¶1dissenting.
¶2I am forced to vigorously register my dissent to today’s Opinion of the Court. The majority Opinion entirely misreads, and accordingly fails to cite, our prior cases on the issue of the nature of the representations made to a defendant and that allegedly result in a confession. In Commonwealth v. Jones, 457 Pa. 423, 435, 322 A.2d 119, 126-27 (1974), this Court stated:
“In the case at bar we are not convinced that the alleged fabrication concerning the co-defendant’s confession was likely to cause an untrustworthy confession. Nor do we find it so reprehensible as to invalidate the confession as offensive to basic notions of fairness. The United States Supreme Court recently considering a quite similar factual situation observed: ‘The fact that the police misrepresented the statements that [the co-defendant] had made is, while relevant, insufficient in our view to make this otherwise voluntary confession inadmissible.’ Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 739, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 1425, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969); See also, Commonwealth v. Baity, 428 Pa. 306, 315, 237 A.2d 172 (1968) (Opinion of Mr. Justice Roberts); People v. Robinson, 31 A.D.2d 724, 297 N.Y.S.2d 82 (1968).
Nor do we believe that this subterfuge precluded the exercise of a knowing waiver. Of course, an accused must know the nature of his Constitutional rights and we caution that any misrepresentation which may cast doubt upon the accused’s awareness of these rights would necessarily render the waiver suspect. However, in the case at bar, we are dealing not with a misrepresentation of rights, *535but with a misrepresentation concerning the amount of evidence against the accused. While we emphasize that we do not condone deliberate misrepresentation of facts supplied to an accused at a time when he must elect to waive a Constitutional right, we do not believe that a misrepresentation, even though intentional, as to the evidence available against him is the type of information that would so distort the factual situation confronting him as to render his waiver unknowing and unintelligent.”
¶3Today’s Opinion stands the law on this issue upside down. The representations appellant alleges were made are not of the type or nature that would preclude the finding of a knowing or voluntary waiver.
¶4I therefore dissent.