Volume 48 — Illinois Appellate Court Reports

<p>1. Drainage Proceedings—Practice—Appeals.—An appeal from an order of the County Court annexing lands to a drainage district under Sec. 58 of the act to revise and amend the Drainage Act of May 89, 1879, approved June 30,1885, (Hurd’s Statutes, 1891, p. 571,) is properly taken to the Circuit Court under the general provisions in R. S., Chap. 37, Sec. 122.</p> <p>2. Drainage Proceedings—Final Order.—An order of the County-Court annexing lands to a drainage district is a final order, from which an appeal lies.</p>

Memorandum.—Prosecution for illegally selling intoxicating liquor. Writ of error to the County Court of Piatt County to reverse a conviction had in that court; the Hon. H. E. Hueston, County Judge, presiding.

Memorandum.—Action of assumpsit. Appeal by the plaintiffs from a judgment in their favor for §39.50, rendered by the Circuit Court of Montgomery County; the Hon. Jacob Fouice, Circuit Judge, presiding.

Memorandum.—Action for killing domestic animals. Appeal from a judgment for plaintiff, rendered by the Circuit Court of Coles County; the Hon. James F. Hughes, Circuit Judge, presiding.

Memorandum,—Action for personal injiu-ies. Appeal from a judgment for the plaintiff, rendered by the Circuit Court of Logan County; the Hon. George W. Herdman, Circuit Judge, presiding.

Memcrsuiflirm.—Action for injuries to stock. Appeal from a judgment for the defendant rendered by the Circuit Court of Macoupin Comity; the Hon. James A. Creighton, Circuit Judge, presiding.

Memorandum.—Action for a violation of a city ordinance. Appeal from a judgment for the defendant rendered by the Circuit Court of Morgan County, the Hon. Cyrus Bpler, Circuit Judge, presiding.

<p>llemoraiiimn.—Injunction. Appeal from the Circuit Court of McLean County; the Hon. Owen T. Reeves, Circuit Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Action for Money Mad and Received, eta.—An action for money had and received under the common counts, can not be sustained without proof that the defendant received the money for the use of the plaintiff, and that a formal demand for the same was made before the commencement of the suit..</p> <p>2. Gifts Causa Mortis and Inter Vivos.—There are two kinds of gifts: 1, gifts simply so called, or gifts inter vivos, as they were distinguished in the civil law; and 2, gifts causa mortis, or those made in apprehension of death. An instruction stating that if a person, when sick and not expecting to get well, give money to another, and afterward recover from his sickness and repossess himself of the money, defines a gift causa mortis.</p> <p>3. Gifts Inter Vivos.—Where an aged wife took a package of money from a book-case and gave or delivered it to her husband, saying that she was getting in poor health and did not expect to live very long, that she wanted him to take it, and at her death bury her, pay the funeral expenses and the balance was his, it was held to be a gift inter vivos.</p>

Memorandum.—Claim against the estate of a deceased person. Appeal from a judgment in favor of the claimant rendered by the Circuit Court of Montgomery County; the Hon. James A. Creighton, Circuit Judge, presiding.

<p>1. Judgment or Order in Bastardy—Commitment to Jail—Recitals. —Under the ninth section of the Bastardy Act, which provides that the defendant shall be committed to the county jail if he refuses or neglects to give the security, the imprisonment is a legal consequence of a failure to comply with the judgment. It is a means provided by law for the enforcement of the judgment, and does not depend upon a recitation in the judgment or order of the court that such means may be resorted to.</p> <p>2. Judgment in Bastardy—Sufficiency.—A judgment has nothing to do with the means provided by law for its enforcement. An order for execution or other process or means of enforcement provided by law is not an integral part and need not be set out in a judgment. So a judgment in bastardy proceedings which did not order that the defendant be committed to jail if he failed to give the bond required by law, was held good nevertheless.</p> <p>3. Judgment in Bastardy—Failure to Provide for Annual Payments. —The failure of a judgment in bastardy to direct to whom the annual payments should be made, does not invalidate the judgment.</p>

<p>1. Master and Servant—Risks Assumed by the Servant—Extra Risks. —It devolves upon the master to prepare the appliances and machinery to be used in and about the business engaged in, with such reasonable care that the servant will not be exposed to perils beyond such as pertain to the work. Extra risks resulting from a failure of the master to discharge this duty do not come within the danger assmned by a servant.</p> <p>2. Master and Servant—Notice of Defects.—Where appliances are contrived and constructed for temporary use without the assistance or knowledge of the employe, not in his care or control, never having operated them or had an opportunity to inspect them, the employe is not chargeable with notice of their defects, either in plan or construction.</p> <p>S. Fellow-Servants.—A person was employed as a “mine blacksmith for Mine No. 10 ; ” the employer (a corporation) was about to raise a smoke-stack from the ground and place it in position on a base prepared foriton the roof of the boiler-house of “Mine No. 9.” No particular servants of the company were charged with the duty of raising stacks. Such work being required only at long intervals, it was customary to call upon any of its employes to assist in the work, and so notified the blacksmith, while he was at work at his anvil, to assist in raising the stack. While doing so, appliances gave way and the stack fell upon him and he was injured. The mode of doing the work of arranging the ropes and pulley by which the stack was to be raised was devised and constructed by servants of the company who were superior in authority to the blacksmith, and with whom he in no wise co-operated in the work, nor was he consulted about it. Under such circumstances the fact that the arrangements were made and machinery constructed and furnished by other servants of the company will not relieve the common master from liability arising from a defect in the machinery or from a lack of ordinary care and skill in the preparation of the contrivances to do the work of raising the stack. The relation of fellow-servants does not exist between them and the blacksmith.</p> <p>4. Employes Right to Assume that Appliances, etc., are Reasonably Safe.—Where an employe of a company is unexpectedly called upon to assist other servants or employes of the company in performing a work not in the usual line of his employment, for instance raising and placing in position a smoke-stack, without an opportunity of seeing or knowing whether the appliances are properly constructed or in fit and safe condition for the work, such employe has the right to assume that the arrangement of the appliances and machinery for performing the work had been so skillfully and carefully planned and executed that those assisting in operating would not be unreasonably exposed to danger other than such as was inseparable from the character of the work about to be done.</p> <p>5. Co-employes—Lines of Employment—Emergencies.—An employe called upon, without previous notice, to assist other employes of a common master in the performance of a work of an emergency character, and not in his ordinary line of employment, is warranted in supposing that such care has been taken and such skill and intelligence employed in preparing for the work, that he would not be exposed to additional danger from the slightest indiscretion of another workman or from a slight disarrangement of the appliances.</p>

<p>1. Receipt—Presumption as to Signature.—The law presumes that a receipt, regularly executed, etc., as it appears when produced by the party claiming its benefit, was signed by the party sought tobe charged; but where the integrity of its statement or the genuineness of the signature is the question, in a civil action, it may be determined, like other questions of fact, upon a preponderance of the evidence, though the proof, which is the effect of the evidence, is not clear, nor unmistakable.</p> <p>2. Questions of Fact.—Where the evidence is conflicting, etc., this court will defer to the judgment of the chancellor, formed under better conditions, etc.</p>

<p>Memorandum.—Action of assumpsit. Appeal from the County Court of Moultrie County; the Hon. John L. Purvis, County Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Memorandum.—Action for damages from fire. Appeal from a judgment rendered by the Circuit Court of Coles County; the Hon. Jambs F. Hughes, Circuit Judge, presiding.</p>

Memorandum.—Petition for mechanic’s lien. Appeal from a decree dismissing the petition, entered by the Circuit Court of Sangamon County; the Hon. James W. Creighton, Circuit Judge, presiding.

<p>Memorandum.—-Action for damages. Appeal from the Circuit Court of De Witt County; the Hon. George- W. Herdman, Circuit Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Memorandum.—Suit in equity. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Sangamon County; the Hon. Jacob Fouke, Circuit Judge, presiding.</p>

Memorándum.—Aotion on a promissory note. Appeal from a judgment in favor of appellee for $460, rendered by the Circuit Court of McLean County; the Hon. Charles Starr, Circuit Judge, presiding.

Memorandum.—Action of case for personal injuries. Writ of error to the Circuit Court of Alexander County, to reverse a judgment of that court in favor of the defendant; the Hon. Oliver A. Harker, Circuit Judge, presiding.

<p>1. Decree in Personam—What is, etc.—In a suit to foreclose a mortgage brought against the administrator and the heirs of a deceased mortgagee, none of whom were personally liable for the payment of the mortgaged debt, the court found that there was due from the defendants to the complainants the sum of $1,263.61 and $10 attorney fees, and ordered that the defendants pay to complainants within ten days the said sum with lawful interest, etc., and that in default of such payment the mortgaged land, or so much thereof as might be necessary to satisfy the debt, etc., be sold at public vendue for cash, etc., and out of the proceeds to pay the costs and amount due the complainants. It was held that the decree was objectionable, in so far as it purports to find an amount due from the defendants to the complainants, and in ordering them to pay the same, but that it was not in this proceeding a decree in personam.</p> <p>2. Effect of the Mortgagee's Default at Common Law.—Under the common law, a default in the performance of the conditions 'of a defeasance worked an absolute forfeiture of the estate, but in equity a mortgage was only regarded as a security for the indebtedness, and a right of redemption after a default was established.</p> <p>8. Judgment in Personam at Common Law,—At common law a mortgagee might, if he desired a judgment in personam, bring his action at law upon the mortgage indebtedness.</p> <p>4. Jurisdiction of the Courts to Render Decrees in Personam in Foreclosure Suits.— Our courts are without jurisdiction to render judgments or decrees for the payment of the mortgage indebtedness against defendants in foreclosure proceedings. Under the statute they can only render a decree for the balance of the amount that may be found to be remaining unpaid after the mortgaged premises have been sold and tlie proceeds applied under the decree.</p>

<p>1. Warranty—What Constitutes.—A. sold a stallion to R. Pending the bargain R. asked for the pedigree. A. handed him a catalogue, telling him that the pedigree of the horse was on page seven. When he asked about the horse being a sure foal getter, A. answered that there was no doubt about that,that the catalogue contained all that was necessary for him to say about that. As to the quality of the horse as a foal getter the statement in the catalogue was, “He will attract attention anywhere and make his mark as a foal getter.” It was held that this was by no means a warranty that the horse would attract attention or prove a foal getter, but was only an expression of the belief of the seller as to what might be expected of the horse in the future.</p>

<p>1. Injunction—Allowance of Damages on Dissolution—Services of Counsel.—Where the services of counsel are directed to the defeat of a bill in chancery upon the main question, and no service is required to obtain a dissolution of the injunction aside from the hearing on the merits, and when it is apparent that the services of counsel would be the same whether there was an injunction or not, the injunction being a mere incident and not the occasion for any special services of counsel apart from the general defense on the merits, it is improper to allow counsel fees as damages.</p>

Memorandum.—Action on a benefit certificate in a life insurance association; appeal from a judgment rendered in favor of appellee by the Circuit Court of Sangamon County; the Hon. Jacob Fouke, Circuit Judge, presiding. Article 10 of By-Laws offered in evidence. Sec. 3.

<p>Memorandum.—Application for a writ of assistance. Appeal from an order of the Circuit Court of Adams County, allowing the writ; the Hon. Oscar P. Bonney, Circuit Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Memor&námii.—Action upon a promissory note. Appeal from a judgment of the Circuit Court of- Sangamon County, for the defendants. The Hon. Jacob Fouke, Circuit Judge, presiding.</p>

Memorandum.—Assumpsit Writ of error to the Circuit Court of McLean County to reverse a judgment entered by that court in favor of the plaintiff; the Hon. Charles R, Starr, Circuit Judge, presiding.

<p>1. Waiver of Objection by Taking an Appeal.—'On the trial of a suit for the violation of a village ordinance, an objection in the form of a motion to dismiss the suit by the defendant on the ground that the justice xvas one of the village trustees, and therefore incapacitated to sit in the case, is waived by prosecuting an appeal under the statute.</p> <p>2. Or dinanees—Depositing with the Village Clerk—Filing, etc.—Under Sec. 46, Ohap. 84, R. S., requiring all ordinances of cities and villages to be deposited in the office of the clerk before they become effective, the village of Lovington adopted an ordinance in terms requiring all ordinances of the village to be filed instead of deposited as required by the statute. It was held that a paper is, in legal effect, filed when it is delivered to the proper officer and by him received to be kept on file. The deposit with the proper officer is the thing essential, of which the filing is but evidence.</p> <p>3. Depositing an Ordinance with the Olerlc Sufficient.—The depositing the ordinance with the clerk is in compliance with the statutory requirement, and sufficient so far as the validity of the ordinance is concerned. It is immaterial whether it was filed or not.</p> <p>4. Ordinances—Proof of.—Ordinances are proven prima facie under the statute, when printed in book or pamphlet form and published by authority of the village board. It is not necessary that a certificate of the clerk written or printed be appended to or accompany such book or pamphlet. It is sufficient if the book or pamphlet on its title page or by printed certificate of the clerk or otherwise on its face purports to have been published by the authority of the trustees.</p>

<p>Memorandum.—Suit for the violation of a village ordinance. Appeal from County Court of Moultrie County; the Hon. John D. Pubvis, County Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Cities and Villages—Ordinances Void as Against Public Policy, etc.—An ordinance providing that “No person, except peace officers, shall carry or wear under his or her clothing, or concealed about his or her person, any pistol, revolver, slung-shot, knuckles, bowie knife, dirk, dagger or any other dangerous or deadly weapon, without the written permission of the president of the board of trustees of said village,” is invalid as against public policy, as well as being without authority of law, vesting, as it does, unlimited and arbitrary power in the president of the board of trustees to say who should and who should not carry concealed weapons, and that it is also invalid as not being in harmony with the enactment of the statute upon the same subject.</p> <p>2. Ordinances Partly Valid and Partly Invalid.—An ordinance can not be valid in part and in part invalid so that the court can reject the invalid portion and support the residue.</p>

<p>1. Forcible Entry.—Where a person entered upon the possession of another without his consent, and by removing the fence and resetting the same, took possession of a strip or parcel thereof, it is a forcible entry under the terms of the statute and sufficient to support the action.</p>

Memorandum.—Action for personal injuries. Appeal from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff rendered by the Circuit Court of Sangamon County; the Hon. James H. Creighton, Circuit Judge, presiding.

memorandum.—Action of debt on an administrator’s bond. Appeal from a judgment in favor of the defendants rendered by the Circuit Court of Champaign County; the Hon. Feancis M. Weight, Circuit Judge, presiding.

Memorandum.—Replevin for crops reserved from a conveyance of the land by a verbal agreement. Appeal from a judgment for defendant rendered by the Circuit Court of Christian County; the Hon. Jesse J. Phillips, Circuit Judge, presiding.

<p>1. Testimony and Evidence.—There is a technical difference between the testimony and evidence; strictly speaking, the former relates only to the statement made by a witness under oath or affirmation, while the latter includes all that may be submitted to a jury, whether it be the statement of witnesses or contents of papers, documents or records, or the inspection of whatever the jury may be permitted to examine and consider during the trial. However, in the ordinary use of these terms they are often, if not usually, treated as synonymous, and properly so, according to standard lexicographers.</p>

<p>jSIenioraiidim.—Suit for personal injuries. Appeal from the Circuit Court of McLean County; the Hon. Thomas F. Tipton, Circuit Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Memorandum.—Action of forcible entry and detainer. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Macon County; the Hon. Edward P. Vail, Circuit Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Fellow-Servants—A yard switchman, employed by a railroad company to assist in switching cars, his duties being to couple and uncouple cars and to manage the brakes upon cars which were being switched in distributing cars about the yard, and the car inspector, are not fellow-servants within the rule as laid down in this State.</p> <p>2. Instructions—Refusal to Give on Questions Not Arising in the Case. —It is not error to refuse an instruction upon a question which does not arise in the case.</p> <p>3. Damages $5,000 Not Excessive.—When a person thirty-one years old, in good health, his labor furnishing the only means of support for his wife and three children, is killed while in the employ of a railroad company under circumstances which entitle his representatives to recover, §5,000 damages are not excessive.</p>

Memorandum.—Action for damages resulting from offensive discharges from a sewer. Appeal from a judgment for $260 in favor of the plaintiff, rendered by the Circuit Court of Morgan County; the Hon. Cyrus Epler, Circuit Judge, presiding.

<p>1. Railroads—Injuries to Domestic Animals—Negligence.—In an action to recover damages for the killing of domestic animals which, escaping- from the plaintiff’s premises, were upon the defendant’s track, it appeared that the company had fenced its track as the law required and provided a gate for the use of the plaintiff at his farm crossing. The gate was made to slide between posts at one end, but the plaintiff changed it so that it hung upon hinges, and at the time of the injury complained of, it was so fastened that stock might push it open by rubbing against it. From the plaintiff’s own testimony it appeared that while the gate was closed and fastened an horn- or two before the injury occurred, it was found open shortly after. This appearing, it was held that the animals got upon the track through no negligence of the company, and that the plaintiff could not recover.</p>

Memorandum.—Bill in chancery to set aside fraudulent conveyances. Appeal from a decree dismissing the bill rendered by the Circuit Court of Cass County; the Hon. George W. Herdman, Circuit Judge, presiding.

<p>Memorandum.—Appeal from the order of the Circuit Court of Adams County, sustaining a demurrer to the plaintiff’s declaration; the Hon. Oscar P. Bonnet, Circuit Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Husband and Wife—Wife’s Separate Property.—Where a wife permitted her husband to use her money in his business operations and to buy and take deeds in his own name, and to retain the same for a period of six or seven years, during which period he became in debt and then conveyed the land to his Wife, she can not be heard, in a proceeding by a creditor's bill, to say that she had an understanding with her husband that he would protect her by putting the land in her name when it was paid for, to defeat a creditor who may have trusted her husband on the faith of the property he held with her knowledge and consent.</p> <p>2. Homestead Right.—In a proceeding by creditor’s bill, where a decree is entered for the sale of real estate and an appeal taken, the question of homestead rights can not be raised for the first time in the Appellate Court.</p>

Memorándum.—Mortgage foreclosure in chancery. Appeal from an order discharging a receiver and apportioning rents and profits rendered by the Circuit Court of Morgan County; the Hon. Cyrtjs Epler, Circuit Judge, presiding.

<p>Memorandum.—Action for personal injuries. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Fulton County; the Hon. Jefferson Ore, Circuit Judge, presiding.</p>

Memorandum.-—Suit to enforce the liability of directors under the statute against permitting the indebtedness of a corporation to exceed its capital stock. Appeal from a decree of the Circuit Court of Schuyler County; the Hon. Charles J. Scofield, Circuit Judge, presiding.

<p>Memorandum.—Distress for rent. Appeal from a judgment for defendant rendered by the Circuit Court of Cass.County; the Hon. Cyrus Epler, Circuit Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>memorandum.—Replevin. Appeal from a judgment for defendants rendered by the Circuit Court of De Witt County; the Hon. Lyman Lacey, Circuit Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Action for Slander.—Slander is a malicious wrong, and an action for it has as legitimate a standing in the courts as any other action.</p> <p>2. Charge of Adultery. —W ords imputing a charge of adultery are not actionable in themselves at common law, and an action for the speaking of such words could only be maintained by averring and proving special damages.</p> <p>3. Malice Implied at Common Laio.—Malice is implied at common law from the speaking of actionable words, and general damages follow as a legal inference.</p> <p>4. Malice Implied under Statutes, etc.—Malice is likewise to be implied from the speaking of words made actionable by statute. The effect of the statute is to increase the number of actionable words from all of which malice is to be alike implied, and recovery allowed without proof of special damages.</p> <p>5. General Damages.—General damages include exemplary or vindictive damages.</p>

<p>1. Explanation of Arbitrary Signs in Account Boohs.—It is error to refuse to permit a party to explain the use of signs and peculiar forms of entry appearing tn account books admitted in evidence.</p> <p>2. Contracts—Waiver of Conditions.—In a printed form of contract between a company and an agent for the sale of its goods, was this clause: “ It is also agreed and understood that no agreements outside of this printed form, or differing from it, shall be of any binding force unless they are confirmed by the said first party’s agent at Chicago, Illinois.” It was held, that the agent who negotiated and procured the signature to the contract in question, not being the agent in Chicago, had no authority to bind the company by waiving this condition of the contract, or to make any agreement different from or outside of the printed form of the contract.</p>

Memorándum —Action for personal injuries. Appeal from a judgment of $3,000 in favor of the plaintiff, rendered by the Circuit Court of Fulton County; the Hon. Jefferson Oer, Circuit Judge, presiding.

<p>1. Mental Capacity of Deceased Testator.—Where the testimony upon, the mental capacity of a deceased testator is voluminous and conflicting, and sufficient evidence appears to support the finding of the jury, it will not be disturbed.</p> <p>2. Instruction Assuming Facts.—An instruction which assumes that a testator signed a will where the bill alleges that he executed the instrument claimed to be his will, the attesting witnesses testified that he signed it, and the fact that he did so is in nowise disputed, can not be regarded as erroneous.</p> <p>3. Misconduct of Jurors— Use of Intoxicating Liquors.—Where, upon a motion for a new trial, the court is satisfied from the affidavit read that none of the jurors drank liquor in sufficient quantity, or at such times during the progress of the trial as to affect the verdict, a new trial will not be granted.</p>

Memorandum.—Action of forcible entry and detainer. Appeal from a judgment for the defendants rendered by the Circuit Court of Adams County; the Hon. Oscar P. Bonney, Circuit Judge, presiding.

<p>Memorandum.—Bill for separate maintenance. Appeal from a decree rendered by the Circuit Court of Sangamon County; the Hon. James M. Creighton, Circuit Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Mortgage—Potver to Appoint a Receiver on Default.—Where a mortgage provides for the payment of taxes and insurance of the buildings upon the premises, and, in case of a default, for the appointment of a receiver to collect rents, etc., during the pendency of foreclosure proceedings, it is held that a non-compliance with these provisions empowered the mortgagees to declare the indebtedness due, though not due by the tenor of the notes to secure the payment of which the mortgage was given, and to procure, through the medium of a receiver, to be appointed by the court, possession of the premises, .and the application of the rents to the payment of such indebtedness. The courts of this State are vested with ample power and jurisdiction to enforce such contracts.</p> <p>2. Mortgagees Right to Rents.—Tire right of a mortgagee to rents secured by a mortgage can not be contracted away by the mortgagor.</p> <p>3. Practice—Exceptions to a Master's Report.—A party dissatisfied with the master’s report, must present exceptions thereto and obtain a ruling of the court below upon the same, from which an appeal will lie. Such exceptions can not be preferred for the first time in the Appellate Court.</p>

<p>JSIeffiiorantimn. —Chancery. Appeal from the Circuit Court of McLean County; the Hon. Thomas F. Tipton, Circuit Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Memorándum.—Suit for separate maintenance. Appeal from the Circuit Court of McLean County; the Hon. Thomas F. Tipton, Circuit Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Memorandum»—Action for slander. Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of $300, rendered by the Circuit Court of McLean County; the Hon. Thomas F. Tipton, Circuit Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Propositions of Law—Effect of a Failure to Present.—When in a chancery proceeding no propositions to be held as law in the decision of the case were presented to the court below or exception taken to any ruling of the court as to the reception or rejection of evidence, the sole question for this court on appeal is, is the decree supported by the evidence.</p> <p>2. Party Galling His Adversary as a Witness, Not Concluded by His Testimony.—Where, in a proceeding by a creditor’s bill, the complainants called the defendants and put them upon the stand as their witnesses, the complainants are not concluded by their testimony, nor is the court bound to accept it as absolutely true.</p> <p>3. Credibility of Witnesses.—The trial court has means and opportunities for judging as to the credibility of witnesses, and as to the weight that ought to be given to their testimony, far superior to that of the Apiólate Court, and if the trial court did not discredit their testimony there is no reason why the Appellate Court should do so.</p>

Memorándum.—Action on the case to recover damages resulting from an ejection from a railroad train at Arrowsmith, a station in McLean County. Appeal from a judgment for six dollars, rendered by the Circuit Court of McLean County; the Hon. Thomas F. Tipton, Circuit .fudge, presiding.

<p>'Memorandum.—Assumpsit for a breach of contract. Appeal from the Circuit Court of McLean County; the Hon. Thomas F. Tipton, Circuit Judge, presiding.</p>

Memorandum.—Action upon a beneficiary certificate insuring the life of appellee’s husband. Appeal from a judgment of the McLean County Circuit Court; the Hon. Thomas F. Tipton, 'Circuit Judge, presiding.

<p>1. Instructions Given Orally.—While the statute requires the court to nstract the jury in writing, it is competent for the parties to waive this requirement, and doing so, they are bound by their agreement to that effect.</p>

<p>1. Drainage Rights and Burdens.—In respect to the rights and burdens of drainage, individuals hold their ownership hi land in accordance with the natural conformation of the ground. The right of the owner of the dominant heritage to drainage is based wholly on the principle that nature has ordained such drainage. He may cast upon the servient heritage such water as naturally there descends, and may in the exercise of good husbandry collect such water by ditches and discharge it with increased flow and in greater quantities upon the lower lands than would in the course of nature occur, provided it be discharged into a natural channel or watercourse.</p> <p>2. Drainage—Burdens of the Servient Proprietor.—This burden the owner of the lower land must accept, but he is not to be burdened with or damaged by the discharge of water upon his premises the flow of which has been by the owner of the upper land directed from its natural course by ditches and thus brought to his land, when in the course of nature such water, but for the artificial ditches or drains, would have flowed in another direction.</p> <p>3. Right of Action—Future Damages.—Whether a right of action for damages occasioned by the overflow of water in a ditch arises upon the construction of the ditch within, the meaning of the statute of limitations depends upon whether the ditch is to be regarded as a permanent structure. If permanent, the owner may upon its construction institute a suit for and recover not only present but future damages, and such recovery will operate as a bar to all future actions by such owner or by any one holding under or through him. <■</p> <p>4. Ditches, When Permanent Structures—Statute of Limitations.— When a ditch by construction or by act of the parties becomes a permanent structure, a failure to bring'an action for damages occasioned by it within the statutory period, operates as a bar to a recovery by the owner or his grantees.</p> <p>5. Ditches, When Permanent Structures in a Legal Sense.—The question as to when a ditch is a permanent structure in a legal sense is not to be determined from a consideration alone of its enduring character, or that, if not changed by the hand of man, it would be likely to continue forever. To be permanent in a legal sense a structure must, in addition to being permanent or enduring within itself, be such that its continuation is lawful, because if not lawful it is subject to be removed or abated by a legal proceeding, and therefore can not be deemed permanent.</p> <p>6. Nuisance, When a Permanent Source of Injury.—A nuisance which may be abated by law is not regarded as a permanent source of injury, but as a continuing source, and successive actions for damages occasioned by it may be maintained from time to time as such damages are inflicted.</p> <p>7. Supreme Court Decisions, Randall v. Cooper, 59 Ill. 817, explained, etc.</p>

<p>Memorandum.—Action for personal injuries. Appeal from a judgment rendered by the Circuit Court of McLean County; the Hon. Thomas F. Tipton, Circuit Judge, presiding.</p>

Memorandum.—Action for selling intoxicating liquors. Appeal from a judgment for the defendants, rendered by the Circuit Court of McDonough County; the Hon. Charles J. Scofield, Circuit Judge, presiding.

<p>1. Relation of Master and Servant in Actions for Seduction.—Where it appeared that a daughter, though an adult, had, since arriving at her majority, resided with her father as one of his family the same as when in her minority, and had since her mother’s death, a period of seven years, been his housekeeper and eared for his minor children, occasionally, with her father’s consent, doing washing and other housework away from their home, etc., it was held that the relation of servant to her father was sufficiently shown to sustain an action for the seduction of the daughter.</p> <p>2. What is Necessary to be Shown.—Only slight acts of service are necessary to create the relation of master and servant when an adult daughter resides with her father so as to enable him to maintain an action for her seduction.</p> <p>3. Loss of Service—Constituents of the Action.—Loss of service is theoretically necessary to support an action for seduction, but only slight evidence of such loss is required for the reason that the loss of the comfort and society of the daughter and honor of the father and the family are the real constituents of the action.</p> <p>4. Special Verdicts.—Special verdicts should not be asked upon immaterial and inconclusive actions.</p>

BfonoraiMlmn.—Claim against the estate of a deceased person for services. Appeal from a judgment ia favor of the claimant rendered by the Circuit Court of McDonough County, on appeal from the Probate Court; the Hon. Charles J. Scofield, Circuit Judge, presiding.

<p>1. Waste—Deeds and Reservations.—A father conveyed land to his daughter with the following reservation in the deed : “ Unto said grantors the full and entire profits, u se and-control of all the above described premises during the natural lives of said grantors.” Ten acres of the tract was timber land, upon which a son cut and felled trees under a license, or by authority from his father, the grantor. In action against him for waste, the Circuit Court ruled that the grantor in the deed reserved, by the clause in question, only a life estate, and that the right to out timber under it, was restricted to three purposes: (1) such as was necessary for improvements on the premises in ordinary repairs; (3) a sufficient amount for ordinary firewood for the grantor, his wife, and the tenants thereon ; (3) such timber as was going to decay. On appeal, it was held to correctly state the rule.</p> <p>3. Waste—The American Rule.—The American doctrine as to such rights somewhat enlarges the common law rule and applies in particular cases only; as, if the estate be wholly wild and uncultivated, a part of it may be cleared for cultivation, leaving sufficient timber for the permanent use of the farm.</p> <p>8. Waste—Defense—Justification.—The fact that the estate in remainder is benefited, or not injured, by the acts of the tenant for life, is always stated as a justification for a departure from the rule at common law.</p> <p>4. Waste—The American Rule.—The rule is that whatever does lasting damage to the freehold or tends to the permanent loss of the owner of the fee, or destroys or lessens the value of the inheritance, is doomed waste.</p> <p>5. Conveyances—Reservation of Profits.—A reservation in a deed of the “ full and entire profits ” of land for life does not in any correct sense, either popular or technical, reserve any part of the estate or body of the land itself, but only the “profits” arising out of such use as maybe made of the property without impairing the freehold estate.</p>

M?morandnm.—Divorce. Appeal taken from a decree upon a cross-bill in favor of the defendant, rendered by the Circuit Court of Macoupin County; the Hon. Jacob Fouke, Circuit Judge, presiding.

Memorándum.—Action of assumpsit for money had and received.' Appeal from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff for §108 rendered by the Circuit Court of Macoupin County; the Hon. Jacob Fouke, Circuit Judge, presiding.

<p>Memorandum.—Action for money advanced. Apjieal from the County Court of Vermilion County; the Hon. John G. Thompson, County Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Contracts of Sale—Possession.—A contract of sale which contains a provision authorizing the vendor to resume the possession of property placed in the possession of the vendee upon the latter’s failure to make payments set forth, or in case the property should be levied upon by virtue of any writ, etc., not acknowledged and recorded as required by the chattel mortgage act, is valid between the parties, but invalid as to judgment creditors.</p> <p>2. Justice of the Peace—Docket Entries—Signatures, etc.—It is not essential that the signature of a justice of the peace should be appended as a verification of his docket.</p>

<p>Memorandum.— Action for personal injuries. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Logan County; the Hon. George W. Herdman, Circuit Judge.</p>

Memorandum.—Trespass for filling a ditch. Appeal from a judgment for the defendant rendered by the Circuit Court of Logan County; the Hon. George W. Herdman, Circuit Judge, presiding.

Memorandum.—Assumpsit for balance due on account. Appeal from a judgment for the defendant rendered by the County Court of Cass County; the Hon. Henry Phillips, County Judge, presiding.

Memorandum.—Action upon a contract. Writ of error to reverse a judgment of the County Court of McLean County; the Hon. ColostinD. Myers, County Judge, presiding. Plaintiff’s fifth instruction : The court instructs the jury in behalf of the plaintiff that if the defendant claims that the contract was contingent upon the colt’s matching one the defendant owned, then the defendant is bound to prove the contingency by a preponderance of the evidence.

Memorandum.—Action for slander. Appeal from a judgment for §0.10, in favor of the plaintiff, rendered by the Circuit Court of. McLean County; the Hon. Thomas F. Tipton, Circuit Judge, presiding.

<p>1. Estoppel—Binding upon principal in a bond, binding upon his sureties.—The principal in an official bond (in this case being the county treasurer) is estopped to deny the truth of his own reports and records. It is a part of his official duty to keep correct accounts and make correct reports. To secure tire performance of this duty is one of the objects and conditions of his bond. He can not be heard to falsify his own official records, and whatever binds him in this respect, binds his sureties.</p>

<p>Slainorandmm.—Foreclosure proceeding. Writ of error to the Circuit Court of Sangamon County to reverse a decree rendered in that court: the Hon. Jacob Fouke, Circuit Judge, presiding.</p>

Memorandum.—Action to recover amounts paid by a stockholder in a benefit association. Appeal from a judgment of §30 for plaintiff, rendered by the Circuit Court of Sangamon County; the Hon. James A. Creighton, Circuit Judge, presiding.

<p>1. Decrees—Conclusive as to Matters Adjudicated.—The Appellate Court can look to the decree alone, to ascertain what was adjudicated in the court below.</p>

memorandum.—Action for slander. Appeal from a judgment for the defendant rendered by the Circuit Court of McDonough County; the Hon. Charles J. Scofield, Circuit Judge, presiding.

<p>.1. Officer—Term, of Office Closed upon a Contingency—Sureties.— Because a certain contingency brings the term of an office to a close, and cuts off or terminates the legal right of the incumbent to perform the acts pertaining to the office, it does not follow that as to the public, his acts are to be discredited or that his sureties are released when his legal right to fill the office has ended. He may be treated as an officer de facto. Being such, his acts are valid, not only as against, but also in favor of, third persons; so held where a constable, being required under chapter 103, B. S., to give a new bond, failed to do so, but continued to act.</p> <p>2. Officer Holding Over—Sureties.—When an officer holds over after the expiration of liis term, no successor having been elected and qualified, the liability of sureties upon his bond will extend beyond the term for a reasonably sufficient time, within which the successor may qualify.</p> <p>8. Officer Tailing to Give a New Surety.—Under chapter 103, R. S., when an officer fails to give a new bond, his duty is to turn over to his sureties, all books, moneys, vouchers, papers, and every description of property pertaining to his office, and the sureties may enforce their rights in this respect, by an action of replevin. It is within their power to proceed against him by quo warranto or by mandamus to require the proper authorities to call an election, etc.</p> <p>4. Sureties—Official Bonds—Liability as to Third Persons.—As the sureties have, by signing an official bond, enabled a person to possess a public office and exercise its functions, and as they have various means under the statute by which to divest the party of his official power, in ease of malfeasance on the part of the person holding the office, as between his sureties and an innocent third party, they ought to bear the burden, of his official malfeasance.</p>

Memorándum.—Suit against stockholders in a national bank for misappropriation of funds. Appeal from a decree in favor of complainants rendered by the Circuit Court of Coles County; the Hon. Francis M. Wright, Circuit Judge, presiding.

<p>1. Patent Laws.—Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts.—Hie Federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under the patent laws. The purpose of the patent laws is to create and preserve a monopoly in the invention, in favor of the patentee, but the Federal courts have no concern with the mode or extent of the enjoyment of the monopoly by the patentee. His right in the patented invention is considered as an article of property, and his contracts with others as to its ownership or enjoyment, do not concern the existence of the monopoly.</p> <p>2. Contests Relating to Property in Patent Rights.—A controversy as to such property, or contract right, is not a case under the patent laws, but may be determined by courts having ordinary jurisdiction over such subjects.</p> <p>8. Scope of the Patent Laws.—The patentability and scope of the invention, the validity of the patent, the right of the patentee to forbid others to employ or use it without his consent, are matters within the scope of the patent laws. But controversies in regard to its authorized use by another, are matters with which the patent laws have no concern.</p>

<p>Memorandum.—Action for personal injuries resulting in death. Appeal from a judgment rendered by the Circuit Court of McLean County; the Hon. Thomas F. Tipton, Circuit Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Verdict Against the Weight of the Testimony.—A verdict against the preponderance of the evidence set aside.</p> <p>3. Contracts—Conditional.—In an action for the price of a boiler, it was contended on the part of the defendant that the sale was conditional; that if the plaintiff would clean the boiler thoroughly, subject it to a water test of 150 to 200 lbs., paint it and deliver it at his factory, he would accept it and pay $200. The boiler was not subjected to the test but was delivered at the factory in the defendant’s absence, and the question whether or not the contract of sale was conditional upon the making of such test was practically the contention between the parties. Plaintiff was permitted to prove that the defendant’s son, at a time when the defendant was not present, offered to sell the boiler for $200, and said it was a good boiler; this the son denied. It was held that the admission of this testimony was error. The court can not know that the denial by the son overcame the prejudicial effect of the incompetent evidence; the existing relationship of the son may have operated to deprive his testimony of full weight as against that of a disinterested witness.</p> <p>3. Contracts—Conditional.—Upon the trial of an issue as to whether a contract of sale is conditional, it is error to admit testimony for the purpose of showing the condition of the article sold, as to its soundness, safety, material composed of, and value. The tendency of such evidence is to divert the mind of the jury from the real issue between the parties, such matters not being in issue.</p> <p>4. Instructions—Assumption of Facts not Admitted.—On the trial of an issue as to whether a contract of sale is conditional, it is error to instruct the jury that it is incumbent upon the defendant to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, a warranty claimed and a breach of such warranty, because the instruction practically assumes that the defendant purchased the property and was defending upon the ground of a warranty, etc.</p> <p>5. Instructions Must Be Consistent with the Issue upon Trial.—On the trial of an issue as to whether a contract of sale is conditional, instructions which deal with the law, concerning false affirmations and fraudulent representation, and advise the jury that they can not avail the defendant unless made under circumstances calculated to deceive an ordinarily prudent person, and to warrant the rescission of a contract, such representations must be both false and fraudulent, are improper, as tending to mislead the jury, and, moreover, as seeming to imply that the plaintiff had contracted for the property, and was seeking to avoid a judgment for the price, upon the ground that he had been induced to make the purchase by false and fraudulent representations.</p>

HeiiioratsSiiBL—Writ of error to reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court of McLean County in sustaining a demurrer to a petition for a writ of certiorari; the Hon. Thomas F. Tipton, Circuit Judge, presiding.

<p>1. Parties—Power of One Partner to Bind the Finn by Deed.—The rule of law in force in this State is that partners can not bind the firm by deed, and ordinarily, a partner, in making and signing such an instrument of writing in the firm name, binds himself only and not the firm.</p> <p>3. Ibidem—Previous Parol Assent.—It is the rule in this State that, it the other partners give their parol assent previous to tile execution of a writing that it should be under seal, it will bind them though they are absent when it is signed.</p> <p>3. Seal—Partnership Contract—Surplusage.—An instrument which will be just as effective without a seal as with one for the purpose intended, and the contract in the instrument being within the power of a partner to make, and binding on the firm, had the seal been omitted, the seal will not vitiate the instrument, if otherwise valid, as to all members of the firm.</p>

<p>Memorandum.—Action upon a stockholder’s liability. Appeal from a judgment rendered by the Circuit Court of McLean County; the Hon. Thomas F. Tipton, Circuit Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Questions of Fact—Verdicts—Weight of Testimony.—Whether the contention of a party litigant is sustained by the facts and circumstances is a question for the jury, and their conclusions should stand unless the court can see that they are manifestly against the weight of the evidence.</p> <p>2. Banking—Payment of Checks—Absence of Funds.—The mere fact that checks drawn upon a bank upon previous occasions when the drawer had not funds on deposit were paid, will not commit the bank to the payment of the party’s checks indefinitely.</p> <p>3. Banking—Liability to Pay Checks of Parties Having no Funds on Deposit.—In. a controversy over the liability of a bank to pay the check of a person having n.o funds on deposit, it is shown that the relations existing between, and the course of dealing pursued by the Dank and the yarty drawing the check, were not merely such as pertain to the business of banking, but were sufficient to induce a person taking such check to accept it, believing that the bank was liable for its payment; the liability of the bank to pay the check becomes a question of fact for a jury to determine under all the facts and circumstances of the case.</p> <p>4. Evidence—Admission of Incompetent, Not Always Prejudicial.— The .admission of testimony not essential to a right of recovery, but not at all prejudicial to the opposite party, is not sufficient cause for setting aside a verdict.</p>

Memorandum.—Bill in chancery to compel the surrender of notes. Apx>eal from a decree rendered by the Circuit Court of Sangamon County; the Hon. Jacob Fouke, Circuit Judge, presiding.

<p>Memorandum.—Suit in equity to enforce a sub-contractor’s lien. Appeal from a decree rendered by the Circuit Court of Madison County; the Hon. Alonzo S. Wilderman, Circuit Judge, presiding.</p>

Meinoranáran.—Foreclosure in chancery. Writ of error to the Circuit Court of Morgan County to reverse a decree of foreclosure rendered by that court; the Hon. Cyrus Epler, Circuit Judge, presiding.

<p>Memorandum.—Bill of interpleader. Writ of error to the Circuit Court of McLean County, to reverse a judgment rendered by that court; the Hon. Charles R. Starr, Circuit Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Practice—Failure to Enter a Default.—On the trial of an action of assumpsit, the court, in the absence of a plea to the declaration, and in the absence of the defendant, without entering a default, impaneled a jury and proceeded to assess the plaintiff’s damages, and upon the verdict rendered a judgment. Held, that the failure to take and enter the default was a fatal error.</p>

Memorandum.—Bill to enjoin the sale of 'a homestead on execution. Appeal from a decree restraining sale, rendered by the Circuit Court; the Hon. Edward P. Bail, Circuit Judge, presiding.

Memorandum.—Action upon a guaranty. Appeal from a judgment rendered by the Circuit Court of Moultrie County; the Hon. Edward P. Vail, Circuit Judge, presiding. Copy of note sued on: “§23.00. No. 8481. Sullivan, Ills., June 5, 1885.

<p>Memorandum.—Action on promissory notes. Appeal from a judgment for plaintiff, rendered by the Circuit Court of Hancock County; the Hon, Chas. J. Scofield, Circuit Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Memorandum.—Writ of error to reverse a judgment rendered by the Circuit Court of Vermilion County; the Hon. Francis M. Wright, Circuit Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Assignment of Errors—Abandonment,—Where an alleged error of the court in giving an instruction is assigned for error, but no specific objection to such instruction is made in the brief of the party complaining, nor any reference to such instruction, such assignment must be considered as waived or abandoned.</p>

<p>Memorandum.—Attachment for the collection of a debt. Garnishee process and interpleader. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Hancock County; the Hon. Charles J. Scofield, Circuit Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Verdict Against the Preponderance of the Evidence.—Where the evidence is conflicting, and the jury choose to accept the version of one party, the court will not ordinarily reverse the'finding.</p> <p>3. Instructions—Repetition.—It is not error to refuse an instruction the substance of which is contained in other instructions given for the same party.</p>

<p>Menioraiiclnm.—Action upon a promissory note. Appeal from a judgment rendered by the Circuit Court of Pike County; the Hon. Oscar P. Bonney, Circuit Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Memorandum.—Petition to have an instrument declared a voluntary assignment. Appeal from a decree rendered by the Circuit Court of Cass County; the Hon. Cyrus Epler, Circuit Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>The facts same as preceding case, etc.</p>

<p>1. Agev cy—Special Agent.—An agent whose authority is confined, to a single transaction is commonly denominated a special agent. The principal of such an agent is bound, only so far as his acts are strictly in accordance with the authority given him, and parties assuming to deal with his principal, through him, must, at then- peril, ascertain the extent of his authority, and in controversies regarding it, be prepared to establish it by a preponderance of the evidence.</p>

Memorandum.—Action for damages resulting from the sale of intoxicating liquors. Appeal from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff for $500, rendered by the Circuit Court of Montgomery County; the Hon. James A. Creighton, Circuit Judge, presiding.

<p>Memorandum.—Action against an employer by an employe for personal injuries. Appeal from a judgment in favor of plaintiff, rendered by the Circuit Court of Coles County; the Hon. Francis M. Weight, Circuit Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Memorandum.—Assumpsit. Appeal from a judgment for plaintiff, rendered by the Circuit Court of Fulton County; the Hon. Jefferson Orr, Circuit Judge., presiding.</p>

<p>Memorandum.—Action for breach of contract. Appeal from a judgment rendered by the Circuit Court of Morgan County; the Hon. Cyrus Epler, Circuit Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Memorándum.—Appeal from a decree entered by the Circuit Court of Morgan County. The Hon. Cyrus Epler, Circuit Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Verdicts.—A verdict may be delivered in writing or orally, but in neither form does it become the verdict until it is announced and received in court. Until then the jury may change it or authorize the judge or clerk to change it in form or substance, and if, before it is received, the change intended is so announced by them and made in accordance therewith and recorded, the one so recorded is the only verdict in the case.</p> <p>3. Verdicts—Objections to Form,.—Objections to the form of the verdict can not be made for the first time in the Appellate Court.</p> <p>8. Instructions—Corrections in Form.—The trial judge having read an instruction to the jury, was dissatisfied with it. He erased a part of it, and stated to the jury that he would read it again, and did so, omitting the part erased; this was held properly done.</p>

<p>1. Guardian and Ward.—Agreements between a guardian and his ward fixing his compensation, though made after the ward has arrived at legal age, are to be viewed with suspicion and zealously scrutinized. It is presumed that the influence of the confidential relationship of the parties exists until final settlement and payment is made, and all transactions and dealings between them, prejudicially affecting the interest of the ward, are held to be constructively fraudulent.</p> <p>2. Guardian and Ward—Agreements Between.—Agreements between a guardian and his ward, upon arriving at legal age, appearing to be' fair and just, and not tending unduly to the benefit of the guardian, may be upheld.</p> <p>3. Evidence—Admissibility under the General Issue.—Any evidence which tends directly to show that the plaintiff did not have a subsisting cause of action at the commencement of the suit, is admissible under the general issue.</p>

<p>Memorandum.—Bill to set aside an award. Appeal from a decree rendered by the Circuit Court of Adams County; the Hon. Osoar P. Bonnet, Circuit Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Partnership Funds.—A partnership caused a sum of money to be deposited in the National Live Stock Bank, of Chicago, to the credit of the Bank of Arthur, for its (said partnership) account. The last named bank placed the amount to the individual credit-of one of the members of the firm, and paid the money out on his check. In a suit by the firm to recover the money, the trial court refused to hold three propositions of law, viz.:</p> <p>(1.) If the court believes from the evidence that plaintiffs, Ellars & Humble, caused funds belonging to them to come into possession of defendant, and that said Ellars & Humble did not want a firm account opened with the bank, but desired to have the funds placed to the credit of one or the other of tire members of said firm, and that such firm funds had been placed prior to the transaction complained of, and that such disposition thereof had been acquiesced in by said firm, and if the court further believes from the evidence that the money in controversy was money belonging to said firm, and was placed by defendant to the credit of Humble, either with or without the special direction of the firm, or either of them, but in accordance with a method of doing business before that time acquiesced in by said firm, and that said money was paid to said Humble on his individual check after having been placed to his account—then the judgment in this case ought to be for defendant.</p> <p>(2.) The placing of partnership funds coming into the possession of a bank to the credit of one of the members of the firm when the firm has no firm account with such bank, and desires not to have one, and payment to said member of said funds on his individual check, is payment to the firm.</p> <p>(8.) If the court believes from the evidence that defendant received thé money in controversy as funds belonging to the firm of Ellars & Humble, and paid the same to Humble as a member of said firm, then the plaintiffs, Ellars & Humble, can not maintain a suit at law in the firm name, although the court may believe, from the evidence, as between Ellers and Humble, Humble had no right to receive said money.</p> <p>It was held, that if the consent of Ellers he not implied, the payment was good as to Humble, and being a complete satisfaction as to one of the parties, a court of equity is alone competent to grant the relief which the firm seeks by this action of assumpsit. The holding was incorrect, as the evidence tended strongly to support the propositions.</p>

<p>Memorandum.—Assumpsit. Appeal from the Circuit Court of McLean County; the Hon. Thomas F. Tipton, Circuit Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Memorandum.—Bill in chancery. Writ of error to reverse a decree for defendant rendered by the Circuit Court of Menard County; the Hon. Cybus Epler, Circuit Judge, presiding.</p>

Memorandum.—Action by personal representatives for death by negligence, etc. Appeal from a judgment for $3,500, in favor of plaintiff, rendered by the Circuit Court of Christian County; the Hon. Jesse J. Phillips, Circuit Judge, presiding.

<p>Memorándum.—Proceedings in chancery against stockholders. Appeal from a decree rendered by the Circuit Court of Sangamon County; the Hon. Jacob Fookb, Circuit Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Memorandum.—Mortgage foreclosure in chancery. Appeal from a decree rendered by the Circuit Court of Calhoun County; the Hon. George W. Herdman, Circuit Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Memorándum.—Petition for mandamus. Appeal from a judgment for defendant rendered by the Circuit Court of Morgan Comity; the Hon. Cyrus Epler, Circuit Judge, presiding.</p>

Memorandum.—Action against surviving partner. Appeal from judgment for the defendant, rendered by the Circuit Court of Sangamon County; the Hon. James A. Creighton, Circuit Judge, presiding.

<p>1. Alteration of Instruments—Adoption, etc,.—It was conceded that a promissory note had been altered, but it was shown that the maker, upon an examination of the note in the hands of the plaintiff, while claiming that it had been altered, unconditionally promised to pay it: held, that this was an adoption of the note as it then appeared, and by which the maker was bound.</p>

<p>Memorandum.—Action for damages. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Morgan County; the Hon. Cyrus Epler, Circuit Judge, presiding.</p>

Memorandum.—Suit for violation of an ordinance. Appeal from a judgment for the defendant, and against the appellant, for costs, rendered by the Circuit Court of Menard County; the Hon. Cyrus Epler, Circuit Judge, presiding.