¶1dissenting.
¶2I dissent. Rule 1114 of our Rules of Criminal Procedure specifies that “[u]pon retiring [to] deliberations, the jury *530shall not be permitted to have a transcript of any trial testimony, nor a copy of any written confession by the defendant, nor a copy of the information and indictment. Otherwise, upon retiring, the jury may take with it such exhibits as the trial judge deems proper.” (emphasis added). Appellant argues here, as he did before the Superior Court, that the trial court erred in allowing the jury to take with it certain “verdict slips” on which the jury was to record its verdict as to each count against appellant, and on which a limited recitation of the facts forming the basis for each count was typed at the trial judge’s direction. These “verdict slips” contained the following description of each count:
“2381 . . Obstructing Administration of Law or Other Governmental Functions September 27,1973
Arrest of Andy Marino (Sgt. Andrew Morrese) Chippy’s Bar.
2382 . . Perjury*
FIRST COUNT:
Testimony of Defendant before Special Investigating Grand Jury on December 20, 1974 Regarding Truth of Statement in Oath Before Judge Melton'to Secure Wairant:
SECOND COUNT:
Testimony of Defendant Before Snecial Investigating Grand July on December 20, 1974 Regarding Speaking to Narcise Prior to Raid on September 27, 1973.
2383 . . PERJURY
Oath of Defendant Before Judge Melton on September 27, 1973 that He Did conduct a Surveillance of Chippy’s Bar on September 25,1973 between the hours of 12:15 P.M. and 1:00 P.M.
#2384 . . BRIBERY IN OFFICIAL AND POLITICAL MATTERS:
FIRST COUNT
Receipt of $20.00 from Narcise on or about July 30,1973.
SECOND COUNT
Receipt of $20.00 from Narcise on or about Sept. 7,1973.
THIRD COUNT
Receipt of $20.00 from Narcise on or about Sept. 18,1973.
FOURTH COUNT
Receipt of $50.00 from Narcise on or about Oct. 3, 1973.
¶3The brief factual descriptions accompanying each count do not fall squarely within those items specifically prohibited by Rule 1114 — namely, a transcript of trial testimony, a copy *531of a written confession or a copy of the information or indictment — nor are they “exhibits” such as may be permitted by the Rule. Nevertheless, the danger presented by allowing the jury to take those prohibited items with it during deliberations is equally present here. The prohibition “. . . are designed to ensure that the jury does not give undue weight to those written materials before them.” Com. v. Baker, 466 Pa. 382, 400, 353 A.2d 406, 415 (1976) (dissenting opinion of Roberts, J.).
Mr. Justice Roberts words of dissent in Com. v. Baker, supra are equally applicable here.
“The court’s procedure in this case could only encourage the jury to ignore the court’s general instructions and to reach a verdict without a complete analysis of the issues involved.
¶4This could have created an impression with the jury that the court considered such definitions unimportant and is similar to an instruction to consider only part of the evidence. Moreover, the jury might have also structured its entire deliberation solely around answering these questions, thus short-circuiting full consideration of all the evidence and the general instructions. These dangers jeopardized defendant’s right to a fair trial.”
¶5Id.,466 Pa. at 402, 353 A.2d at 416.
¶6Similarly, by including a brief description of some of the evidence associated with each count, the court in the instant case may have encouraged the jury to conclude that other évidence was considered unimportant by the court, and that the listed “facts” were the only ones that needed to be considered by the jury. Additionally, these cryptic summaries may have caused the jury to believe that the listed “facts” has been proven by the prosecution. “These dangers jeopardized [appellant’s] right to a fair trial.” Id.,466 Pa. at 402, 353 A.2d at 416. I therefore dissent.