¶1(concurring in the result) — I concur in all of the majority opinion except that latter portion which holds that a recent roadside operational test of the electromatic speed meter was not necessary to establish the accuracy of the device at the time and place of appellant’s arrest. Specifically, my objection to that portion of the opinion is that it is susceptible of an inference that law enforcement officers may obtain convictions based solely upon their testimony that the “radar reading” showed the operation of a vehicle at a speed in excess of the legal limit, together with evidence that the instrument was checked for accuracy (in a laboratory) one month before, and again two and one-half months after, the arrest. The necessity of roadside tests of the device is discussed in 33 N. C. L. Rev. 343 (April 1955).
¶2While in my opinion the “radar evidence” in the record does not provide a competent basis for sustaining appellant’s conviction, I nevertheless feel that, because of other competent evidence in the record, the judgment should be affirmed.
¶3Patrolman West, the arresting officer, and Sergeant Giles, operator of the radar car, both testified that, by the use of their senses of sight and hearing, they observed the approach of appellant’s vehicle. Patrolman West testified, “in my opinion the vehicle was traveling, outside of any machine to tell me, I would say it was traveling a good fifty miles per hour.” Sergeant Giles testified, “I knew the vehicle was speeding in excess of the thirty-five miles an hour speed limit before it came into the radar pattern.”
¶4It is my opinion that this testimony of these officers, which the trial court chose to believe, is a sufficient basis *311upon which to sustain a conviction of the misdemeanor with which appellant was charged, and that the judgment should be affirmed upon that ground alone, without reference to the “radar evidence.”
¶5(dissenting) — This judgment could not be sustained on the basis of the independent evidence as to speed.
¶6On the evening in question, about eleven o’clock, Sergeant Giles, by use of radar, observed the Ryan car traveling at fifty-six miles an hour. He radioed Officer West, who was stationed in a car six hundred feet down the road, the following message:
“General Motors — first three numbers — 789-56.”
¶7Officer West, understanding that to mean fifty-six miles per hour, turned on the red light, waved a flash light, stopped Ryan, advised him that he had been clocked by radar at fifty-six miles an hour, and issued to Ryan an arrest citation for the offense of operating his vehicle at the speed of fifty-six miles per hour in a thirty-five-mile zone.
¶8Reading from the court’s oral opinion, I find that it did not base the conviction of the appellant upon the independent evidence of speed; the court mentioned such evidence only in connection with the question as to the lawfulness of the arrest. The trial court, after announcing that it was striking from the testimony the hearsay statement made by Officer Giles to Officer West and would not consider it, made finding of fact No. 1:
“That on the 15th day of December, 1953, in the County of Spokane, State of Washington, the defendant, Theodore M. Ryan, did drive and operate a motor vehicle over and along a public highway of the State of Washington, at the speed of fifty-six miles per hour.”
¶9This was the only finding concerning speed. In discussing this finding, the court makes frequent reference to the radar testimony; and it seems to me to indicate that the court relied solely upon radar evidence in making the above finding. Thus, the question relating to the use of radar must be considered.
¶10*312I agree with the majority that an electromatic speed meter, or radar, does not constitute a “speed trap.”
¶11I agree that the electromatic speed meter, commonly known as radar, is a scientific instrument, which, if properly operated and properly functioning, will accurately measure the speed of a moving vehicle.
¶12Dr. John M. Kopper’s article, 33 N. C. L. Rev. 343, in discussing the scientific reliability of radar, points out that the operator thereof should have at least one and one-half to two hours of instruction and training in the use thereof, and that the proper and adequate use of an electromatic speed meter depends upon the operator’s care and judgment. It further points out that the radar speed meter will read the higher of the speeds of two cars running simultaneously through the zone at different speeds. If two cars are running abreast of each other at the same speed through the zone, the radar cannot tell which car is being observed, but its reading will be the speed of either of them. It is then up to the operator to ascertain that the cars are traveling abreast of each other. If one car is passing another, the radar speed meter reads the higher of the two speeds. The meter reads the speed of both oncoming and receding vehicles with equal accuracy. However, a car traveling along the other side of the road, going in the opposite direction to that of the car being observed, will be farther away when it is in the operating zone of the meter than the one being observed and will reflect back a much weaker signal than that coming from the car under observation.
¶13In a simple traffic pattern, the electromatic speed meter may take the place of an ordinary mechanical speedometer as an instrument which accurately measures the speed of moving vehicles. However, in a more complicated traffic pattern, the electromatic speed meter’s value as evidence of the speed of a moving vehicle depends upon the ability and training of the operator of the radar instrument to establish the relation of what is observed upon the meter to the particular vehicle’s speed which is being measured.
¶14In answer to the question of what training Officer Giles *313had had in the operation of an electromatic speed meter, he testified:
“The training, I explained in Justice Court, was the same training that I explained here- — a simple operation of testing and warming up the speed meter, locating the box in the trunk. That is the sum total of my training.”
¶15The law presumes one accused of a crime to be innocent until all essential elements of the crime charged have been established beyond a reasonable doubt by legally admissible evidence.
¶16The lack of training of the operator of the electromatic speed meter creates a doubt as to whether he could properly interpret what the meter reflected.
¶17The judgment of conviction, therefore, should be reversed.
¶18Schwellenbach, J., concurs with Rosellini, J.