¶1dissenting.
¶2I dissent. Appellants both argue that the trial court abused its discretion in discharging a principal juror and substituting an alternate juror. During the trial, the judge called all counsel into chambers and advised that the Court Administrator had received a message from juror No. 4’s father. This letter stated that juror No. 4 was to arrange a job interview for a teaching position. Since apparently an interview could not be arranged prior to the deadline established by the School District, the trial judge discharged the juror notwithstanding appellants’ objections.
¶3Pa.R.Crim.P. § 1108(a) establishes when a principal juror may be replaced by an alternative juror. Rule 1108(a) states in pertinent part:
“Alternate jurors in the order in which they are called shall replace principal jurors who, prior to the time the jury retires to consider its verdict, become unable or disqualified to perform their duties.” (Emphasis added.)
¶4While one may understand juror No. 4’s desire to schedule a job interview during the trial, it cannot be said that juror No. 4 was in any way “unable” or “disqualified.” In Commonwealth v. Black, 474 Pa. 47, 376 A.2d 627 (1977) although some members dissented on other grounds, this Court upheld *99the replacement of a juror by an alternate. However, that juror was “disqualified” since the first defense witness was the sister of the juror.
¶5In Commonwealth v. Saxton, 466 Pa. 438, 353 A.2d 434 (1976), we held that the record must support a finding of “unable” or “disqualified.” The record in this case does not support such a finding. The terms of Rule 1108(a), are unambiguous and must be given their natural meaning. Cf. Commonwealth ex rel. Walton v. Aytch, 466 Pa. 172, 352 A.2d 4 (1976) (retrial barred where trial court improperly discharged a juror who was unsuccessful in hiring a babysitter for her children). The need of scheduling a job interview does not make a juror “unable” to serve and appellants are entitled to a new trial.
¶6Furthermore, the conviction of murder of the first degree of appellant, Jerry, should be reversed and appellant, Jerry, discharged as to murder of the first degree. There is no evidence to support a finding of deliberate and premeditated killing. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(d). Use of a deadly weapon on a vital part of the body, standing alone, is not enough to support a finding of “premeditation.” Commonwealth v. O’Searo, 466 Pa. 224, 241, 352 A.2d 30, 38 (1976) (Manderino, J., dissenting opinion).