Volume 49 — Illinois Appellate Court Reports

Memorandum.—Action for personal injuries. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Coles County; the Hon, Francis Mi Wright, Circuit Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the November term, A, D, 1893, and affirmed.

<p>1. Promissory notes—Indorsement and Guaranty.—The following indorsement upon a promissory note—‘ ‘ for value received-guarantee ‘¿he payment of the within note at maturity,” made by the payee ¿hereof before maturity, and prior to the delivery of the note to a third parson, operates as an assignment as well as a guaranty, and is enforceable in favor of any legal holder of the note.</p> <p>2. Promissory Notes—Restrictive Indorsements.—The holder of a promissory note made the following indorsement thereon, viz., ‘ ‘ Pay W. H. C., cash, or order for collection, and return,” and sent it to the bank of which W. H. C. was cashier, ior collection. A few days later the holders received from the bank, the following, viz.: * * * “We enclose our draft, $395.97, in payment of coll. No. 8943, on Bonney, sent us July 22, This includes face and interest at 8 per cent, less our charges of $1.00. Don’t release chattel mortgage, as we still hold the note unpaid. By mistake our collection clerk left the coll, off the protest list, and it was not protested, but I think the security is ample to pay ¿he obligation.” It tvas held that the indorsement by the holder to the bank was restrictive, and was for collection merely, but that the action of ¿he hank and the statement in its letter, when assented to by the acquiescence of the holder, amounted to a purchase of the paper and gave the bank all the rights of a general holder, including the right to enforce ¿he guaranty. The restrictive indorsement may be treated as stricken out, and the bank regarded as any other holder under an indorsement in blank.</p>

<p>1. Trespass to Heal Estate—Highways.—When a person fences in a part of the highway he is liable to a penalty, and the fence as an obstruction may be removed by the public officials or by a private citizen.</p> <p>2. Highways—Encroachments by Fencing—Acceptance and Dedication-, etc.—If, when a man owning the land adjacent to a highway, encroaches upon it by fencing, he gives to the public another way outside of his fence connecting with the road, the way so given may be accepted by the public, and in such case there will be as to such portion, a public highway it by dedication. A road so acquired will be just as binding on the land owner as though it had been laid out in the first histance by the authorities, and the owner can not thereafter withdraw it.</p> <p>3. Dedication—Lands of Minors Dedicated by Occupant, etc.— Estoppel, etc.—Where a person, not the owner of lands which were adjacent to a highway, changed the location of the highway by moving fences, etc., and the minors, in whom the title of the lands was vested, acquiesced in such change and re-location after they became of age, and sold tlie lands to another, it was held that they were bound by the original act of re-looation as to all rights acquired by the public by reason thereof.</p>

Memorandum.—Action on a policy of insurance. Appeal from a judgment rendered by the Circuit Court of Greene County; the lion. George W. Herdman, Circuit Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the November term, A. D. 1893.

Memorandum.—Action for damages. Appeal from a judgment for plaintiff, rendered by the County Court of Moultrie County; the Hon. John D. Purvis, County Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the November term, A. D. 1892.

Memorandum.—Action for damages. Appeal from a judgment for plaintiff rendered by the Circuit Court of Cass County; the Hon. Lyman Lacey, Circuit Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the November term A. D. 1892, and affirmed.

Memorandum.—Action for damages. Appeal from a judgment for plaintiff, rendered by the Circuit Court of Shelby County; the Hon. James A. Creighton, Circuit Judge, presiding. Heard in this ciurt at the November term, A. D.'1892, and affirmed.

Memorándum.—Certiorari to the county superintendent of schools. Appeal from a judgment rendered’ by the Circuit Court of McLean County; the Hon. Thomas F. Tipton, Circuit Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the November term, A. D. 1892, and affirmed.

Memorandum.—BUI to construe a will. Appeal from a judgment rendered by the Circuit Court of Macoupin County; the Hon. Jesse J. Phillies, Circuit Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the November term, A. D. 1892, and affirmed.

Memorándum»—Action for violation of an ordinance. Writ of error to the McDonough Circuit Court, rendered in that court to reverse a judgment in favor of the appellee; the Hon. Charles J. Scofield, Circuit Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the November term, 1892.

Memoran<limi.—Action in assumpsit. Appeal from a judgment for plaintiff, l-endered by the Circuit Court of Logan County; the Hon. Cyrus Eplbb, Circuit Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the November term, A. D. 1893, and affirmed.

Memorandum.-Sale of intoxicating liquors. Appeal from a fine imposed by the County Court of Pike County; the Hon. EDWARD D000ay, County Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the November term, A. D. 1892.

Memorándum.—Action for damages. Appeal from a judgment for plaintiff, rendered by the Circuit Court of Cumberland County; the Hon. Edmund D. Youngblood, Circuit Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the November term, A. D. 1893.

Memorandum—Attachment and interpleader. Appeal from a judgment in favor of the defendant, rendered by the Circuit Court of Cass County: the Hon. Lyman Lacey, Circuit Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the November term, A. D. 1893, and affirmed.

MeiMoranfium,,—Consteuction of will. Appeal from a decree rendered by the Circuit Court of Sangamon County; the Hon. James A. Creighton, Circuit Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the November (term, A D. 1892, sad affirmed,

Memorandum. —Appeal from an order of imprisonment for an alleged contempt of court, entered by the Circuit Court of Morgan County; the Hon. Cyrus Epler, Circuit Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the November term, 1892, and affirmed.

Memorandum.—Action of assumpsit upon a policy of insurance. Appeal from a judgment rendered by the Circuit Court of McLean County; the Hon. Thomas J. Tipton, Circuit Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the November term, A. D. 1892, and affirmed.

Meinorandum.--Bill of interpleader filed by the County of Jersey to require different claimants for a reward for the arrest of a crinunal, to litigate their respective claims. Appeal by the defeated claimant, from the decree, entered by the Circuit Court of Jersey County; the Hon. GEORGE W. HERDaLS.N, Circuit Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the November term, A. D. 1892, and affirmed.

<p>Memorandum.—Breach of warranty. Appeal from the Circuit Court of McLean County; the Hon. Thomas F. Tipton, Circuit Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the November term, A, D. 1892, and affirmed.</p>

Memorandum.—Action for personal injuries. Writ of error to the Circuit Court of Cass County, to reverse a judgment rendered by that court; the Hon. Cyrus Epler, Circuit Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the November term, A. D. 1892.

Memorsmttan.—Action of replevin. Appeal from a judgment for plaintiff, rendered by the Circuit Court of Edgar County; the Hon. Ferdinand Bookwalter, Circuit Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the November term, A. D. 1892.

Memorandum.—Action of trespass on the case. Appeal from a judgment for plaintiff, rendered by the Circuit Court of McLean County; the Hon. Thomas F. Tipton, Circuit Judge, presiding. Heard in tliis court at the November term, A. D. 1892, and affirmed.

Memorandum.'—Writ of attachment. Appeal from a judgment for the plaihtiff, rendered by the Circuit Court of Coles County; the Hon. Francis M. Wright, Circuit Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the November term, A. D. 1892.

Memoramithsm.-Action of assuinpsit. Appeal from a judgment renderscl by the Circuit Court of Coles County; the Hon. Fna~oxs M. Wrioht, Circuit Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the November term, A. D. 1892.

<p>Memorandum. —Appeal from a judgment rendered by the Circuit Court of Moultrie County; the Hon. Edwaed P. Vail, Circuit Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the November term, A. D. 1892,</p>

Memorandum.—Action for damages. Appeal from a judgment for the plaintiff, rendered by the Circuit Court of McLean County; the Hon. Thomas F. Tipton, Circuit Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the November term, A. D. 1892.

Memorandum. Assumpsit for money loaned. Writ of error to the Circuit Court of Champaign County to reverse a judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff; the Hon. Francis M. Weight, Circuit Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the November term, A. D. 1892, and affirmed.

Memorandum.—Aetion of assumpsit. Appeal from a judgment for fche plaintiff rendered by the Circuit Court of Menard County; the Hon. Cyrus Epler, Circuit Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the November term, A. D. 1892.

Memorandum.—Foreclosure. Writ of error to the Circuit Court of Mason County, to reverse a decree entered by that court from the complainant; the Hon. Cyrus Epler, Circuit Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the November term, A. D. 1892, and affirmed.

<p>Memorandum.—Assumpsit. Appeal from a judgment rendered by the Circuit Court of McLean Comity; the Hon. Thomas F. Tipton, Judge, presiding. Heard in. this eourt at the November term, 1892.</p>

Memorandum.—Action of assumpsit. Appeal from a judgment rendered by the Circuit Court of Hancock County; the Hon. Charles J. Scofield, Circuit Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the November term, A. D. 1893, and affirmed.

Memorandum.—Bill in chancery to expunge a clause surreptitiously inserted in a deed. Writ of error to reverse a decree rendered by the Circuit Court of Fulton County; the Hon. Jefferson Orr, Circuit Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the November term, A. D. 1892, and affirmed.

Memorandum.—Action for damages. Appeal from a judgment for plaintiff, rendered by the Circuit Court of McLean County; the Hon. Thomas F. Tipton, Circuit Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the November term, 1892, and affirmed.

Memorandum.—Assumpsit on certificate of insurance. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Edgar County; the Tlon. Ferdinand Bookwalter, Circuit Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the November term, A. D. 1892, and affirmed.

Memorandum.—Indictment for a conspiracy. Appeal from a conviction in the Circuit Court of Clay County; the Hon. Carroll C. Boggs, Judge. Heard in this court at the August term, A. D. 1893, and affirmed.

Memorándum.—Action for a statutory penalty. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Lawrence County; the Hon. Cyrus Z. Landes, Circuit Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the February term, 1893, and affirmed.

Memorandum.—Action for personal injuries. Appeal from a judgment rendered by the Circuit Court of Perry County; the Hon. Benjamin R. Büeeoüg-hs, Circuit Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the August term, A. D. 1891.

Memorandum.—Action for personal injuries. Appeal from a judgment rendered by the Circuit Court of Union County; the Hon. Joseph B. Robarts, Circuit Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the August term, A. D. 1892. Statement oe the Facts by the Court. Appellee recovered a judgment in the court heloiv for a personal injury alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the appellant.

Memorandum.—Action on a promissory note. Appeal from the County Courty of Richland County; the Hon. T. A. Fritchey, County Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the February term, A. D. 1893, and affirmed.

<p>1. Misjoinder of Parties Plaintiff.—Where a person brought a joint action of trespass on the case, to recover damages against an insurance company for an alleged fraudulent declaration of forfeiture of a policy of insurance on his life in his own name, and that of bis wife, the beneficiary named in the policy, it was held, that there was a misjoinder of parties plaintiff, and a judgment recovered by them was reversed.</p> <p>2. Non-suit—-Misjoinder of Plaintiffs.—The joinder of too many plaintiffs in an action ex delicto, is ground for a non-suit on the trial. In this respect actions on contracts and for torts are alike.</p> <p>3. Husband and Wife—Misjoinder as Parties Plaintiff.—Where a husband and wife sued jointly to recover damages for an alleged injury to the person of the wife, it was held, that the husband was improperly joined with the wife asa co-plaintiff in the action.</p> <p>4. Life Insurance—Right of Action in the Name of Beneficiaries.— Where a person insured his life for the benefit of his wife, naming her in the policy as the beneficiary, and the policy contained a condition that any member having designated his beneficiary might change the same at his pleasure without notice to or consent of the beneficiary, and that all persons accepting any interest in the policy or company did so upon these express terms, it was held in an action to recover damages for an alleged declaration of forfeiture of the policy, that the wife had no present right of action, either to recover the premiums paid by her husband because they were not paid for her use, or to recover damages for being deprived of an expectancy, because she might be deprived of that by the act of her husband in appointing another beneficiary.</p>

<p>1. Exceptions—Record.—A record which contains no proper exceptions presents no question for the consideration of an appellate court.</p>

<p>1. Record in the Appellate Court—Sufficiency of Clerk's Certificate.— Where a clerk’s certificate does not show that the record filed contains any order or judgment of the court below, but only that it contains “ all the papers designated, numbering from 1 to 52,” it was held that the judgment and the order allowing an appeal are records and not papers; therefore, under the clerk’s certificate, there was no judgment before the court for review.</p> <p>2. Records—Fatal Defects.—Where a record has fatal defects in not showing that the appeal was granted upon one of the days of the term of court from which it was taken, the appeal will be dismissed.</p>

<p>1. Hules of Court—Advance Docket Fees.—Under a rule of the Circuit Court providing that " whenever the appellant neglects to have the case docketed, the appellee may do so and obtain an order upon the appellant to pay the costs necessarily advanced, and upon failure to comply with the same, the appeal maybe dismissed,” it is error to require more than the fees fixed by law for costs necessarily advanced, for services performed, or to be performed, in the docketing of the case.</p> <p>2. Dismissal of Appeal for Non-compliance with the Rules of the Court.—Under a rule of the Circuit Court, providing that whenever the appellant neglects to have the case docketed, the appellee may do so, and obtain an order upon the appellant to refund the costs necessarily advanced by him in so doing, it was held, that the rule covers only sucli costs as may be necessarily advanced. This necessity is not one which arises from the compulsion of the clerk, or from long continuing acquiescence of attorneys and their clients, or from the order of the court requiring the payment of illegal fees. It is necessary to advance none but legal fees. The appellant has the right to refuse to pay any fees except those legally chargeable, and his appeal can not be dismissed for such refusal.</p>

Memorandum.—Trespass for wrongfully cutting a ditch. Appeal from a judgment rendered by the Circuit Court of Union County; the Eton. Joseph P. Robaets, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the August term, A. D. 1892, and affirmed.

<p>Memorandum.—Appeal from the County Court of Franklin County; the. Hon. R. H. Flannigan, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the February term, 1893, and affirmed.</p>

Memorandum.—Action for slander, Ajxpeal from the Circuit Court of St. Clair County; the Hon. Alonzo D. Wildékhan, Circuit Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the February term, A. D. 1893, and affirmed.

Memorandum.—Appeal from a judgment rendered by the Circuit Court of Jefferson County; the Hon. Edmond D. Youngblood, Circuit Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the February term, A. D. 1893, and affirmed.

Memorandum.—Distress for rent. Appeal from a judgment rendered by the Circuit Court of Wayne County; the Eon. Edmund D. Young-blood, Circuit Judge, presiding. Heard in'this court at the February term, A. D. 1893, and affirmed.

Memorandum.—Action for personal injuries. Appeal from the Circuit Court of St. Clam County; the Hon. Alonzo D. Wilderman, Circuit Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the August term, A. D. 1892, and affirmed.

Memorandum.—Action of trespass, for removal of building. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Jackson county, the Hon. Joseph P. Robabts, Circuit Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the August term, 1892.

Memorandum.—Action for personal injuries. Appeal from a judgment rendered by the Circuit Court of Wabash County; the Hon. Edmund D. Youngblood, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the Eebru. ary terra, A. D. 1893, Statement of the Facts bt the Court. Appellee’s left hand near the wrist was crushed between the deadwoods of two ears at St. Francisville, on the 4th day of July, 1891, while, as brakeman for appellant, he was attempting to make a coupling.

Memorandum.—Bill for injunction and relief. Appeal from a decree of dismissal rendered by the Circuit Court of St. Clair County; the Hon. Alonzo S. Wildbrhan, Circuit Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the February term, A. D, 1892, and dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

Memorandum—Action upon an oral contract. Appeal from a judgment rendered by the Circuit Court of Jefferson County; the Hon. Edmund D. Youngblood, Judge. ■ Heard in this court at the August term, A. D. 1892.

Memorandum.—Bill for an injunction. Writ of error to the Circuit Court of Jefferson County; the Hon. Edmund D. Youngblood, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the February term, A. D. 1892, and affirmed.

SlemoraiMhm.—Appeal from a judgment rendered by the City Court of East St. Louis; the Hon. B. H. Canby, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the February term, 3893, and affirmed.

Memorandum.—Action for unjust discrimination. Appeal from a judgment for the defendant rendered by the Circuit Court of Saint Clan- County; the Hon. Benjamin R. Burroughs, Circuit Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the August term, A. D. 1892, and affirmed.

Memorándum.—Action on the case. Appeal from a judgment rendered by the Circuit Court of Union County; the Hon. Joseph P. Robarts, Circuit Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the February term, A. D. 1893, and affirmed.

Memorandum.—Action upon an account. Appeal from a judgment rendered by the Circuit Court of Wayne County; the Hon. Edmund D. Youngblood, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the February term, A. D. 1898.

<p>1. Bonds—Material Alterations—Duty of the Court to Instruct as to the Law.—A person employed in the service of another, being required to give a bond for the faithful performance of certain services, wrote the bond himself, from a form furnished him by his employer, and took it away with him for the purpose of having it signed and acknowledged by his sureties, one of whom did not read the bond, or require it to be read, but inquired what it was intended to secure, and signed it after having been informed that it was only for the purpose of securing the return of a wagon, and implements which were furnished him by his employer for use in his business. Afterward, said person delivered the bond to his employer. When delivered, the condition of the bond was, that he should, take good care of the implements, wagon and other property furnished him, deliver up the same in good condition when called upon to do so, and promptly report, deliver and pay over to the obligee, all money, goods and other property received by him. Default having been made, an action was brought against the obligors. The defense was a denial of liability, on the ground of material alterations in the bond. On one hand the evidence tended to show that the penalty, both in words and figures, and perhaps the names of the sureties, were inserted in the bond after it was signed, and before delivery to the obligees. On the other hand, there was evidence tending to show that if the bond was altered after it was signed, it was while it was in the hands of the person so employed, and before the delivery to his employer, and without the latter’s fault or knowledge. It wus held in this state of the evidence, to be the duty of the court to instruct the jury upon the law, as to what was, and what was not, a material alteration sufficient to avoid the bond, and leave the jury to determine the facts from the evidence.</p> <p>2. Material Alterations—A Question for the Court—Instructions.— In an action upon a bond, the defense was that of material alterations, and there was a conflict of evidence on the trial. An instruction which informed the jury that if the bond sued upon had been altered in a material point by the principal obligor, after the same had been signed by his sureties, and without them knowledge and consent, then such bond would cease to be binding upon the sureties, unless afterward ratified by them, is erroneous, because it makes the jury the judges of what constitutes a material alteration of the bond.</p> <p>3. Defenses—Aetion on Bonds—Filling Blanks.—It, is no defense to an action on a bond, that the names of the sureties and the amount of the penalty were inserted in the appropriate blanks by the principal obligator after the execution, before the delivery of the instrument and without the knowledge or fault of the obligee.</p> <p>4. Bonds Signed in Blank—Authority of Principal Obligee.—If the surety upon an official bond relying upon the good faith of his principal permits him to have possession of the bond signed in blank, such an act will clothe the principal with authority to fill up the blanks in any appropriate manner consistent with the nature of the obligation, so that, as against the obligee, receiving the bond without notice or negligence, and in good faith, the surety will be estopped to allege that he executed the instrument with a reservation, or upon condition, with reference to filling the blanks, and this, whether the blanks to be filled relate to the penalty, or the names of co-sureties. The liability of the surety in these cases is put upon the ground that he makes the principal maker his agent to deliver the bond, and clothes him with apparent authority to fill up the bond, and to do any other acts which are necessary to make the instrument effectual for the purposes intended.</p> <p>5. The Rule Applies to Private as Well as Official Bonds.—A bond without a penalty is valueless; therefore where a surety signs a bond in this condition he authorizes the principal intrusted with the delivery of it to insert the penalty in the appropriate blank. And if tire obligee takes the bond without notice or negligence, the surety is bound. The reason of this rule applies to private as well as to official bonds.</p> <p>6. Of Two Innocent Parties Who Must Suffer.—In a case where one of two innocent parties must suffer by the fraud or deceit of another, the loss should fall on him who- put his trust and confidence in the deceiver.</p> <p>7. Affirmance—Under the Rule in the Rapp Case.—Unless it appears from the record that the obligor has been released from his entire liability upon the bond under the rule of law laid down in the cáse of the estate of Michael Rapp v. The Phcenix Insurance Co., HE Ill. 390, the judgment will not he affirmed.</p>

Memorandum.—Action of assumpsit on promissory notes. Writ of error to the Circuit Court of St. Clair County, to reverse a judgment rendered therein; the Hon. George W. Young, Judge. Heard in this court at the August term, A. D. 1891, and affirmed.

<p>Memorandum.—Action of assumpsit. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Whiteside County; the Hon. James Shaw, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the December term, 1892, and affirmed.</p>

<p>Memorandum.—Forcible detainer. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Kane County; the Hon. Henry B. Willis, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the December term, 1892.</p>

Memorandum.—Action for personal injuries. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Knox County; the Hon. Arthur A. Smith, Judge, presiding. Heard in this 'court at the May term, 1893, and affirmed.

Memorandum.—Indictment, violation of the dram shop act. Error to the County Court of Lee County; the Hon. Richabd S. Fabband, Judge, presiding. Heai-d in this court at the May term, 189S, and affirmed.

Memorandum.—Action for breach of contract. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Knox County; the Hon. Arthur A. Smith, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the May term, 1893, and affirmed.

<p>Memorandum.—Action for personal injuries. Appeal from the Circuit Court of La Salle County; the Hon. Charles Blanchard, Judge, irresiding. Heard in this court at the May term, 1893.</p>

<p>Memorandum.—Mandamus proceedings. Error to the Circuit Court of Rock Island County; the Hon. John J. Glenn, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the May term, 1893.</p>

<p>1. Instructions—Liability of Parent for the Debt of a Child.—An instruction which st ites that if the jury believe from the evidence that the lilaintiff sold the minor child of the defendant articles of clothing, and that the same were necessaries suitable to the condition of said child, and that the defendant authorized the plaintiff to sell and furnish her minor child with goods on her credit, by either direct instructions or by circumstances which would lead a reason able m an to infer that the defendant would pay for the goods, then the verdict must be for plaintiff, is erroneous. Parents often pay debts improvidently made by children when there is no legal obligation to do so. It is sometimes done from a spirit of pride and sometimes to prevent unpleasant consequences; under such circumstances a reasonable man might infer that a parent would pay.</p> <p>2. Parent and Child—Parent's Liability. —Where a child resides away from home without the consent of its parent, in order to hold the parent for goods furnished, an express promise must be proven or the facts and circumstances must be such that a promise can be inferred.</p>

<p>1. Character—An Action for Slander.—Where a plaintiff’s character is attacked by evidence under a plea of justification, showing that the X>laintiff has committed a crime, and casting upon him an imputation of dishonesty, it is competent for him to show, if he can, that he has sustained a good character for honesty in the community where he has lived.</p> <p>2. Instructions—Character in Actions of Slander.—In an action for slander it is error to refuse to instruct the jury that evidence of the plaintiff’s general reputation as a law abiding citizen is only intended in mitigation of damages, and not as an impeachment of his character for honesty and integrity.</p>

Memorandum.—Trespass on the case for injuries resulting from a defective sidewalk. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Will County; the Hon. Dorrance Dibbel,, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the May term, 1893, and affirmed.

<p>Memora ml um.—Action for trespass. Ax>peal from the Circuit Court of Warren County; the Hon. John J. Glenn, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the May term, 1893.</p>

Memorandum.—Action on j>olioy of insurance. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Kane County; the Hon. Henry B. Willis, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the May term, A. D. 1893, and affirmed. Statement of Facts by the Ooubt. On the 4th of January, 1891, appellant issued a policy of insurance to appellee insuring him against loss by fire to his ice house building on the bank of Fox Eiver, near Elgin, until the 4th of July, 1892, to the amount of $1,000.

Memorandum.—Action for killing domestic animals. Appeal from a judgment rendered by the Circuit Court of Ogle County; the Hon. John D. Crabtree, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the May term, A. D. 1893, and affirmed.

<p>Memorandum.—Foreclosure proceedings. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Lee County; the Hon. John D. Crabtree, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the May term, 1893, and affirmed.</p>

Memoi'andum.-—Scire facias to foreclose mortgage. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Knox County; the Hon. Arthur A. Smith, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the May term 1893, and affirmed.

Memorándum.—Petition under the act relating to assignments for the benefit of creditors. Appeal from the County Court of Kane County; the Hon. C. H. Donnelly, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the May term, 1893.

<p>1. Cities and Villages—Right to Amend Records of Proceedings.—A village board has the right to amend the record of its proceedings at a subsequent meeting so as to correspond to the facts and make truth appear by supplying omitted facts. So held, where a village board amended the record of its proceedings at a previous meeting, so as to show the legal passage of an ordinance.</p> <p>2. Cities and Villages.—Record of Passage-of Ordinance. —The record of the proceedings of a village board, which recited that all the members were present and that the ordinance in question was passed unanimously, shows that the ordinance was legally passed.</p> <p>3. Legislative Bodies—Records—Amendments.—A legislative body makes and controls its own record and decides for itself when it contains a true history of its proceedings. It may amend its record by the addition of omitted facts so as to make it show the whole truth and correspond with the facts; and this may be done from the personal knowledge of the members of the body.</p> <p>4. Vested Rights—Violation of Ordinances—Defective Records.—The record of a village board did not show at the time an ordinance was violated that it had been passed by the affirmative vote of a majority of the board, but the record was subsequently amended so as to show the fact. It was held, that the person violating the ordinance was presumed to have known that the law authorized the board to amend its record, and he could acquire no vested right; that the prosecution for his wrongdoing should be governed by the record in its incomplete form. When he undertook to violate the ordinance, because he thought that the village would not be able to prove its passage, he took the risk of such proof being made and had no right to insist that it should not be made.</p>

Memorandum.—Action for damages caused by overflow of water. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Will County; the Hon. Dorrance Dibbel, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the May term, A. I). 1893, and affirmed.

<p>■ 1. Witnesses—Separation of.— The matter of separating the -witnesses and excluding them from the court room until called to tlie witness stand, rests entirely within the discretion of the trial court, and the Appellate Court will not inquire as to whether the discretion was judicially exercised.</p> <p>2. Trials—By the Court—Conduct of, ete.—It is entirely proper for the trial court, in ruling upon objections to evidence, to give his reasons for his holding, being always guarded against saying anything in the presence of the jury prejudicial to either litigant.</p> <p>3. Vendor and Vendee—Possession of Goods by Fraud—Execution Debtor.—Where a merchant who is insolvent obtains possession of goods under a pretense of purchase, by means of fraud and fraudulent representations as to his financial condition, and with no intention to pay for them, title does not pass between them', and the vendor may recover possession of the goods in replevin, if they have not passed into the hands of a bona fide purchaser. Such title does not extend to an execution debtor; he does not stand in the sense of an innocent purchaser, but is a mere lienor who takes title subject to all the infirmities existing between the vendor and the fraudulent vendee.</p> <p>4. Vendor and. Vendee—Fraud■—Recovery of Goods—Intention.— To sustain a recovery of the goods by the vendor, .it must appear that the vendee at the time of going through the forms of a purchase, entertained a positive intention, not to pay for them. It is not a fraud for a purchaser to buy on credit when he is insolvent. He may even conceal the condition of his liabilities, if he buys with an honest intention, and if he does so with a belief that his affairs will so improve as to enable him to get through his embarrassment, the purchase will stand.</p> <p>5. Fraud—Misrepresentations Knowingly Made.—Misrepresentations knowingly made are sufficient to warrant an inference of fraudulent intent, but to hold that the intention of the party making the misrepresentation is immaterial would be against authority and principle.</p> <p>6. False Representations—Commercial Agencies.—The false representation must be shown to have been made to the vendor or to a commercial agency, whose business it is to ascertain the financial condition of dealers and report to its customers. The business of commercial agencies is well understood in the commercial world, and a false and fraudulent statement made by a retail dealer to one of them upon which a vendor is induced to extend credit, would be followed by all the conseiiueiiees of a false statement made directly to the vendor.</p>

Memorandum.—Action of assumpsit. Goods sold and delivered. Appeal from the Circuit Court of La Salle Comity; the Hon. Charles Blaxcharh, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the May term, 1893.

Memorandum.—Order overruling a motion to vacate a judgment entered by confession. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Putnam County; the Hon. Nicholas E. Worthington, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the May term, 1893.

<p>Memorandum.—Action of assumpsit. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Kankakee County; the Hon. Charles E. Starr, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the Hay term, 1893, and affirmed.</p>

<p>1. Negligence—Defective Sidewalk.—On the trial of an action against a municipal corporation for damages, sustained by reason of a defective sidewalk, it is error to permit the introduction of evidence on the part of the plaintiff, showing the condition of the walk at other places than that at which the injury occurred.</p> <p>2. Negligence—Defective Sidewalk—Burden of Proof.—In an action for the recovery of damages, sustained by reason of a defective sidewalk, it is necessary to the recovery for the plaintiff to prove that the proximate cause of the accident and consequent injury was the failure of duty on the part of the municipal corporation to keep its sidewalks in a reasonably safe condition.</p> <p>3. Negligence—Defective-Sidewalk—Subsequent Repairs.—On the trial of an action for personal injuries, resulting from a defective sidewalk, it is error to permit the admission of evidence showing that repairs were made on the sidewalk after the occurrence of the accident.</p> <p>4. Instructions.—It is error to refuse an instruction which states the law correctly and contains propositions of law which are not embraced in other instructions given to the jury.</p>

<p>1. Contracts—WorJc, Labor and Services.—"Where a person enters into a contract to complete a piece of work for a stipulated sum and is prevented from fulfilling it by the default of the party for whom the work is to be performed, be is excused from completing the performance and may recover pro tanto at the contract price.</p> <p>2. Instructions—Erroneous, Not Cured by Proper Ones, Unless, etc.— An erroneous instruction is not cured by the giving of a proper one for the opposite side, unless the court can see, everything considered, that the jury were not misled, and that the verdict was clearly the proper one.</p>

Memorandum.—Action of assumpsit on promissory note. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Will County; the Hon. Charles Blanchard, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the May term, 1893, and affirmed.

<p>1. Rewards—Coniniets for.—A person having an old harness of the value of ¡;¡i5 stolen, U -oming much excited over the matter, exclaimed: “ I will give ¡1100 to any man who will find out who the thief is, and I will give a lawyer ¡1100 for prosecuting him. It was held, that the language used, under die circumstances, did not show an intention to contract to pay the reward, but was in the nature of an explosion of wrath against the supposed thief, coupled with boasting and bluster about prosecuting him.</p> <p>2. Rewards—Burden of Proof.—A person claiming a reward for obtaining information concerning the identity of a thief, must show that he was the first to give the desired information, for if he was not the first to gain and impart the information, he can not recover.</p> <p>3. Rewards—Information Already Possessed.—In an action to recover the amount of a reward offered for information concerning the identity of a thief, it was competent for the defendant to show that the information given him, and for which the recovery was claimed, was in his possession before, and was not new to him.</p> <p>4 Instructions—Rewards for Information Concerning Thief.'—In a suit to recover the amount of a reward for the discovery of a person who stole a harness, it was held error to instruct the jury to find for the plaintiff, if he discovered who stole the harness and informed the defendant, without requiring that he should have been the first person who ascertained the facts leading to the discovery of the thief, or the first who communicated it to the defendant.</p>

Meittorandum.y-Foi'cible entry and detainer. Appeal from the County Court of Peoria County; the Hon, Samuel D. Mead, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the May term, 1893.

<p>Memorandum.—Action of case. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Will County; the Hon. Dorrance Dibell, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the May term, 1893, and affirmed.</p>

Memorandnm.-Bill for accounting. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Knox County; the Hon. Aurmjn A. SmnTn, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the May term, A. D. 1893, and affirmed.

Immadnm.—Foreclosure proceedings. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Lee County; the Hon. John D. Crabtree, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the May term, A. D. 1893. Held: intending and supposing that he was receiving it as additional security on the indebtedness; that he did not intend or agree to cancel or release the said notes; claims that any surplus arising from the sale of the lands after satisfying the prior mortgages, be paid to him on the said indebtedness.

Memorandum.—Action for personal injuries. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Knox County; the Hon. Arthur A. Smith, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the May term, 1893, and affirmed.

Memorandum.—Trespass by domestic animate. Appeal from a judgment rendered by the Circuit Court of Iroquois County; the Hon. Charles R. Stare, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the May term, A. D. 1893, and affirmed.

Memorandum.—Trespass for assault and battery. Appeal from a judgment rendered by the Circuit Court of Iroquois County. The Hon. Charles E. Starr, Judge, presiding. Heard hi this court at the May term, 1893.

Memorandum.—Bill to remove cloud from title of real property. Appeal from decree entered by the Circuit Court of Kane County; the Hon. Henry B. Willis, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the May term, A. D. 1893, and affirmed.

Memorandum.—Bill for an injunction. Appeal from a decree rendered by the Circuit Court of Kane County; the Hon. Henry B. Willis, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the May term, A. D. 1893.

<p>1. Creditor's Bill—Judgment by Confession—Bights of Creditors.— S. having become surety on a promissory note for T. & McL., and having guaranteed the payment of accounts due by them to different persons, for the purpose of indemnifying himself for what he might have to pay, took a judgment note from them and caused judgment to be entered upon it. Upon this judgment an execution was issued, •which, being returned in part unsatisfied, he filed a creditor's bill. Upon the question being raised as to whether the judgment was such as would enable him to maintain his bill, it was held that it was not fraudulent, simply because he did not pay the debts for which he was surety until after his judgment was entered, and as defendants in the creditor’s bill had not been misled, injured or deferred in any way on account of it, the bill would lie.</p> <p>2. Statute of Frauds—Promise to Pay the Debt of a Third Person.— S. signed a promissory note payable to F. & M. Bank as surety for T. & McL., afterward entering into a verbal agreement with the bank that it should pay him one-half of any loss he might sustain through failure of T. & McL. to pay said note and certain other debts for which he. was surety for them. It was held that the agreement was within the statute of frauds and void.</p> <p>3. Statute of Frauds—Special Promise to Answer for the Miscarriage of a Third Person—Consideration.—A consideration for a promise to answer for the miscarriage of a third person, does not obviate the necessity of a writing, or make a, promise original which is in its nature collateral.</p> <p>4. Insolvency— Unlawful Preferences—Judgment Notes and Attorney’s Pees.—-The J. V. F. Co had two uotes of T. & McL., which provided for reasonable attorney’s fees if not paid when due, and knowing the said T. & McL. to be insolvent, it voluntarily surrendered said notes, taking from them a new judgment note in lieu thereof, which provided for an attorney fee of $350. It was held that the provision for the attorney fees constituted au unlawful preference.</p>

Memorandum.—Suit on promissory note. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Peoria County; the Hon. Thomas M. Shaw, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the May term, A. D. 1893, and judgment modified.

Memorandum. —Action for forcible detainer. Appeal from the County Court of La Salle County; the Hon. Benjamin F. Lincoln, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the May term, A. D. 1893, and affirmed. Form of the notice and return: “ToN.

Memorandum.'—Action for killing domestic animals. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Kankakee County; the Hon. Charles E. Starr, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the May term, 1893.

<p>1. Estoppel—Liability of Property to be Sold on Execution.—C. sold to D. a quantity of com, and agreed to deliver it at a place named. Be•fore the delivery, and while it was in O.’s possession, it was levied upon by one of his creditors and allowed to be sold. After the title had thus passed out of C., he wrongfully delivered the corn to D., and the purchasers at the sale replevied it from him. C. had notice of the replevin suit, and had an opportunity to defend it, but he failed to do so. It was held that he was estopped to deny that the corn, while under his control, was liable to execution on a judgment against him.</p> <p>2. Warranty—Title Between Vendor and Vendee—Execution Creditors.—If a person sells a quantity of corn to be delivered when required to do so, and while the com is in his possession, although the title may have passed, as between vendor and vendee, to the purchaser, if the vendor allows the title to pass from him by a sale under an execution against him, his warranty fails, and he can not recover for the price of the com.</p>

<p>1. Judgment upon Confession—Motion to Vacate.—Where a notice was made to vacate a judgment, entered by confession, under a power of attorney, attached to a promissory note, it was shown by affidavits, that the only consideration was an agreement by the payee with the makers, not to prosecute a son of one of the makers for forgery. It was held, that if the fact shown were true, it would render the note void, and was sufficient ground for granting the motion.</p>

<p>1. Watercourses.—Pollution of—Nuisances.—The pollution of water in a stream, so as to render it unfit for domestic Use or for the watering of stock, is a sufficient ground for equitable interference.</p> <p>2. Nuisances—Pollution of Streams—Cities and Villages.—An incorporated city or village has no more right than an individual, to render corrupt and unwholesome, a stream of water. Its duty to prevent a nuisance to its citizens by taking care of its sewage, gives it no right to create one, as to others, by the pollution of a stream in which the latter have rights.</p> <p>3. Injunctions— Watercourses—Owner of Lands upon a Stream. —An owner of land upon a stream below a village, and into which the village attempts to discharge its sewers, is entitled to an injunction against irreparable injury by the outflow of sewage, and this is so, even where the stream in question is not a constantly flowing stream.</p> <p>4. Nuisances—Statutory Definition—Running Streams.—To corrupt or render impure the water of any spring, river, stream, pond or lake to the injury or prejudice of others, is declared to be a nuisance by section 221 of chapter 38, R. S. Ill. There is no such limit as that of a constantly running stream.</p> <p>5. Nuisances—Chancery Jurisdiction—Trials at Law.—The rule that before a court of equity will grant preventive relief against a threatened nuisance, the question of whether the thing is a nuisance must first be determined by a jury at law, or in special cases by a jury in an issue directed out of chancery, applies to cases only in which the thing threatened is not necessarily a nuisance, and not to cases where the thing threatened is a nuisance pe?’ se, or where its contemplated use will necessarily make it a nuisance.</p> <p>6. Estoppel—Easements Created by Deed or Prescription.—The owner of land upon a stream below a village, when the citizens were agitating the question of sewage at a public meeting, was called upon for a speech and was represented as stating that he was willing that the sewage should be discharged into the stream provided a sufficient flow of water was had to keep the sewage moving. When applied to for a deed giving the village the righi, he refused. It was held, that his alleged consent was simply an oral license, revocable at any time. The right was in the nature of an easement, which can not exist except by deed or prescription.</p>

Memorandum.—Action for obstructing a highway. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Kankakee County; the Hon. Charles R. Starr, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the May term, 1893, and affirmed.

<p>Memorandum.—Action for obstructing a highway. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Kankakee County; the Hon. Charles R. Starr, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the May term, 1893.</p>

Memorandum .“-Action for obstructing a highway. Appeal from the Circuit Gourt of Kankakee County; the Hon. Charles R. Starr, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the May term, 1893, and affirmed.

Memorandum.—Action of trespass and case. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Livingston County; the Hon. Alfred Sample, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the May term, 1893, and affirmed.

Memorandum.—Action of covenant upon a lease. Appeal from a judgment rendered by the Circuit Court of Peoria County; the Hon. Thomas N. Shaw, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the May term, A. D. 1893, and affirmed.

<p>Memorandum.—Creditor’s bill. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Carroll County; the Hon. James Shaw, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the May term, A. D. 1893, and affirmed.</p>

<p>Memorandum.—Bill to foreclose a trust deed. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Mercer County; the Hon. John J. Glenn, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at tbe May term, 1893.</p>

<p>Memorandum.—Assumpsit. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Peoria County; the Hon. Nicholas E. Worthington, Judge, presiding-. Heard in this court at the May term, 189E.</p>

Memorandum.—Suit for divorce. Appeal from a decree rendered by the Circuit Court of Peoria County; the Hon. N. E. Worthington, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the May term, A. D. 1893.

Memorandum.—Action of covenant. Appeal from a judgment rendered by the Circuit Court of Peoria County; the Hon. Thomas M. SHaw, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the May term, 1893, and affirmed.

<p>1. Railroad Companies—Right to JSxpel Passengers for Violating Rules.—A street car company lias the right to require of passengers the observance of all reasonable rules tending to promote the safety and convenience of passengers and the successful conduct of its business. So long as a passenger observes such rules the company is bound to carry him; but when he wantonly refuses to obey them, the company has the right at once to expel him, using no more force than may be necessary for that purpose.</p> <p>2. Railroad Companies—Rules and Regulations—Notice.—Where a street car company has adopted a rule against passengers riding on the platform, a request by the conductor that persons violating the rule shall come inside the car, in observance of the rule, should be complied with whether the person, had notice of the rule or not. The conductor should have control of his car with the right to enforce all needed regulations and all reasonable requests made by him, with that end in view, should be obeyed by the passengers.</p>

<p>1. Evidence—Admissibility Under Allegations of the Declaration.— Under a declaration charging that dirt, waste coal, waste material and other refuse matter from the coal shaft were deposited either directly or through the agency of a stream upon the plaintiff’s land, rendering it unfit for cultivation or tillable purposes, evidence of damages by water occasioned by the obstruction of the channel of the stream by the coal so as to flood his land and destroy crops by the action of the water, is inadmissible.</p> <p>2. Evidence—Admissibility Under Allegations of the Declaration.— Under a declaration charging that the defendant occupied the premises and operated a mine, it was held, that the plaintiff could not recover for an injury sustained by him from the wrongful acts of the defendant’s tenants.</p> <p>3. Pleading—Liability for the Wrongful Acts of Lessees.—Under proper pleadings a person may be made liable if he leases premises with a coal washer built upon them in such a way that its operation may inflict injury upon the premises of another, such leasing being made with the knowledge that it would be used by the tenant and results would naturally follow the proper use of it, the injury in such a case being the result of the prosecution of the business for the continuance of which the lessor would receive rent as a consideration.</p>

Memorandum.—Action on the case. Appeal from the Circuit Court of De Kalb County; the Hon. Charles Kellum, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the May term, 1893, and affirmed.

Memorándum.—Assumpsit. Appeal from the Circuit Court of White side County; the Hon. James H. Cartwright, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the May term, 1893, and affirmed.

<p>Memorandum.—Assumpsit. Writ of error to the Circuit Court of Knox County; the Hon. John J. Glenn, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the December term, 1892, and affirmed.</p>

Memorandum.—Assignment for the benefit of creditors. Petition by creditors to remove property, etc. Appeal from the County Court of La Salle County; the Hon. Benjamin F. Lincoln, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the May term, 1893.

Men1orau1u]n~-Trespa~s for cutting ice, Appeal from the Circuit Court of La Salle County; the Hon. CH.neLEs Bi~&NdnARD, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the May terni, 1893, and affirmed~

<p>1. Slander—Allegations and Proof—Conversations.—In a declaration. for slander, wb ere the actionable words were alleged to have been spoken in the third person, the evidence showed them to have been spoken in the second person. It u)as held, that the allegations were not sustained by the proof.</p> <p>2. Jury—Disregarding Instructions.—Where a jury disregards the instructions of the court, their Verdict may be set aside and a new trial granted.</p>

<p>Memorandum.—Appeal from the County Court of Rock Island County; the Hon. Lucian Adams, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the May term, 1898, and affirmed.</p>

Memorandum.—Action for killing domestic animals. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Mercer County; the Hon. John J. Glenn, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the May term, 1893, and affirmed.

Memorandum.—Assumpsit for goods sold. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Circuit Court ©f La Salle County; the Hon. Charles Blanchard, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the May term, 1898, and affirmed.

Memorandum.—Assumpsit. Action for goods sold and delivered. Appeal from a judgment rendered by the Circuit Court of Jo Daviess County; the Hon. James Shaw, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the May term, A. D. 1893.

Memorandum.—Suit for a violation of an ordinance. Appeal from the Circuit Court of DeKalb County; the Hon. Charles Kellum, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the December term, 1892, and affirmed.

<p>Memorandum.--Action for personal injuries. Error to the Circuit Court of “Will County; the Hon. George W. Stipp, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the May term, 1893.</p>

Memorandum.—Action in case under the Dram Shop Act. Plea of not guilty. Judgment for plaintiffs. Error by the defendant to the City Court of Aurora; the Hon. James Shaw, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the May term, 1893, and affirmed.

Memorandum.—Action upon a contract of subscription. Pleas: General issue sworn to; statute limitations. Appeal from the Circuit Court of LaSalle County; the Hon. Charles Blanchard, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the May term, 1893.

Memorandum.—Assumpsit on promissory note. Pleas : General-issue and denial of assignment. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Kankakee County; the Hon. Charles R. Starr, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the May term, 1893.

<p>1. Pleas and Proofs.—Variances.—Under a declaration upon a promissory note alleged to have been executed by the defendant, and one J. H. S. to one H. E., and to have been assigned by H. E. to the plaintiff, a promissory note which does not appear to have been assigned by H. E., as alleged, is not admissible.</p> <p>2. Promissory Notes—Assignment—Bight to Correct Indorsements.— Where a payee of a promissory note assigned it to another person, and indorsed upon the back of it that he had received from such person full payment, it was held, that if, as a matter of fact, he had sold the note to the person named, and the indorsement appearing as a receipt was intended by him as an assignment, there could be no impropriety in his correcting it. It could be treated as an indorsement in blank, and corrected or filled out upon the trial.</p> <p>3. Accounts Sued On—Copies—Objections for Not Filing—When Too Late.—Where a plaintiff fails to file a statement of the account sued on, the defendant may have the case continued for the term, or he may obtain a rule upon the plaintiff to file such statement. If he does not elect to do so, however, and pleads in bar, he can not raise the objection on the trial.</p>

<p>Memorandum.—Bill in aid of execution. Decree for complainants. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Whiteside County; the Hon. John D, Crabtree, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the May term, 1893,</p>

Memorandum.—Bill for partition and relief. Appeal from the Circuit Court of DeKalb County; the Hon. Charles Kelltjm, Judge, presiding. Heard in tliis court at the May term, 1893, and affirmed.