chain, worth 8868, to the steam propeller F. E. Spinner, at the request of her master and owners. That the libelant relied upon the credit of the vessel as well as that of the owners and master, and would not have furnished the chain except upon the credit of the vessel. That by reason of these facts the libelant acquired a linn upon the vessel for the value of the chain. The answer of the owner of the Spinner denies every allegation of the libel which seeks to charge the vessel with liability. On the 10th of September, 1885, the libelant received the following telegram:</p> <p>“Detroit, Sept. 10th, 1885.</p> <p>“To Capt. M. M. Drake, Supt. Union Dry-Dock, Buffalo, N. T.: Want to buy eight or nine hundred ieet two inch chain; understand you have it. What’s your best price and terms? Answer quick.</p> <p>“Detroit Tug- and TRANSIT Co.”</p> <p>This was followed by various telegrams and letters, which culminated in an agreement between the libelani and the Detroit Tug & Transit Company as evidenced by the following telegrams:</p> <p>“Buffalo, Sept. 16, 1885.</p> <p>“Detroit Tug & Transit Co., Detroit, Mich.: I will deliver to the tug you name on her arrival heie the chain you speak of. My understanding is that you are to have this chain with the option of purchasing it, decision to be made and communicated to me by November first, at a price of forty dollars per ton, or you are to have it for forty-five days at a rental of five hundred dollars. Decision to be made as above, chain to be taken here without cost to us and returned here on same terms, if you choose to have it on rental, damage if any to be made good by you. All the above conditioned on my receipt from you at once of a telegram accepting above terms.</p> <p>“W. Bullard.”</p> <p>On the same day the following answer was received:</p> <p>.“Detroit, Mioit., Sept. 16, 1885.</p> <p>“ W. Bullard, Buffalo: Your telegram received; we accept terms and conditions stated therein about chains.</p> <p>“Detroit Tug- & Transit Co.,</p> <p>“S. A. Murphy.” ■</p> <p>Mr. Bullard was the general manager of the libelant at Buffalo. Prior to the first telegram of September 10, 1885, the Spinner was lying sunk in the Sault Ste. Marie river. The chain was delivered on board a tug sent by the Detroit Tug & Transit Company to Búllalo for that purpose, and was used in raising the Spinner by the International Wrecking Company, which company had a contract to raise her with the insurers, to whom the wreck had been abandoned.</p> <p>After the propeller had been raised, and on the 3d of November, 1885, the following letter was sent by Mr. Bullard:</p> <p>“Buffalo, N. Y., Nov. 3, 1885.</p> <p>“Mr. S. A. Murphy, Prest. Det. Tug & Trans. Co., Detroit, Mich. — Dear Sir: By terms of our agreement of Sept. 16th you were to communicate to me by Nov. 1st your decision as to whether you would pay rental of $500 for 45 days’ use of steel chain loaned you or whether you would purchase same at $40 per ton. I have heard nothing from you in regard to the matter. Can I draw on you at sight for the value of the chain at the agreed price named above? Yours, truly, W. Bullard, Gen’l Mgr.”</p> <p>This letter was never answered. The chain was not returned or paid for.</p>

<p>In Admiralty. Libel in rem for wages.</p>

<p>In Admiralty. Libel’by Daniel II. Chamberlain, as receiver of the South Carolina Railway Company, against the British steam-ship Tor-gorm, to recover possession of 52 bales of cotton.</p>

<p>Shipping Regulations — Inspection—Passengers.</p> <p>Where the wife and neighbors of a tug-owner go upon the tug during a trial trip, merely to witness the test of her machinery, they are not passengers, within the meaning of the statute requiring passenger boats to be inspected and licensed; and the owner is not liable to the lino imposed by Rev. St. TI. S. § 4499, for navigating any vessel contrary to the shipping regulations.</p>

At Law. Assumpsit by Alfred Earnshaw against Isaac McHose & Sons to recover on $56,000 as the agreed price of iron ore sold and delivered by the plaintiff to defendants in accordance with contract, which provided, inter alia: “Price to be at the rate of seven dollars and seventy-five cents ($7.75) per ton of 2,240 pounds for the mined ore, commonly known as ‘Marbelia Lump,’ and seven dollars and thirty-five cents ($7.85) for the sand ore, commonly known as ‘Marbelia Sand,’…

<p>1. Shipping — Chabtuk-Pahtv—Construction.</p> <p>Under a charter-party which provides that the charterer shall furnish a cargo of logs, “to be delivered along side, and held at charterer’s risk and expense,"the charterer is not entitled to damages for the loss of logs delivered along-side, but carried away by reason of negligent mooring.</p> <p>2. AmMiB.vr.Tr — Evidence—Ex Paute Documents.</p> <p>The official documents of the officers of a foreign nation having jurisdiction of a port of lading, containing what purports to be a protest by a charterer against the action of the vessel, and depositions in support of the facts alleged in such protest, being ex parte, are not admissible to establish a controverted fact.</p> <p>8. Shipping — Lien poit Febight.</p> <p>The refusal of a master to deliver a cargo until security is furnished for the freight gives no right of action to the charterer, as the cargo is subject toa lion for freight.</p>

<p>1. Removal ov Causes — Time op Filiko Petition — Demubbeb.</p> <p>As t,he removal act requires tbe petition tobe tiled at or before tbe time “defendant is required by tbe laws of tbe state” to answer, tbe tiling' oí a demurrer, instead of an answer, as allowed by Comp. St. Mont. p. 81, § 87, does not enlarge the time Cor filing the petition; for the allowance of an answer after demurrer is within the discretion of the court, and is not in accordance with any provision of law.</p> <p>0. Same — Rule op Cotjkt.</p> <p>The time allowed by the court for answering, after the overruling of such demurrer, is not “the time * * * defendant is required ':i * * by a rule of the state court * * * to answer, ” within tho meaning of that clause of the removal act; for that has reference only to jurisdictions where the time to answer is fixed by a general rule of court instead of by statute.</p>

On Motion to Remand. Action by James E. Martin against John F. Carter, Selena H. Carter, the Montana Mining & Reduction Company, John W. Cook, and Samuel Whitney. The cause was removed to the United States circuit court, and defendants Cook and Whitney moved to remand it..

In Equity. Bill by W. R. Hall and others, residents of Tennessee, in a state court, as creditors and stockholders of the Chattanooga Agricultural Works, a Tennessee corporation, and others, to wind up the affairs of the corporation, pay its debts, and distribute the surplus, if any«, among the stockholders.

At Law. Action by Joseph W. Davis, assistant treasurer of Cham-paign county, Ohio, against Ephraim Tillotson and Mary S. Tillotson to recover taxes. Heard on motion to remand to the state court, from which it was removed.

<p>In Equity. Suit to foreclose a chattel mortgage. On motion to remand to the state court.</p>

Petition by the Helena & Livingston Smelting & Reduction Company fora writ of certiorari commanding a state court of Montana to remove the cause of .lohn «T. Hall against said' company to the United States circuit court.

<p>In Equity. Suit by A. A. Wenham against William S. Switzer. Heard on motion to strike depositions from the tiles.</p>

In Equity. On motion by defendant to suspend the operation of an injunction granted herein (44 Fed. Rep. 532j pending appeal to the supremo court.

<p>In Equity. Suit by Elihu Thomson against Thomas P. Beal, as receiver of the Maverick National Bank, to recover interest on a certificate of deposit. Heard on demurrer to the complaint.</p>

In Equity. Bill by G. Weidenfeld against the Sugar Run Railroad Company and others to restrain that compai y from appropriating the right of way of the Allegheny & Kinzua Railroad Company, in which complainant is a stockholder.

<p>In Equity. Suit by the Sioux Falls National Bank against Ole S. Swenson and others to enjoin the collection of taxes.</p>

<p>In Equity. Suit .by the Dakota National Bank against Ole S. Swenson and others to enjoin the collection of taxes.</p>

At Law. This is a proceeding in mandamus, instituted by the state of Ohio upon the relation of the city of Columbus to compel the defendant railroad companies, all of which, with the exception of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company, are citizens of the state of Ohio, to construct a sáfe and sufficient crossing over the tracks at High street in said city, and to restore said highway to its original condition of usefulness.

' At Law. Petition by L. C. Chase & Co. for a review of the decision of the hoard of general appraisers as to the classification of common goat hair.

At Law. Suit by the United States Bank against the county of Lyon, Iowa, and others. Heard on motion to transfer the cause from the equity to the lawr docket.

At Law. This is an application for a commission to take testimonyof witnesses residing in Han Francisco in a proceeding under the Chinese exclusion acts, pending before Edward L. Strong, a United States commissioner at Ogdensburgh in this district. The affidavit upon which the motion is based is not entitled in the United States district court, but “before Edward L. Strong, United States commissioner.” The motion is made at a special session of the district court.

Application by D. G. Hitchcock & Co. for a writ of mandamus to the mayor and aldermen of the City of Galveston, requiring them to levy a tax for the purpose of paying a judgment against the city, owned by him. Heard on demurrer to the return to the alternative writ.

<p>1. Cef.p.ks op Oouiit — Fees—Fii.ixo Disoiiabhks of Witnesses.</p> <p>The dorks of the federal courts are entitled to fees for filing the discharges given by tbo district attorney to witnesses for the government, since Rev. Í3t. U. S. 877, provides that such witnesses shall not depart without leave of the Court or the district attorney, and it is tho approved practice to give them written discharges for use in drawing their pay from the marshal.</p> <p>2. Same — Fimxo Receipts.</p> <p>Although there is no law expressly requiring the clerks of the federal courts to take receipts from the United States collector for fines paid by persons sentenced for violation of the internal revenue laws, yol, as such receipts a>. j necessary for the proper settling of the accounts of both clerks and collectors, they are papers, within tho meaning of Rev. St. lj. S. § 838, cl. 8, giving fees to the clerks for filing- “ a declaration, plea, or other paper. ”</p> <p>3. Sami; — Repokt ox Accoi;xts.</p> <p>Under the rule of court requiring the district attorney to examine the accounts of the. marshal, clerk, and commissioners, and make a written report thereon to the court, such report, though not required by statute, becomes a part of the records of the court; and tho clerk is entitled to a fee for filing tho same.</p> <p>4. Same — Uiuctieicate of Amavwaxce of Accotjxts.</p> <p>Act Cong. Fob. 23, 1875, requires the accounts and vouchers of the marshal, clerk, and district attorney to bo made out in duplicate, the original to bo forwarded to Washington, and the duplicate to be retained by the clerk; the papers forwarded to be accompanied by a certified copy of the order of allowance. Held, that the latter paper is no part of the vouchers required to be made in duplicate, and hence tho clerk is not entitled to a fee for duplicates thereof.</p> <p>5. Same — Extrifs of Submission' ax» Appbotat, of Aococxts.</p> <p>Under Act Cong. Feb. 38, 1875, requiring the official accounts to be, presented to the court in the presence of the district attorney or his assistant, it is necessary that an entry should he made, showing such submission; and the clerk is entitled to a fee for making the same, as well as for entering the subsequent order of approval or disapproval.</p> <p>6. Same — Drawing Juries.</p> <p>The clerk is entitled to compensation for services rendered in procuring the names of persons to serve as jurors, and in drawing the juries for the terms of court in the district. Goodrich v. V. S., 43 Fed. Hep. 393, followed.</p> <p>7. Same — Duplicate Vouchees op Accounts.</p> <p>The clerk is entitled to fees for filing the vouchers and duplicates accompanying the accounts of the marshal, since, by the instructions of the department of justice, he is required, when sending forward the originals, to certify that duplicates thereof are on file in his office.</p> <p>8. Same — Copt op Bail-Bond.</p> <p>Rev. St. U. S. § 1018, authorizes the sureties on a bail-bond to arrest their principal, and to deliver him to the marshal before a judge or committing officer, and requires the latter, on request of the sureties, to enter their exoneration upon the recognizance or a certified copy thereof. Held, that the clerk is not entitled to a .fee from the government for making a certified copy for this purpose, as the sureties themselves should pay him for the same.</p> <p>9. Same — Issuing Warrant to Bring Prisoner prom Jail.</p> <p>Under Rev. St. U. S. § 1080, a formal warrant is not necessary to authorize a marshal to bring a prisoner confined at Sioux City to Ft. Dodge for trial; and the clerk is not entitled to a fee for issuing the same.</p> <p>10. Same — Indictment—Copy Furnished to Accused.</p> <p>The clerk is entitled to a fee for a certificate and seal to a copy of an indictment furnished to the defendant under the rule of court, as it is the usual practice to cei’tify copies of all parts of the record furnished by the clerk.</p> <p>11. Same — Indorsing Approval op Recognizances.</p> <p>As it is the duty of the clerk to approve recognizances in criminal cases, his in-dorsement of approval thereon, in accordance with the usual practice, is the making of an entry or certificate, within the meaning of Rev. St. U. S. § S3S, allowing a fee of 15 cents per folio for such entries.</p> <p>13.Same — Rating Jurors.</p> <p>The clerk is entitled to fees for administer' ig the oath to jurors, both grand and petit, when they prove up their attendance before him; for the issuance of a certificate to each juror showing the number of days’ attendance and the miles traveled, as a basis for the mai-shal’s payment; for entering the order requiring the marshal to pay the jurors, and for making copies thereof for the marshal; and for making a report to the court of the per di.eni and mileage due the jurors, — since all these acts are required by the rule of court, and are useful cheeks upon the accounts of both officers.</p> <p>13. Same — Order por Drawing Jurors.”</p> <p>The clerk is entitled to fees for the certificate and seal attached to the copy of the order for drawing juries, under the provisions of the statute and rules of court, as this is the proper method of furnishing that officer with evidence of the court’s order.</p> <p>14. Same — Final Entries in Criminal Cases.</p> <p>According to the settled practice in Iowa, the final entries in criminal eases should contain the' following papers, for which the clerks of the federal courts m Iowa are entitled to folio fees: The commissioner’s order for appearance before the grand jury; the entry showing the due presentment of the indictment by the grand jury; the indictment; the bench-warrant, and return thereon; the arraignment and plea; the entry showing trial and verdict; the sentence and final orders, such as granting new trial, modifying or suspending sentence, or directing manner and place of executing it: the rmttlmViS and return showing the execution of the sentence; and the entry of satisfaction when a fine is paid. But it should not contain the bail-bonds or entries of default and forfeiture thereof, the orders for attachments of witnesses who fail to appear, the attachments themselves, or the return thereon. •</p> <p>15. Same — Swearing Witnesses.</p> <p>The docket fee of three dollars in criminal cases does not include compensation for swearing the witnesses, and the clerk is entitled to the statutory fee therefor.</p> <p>16. Same — Copt op Sentence.</p> <p>Code Iowa, § 4515, requires that when a prisoner is committed to the custody of a jailer the latter shall be furnished with a certified cojiy of the entry of judgment. Held that, when a prisoner is committed to the state jail under the sentence of a federal court, it is the duty of the clerk to furnish such certified copy and he is entitled to the statutory fee therefor.</p> <p>17. SAMK~t'01>lSS OB’ ISTUICTMEXTS.</p> <p>When the clerk, upon the written order of the district attorney, furnishes him with copies of indictments containing numerous counts against the officers of a national bank, and it clearly appears that such copies are necessary for the proper preparation, of the government’s «me, the clerk will bo allowed folio fees therefor.</p> <p>18. Same — Mittimus.</p> <p>When a prisoner is ordered to be confined until his fine is paid the clerk is on-titled to fees for issuing the mltUmun, for filing the same when returned by the marshal, and for entering his return thereon.</p> <p>19. Same — Vouchees.</p> <p>The order of the court of the northern district of Iowa, directing the marshal to procure the necessary record-books for the Cedar Ilapids division of the district, constituted the proper voucher for his expenditures; and, as he is required to file with the clerk a duplicate of all vouchers which accompany his account, the clerk was entitled to fees for furnishing duplicates of the order.</p>

<p>At Law. Action by the Vulcan Iron-Works against the Cyclone Stoam Snow-Plow Company and Commodore P. Jones, upon a replevin bond. Heard on motion for a new trial.</p>

<p>Statutes — Amendment—Whex Retrospective — Disabled Soldier.</p> <p>Rev. St. XT. S. §§ 4787, 4788, provide that certain ex-soldiers, sailors, etc., shall be entitled to l-eceive from the war department artificial limbs, or a money commutation therefor, from the time of their application therefor, and “at the expiration of every five years thereafter. ” Act Cong. March 3,1891, amended the provision by substituting “three years” for “five years.” Held, that the amendment was not reti’ospective, so as to entitle a person who had been receiving commutation money at intervals of five years to back pay equivalent to the same sums at three-year intervals.</p>

<p>1. Sale — Warranty—Brands of Meat.</p> <p>A dealer in cured meats in Chicago agreed in writing to furnish a dealer in provisions in Liverpool “75 boxes Kingan’s Cumberland Cut bacon, ” and “50 boxes Thallon’s Stafford middles, * * goods all warranted to be of choicest quality of grade and brand, or sale to be voided, and goods to be sold for account of” the seller. Both of the packers mentioned were putting up brands of meat exclusively for the Liverpool market, which bore their respective names, and other brands, without their names, for the general market. The seller furnished the latter brands. Their quality was equal to that of the others; but those bearing the packers’ names had a first-class reputation in the Liverpool market, and always brought a better price there, the others being rated as second-class. Similar contracts were filled by other dealers by furnishing the same meat. Held, that there was a breach of the warranty.</p> <p>2. Same — Evidence.</p> <p>The fact that the brands bearing the packers’ names were not for sale by brokers generally, but only by their designated agents in Liverpool, was no proof that such brands were not intended by the contract, when it did not appear that the pm-chaser was aware of that fact.</p> <p>' 3. Same — Effect of Receiving G-oods.</p> <p>Nor is it a defense that the purchaser received the goods after being notified by the bills of lading that other brands were furnished, since the contract gave him authority in such event to receive and sell the goods on the seller’s account.</p> <p>4. Same — Effect of Bating Draft.</p> <p>Acceptance and payment by the purchaser of drafts drawn upon him in payment therefor, after he became aware of the breach of contract, were not prejudicial to him.</p>

<p>At Law. Action of deceit.</p>

<p>At Law. Proceeding to condemn lands.</p>

At Law. Action by Mary Kelley, administratrix of the estate of Nicholas Kelley, for damages in causing the death of her intestate. The main question determined in this case was as to the measure of damages, and the report was limited to that part of the judge’s charge to the jury which bears upon this subject.

<p>1. BANKRTJPTaT — FrEPBRENCE OP CREDITOR — CHATTEL MORTGAGE.</p> <p>Rev. St. U. S. § 5.188, providing that any conveyance by a debtor in contemplar tion of insolvency, and with intent to prefer any creditor, shall he void if made within four months before the filing of a petition'in bankruptcy, does not apply to a chattel mortgage made with such intent before the four months, hut, by agreement, kept from record until within thai-time.</p> <p>2. Same.</p> <p>The giving of a chattel mortgage with intent to create a preference is invalid when made within the four months.</p>

<p>Chinese Restriction Act — Right of Entry — Certificate of Identity.</p> <p>The Chinese restriction act of 18S4, § 6, provides that any Chinóse person other than, a laborer, entitled hy treaty to enter the United States, shall have a certificate of his identity issued by the Chinese government, and viséd hy the diplomatic representatives of the United States, etc., which “shall he the sole evidence permissible on the part of the person so producing the same to establish a right to entry into the United States. ” Held, that a Chinese person who fails to produce such a certificate cannot establish a right to enter by any other evidence.</p>

At Law. Information against Dennis Penn for a petty larceny committed in the National Cemetery on the Arlington estate, Alexandria county, Va. On plea to the jurisdiction, and demurrer thereto. The United States purchased the Arlington estate during the war at a tax-sale, and has held possession ever since, but jurisdiction thereof was never ceded by the state of Virginia. The plea was based upon this fact.

<p>At Law. Prosecution of Fred Partello for rape. On demurrer to a plea to the indictment.</p>

<p>In Equity. Separate suits by Benjamin J. Falk against the Brett Lithographing Company in the one case, and Davis S. Brown and Dela-plaine Brown in the other, for infringement of a copyrighted photograph.</p>

<p>1. Patents t?ok Inventions — .Novelty—Utility.</p> <p>Letters patent No. 379,644, issued March 20, 1888, to Michael Haughey, for an improved device to prevent interfering by horses, and consisting of a boot buckled around the leg just above the pastern j oint, and having attached to it short pendant straps on which are strung small rubber balls, covers a new and useful invention.</p> <p>2. Same — Prior Use — Evidence.</p> <p>Although the defendant in a suit for infringement adduced considerable evidence of prior use, the fact that he was unable to produce a single device antedating the patent deprived his evidence of the certainty required to overthrow a patent.</p>

<p>In Equity. Suit by George H. Wilson against the Ansonia Brass & Copper Company for infringement of a patent.</p>

<p>1. Patents for Inventions — Infringement—Method for Sotplting Street-Lamps tvith Oil.</p> <p>The first claim of letters patent No. 223,856, issued December 23,1879, to Henry S. Belden, for a method of supplying street-lamps with oil, consisting in providing the lamps with removable reservoirs of a number greater than the lamps, and providing a conveyance for transporting filled reservoirs, and substituting them for the emptied ones, is not infringed by a device for transporting filled reservoirs and substituting them for the emptied ones, which does not use the case or rack for conveying the reservoirs described in the Belden patent. •</p> <p>2. Same — Oil Reservoir.</p> <p>The second claim of lettei’s patent No. '286,211, issued October 9,'1883, to Alfred L. Mack, for an oil reservoir having its bottom set in to form a flange to fit over and upon a suitable tank adapted for peznnanent connection to the service pipe of a lamp, said bottom having an opening provided with a screw-cap, arid air and feed pipes connected thereto, is not infringed by a device which does not combine a screw-cap with the feed and air pipes, and which does not use a second pipe as a feed-pipe, the patent being limited to the entire combination, none of its elements being new.</p>

Libel by Edwin N. Pratt, as master, etc., of the schooner Helen Augusta, against the brig Havilah, her tackle, etc. Decree below for libelant. Lincoln Coombs and others, claimants, appeal. Heard on motion to dismiss the appeal.

<p>1. Admiralty — Practice—Submitting Cause oh Pleadings.</p> <p>Upon the submission of the cause on the pleadings, averments of new matter in the answer, or matters alleged in the libel and denied generally, must be wholly disregarded, as unproved, except in so far as they may be admissions against interest.</p> <p>2. Derelicts at Sea — Dangerous Obstructions — Destruction oe by Otiier Vessels —Master’s Personal Tort.</p> <p>A scow in tow of a steamer on a voyage from Charleston to Nicaragua having broken adrift oif Fortune island in July, 1890, was drifting in the track of steamers going up and down the coast for over three weeks, when she was taken in tow by the defendant steamer, and on the following day set fire to for the purpose of destruction.- The libelants, according to the libel, had notice from time to time during this interval of the whereabouts of the scow, but gave no evidence that they made any efforts to rescue her, or that they intended to do so. Held, that the inference from these facts was that the scow was abandoned by the owners, to be dealt with by other vessels that might meet her as prudence should dictate; that by the nature of the vessel she was an obstruction dangerous to navigation; and there being no evidence of her value, or that she was worth salvage, held, that there was no presumption, in the absence of evidence, that the act of the master of the River Mersey in destroying this obstruction was either tortious or negligent; but that it was presumptively a beneficial service in the public interest, for the safety of life and property at sea, — a work similar to that in which the public vessels of maritime nations, including our own, are more or less engaged. Held, also, that the master’s act, if tortious, was a personal tort, and not being done for the benefit of the ship, or in the course of navigating the ship, or within the scope of his powers as representative .of the owners, neither the owners nor their property were liable.</p>

In Admiralty. The Electro-Dynamic; Company of Philadelphia libeled the yacht Electron to recover for machinery furnished. James Bigler filed a cross-libel, and moved for stay until security is filed.

<p>In Admiralty. Libel by a river pilot for wages.</p>

<p>2, Shipi-ino Owner Pro Hao Vice — Wages.</p> <p>A part owner, having agreed with the other owners to run the vessel on shares, and pay her disbursements, is owner pro hac vice, and personally liable to the master, whom he has employed, for all his wages and disbursements.</p> <p>S. Same — Limite» Liability — Disbursements.</p> <p>The vessel being lost, the act of 1884 limiting liability applies in favor of the other part owners as to the master’s disbursements, but not as to the master’s wages; but the other owners are entitled to indemnity from the owner pro hac vice.</p> <p>8, Admiralty — Practice—Amendment.</p> <p>The owner pro hac vice being sued with others as joint owner, an amendment of the libel was permitted to recover the disbursements for which he only was liable; but, no proper account having been submitted to him by the master, no costs up to the present time were allowed, nor any further proceedings, until an account, with proper vouchers, had been submitted, and opportunity afforded for settlement.</p>

<p>1. Common Gamier — Damage mom Other Goons — Vessel’s Risk — Bona Ride Fan-CHASER.</p> <p>A common carrier vessel under the usual bill of lading takes the risk of damage to goods through contact with other goods, when not caused by peril of the sea, as. respects a bona fide purchaser, though the goods are shipped by the charterer.</p> <p>2. Same — Leakage or Oil.</p> <p>On delivery of plumbago in barrels shipped under the usual bill of lading, a part were found damaged by cocoa-nut oil, stowed above the plumbago. In other respects the cargo was well stowed. There was no shifting, the usual dunnage, and no extraordinary perils on the voyage. The damage arose either from unfit oil casks, or improper stowage of such casks over the plumbago. Held, that the ship took the risk and was liable for damage.</p>

<p>In Admiralty. Libel for damages to cargo.</p>

<p>Iii Admiralty. Edward S. Abell sued the tugs Nathan Hale and Gertrude to recover for personal injuries.</p>

<p>In Admiralty. Libel by John A. Pihlag against the schooner Elsie Fay to recover for personal injuries.</p>

<p>Salvage — Pibe on Dock — Towage—Master’s Sele-Sacrieioe.</p> <p>A fire breaking out about noon in a bay and straw store-bouse, within 50 feet of the bulk-head at Coxsaekie, in the North river, where the large passenger steamer Kaaterskill was lying without steam up, the ferry-boat Coxsaekie, from the adjoining slip, on moving out for her own safety, was called back to tow the steamer away, and thereupon, within two or three minutes, got along-side and towed the steamer to a place of safety. On contradictory testimony, held, that the steamer at the time when the Coxsaekie took hold of her, was not out of the way of great danger, and but for her help would probably have been greatly damaged or wholly destroyed; and the steamer being worth from8100,000 to 8140,000, and the ferry-boat 88,000, held. 82,500, a reasonable salvage award; and it appearing that, when the ferry-boat’s master went to the help of the Kaaterskill, his own hotel, very near the burning warehouse, was threatened by the fire, and was afterwards consumed, held, that his conduct in going to the relief of the Kaaterskill, instead of attending to his own property, belonged to the class of heroic and self-sacrificing actions, and deserved recognition as such; and 81,200 of the award was allowed to him, the lerry-boat not having incurred any damage or danger in the service.</p>

<p>In Admiralty. Libel of information against the steam-tug Annie S. Cooper for failure to carry tlie lights required by law while towing a log-raft.</p>

<p>Removai, op Causes — Citizenship of Railiioad Cobpokatioas.</p> <p>When a railroad charter gives the company a right to sell its road within the state to any company incorporated by another state, the purchasing, company to have “ all the rights and privileges ” of the seller, a non- resident company, which purchases the road to form an extension of its line, does not thereby become a resident corporation, so as to take away its right to remove a cause from the state to a federal court.</p>

<p>Taxation op Costs — Docket Fees.</p> <p>When a demurrer to a hill in equity is sustained, a docket fee of $30 is taxable in favor of defendant.</p>

<p>1. Mortgages — Payment—Evidence—Statements in Interest.</p> <p>In a suit to set aside, a foreclosure sale, letters written by the mortgagor before the foreclosure, and tending to'show that the mortgage debt had then been entirely paid, are inadmissible to bind the purchaser when there is no evidence of a conspiracy between him and the mortgagor to keep the mortgage alive after payment, in order to defraud subsequent lienholders. Such letters are merely un-sworn statements, made in the interest of the writer.</p> <p>3. Same — Rights op Second Mortgagee.</p> <p>The fact that the assignee of a mortgage which constitutes a valid and subsisting lien transfers the same to the children of the mortgagor without consideration gives no ground of complaint to the holder of a second mortgage.</p> <p>3. Same.</p> <p>The fact that a mortgage was foreclosed by the assignee thereof in the name of the original mortgagee, after such assignee had transferred the mortgage to the mortgagor’s children, gives the holder of a second mortgage no right to attack the title of such childi’en as purchasers at the foreclosure sale.</p> <p>4. Limitation op Actions — Rights op Second Mortgagee.</p> <p>Act Ga. 1869, declaring that all proceedings to recover debts due before June 1, 1865, shall be begun by January 1, 18?'0, is not available in favor of a second mortgagee, to defeat the title of the purchasers at the foreclosure of a first mortgage, though, as between the parties to it, the first mortgage was barred thereby before its foreclosure.</p>

<p>Violation of Customs Raw — Landing “ Merchandise. ”</p> <p>The compass of a stoam-ship, being part of its apparel and tackle, is not “ merchandise, ” within the meaning of Rev. St. TT. S. § 2873, imposing a punishment upon the master of a vessel for being concerned in landing any merchandise without tho permit required by the preceding section. IT. 8. v. Chain Cable, 2 Story, 3G2, followed.</p>

<p>• At Law. Action against James C. Peace and others upon a distillery warehouse bond.</p>

At Law. Action by Calvert P. Cottrell against Daniel K. Tenney and others for conspiracy to wreck the John B. Jeffrey Printing Company, whereof complainant was a stockholder. Heard on demurrer to amended complaint.

<p>Wills — Specific and Demonstrative Legacies.</p> <p>A bequest of “$2,000 of the South Ward Loan of Chester, Pennsylvania, ” by a person owning $10,000 worth of bonds known by that designation, is a demonstrative, and not specific, legacy, and is not adeemed by the payment of the bonds before the testator’s death.</p>

<p>Pensions — Procuring Payment — Excessive Compensation.</p> <p>At the instance of an ignorant pensioner, an attorney filled out the vouchers necessary to obtain the first payment, forwarded them to the proper pension agent, received the latter’s check, procured the pensioner’s indorsement thereto, and drew the money. Held that, although he had no hand in procuring the allowance of the pension, he was still a “person instrumental in prosecuting the claim, ” within the meaning of Rev. St. U. S. § 5485, which makes it a misdemeanor for such a person to retain a greater compensation than is allowed by the pension laws.</p>

<p>In Equity. Bill by Charles Leib against the Electric Merchandise Company and others for infringement of a patent.</p>

<p>1. Shipping — Charter-Party—Cancellation.</p> <p>A charter-party made November 32d provided for a voyage from Liverpool to Norfolk and back; the vessel-to bring over a cargo of guano, “freight fi-ee, and all other conditions as per charter-party, ” the charterers to furnish her at Norfolk with a full cargo of cotton, etc., at 30 shillings per registered'ton, which was above ' the current rate; charter to commence “ when the vessel'is ready to receive her cargo at the place of lading, ” and the charterers to have the right of canceling the contract if she failed to arrive at Norfolk by tlielOth of February. The vessel, through no fault of her own, failed to arrive until April 4th, which was too late to use the guano that year, and the charterers canceled"the contract. Held, that the voyage commenced at Liverpool, and the cancellation applied to the part already performed, as well as that remaining; and, as the guano was evidently brought f ree in consideration of the high return freight expected, the charterers were bound to pay reasonable freight thereon.</p> <p>2. Admiralty Practice — Set-Ope.</p> <p>Under a libel on the guano for the freight, the charterers could not claim a set-off for damages caused by the delay, as a set-off is unknown to admiralty except as a credit on the particular transaction which is the subject of the libel.</p>

In Admiralty. Appeal from tbe circuit court of the United States for the southern district of New York. Libel against the steam-ship Majestic and the steam-tug Nannie Lamberton for damage to tbe canal-boat Emma while in tow of the tug. Decree against the claimants of both vessels. Both appeal. Decree affirmed as to the Majestic, but reversed as to the Nannie Lamberton.

<p>Cakkibbs — Negligent Stowage — Cases os Household Goods.</p> <p>Cases oí household goods, shipped under a bill of lading which contained the exception, “not accountable for damage and breakage, ” were stowed in the lower hold of the brig J., and were delivered damaged by waler taken on by the ship in heavy weather. The brig was old, and her construction was such as to necessitate more than usual care in the stowage of merchandise liable to be damaged by water. The master had notice that the cases contained household goods. Meld, that it was negligence to stow such goods near the bilge in the hold of a vessel of such construction and age, and the ship was liable for the damage.</p>

<p>In Admiralty.</p> <p>Petition by libelant for order on respondent to pay over remainder of money left in his hands after deduction of average charges. Answer of respondent, and cross-petition by respondent to restate account. A cargo of sugar, shipped by Claus Spreckels on the steam-ship Weatherby, was damaged by collision; and the proceeds of the sale of the cargo, which was sold in Germany, was remitted to the vessel owner in Jfngland on June 15, 1890, and was retained by him until October, 1890, when,, in pursuance of a decree of court, the sum in hand was declared to be $51,-842, which, less a sum of $15,000, retained to cover average charges, was paid over to Spreckels. After adjustment Spreckels claimed $7,375.46, the difference between the average charges and the $15,000 retained, together with interest on the amount retained. The vessel owner then moved to restate his account so as to account only for so many dollars as the amount of pounds which came into his hands would have produced on June 15, 1890, at the rate of exchange current on June 15, 1890.</p>

<p>In Admiralty.</p> <p>Libel, by Baldasare Damora, master of the bark Cuomo Primo, against John F. Craig and James Craig, trading as John F. Craig & Co. The vessel was chartered to proceed to St. Johns Antigua, and take in a cargo of sugar; the vessel to be consigned to charterers’ agents at port of discharge, and, being loaded, to proceed to Delaware breakwater for orders. Master to sign bills of lading at any rate of freight required without prejudice to this charter, but at not less rates than certain rates mentioned. The vessel arrived at the Breakwater, and received orders from Watson & Farr, the charterers’agents, to Philadelphia. The respondents, John F. Craig & Co., effected a sale of the whole cargo, as sugar brokers, to Spreckels & Co., by order of said Watson & Farr, and of the other consignees; and, as agents, paid to the master’s agent $1,000 on account of charter freight, which, with advances made to the master at Antigua, including insurance, left a balance due under the charter of $298.87, for which a bill was presented by the master’s agent. Respondents were directed to pay the amount of charter freight appearing by this bill, requesting the master to authorize Watson & Farr to collect the bill of lading freights, which belonged to the charterers. The captain refused to do so. Watson & Farr found that consignees of the rest of the cargo were willing to settle the bill of lading freights with them without such authorization, and directed respondents to pay the balance of the freight as per bill rendered, which said master’s agent refused to accept, and this suit was brought for the full amount of the bill of lading freight. Respondents stated that they were authorized and directed by Messrs. Watson & Farr to tender the charter freight due to the vessel.</p>

In Admiralty. Libel by John Hall and others against the ship Bay of Naples for salvage. Decree for libelants for $20,000, which was affirmed pro firnna, on appeal to the circuit court. From the decree of the circuit court the claimant appeals,

<p>In Admiralty. Suit to recover salvage compensation.</p>

<p>Salvage — Towage Sbiivices bx Ocean Steamisk — Yellow Fevek — Compensation.</p> <p>An ocean steamer worth. 8150,000, with a valuable cargo, and about 50 men, as crew and passengers, while running on schedule time from New York to Cartha-gena and other Caribbean ports, encountered a brig, in a practically helpless condition, about 180 miles off Cape Henry. Only three men were on the brig, the captain and the rest of the crew having died of yellow fever. It being considered unsafe to put men aboard her, the brig was towed into Hampton Hoads, during a high and dangerous wind, the steamer deviating from her course about three days for that purpose. The brig and cargo wore appraised at 87,6-45 as the auction value in Norfolk, which was much below their commercial value. Held, that §2,750 should he awarded as salvage in addition to the expenses incurred by the deviation.</p>

<p>1. SALVAGE — SUU.TECTS OP SALVAGE — STEAMER OX 1ÍAK.</p> <p>The large fiat-bottomed steamer Excelsior grounded broadside on near high tide, on the eastern shoal of Hampton bar at Hampton Roads. Shortly afterwards another steamer tried in vain to pull her oil, and at the next high tide the most powerful tug in those waters, aided by the steamer’s own engines, was unable to move her. Thereupon a wrecking schooner in charge of a professional wrecker, and with powerful apparatus, was employed, and, with the aid of a tug, tided during one high tide to move the steamer without success, but at the next succeeded in drawing her off. The tide there runs in strongly, and the evidence showed that a tide sufficient to float her would probably have carried her further upon the bar. Held, that she was a subject of salvage, and the servicies rendered were salvage services.</p> <p>2. Same — Compensation.</p> <p>The Excelsior was worth $150,000. ISo danger was incurred by the wrecking schooner or the fug. There was no agreement as to compensation, but the captain of the wrecker presented a bill for $8(X), which was refused. Held» that the wrecking company was entitled to $700 as salvage.</p> <p>3. Same — Evidence.</p> <p>On a hearing to determine the amount of salvage to be awarded for pulling a steamer off a bar, evidence as to the sums paid in particular instances for drawing off other vessels which had gone aground is inadmissible.</p>

■ Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States-for the Southern District of New York. . In Admiralty. Libel by Ebenezer II. Davis against a cargo of chalk,, lately on hoard' of the ship Glenfinlas, and Howard Fleming, consignee^ for demurrage. ■ Decree for libelant. Respondents appeal. statement by the court. " ’The ship Glenfinlas arrived at the port of New York on July.5, 1889', with'a cargo of 8,000 tons of chalk consigned to Howard Fleming.- .

<p>In Admiralty. Libel by O. E. Maltby against the steam-tug R. R„ Kirkland for damages for a collision.</p>

Petition by the Dampsldbsselskabet Thingvalla (Thingvalla SteamShip Company) for limitation of liability for loss caused by collision of the steam-ship Thingvalla with the steam-ship Geiser. Certain insurance companies and others interested in the cargoes lost, caused themselves to be entered as respondents to the petition, and, from a decree in favor of the petitioner, appeal.

<p>Error to the Circuit Court for the Norttisju..J)ifiirict of Texas.</p>

In Equity. Prosecution for contempt in violating an injunction. The bill alleged plaintiff’s ownership of a certain silver mine in Colorado, then in the possession of the defendant; and upon his application a preliminary injunction was granted, restraining defendant from . mining or disposing of any ore pending the suit. Afterwards plaintiff ejected the defendant, and himself took possession of the mine.

<p>1. Ijvleohi, Assessment, When Tax Levied ox may be Enjoined.</p> <p>Where an assessor assessed a large body of lands belongingto the plaintiff, oí various values, at a uniform value, without reference to the local advantages oí the various parts of the tract or -tracts, an.a beyond the cash value of 1 he whole, rind relatively at a much greater value than the lands of resident tax-payers, for the purpose of favoring the latter at the expense of the former, equity will restrain the collection of a tax levied upon such an assessment, when it further appears that the collection of the tax will east a cloud upon the title of the plaintiff, and involve the party in a multiplicity of suits.</p> <p>2. Board op Equalization.</p> <p>The board of equalization is a part of the machinery for the assessment of property for taxation, and a person, by asking it to reduce an alleged overvaluation of his property, does not thereby elect to pursue a remedy at law for such overvaluation, or an illegal or fraudulent assessment, if it he such.</p> <p>S. The Writ of Review.</p> <p>A writ of review directed to the board of equalization is the commencement of proceedings at law to correct such assessment, on which the circuit court examines the record of the board, including the facts found, if any, and determines, without reference to the evidence, whether, as a matter of law, the board has exceeded its jurisdiction, or exercised its functions erroneously, to the injury of the substantial rights of the plaintiff therein.</p> <p> CSyllabus by the Court.) </p>

In Equity. Suit for the specific performance of a contract of sale of bonds, brought by the Rollins Investment Company against M. C. George, E. A. King, J. L. Sperry, C. H. Meussdorffer, William M. Ladd, John Parker, C. C. Redman, and T. W. Pittenger, constituting the bridge committee of the city of Portland, Or. Heard on demurrer to the bill.

Bill in equity by Fannie E. B. Lathrop against Richard Peeler for an accounting of rents collected by defendant, and to set aside a settlement between the parties for false representations of defendant. On the death of defendant the suit was revived in the name of Clementine G. Peeler as administratrix. Decree for plaintiff. Defendant appeals. STATEMENT OF CASE.

Tn Equity. Bill by Seth A. Fowle and Horace S. Fowle against Jolm D. Park, Ambro R. Park, and Godfrey F. Park for an injunction and accounting. The defendants filed an answer and a cross-bill for an injunction. Both the bill and cross-bill were originally dismissed by the circuit court. On appeal by complainant the decree was reversed. 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 658.

In Equity. Suit by Edwin A. MeCampbell, as assignee of Dodd-ridge & Co., and others, against J. B. P. Brown and David Siuton. Heard on demurrer to the bill. STATEMENT BY SAGE, 3.

Tn Equity. Suit by the First National Bank of Alma, Kan., for the use of Frank T. Burt, receiver, against David II. Moore and Augustus Norton, the First National Bank of Athens, and the Pomeroy Bank, of Pomeroy, Ohio, for the cancellation of certain certificates, and the return of certain notes held as collateral security therefor. Heard on demurrer to the hill.

Suit by the Boomer & Boscbert Compress Company against the lia-zlehurst Compress & Manufacturing Company to foreclose a mortgage to secure the balance of the purchase price of a cotton-press. Decree for complainant. Defendant appeals.

<p>1. Estoppel in Pais — False Representations — Mortgages.</p> <p>An owner of lands who induces his creditor to accent as security a mortgage thereon from a third person, by representing that the third person is the owner, is estopped to claim the lands as against the lien of the mortgage.</p> <p>2. Equity — Reformation of Instruments.</p> <p>When a mortgage shows on its face that the consideration moved from a certain person, and it appears that his name as mortgagee was omitted by mistake, equity will reform the instrument by inserting his name.</p>

<p>In Equity. Bill to foreclose a mortgage.</p>

<p>Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern Division of the Northern District of Mississippi.</p> <p>Action by E. Cahn against the Western Union Telegraph Company to recover damages caused by delay in delivering a telegraph message. Judgment directed for plaintiff for nominal damages. Plaintiff brings error.</p>

In Bankruptcy. On appeal from the decision of the district court that the plaintiff’s claim was provable against the partnership, and not against the estate of a partner.

<p>1. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES — CONSIDERATION—HUSBAND AND WIPE.</p> <p>When, by direction oí a wife, the rents of her separate estate are paid to her husband with the understanding that he will invest them for her benefit, this creates a debt sufficient to constitute a valid consideration for a subsequent deed from him to her, as against the claims of other creditors.</p> <p>2. Same — Reading Depositions — Argument—Attacking Credibility ofWitness.</p> <p>When a party who assails a conveyance from husband to wife, as made in fraud; of creditors, calls the husband and wife as witnesses, and afterwards reads their depositions in court, he thereby vouches for their credibility, and cannot be heard, in argument, to question their veracity.</p>

<p>1. Master .and Servant — Duty to Employ Skillpul Fellow-Servants.</p> <p>A company employing helpers to its blacksmiths, is bound to see that they are reasonably skillful in that work; but this duty is discharged if the foreman employing them exercised ordinary care therein.</p> <p>2. Same — Negligence op Fellow-Servant.</p> <p>A blacksmith, injured by the careless blow of a skillful helper, cannot recover from their common master, unless the helper was habitually careless, and that fact was known to the master, and not to the blacksmith.</p> <p>3. Same — Aocídents—Risks op Employment.</p> <p>A servant, injured by a mere accident, incident to the work iu which he is employed, cannot recover from his master.</p>

<p>1. BANKRUPTCY — Powers op .Assignee — Suit in State Court.</p> <p>The assigneo of a bankrupt cannot, either voluntarily or by service of process, become a party to a suit in a state court to enforce a lien against the bankrupt’s lands, except by express authority from the bankrupt court, as that court, under the bankruptcy act, has exclusive jurisdiction over the entire estate.</p> <p>2. Same — Estoppee.</p> <p>But, although the assignee is made a party without such authority, the bankrupt himself cannot, after litigating the case during five years to a final decree in the state supreme court, have an injunction in the bankruptcy court against the execution of such decree.</p>

<p>Chinese Merchants — Ue-kxthy without Certificate — Decision of Coi,lector.</p> <p>The presence oí a Chinese merchant, otherwise entitled to be in the U nitod States, is not rendered unlawful by the fact that upon his return from a visit to Canada the collector permitted him to land, upon the certificates of private persons and his own personal knowledge, without the viséd certificate required by section (5 of the amended exclusion act, (Act Cong. July 5.1884;) since that section also provides that “the collector shall in person decide all questions in dispute with regard to the right of any Chinese passenger to enter the United States, and his decision shall be, subject to ‘review by the secretary of the treasury, and not otherwise. ”</p>

<p>1. United States Bonds — Fraudulent Imitations.</p> <p>Under Rev. St. U. S. § 5430, denouncing a punishment against any one having in possession “any obligation or other security” alter the similitude of any obligation issued by the United States with intent to sell or otherwise use the same, it is no offense to so have in possession a bond issued by a mining company, and resembling a United States bond, but not purporting to be executed by any party whatever. The want of execution is not merely a fact which the jury may consider in determining as to the degree of similitude, but is a complete bar to a conviction.</p> <p>2. Same. '</p> <p>To constitute the offense it is not necessary that the instrument should purport to be an obligation of the United States, or bear such a likeness thereto as to deceive experts or cautious men. It is sufficient if it is calculated to deceive a sensible and unsuspecting man of ordinary observation and care, dealing with a man supposed to be honest.</p>

<p>Patents toe Inventions — Combination—Anticipation.</p> <p>Letters patent No. 9,108, issued to Jackson C. Millner for a tobacco curer, consisting of a combination of two fire-places of different sizes on each side of a chimney, leading through suitable heaters, which traverso the building to a common flue, connecting with a central heater, which serves as a return flue, connected with the chimney, are void as being a mere combination of old parts, which have long been used in substantially the same manner.</p>

<p>1. Patents for Inventions — Infringement—SnoE-BnoKr.ES.</p> <p>Letters patent No. 301,881, issued July 15,1884, to Theodore E. King and Joseph Hammond, Jr., are for an improvement in shoe-buckles and similar articles, consisting in a tongue-plate composed of a single piece of metal doubled upon itself, and forked at its rear and next the oatoh-plate. The tongue swung- in this bifurcation, its pivot being located underneath the tongue-plate. Indentations in the under-fold of the tongue partially embraced the ends of the pivot-pin, which was held between the two folds. The object of this construction was to cause the tongue-plate to extend rearward of the tongue, forming- there a. hearing surface for the catch-plate. The first claim was: “In combination, the catch-plate, the tongue, pivoted directly to the tong-ue-plate, and the tongue extending- rearward of the pivot, and in contact with the catch-plate, when the parts arc engaged. ” Held, that the patent, was infringed by a buckle composed of two plates riveted together, the lower being provided with projections, in which the pivots of the tongue turn, and which lit into openings in the upper plate when the two lie together; and the upper, which is a spring-plate, being bifurcated, and extending on both sides of the tong-uo rearward, to afford a bearing surface for the catch-plate, though the lower plate has no extension.</p> <p>2. Same.</p> <p>The fact that the upper plate is a spring-plate, and similar in construction to the spring-plate of an older patent, (No. 191,138, also issued to King and Hammond,) does not prevent infringement, since, as combined with the under plate, it forms a tongue-plate substantially like that of the double plate of the patent.'</p>

In Admiralty. Libel by Baker and others against the Wm. Gates to enforce certain maritime liens, which were all of equal dignity.

<p>In Admiralty. Libel by Bain & Bros, against the ship Minnie L. Gerow for wharfage.</p>

<p>1. Cakiiieiik op Goods — Connecting Lines — Paiitnershu’.</p> <p>Where the owners of several steam-boats are not in fact partners, and do notown or use any property in common, or share any of the profits, the fact that they allow their boats to bo advertised as forming a line under a common name, and have a common agent, who solicits custom and transacts business for all, does not make them jointly liable for the torts and contracts of each other.</p> <p>S3. Same — Bill op Ladino — Notice.</p> <p>The fact that a bill of lading for goods shipped on one of the boats was made out in her name only was sufficient notice to the shippers that she and her owners alone wei'e bound by the contract.</p>

<p>1. Rispaiks and Sri’MJEB — Foreign Vessels — Liens—Bona Fide PtntonASKKS— Laches.</p> <p>¡Supplies being furnished to a vessel known to belong in another state; and the libel not being filed until the last day oí the year after the supplies were furnished; and the vessel having been in the mean time twice sold iolxmajide purchasers for full value, without notice, from six to eight months after the supplies were furnished, though they made special efforts to learn of any existing liens; and the vendor becoming in the mean time insolvent; and the vessel being a.11 the time amenable to process daily: Jleld that, as against the bona fide purchasers, the maritime lien was lost, through laches.</p> <p>3. State Liens — Construction—Not Applicable to Foreign Vessels — Admiralty Law not Controlled by State Legislation.</p> <p>'The law of the state of New York allowing a lien for supplies furnished to any vessel upon filing a notice within ¡50 days in the county clerk’s office, the lien to continue “for one year," held, (1) following The OUusnn, 3 Story, 155, that the statute was not applicable to foreign vessels on which a maritime lien existed for the same supplies; and, (3) if the statute was applicable at all to foreign vessels, that state legislation was incompetent 1 o change the rules of decision in admiralty as respects the scope, effect, or priority of liens as regards other lienors or bona fide purchasers, or 1.o impart to such state liens any superior qualities or attributes over maritime liens; that both are subject to the same limitations, as respects laches; and on both grounds the libel was dismissed.</p>

<p>1. S~Lv!~Gx--OourarsArION.</p> <p>A. schooner worth $15,001), with a cargo worth p5,000, bound from New York to Georgetown, S. C., when off Frying-Pan shoals, discovered an apparently abandoned vessel, water-logged, and with her cargo of lumber washin~about her deck. The schooner lay by her all night, atid the next day towed her to Georgetowa bar. Finding that she could not cross the bar, the master of the schooner procured two tugs, went on the lumber vessel with a small crew, and had her towed to Charleston. Neither life nor prbperty of tho salvors was in any danger. The vessel was sold for $1,950, and her cargo for 21.500. Bold., that the harbor expenses, pilotage, harbor towage, wharfage, etc., should be charged to the ship, the layage and expense of discharging the cargo to the cargo, and that $051) should be allowed as salvage.</p> <p>2. S.m.</p> <p>The fact that the master of the lumber vessel had not abandoned her finally, but had gone to seek the assistance of a tug, and had taken his crew because ho thought it dangerous to leave them there without a boat, was immaterial to the amount of the recovery, as the rule of a generous recompense would be applied, as in all other cases of salvage.</p>

<p>Collision — Hell Gate — East' Channel — Duty to Alter Course in Accordance with Whistle — Rule 19.</p> <p>A tug, with two small schooners in tow on a hawser, was going up the east channel of Hell Gate with the first of the flood-tide, and was about in the middle of the channel. A steam-yacht, bound west, tools the east channel to avoid meeting two sailing vessels, directly in front of her. On seeing the tug, the yacht gave one whistle and ported her helm. The tug immediately responded with one whistle, but did not alter her wheel. As soon as the yacht saw that the tug did not change her course she reversed, but too late to avoid the tug, which was sunk. Held, that the yacht had the right to take the east channel, and her navigation was without fault; that the cause of the collision was the failure of the tug to alter her course in accordance with the whistle, which there was nothing to prevent her from doing, and she was consequently solely liable for the collision.</p>

<p>Coi.lisiox — Mississippi Steaii-Boat — Vessel at Laxdixg.</p> <p>'Oio sieaiu-boat Trudeau, descending the Mississippi, attempted to land at the foot oí Canal street, New Orleans, Diit caught an obstruction in lira-rudder, became unmanageable, and ran into a tug-boat lying at a wharf. Opposite and above this landing is a strong eddy, well known t o boatmen, and the usual and prudent course, is for descending boats to keep outside of it until past the lauding, and then to turn and approach it from below. The Trudeau, however, kept in the eddy, and attempted to turn opposite the point of landing. Held, that the collision was not an inevitable accident, but was due to the prior fault of the Trudeau.</p>

<p>1. Appeal to Ciecoit Goukt op A ppeals — Citamos—Defect Cubed by Appearance.</p> <p>The citation on appeal must be signed by the judge or justice, and, under rule 14, par. 5, must be made returnable not exceeding 80 days from the day of signing, whether the return-day fall in vacation or in term-time; but a defect in such particulars is cured by the filing of the transcript and an entry of a regular appearance by appellees’ counsel.</p> <p>3. Same — Approval op Boyd.</p> <p>The appeal-bond must be approved by the judge or justice. An approval by the clerk alone is not sufficient, and is ground of dismissal.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Georgia.</p> <p>Bill in equity by the Central Trust Company of New York against the .Marietta A. North Georgia Railway Company, to foreclose a mortgage made by the railroad company. The Iliawassee Company intervened, claiming title to certain rolling stock in the possession of the receiver appointed in the suit. Decree for intervener. Plaintiff appeals.</p> <p>-Vet Cong. March 3, 1S91, e. 517, § (>, provides that the circuit courts of appeals established by the act shall exercise appellate jurisdiction to review any “final decision” in the district court and circuit courts, in all cases except as otherwise provided.</p> <p>STATEMENT I5Y PARDEE, ,T.</p> <p>On the 17th March, 1801, the Iliawassee Company filed a petition, as an intervention, in the suit of Central Trust Company of New York v. Marietta & North Georgia Railway Company, for the foreclosure of mortgage, pending in the circuit court of the United States for the northern district of Georgia, wherein a receiver had been appointed and put in possession of the railway property. Intervener claimed certain railway equipment, then in possession of J. B. Glover, receiver of the .Marietta & North Georgia Railway, as follows: One Brooks locomotive, shop No. 5, railroad No. 13; four Baldwin locomotives, Nos. 11, 12, 11, and .1 o;'two combination mail, baggage, and express cars, Nos. 11 and 12; two llrst-etass passenger-ears, Nos. 13 and 14. This petition was demurred to by Central Trust Company of New York, and thereupon was amended on 28th -March, 1891, making the claim as follows:</p> <p>"The property described and claimed by it was purchased by the North Georgia improvement Company from original owners. It was placed upon the line of the 41. & N. G. It. It. Company by the North Georgia Improvement Company, through the instrumentality of Geo. It. Eager, who was largely interested in both companies, but without any contract of purchase or lease by the M. <& N. G. It. It. Company, and nothing has been paid on the same by said railroad company, nor has it any claim of any kind on said property. The right of possession to all of said property is in the Iliawassee Company, and the title to all of said property has vested in it, except the title to engines Nos. 14 and 15. These engines were bought from Burnham, Barry, Williams & Co. All of the purchase money has been paid on the. same except six notes dated May 80, ’Hi), for $818.00 each, due, respectively, 17,20, 21, 22, 23, and 24 months from date. Cpon the payment of these notes the title to said engines also will vest in the Iliawassee Company.”</p> <p>It is to be noted that the intervener, in its amended petition, alleges the title to two of the locomotives, Nos. 14 and 15, is in Burnham, Parry, Williams tfc Co. The intervention, without being put in issue, having been referred to a special master in chancery, the testimony of George R. Eager and J. B. Giover, receiver, was taken. This testimony, together with exhibits introduced by intervener, shows substantially the following facts: That George R. Eager was the contractor to build the Marietta & North Georgia Railway; that he was also the president and a large stockholder in a company organized under the laws of New Hampshire, known as the North Georgia Improvement Company, w'ith its headquarters in Boston, Mass.; that said Eager, as contractor, was to receive stock and bonds of the Marietta & North Georgia Railway for its construction; that said Eager procured the North Georgia Improvement Company to purchase and pay for the whole equipment hereinbe-fore stated, except the sum of $4,908, the balance due Burnham, Parry, Williams & Co., of Philadelphia, for engines Nos. 14 and 15, which amount was evidenced by six notes outstanding, not produced at the hearing of the cause, presumably in the hands of the payees; and that the Hiawassee Company was organized under the laws of Maine, and was, among other things, authorized to invest in stocks, bonds, and real estate; that the said equipment was purchased from various original vendors, w'as marked in name of said Marietta & North Georgia Railway Company, and put in the possession, custody, and control of said company, the Marietta & North Georgia Railway Company, by said Eager, contractor and president, as aforesaid; that by the writings executed by Burnham, Parry, Williams & Co. and the North Georgia Improvement Company, the title was reserved until full payment, and the locomotives are stated to be loaned to the lessees, to be used “upon their railroad,” etc.; that by writing executed between Jackson & Sharp Company and North Georgia Improvement Company, it is stated that the cars are to be used on the Marietta & North Georgia Railway Company; that for the engine bought from S. W. Groome there was no written agreement; that the Marietta & North Georgia Railway had been in possession of locomotive engines 14 and 15 since about May, 1889, upon which w'as still due the sum of $4,908 to Burnham, Parry, Williams & Co., represented by six notes still held and owned by them; that the railway company had been in possession of the two first-class passenger-cars, 14 and 15, one combination mail, baggage, and express car, numbered 11, and one combination mail, baggage, and express car, numbered 12, since April 17, 1889, and that said company had been in possession of locomotive engines Nos. 11 and 12 since about 20th day of December, 1888.</p> <p>George R. Eager testified, as is shown on pages 17 and 18 of the transcript of the record, as follows:</p> <p>“Question. What was your plan, Mr. Eager, in regard to the purchase of this rolling stock? Did you control a majority of the stock of the M. & 27. G. Ry.? Answer. Yes; land my friends controlled three-fourths of it. Q. What was your plan with regard to this rolling stock, — in regard to the future? A. Our plan was, when we got the road fully completed, it would improve our mines, and we bought as much rolling stock as we should want for the immediate present; that we would endeavor to arrange equipment, and issue equipment bonds for sufficient amount to cover all the rolling stock, and to secure all the rolling stock we thought it w’ould be necessary to have. Q. Up to this time no contract betw'een the M. & in. G. Ry. and the North Georgia Improvement Company was made? A. No, sir; none whatever. Q. Was there any agreement, verbal or otherwise, between the improvement company and the railway company as to the improvement company furnishing stock to the railway company? A. No, sir; no agreement in any shape. Tlie rolling stock was sent down there with the idea that the railway company very soon would be done, and would make a car trust, — get somebody to let them have money, and make a car trust.”</p> <p>It further appeared from the exhibits introduced — First, that Burnham, Barry, Williams & Co., of Philadelphia, had contracted with the North Georgia Improvement Company concerning the two locomotives, 14 and 15, whereby the title was reserved until they were paid for; but this contract, although dated 13th May, 1889, was not proved until the 19th January, 1891, and was never recorded at all; second, that on the 27th day of January, 1891, more than a week after the Marietta & North Georgia Railway was placed in the hands of the receiver, the North Georgia Improvement Company executed a paper purporting to be an absolute sale to the liiawassee Company of all the railway equipment hereinbefore set forth.</p> <p>On this testimony the special master found in favor of the interveners, as "follows:</p> <p>“I do therefore respectfully report that the intervener, the liiawassee Company, has a valid claim and title to all of said property, except to Nos. 14 and 15 Baldwin locomotives, and upon payment of the balance due on said two locomotives will have a valid title to them; and that the present value of all said rolling stock, including interest at six per cent., calculated up to April 7, 1891, is $64,653.03. I further report that said rolling stock is absolutely necessary to the operation of the said Marietta & North Georgia Railway, and that it is advisable that the receiver be allowed to purchase all of said rolling stock at the sum of $64,653.03; that the said outstanding notes *>v Baldwin locomotives Nos. 14 and 15 be paid out of this amount.”</p> <p>To this report exceptions were duly filed, which, on hearing, the court-ordered—</p> <p>"(1) That the case be resubmitted to the master, to take evidence and report apon the question of the value of the equipment mentioned in said intervention on the 19th of January, 1891, when the receiver was appointed. (2) To take evidence and report upon the relations existing between the Marietta and North Georgia Railway Company and the North Georgia Improvement Company, by contract or otherwise, and the relations existing between said two companies and George 11. Eager, and the relations existing between said two companies and said Eager and the liiawassee Company, so far as they throw light upon or affect this ease.”</p> <p>After the first hearing before the master, and prior to a second hearing, the Central Trust Company filed in the court certain answers, setting up defense substantially as follows: (1) A general denial of the statements made in the original and amended intervention. (2) Averment as to the appointment of receiver on 19th January, 1891, and that Burnham, Parry, Williams & Co. were still due the sum of $4,908, balance upon two locomotives, Nos. 14 and 15, and that the North Georgia Improvement Company had paid in full to parties from whom it was purchased for all the other equipment mentioned in said petitions. That upon such payment full right and title to said equipment vested in said Marietta & North Georgia Railway Company, without any lien or reservation of title on the part of the North Georgia Tmprovemer* Company; and that, if any sum was duo for such equipment, so paid for by said North Georgia Improvement Compaq-, it was only an open account debt, and that said equipment was purchased by said North Georgia Improvement Company, and placed in the possession and control of' said Marietta & North Georgia llaihvay Company for its special use and benefit, and became and was subject to the lien of the mortgage now being foreclosed. (3) Setting forth that the North Georgia Improvement Company on the 27th of January, 1891, undertook to sell and to convey to the Hiawassee Company said equipment, and controverting the right of said improvement company to make such sale as to the two locomotives 14 and 15, because the title was in Burnham, Parryr Williams & Co. as to them, and as to the other equipment, because, it having been fully paid for by the North Georgia Improvement Company, the title was in the Marietta & North Georgia Railway Company. (4) That when the Hiawassee Company, on the 27th of January, 1891, accepted from the North Georgia Improvement Company the writing undertaking to convey the title to said equipment, said Hiawassee Company knew, or was bound to know, all that the North Georgia Improvement Company, or its officers; knew in relation to said equipment. (5) That George It. Eager negotiated for all of said equipment, and at the time was president of the North Georgia Improvement Company, and was a very large stockholder and controlling spirit therein, and had absolute control of said company in every way; and that the deed of trust securing the bonds of said railway, delivered to said Eager, as contractor, recited that they were for the purpose of improving, completing, and ('quipping said railway. "(0) That the information and knowledge of 'Eager, contractor, as to the purchase of said equipment, was legal and actual notice to the North Georgia Improvement Company. (7) That the title to the two locomotives, 14 and 15, was.in Burnham, Parry, Williams & Co., etc. (8) That the title to the remainder of said equipment, having been paid for by the North Georgia Improvement Company, was in the Marietta & North Georgia Railway Company, etc. And, further, that the Hiawassee Company is composed of stockholders who hold claims and debts due to them by the North Georgia Improvement Company, and occupy intimate and confidential relations with said company, and as such they"were put upon notice and bound to know the relations existing between Eager, the North Georgia Improvement Company, and the Marietta & North Georgia Railway Company. (9) ('ailing attention to the provisions in the deed of trust now being foreclosed, as to how the bonds should be issued, and that the railway-should be constructed and equipped out of the proceeds of said bonds, etc. (10) That the North Georgia Improvement Company or Eager caused said equipment to be delivered to the Marietta & North Georgia Railway, as Eager, as contractor, was in duty .bound to do, and without any reservation and title thereto, and thereupon Eager procured the Marietta & North Georgia Railway Company to execute, in accordance with ’the mortgage now being foreclosed, certificate, or certificates, that the railway had been completed and equipped, to the extent to authorize the issuing of said bonds, which certificate Eager caused to be delivered to (Central Trust Company of Now York, ami .thereupon procured the issue by said Central Trust Company to Eager, as contractor, of the bonds of said Marietta & North Georgia Railway Company.</p> <p>Upon the resubniission, the only witness examined in this intervention was ,1. B. Glover, the receiver, whose testimony shows substantially as follows: That all the railway equipment set forth in the ITiawassee intervention was placed upon the road by George R. Eager, and marked with the name of the Marietta & North Georgia Railway Company, and wrent into the custody, control, and use of said railway, the same being received by said Glover, who was then superintendent of said railway. That at that time Eager was the contractor, building part of the Marietta <fc North Georgia Railway, and broadening the gauge of other parts. Eager was the chief stockholder in said railway, was the president and general controller of the North Georgia Improvement Company, and his sister, 11. A. Eager, was treasurer, with headquarters at Boston, Mass. That in addition to the duties of superintendent of the railway, said Glover was the agent of Eager, receiving a salary of a month. That, as the line of railway was constructed, the North Georgia Improvement Company paid many of the bills duo for such construction. That the N ortli Georgia I improvement Company would frequently furnish to Glover, as agent of Eager, money with which to pay claims duo laborers under Eager, as contractor, and also height on rolling stock coming to the North Georgia Improvement Company or to Eager, and which Eager caused to be placed on the Marietta & North Georgia Railway. That whenever the Marietta & North Georgia Railway would pay claims against Eager, contractor, or against the North Georgia Improvement Company, <¡-lover, as agent for Eager, would then send the bills to 11. A. Eager, treasurer of the North Georgia Improvement Compauy, at Boston. That if there was any charge for freight upon locomotive or passenger equipment consigned to or received by the Marietta & North Georgia Railway, a charge would he made up against George R. Eager, and sent to 11. A. Eager, treasurer of the North Georgia Improvement Company, and that drafts would be drawn on H. A. Eager, as such treasurer, to settle these accounts, and the vouchers would be sent to her. That there were throe ways that Glover, as agent for Eager, obtained money for claims due laborers for construction or for freight upon the railway equipment furnished the Marietta & North Georgia Railway: (1) By drawing on II. A. Eager, treasurer; (2) by checks drawn by George It. Eager upon some bank in Boston or Now York; (8) by drafts drawn by George R. Eager on H.-A. Eager, treasurer, — that is, whatever was paid out of the funds of the Marietta & North Georgia Railway Company by Glover, as superintendent, for debts due by George R. Eager, as contractor, or for debts due by George R. Eager or the North Georgia Improvement Company for freight on railway equipment sent to the Marietta & North Georgia Railway, was reimbursed in one of the three ways above mentioned. That George R. Eager was contractor, not only to build and widen the gauge of the Marietta & North Georgia Railway in the states of Georgia and North Carolina, hut he was at the same time contractor to build the Knoxville Southern Ralilroad, then being constructed in the state of Tennessee, and which was afterwards consolidated with the Marietta & North Georgia Railway, under that name.</p> <p>There was also introduced on said second hearing documentary evidence, to-wit:</p> <p>“This is to certify that the Marietta & North Georgia Railway has been completed -miles, and is now ready for operation-miles of the same between-and-, and that there has been delivered and in good working order upon said railway an amount of rolling stock and equipment bearing the same proportion to the whole rolling stock and equipment requisite for the proper and efficient working of the railway as the number of miles completed at the date of this certificate bears to the total mileage of said railway, and that the stations included in the sections herein certified have been fully and completely equipped witlrall usual and necessary apparatus, appliances, and furniture. ”</p> <p>An agreement was made on 25th August, 1888, between Hambro & Son, of England, Marietta & North Georgia Railway Company, George R. Eager, contractor, and Knoxville, Cumberland Gap & Louisville Railway Company, whereby the said Hambro & Son were, among other things, to place $1,000,000 of the consolidated mortgage bonds of. the Marietta & North Georgia Railway Company, now being foreclosed in the main suit, upon certain terms, conditions, promises, and agreements set forth in said contract. This agreement was signed by George R. Eager, as general manager for the Marietta & North Georgia Railway Company, and by George R. Eager, contractor, and by George R. Eager as general manager of the Knoxville, Cumberland Gap & Louisville Railroad, and for the Cumberland Gap Construction Company. Further, there was an indorsement upon this contract by which George R. Eager signed his own name, and also signed as attorney in fact for Royal M. Pulsifer, and guarantied that the contract between Hambro & Son and others should be carried into effect, and the completion of the Marietta & North Georgia Railway assured, by Eager and Pulsifer, at their own cost and expense, if the proceeds of the sale of the mortgage bonds were not sufficient for the purpose. This contract recites “that it has been agreed, for the purposes of this agreement, completed sections shall consist of not less than five miles, with the corresponding proportion of rolling stock and equipment;” and therein it is agreed by the Marietta & North Georgia Railway Company that no certificate of completion shall be given until there shall be delivered and in good working order an amount of rolling stock, etc. This contract and agreement also had attached to it authority from the Marietta & North Georgia Railway Company, giving George R. Eager the power to enter into such agreement with Hambro & Son; and it appears that thereafter the form of the certificate was changed so as to show completed sections fully equipped with rolling stock. Also three separate contracts and agreements: (1) Contract made between the Marietta & North Georgia Railway Company by Joseph Kinsey, its president, and George R. Eager, whereby Eager was employed as contractor to do certain work on that railroad, and the company was to furnish certain convicts and make certain payments to Eager. This contemplated only a narrow-gauge road. (2; Agreement between Eager and the Marietta & North Georgia Railway Company, made on the 4th of August, 1881, whereby Eager was employed as contractor to build certain lino of railroad for said company. (3) Another contract between George R. Eager and the Marietta & North Georgia Railway Company, whereby Eager was to broaden the gauge of the said line of railway, was to put down steel rails not lighter than 5(> pounds to the yard, and was to do other things therein set forth, upon the consideration of receiving certain bonds and stock and $3,000 a mile in cash. In said contract the following language is used:</p> <p>“The party of the first part agrees, [that is, George B. Eager,] whenever requested to do so by the party of the second part, to survey and lay out its road or roads as hereinbefore agreed to be constructed and equipped, and to acquire by purchase, condemnation, or otherwise, such rights of way,” etc.</p> <p>There was also used at the hearing of the intervention of the lliawas-isce Company, under the agreement of counsel, the testimony of C. R. Walton, chief engineer of the Marietta & North Georgia Railway Company, which testimony is substantially as follows: That he was chief engineer of the Marietta & North Georgia Railway Company, and the officer of that road who sent on the certificates, as the road was completed, to the Central Trust Company of New York. That there were 20 of these certificates which were forwarded to Royal M. Pulsifer, president of the railway company, Walton, as chief engineer, having made one copy of such certificates, and forwarded to Pulsifer, and another copy handed to Hammett j secretary of the company at Marietta. That the said certificate was as follows:</p> <p>“This is to certify that the Marietta & North Georgia Kailway Company have completed and in operation one hundred and eleven fifty-two one-hundredths miles of railroad between Marietta, Ga., and Murphy, North Carolina. C. B. Waltox, Chief Engineer.”</p> <p>This was addressed to the Central Trust Company of New York. The first was, in substance, like the second, except in mileage; being for 99 miles. The first certificate was dated June 17, 1887, and the second May 19, 1888. That the certificates, after the first two sent by him, as chief engineer, to the Central Trust Company of New York, contained the following language:</p> <p>“And there lias been delivered and in good working order upon said railway an amount of roiling stock and equipment requisite for the proper and efficient working of the railway, as the number of miles completed at the date of this certificate bears to the total mileage of said railway.”</p> <p>—And that this form of certificate was used in order to get bonds on that portion of the road lying between Blue Ridge and Knoxville, Tenn., as well as on the other parts of the line. That the form of certificate was adopted unanimously by the board of directors on the 8th of April, 1889, as the form to be signed by him as chief engineer, and that such form, so adopted by the board of directors, he continued to send to Central Trust Company, and upon which the bonds were obtained.</p> <p>It was conceded at the hearing before the court that the mortgage or deed of trust given by the Marietta & North Georgia Railway Company to Central Trust Company of New York, under which bonds were issued upon certificates of completion and equipment, contained the following:</p> <p>“And whereas, the said party of the first part is desirous of borrowing money for the purpose of paying off and discharging all of said mortgage indebtedness of said Marietta & North Georgia Railway Company, and for the further purpose of constructing, improving, extending, completing, and equipping its railway, and proposes, in conformity with the laws of said states, to issue its bonds therefor, and to secure the payment of the same by the mortgage of its railway, equipment, and franchise, and all of its other property, whether now in possession or hereafter acquired.”</p> <p>—And that the said mortgage or deed of trust covered all after-acquired property appurtenant to the railroad and its branches.</p> <p>It further appeared in evidence that about the times the certificates of completed sections, with rolling-stock equipment, were made, other (besides the ones in question here) conditional purchases of rolling stock were negotiated by Eager and the North Georgia Improvement Company, resulting in rolling stock being placed upon the Marietta & North Georgia Railway, to justify the certificates, and that of all the rolling stock found on the Marietta & North Georgia Railway, 231 miles long, at the time the receiver was appointed, outside parties claimed the ownership, except of two locomotives. By agreement, a report of a meeting of bondholders of'the Marietta & Norlh Georgia Railway Company, for reorganization purposes, held after the appointment of a receiver, was put in evidence, showing the adoption of a report of a committee, of which George R. Eager was one, recommending the purchase of rolling stock in use on the railway; special care to be taken that the railroad shall acquire a perfect title to the property, — amount stated at $291,933.</p> <p>The second report of the master was substantially as follows:</p> <p>“(1) As to the value of said rolling stock on the 19th January, 1891, the master found the total aggregate value of the same to be .$55,993.59, to which should be added interest at the rate of 7 per cent, per annum from the 19th January, 1891.</p> <p>“(2) The evidence shows that the North Georgia Improvement Company in 1888 and 1889 bought all of this rolling stock, and placed the same on the Marietta & North Georgia Railway Company. The contract between the North Georgia Improvement Company and the original owners of said rolling stock was in writing; the contract in each case being a conditional sale, with title reserved until fully paid for. These contracts were all duly executed, ■but none of them have ever been recorded. The North Georgia Improvement Company placed all of said rolling stock on said Marietta & North Georgia Railway, without any contract or agreement, either oral or written, with said company. The evidence shows that the North Georgia Improvement Company has fully paid for all of said rolling stock, except six notes, aggregating $4,908, payable to Burnham, Parry, Williams & Co. The proof shows that the North Georgia Improvement Company, on the 27th day of January, 1891, duly transferred and assigned all its right, title, and interest in and to said rolling stock to the Iliawassee Company, the intervener in this case. The master is of the opinion that these contracts, reserving title between the original owners and the North Georgia Improvement Company, are good except as to subsequent purchasers or creditors without notice; and, when the Xorth Georgia Improvement Company had fully paid for said rolling slock, it acquired a valid title, which it could legally transfer. The master is of opinion that, when said rolling stock was placed on said Marietta & North Georgia liailway without any contract, the legal effect was to create a bailment, subject to the termination at option of either party, and that therefore this property was held by the Marietta & Xorth Georgia liailway Company as bailee. Counsel for the Central Trust Company further contend that George U. Eager was under written contract to equip said railway with rolling stock; that said Eager was really the Xorth Georgia Improvement Company; and that, when said company placed said rolling stock upon said railway, it did so in pursuance of said Eager’s contract to equip said railway, and therefore it became the property of said railway, and became subject to the mortgage executed by said railway to secure the payment of its bonds. The master does not think that this position is sustained by the evidence. In his opinion, a careful examination of the contract made between Eager and the railway company, the original railroad company, the certificates of O. II. Walton, chief engineer, the contract with Ilambro & Sou, of London, will show that George II. Eager was not to equip the road with roiling stock. In the opinion of the master, the intervener, tlie Iliawassee Company, has a valid title to all of said rolling stock, and has a good title to all of said property, except as to Xos. 14 and 15, Baldwin locomotives, upon which there is still due the sum ■of $4,908. The evidence shows that this rolling stock is essential to the operation of the railway by the receiver, and I therefore recommend that he be authorized to purchase tlie same at its value on the 19th of January, 1891, with 7 per cent, per annum interest from said date; the $4,908 balance due to be included in the amount. As to the ability of tlie receiver to pay cash for this rolling stock, the master refers to his report iilod on J une 0th, in the intervention of Samuel IV. Groome.</p> <p>“(8) The master finds that George B. Eager was and is the largest stockholder in the Marietta & Xorth Georgia liailway Company', and that he was the contractor to construct said railway; that said George R. Eager was, 'until recently, president of the X'orth Georgia Improvement Company. The evhieuee further shows that tlie only relation existing between the Marietta & Xorth Georgia liailway Company and the Xorth Georgia Improvement Company, by contract or otherwise, was in reference to this rolling stock, and, in opinion of the master, was that of bailor and bailee. The evidence does not show any connection between said two companies and George li. Eager and the Iliawassee Ooinnany, except the transfer by the said X'orth Georgia Improvement Company to the said Iliawassee Company of all its right, title, and interest to the rolling stock covered by this intervention.”</p> <p>The Central Trust Company filed elaborate exceptions to the master’s report, mainly on the line of tlie answer hereinbefore given in substance; the important ones being as follows:</p> <p>“Because it is shown by the evidence that there was nothing whatever duo by the Xorth Georgia Improvement Company to the original vendor for the aforesaid property, except $4,908, due to Burnham, Parry, Williams & Co. as a balance upon locomotives 14 and 15, and that there was no reservation of title or lien upon these locomotives by the original vendor, or any one else, as against the Marietta & Xorth Georgia Railway Company, hut that all of said property has been paid for, except as above stated, and had been placed by George B. Eager, president of the Xorth Georgia Improvement Company, upon the Marietta & Xorth Georgia Railway Company, three-fourths of the stock of which lie and his friends control, with the distinct understanding, at the time that said rolling slock was placed upon said line of railway, and that the railway company was thereafter to pay the said Xorth Georgia Improvement Company for the same by issuing equipment bonds; but that the said understanding was only on the part of the said Eager, as president of said improvement company, and without any contract or agreement to the effect being agreed to on the part of the railway company, who took said rolling stock, and used it as its own, unincumbered by any reservation of title or any contract other than the law implies to pay for the same.</p> <p>“Because the special master did not find and report that George It. Eager, the contractor to build the Marietta & North Georgia Railway, was under obligation to adequately equip said railway with rolling stock; and further, ■because said special master did not find and report that the relations between said George It. Eager, contractor, and as president of the North Georgia Improvement Company, and as controlling more than three-fourths of the stock of the said Marietta & North Georgia Railway Company, was such that any debt and demand due to the Hiawassee Company by the Marietta & North Georgia Railway Company grounded upon rolling stock furnished said railway company, and paid for by said North Georgia Improvement Company, should not again be paid for to the Hiawassee Company; but that such claim of the Hiawassee Company was void and invalid against said railway company, because of the relations existing between that company, George R. Eager, the North Georgia Improvement Company, and the Marietta & North Georgia Railway Company.”</p> <p>The court on hearing having overruled the exceptions and confirmed the master’s report, and having further rendered final decision that the receiver should purchase the railroad equipment mentioned in the intervention, by giving notes due in six months from date, with interest at 7 per cent, per annum from January 19, 1891, the Central Trust Company appealed to this court, assigning, substantially, as error the sáme points made in the answer and in the exceptions to the master’s report. On the hearing in this court counsel for appellee filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground of prematurity, no final decision having' been rendered in the main case pending in the court below.</p>

<p>1. Fobeclosure of Railroad Mortgage — Conditional Sale — Rights of Vexdoe.</p> <p>Tbe vendor of rolling stock to an. improvement company by his contract of sale reserved title thereto until payment of the purchase money. The improvement company supplied the rolling stock to a railroad company in order to enable the latter to raise money on bonds secured by mortgage on its railroad and equipments. Held, in a suit to foreclose such mortgage, that the original vendor, having no notice of equities existing between the purchasers of the bonds of the railroad company and the improvement company, was entitled to the possession of the rolling stock, title to which he had retained.</p> <p>8. Same — Estoppel.</p> <p>But in such case, the improvement company being estopped from setting up title against the bondholders by tbe fact that the bonds of the railroad company were placed through its instrumentality, the original vendor could take nothing by a resale to him by the improvement company of such rolling stock.</p>

<p>1. Foreclosure op Railroad Mortgage — Conditional Sale — Rights op Vendor.</p> <p>A railroad company issued equipment bonds, and executed a mortgage to secure the same, covering “all after-acquired”property of the company. 1 Afterwards an improvement company, interested in the railway company, purchased certain rolling stock from a car-building company, which, by the contract of sale, retained title to the rolling stock nntil tho purchase price thereof should be fully paid. The rolling stock was then furnished by the improvement company to the railroad company, under an agreement by which the improvement company undertook to equip the railroad company. Held, in a suit to foreclose the mortgage, that the car-building company, having no notice of any equities in favor of the holders of the railroad company’s bonds against the improvement company, arising out of the contract of the improvement company to equip the railroad in order to enable it to issue such bonds, was not estopped to intervene and assert its title to the rolling stock in question, and was entitled to the possession of so much thereof as it bad furnished to the railroad company.</p> <p>3. Same — Recording Contract of Sale Reserving Title — Operation of Statute.</p> <p>Laws Ga. 18S9, p. 188. validating contracts for the sale of rolling stock made or to be made to the owner or operator of a railway within the state of Georgia, with reservation of title, and requiring such contracts to be recorded within six months after execution, has no application to such a contract, made before the passage of such act, by two foreign corporations, outside of the state, for the sale of rolling stock to be used within the state, neither corporation being the owner or operator of a railway in the state.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Georgia.</p> <p>Bill in equity by the Central Trust Company of New York against the Marietta & North Georgia .Railway Company to foreclose a mortgage made by the railway company. Samuel W. Groome intervened, claiming title to certain cars in possession of the receiver appointed in the suit. Decree tor intervener. Plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>Foreclosure or Railroad Mortgage —Conditional Sale — Rights of Vendor— Increased Value of Rolling Stock.</p> <p>In a suit to foreclose a railroad mortgage, wherein an intervener claimed title to certain rolling stock as vendor lindera conditional sale thereof, the evidence showed that the value of rolling stock liad increased 10 per cent, since the time when the rolling stock in question was furnished by the inlorvenei-. Meld that, in determining the sum which the receiver in the suit should pay in order to retain possession of the rolling stock, 10 percent, should be added to the cost thereof before deducting a percentage per annum for wear and tear.</p>

In Equity. • Bill- by the Holly Manufacturing Company, a corporation organized under the laws of the state of New York, and having its principal place of business in the city of Lockport in county of Niagara, and a citizen of the state of New York, against the New Chester Water Company; the South Chester Water Company; W. G. Hopper and Harry S. Hopper, trading as W. G. Hopper & Sons; William Bucknell; Richard Wood, George Wood, Walter Wood, and Stuart Wood, trading as R. D.…

<p>L Wife’s Separate Estate — Power to Charge — Instrument op Settlement.</p> <p>Code, § 1783, declares that “the wife is a feme sole as to her separate estate, unless controlled by the settlement. Every restriction on her power must be complied with. But, while a wife may contract, she cannot bind her separate estate by any contract of securityship, nor by any assumption of the debts of her husband. * Meld, that where a husband settled property on his wife free from all his liabilities, except such incumbrances as the two together shall request the trustee to make, a mortgage given thereon to secure a debt of the husband is valid.</p> <p>2. Same.</p> <p>Such an exception is not repugnant to the grant, but is merely a qualification thereof. Affirmed in 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 61.</p>

<p>In Equity. Petition for the condemnation of lands belonging to Thomas Montgomery and others, for the use of the United States. Heard on motion to quash the petition for appointment of commissioners.</p>

<p>1. Presenting Fraudulent Claims against tiie United States — Deputy-Marshal’^ Indictment.</p> <p>Under Rev. St. U. S. § 5488, denouncing the offense of knowingly presenting for payment or approval to any officer in the civil, military, or naval service of the United States any false or fraudulent claim against the United States, an indictment averring the presentation of such a claim to “Q. T., then late marshal of the United States, he being then and there an officer in tho civil service of the United States, ” is not insufficient or repugnant, since a marshal, after the expiration of his term, is still an officer for the purpose of serving process then in his hands, and for settling his accounts with the government.</p> <p>2. Same — Sueeicienoy.</p> <p>•An averment that tho accused, claiming to be a deputy-marshal of the United States, presented a claim against the government of tho United States, “purporting to have been for services rendered and payments made by said deputy-marshal ” in a criminal proceeding mentioned, before a certain United States commissioner, sufficiently shows that the services were performed and payments made for the United States, in the defendant’s capacity as deputy United States marshal.</p> <p>3. SAME — RePT“G-XAXOY.</p> <p>An averment that .such claim, allegad to have hoen presented to “G-. T„ the late marshal, ” etc., was a claim “in favor of the said Gk T., the then late marshal, ” etc., does not render the indictment bad for repuguaney, since the court will take judicial notice that the accounts of deputy-marshals are habitually presented tó the government in the marshal’s name, and the money therefor is paid to him, and by him paid to his deputies.</p> <p>4. Same — PnjRSRXTixa to Marshal.</p> <p>As the statute makes it an offense to present the claim to “any person or officer” in the civil service, etc., it is immaterial that the marshal is not expressly authorized by law to approve a deputy’s account. The fact that he is required to incorporate the deputy’s account into his own, and to swear that the items therein charged are correct and legal, is sufficient to show that he must pass upon it, within the meaning of the statute.</p> <p>5. S wf, — mmsKNi'TNO to Judge.</p> <p>Although che act of a federal judge, in passing upon the accounts of a United Stales marshal in open court, ns required by Act Cong. Feb. 22, 1876, is, in a sense, the act of the court, yet, as his decision is subject to revision by the accounting officers of the treasury, it is only quasi judicial, and therefore a presentation to him is a presentation to an officer in the civil service of the United States, within the meaning of section 5428.</p>

<p>1. Patents for Inventions — Novelty—Combination—Usefulness—Box-Hinges.</p> <p>' Letters patent No. 378,861, issued March 6,1888, to Benjamin S. Atwood, for a duplex box-hinge, to be placed inside the box, and consisting of two flanges jointed to a connecting plate, bent at right angles at distances from the joints equal to the thickness of the side and cover of the box, so that, when applied, a smooth face, flush with the outer surface of the box, is {¡resented, and the cover, when open, turns completely over, and rests against the side, are void for want of novelty m the component elements and new and useful results in the combination.</p> <p>2. Same — Prior Use.</p> <p>The feature of allowing the cover to fall back against the side of the box is found in the old Smith and Paine double-hinge; and, though the leaves of the latter were straight and applied to the outside of the box, they could be applied to the inside by the simple mechanical device of bending the shanks, the result being substantially the same as that obtained in the Atwood patent.</p> <p>8. Same.</p> <p>The feature of applying the hinge so as to present a smooth face, flush with the box and cover, was anticipated by the Lovett double hinge, which embodied the principle of the Smith and Paine hinge, and could be inserted in the same way.</p> <p>i. Same.</p> <p>The feature in the patent of having the cover-leaf press against the connecting plate when the box closed, so as to prevent the cover from moving backward, does not make the combination patentable, because bearings are old, and the prior Smith and Paine duplex hinge shows a bearing against the inside of the link, producing the same result.</p> <p>6. Same — Infringement.</p> <p>If the combination should be considered patentable because of the bearing, it is not infringed by a hinge in which, owing to differences of structures, the bearing is obtained in an entirely different manner.</p>

In Equity. Suit by the National Folding Box & Paper Company against the American Paper Pail & Box Company for infringement of letters patent No. 171,866, granted January 4, 1876, to Reuben Ritter, for an improvement in paper boxes. Heard on motion for a preliminary injunction.

<p>1. Shipping — Liability fob Personal Injuries — Defective Appliances.</p> <p>A ship is liable in damages to one of a stevedore’s gang who is injured while unloading cargo by the unexpected falling of a stanchion because of defects in the fastening not observed by him, and not apparent to the eye.</p> <p>2. Measure op Damages — Personal Injuries.</p> <p>By an accident on a vessel, for which the ship was liable, a stevedore’s laborer received a comminuted fracture of the bones of his leg, and had his leg amputated below the lmee, being treated in a free hospital. He was between 30 and 35 years old, and earned $1.25 a day, or S375 a year. Held, that he would be allowed $500 for sufferings, and it would be assumed that his earning capacity was reduced two-thirds, and that his life-interest in the capitalized value of his income was worth one-half the amount thereof, on which theory he was entitled to recover $1,786, or $2,286 in all.</p>

<p>In Admiralty. Suit to recover damages for negligent towage.</p>

In Admiralty. Appeal by respondent below, the steam-ship Protos, from a decree of the district court awarding SI,250 as damages for injury' to person of libelant, Frank Cannon, incurred while unloading the cargo.

In Admiralty. Libel in personam by owner of vessel for extra expenses of finishing loading his vessel in the lower bay of Mobile, 30 miles from the city of Mobile. The facts are stated in the opinion.

<p>1. Salvage — Towing Disabled Steamer.</p> <p>The machinery olthe steam-ship Schiedam had been disabled, so as to compel the vessel to anchor some 15 miles east o£ Sandy Hook, and abontliniles from the Long Island shore. The weather was hazy. The powerful tug Evarts came up, and agreed to take her to lier dock in Hoboken for 551,000. The Evarts was the only tug in sight at the time. She towed the steam-ship to her dock as agreed, with some assistance from other tug's met on the way. some of which had been sent by the agents of the ship. The Schiedam and cargo wore worth $185,000; the Evarts was worth 830,000. Held, that the amount agreed on was reasonable, and should be awarded.</p> <p>S. Same — Contracts fob Agreed Amounts.</p> <p>Salvage, viewed as a reward, is not properly the subject of a binding contract in advance. Courts of admiralty fully examine into the circumstances of the service in the interest of the property saved, and award no more than a reasonable sum, and are not bound by the amount agreed on beforehand.</p>

<p>In Admiralty. Suit to recover salvage award.</p>

<p>1. Contempt — Resistance to Process op Court.</p> <p>Whore the marshal had served process on the vessel-owner, who had read enough of the paper handed Mm to know Its meaning, and who thereafter refused *' obey the orders of the officer as to where he should go, and who, when the officer suepped ashore to call a keeper, steamed away with his vessel, held, such acts constituted a resistance and evasion of the process of the court, subjecting the vessel-owner to the penalties of a contempt.</p> <p>2. Samis — Pine—Amount—Marshal’s Expenses.</p> <p>As it appeared possible, however, that the vessel-owner might not have understood the character of Ms act, the court would only impose as a line the actual expenses incurred by the marshal in searching for and retaking the vessel.</p>