Volume 49 — Florida Reports

This case was decided by Division A. Writ of error to the Criminal Court of Record for Escambia County. The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court.

<p>This case was decided by Division B.</p> <p>Writ of Error, to the Circuit Court for Columbia County.</p>

<p>This case was decided by Division A.</p> <p>Writ of Error to tbe Circuit Court for Marion County.</p> <p>The facts in tbe case are stated in the opinion of the Court.</p>

This case was decided by Division A. Writ of Error to the Circuit Court for Monroe County. The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the Court.

This case was decided by Division A. Writ of Error to the Circuit Court for Duval County. The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the Court.

This case was decided by Division B. Writ of Error to the Circuit Court for Wakulla County. The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the Court.

This case was decided by Division’ A. Writ of Error to the Circuit Court for Jackson County. The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the Court.

This case whs decided by Division. A. Writ of Error to the Circuit.Court for Duval County. The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the Court.

This case was decided by Division B. Writ of Error to the Criminal Court of Record for Escambia County. The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the Court.

This case was decided by the Court En Banc. Writ of Error to the Circuit Court for Leon County. STATEMENT; This case was taken up for consideration by Division B, but there being a difference of opinion among the members of the division, was referred to the court en Txmc. for decision.

This case was decided by Division A. Writ of Error to the Circuit Court for Holmes County. The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the Court.

This case was decided by Division A. Writ of Error to the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County. The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the Court.

This case was decided by Division A. Writ of Error to the Circuit Court for Duval County. The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the Court.

<p>1. If a Circuit Judge fails to attend the court on the first day of the term the statute, provides that “.the court shall stand adjourned until 12 o’clock on the second day;” and if the judge shall not then attend the clerk is required by statute to “adjourn the court to such time as the judge may appoint, or to the next regular term, by law established.” If by order of the judge the court is adjourned to the third day of the term, the premature entry iof the order on the first day adjourning the court to the third day of the term, when the statute adjourned it to the second day, does not cause a lapse of the term. The statute adjourned the court to the second day, and the order of the court though prematurely entered on the record adjourned the court to the third day, and this being within the period designated by law for- the term to be held, the term did not lapse, and the convening and organization of the court pursuant to the adjournment were not thereby ■ made illegal.</p> <p>2. .An indictment for murder in the first degree which charges that the defendant with an axe “feloniously, willfully and of his malice aforethought and from a premeditated design to effect the death of the said E. H. F., the said E. H. F., with the axe aforesaid did strike, cut and wound,” &c., sufficiently charges that the act constituting the efficient cause of the death.was done'from a premeditated design to effect the death of the person assaulted.</p> <p>3. Allegations in an indictment charging that the defendant “feloniously, wilfully and of his malice aforethought and from a premeditated design to effect the death” of the deceased committed the acts resulting in death, sufficiently charge the premeditated design or criminal intent; tne statute does not require a different form of allegation of wilful and deliberate design, or of criminal intent 10 effect death in a charge of murder in the first degree.</p>

<p>1. Though the county boards of public instruction are made corporations by statute, and authorized to act as such in a corporate name, yet a sqhool warrant, drawn upon the treasurer of a county, signed by the chairman of the board and countersigned by county superintendent of public instruction, is not a mere brutum fulmen, but it imports such validity as to make it a subject of forgéry.</p> <p>2. Where an indictment charged that the signature of the chairman of the board of public instruction to a school warrant was forged, and also that the name of the payee thereof endorsed thereon “J. W. B. by A., J. W.,” was also forged, such indictment does not charge .two forgeries, inasmuch as the signing J. W. B. by A. J. W. even though unauthorized by J. W. B. does not constitute forgery; and in a prosecution of A. J. W. for forging said warrant it is not erroneous to ask J. W. B. the payee as a witness for the State whether he authorized A. J. W. to endorse his name on said warrant where the purpose of the question was to show an intent to defraud upon the part of A. J. W..</p> <p>.3. It is not erroneous for the State Attorney, in a prosecution against a party for forging a school warrant, to ask the chairman of the county board of public instruction how he signed school warrants, it not being apparent that it would have been possible to introduce in evidence all the warrants which the witness had signed, and the question relating to a collateral matter.</p> <p>4. In a prosecution for the forgery of a school warrant by the county superintendent of public instruction, the chairman of the county board of public instruction, who was introduced as a witness by the State and who has had opportunities for becoming acquainted with the handwriting of the accused, and was to some extent familiar with it, may be asked by the State Attorney whether the handwriting in the body of certain warrants was that of the accused, over the objection that the witness was not sufficiently familiar with the handwriting of the accused to be a competent witness thereto.</p> <p>5. In a prosecution for the forgery of a school warrant where the chairman of the county board of public instruction was introduced by the State as a witness and had testified that he did not sign, or authorize any one to sign for him, the warrant which was alleged to be forged and which purported to be signed by him, and on the cross-examination that it was not a fact that warrants were left signed by him in blank with directions to be filled out, it was not erroneous for the court to exclude the further questions as to whether or not it was the custom for the chairman or member of the board acting as chairman to sign warrants in blank with directions to be filled out afterwards.</p> <p>6. Where assignments of error are based on the refusal of the trial judge to allow a witness to answer certain questions, and it appears from the record that all said questions were substantially answered at a subsequent stage of the proceedings, such assignments of error will not be considered by this court.</p> <p>7. Where a witness' for the State states a fact in his testimony which .the accused admits to be true, this court will not determine whether the trial court should have permitted certain questions on cross-examination, the object of which was to test the knowledge of the witness of the fact so admitted.</p> <p>8. Where a person is on trial fo‘r the forgery of a county school warrant, he can not show as a defense that the alleged forgery has been condoned or ratified by the county board of public instruction.</p> <p>9. A defendant in a criminal case can not complain of questions asked a State witness by the State Attorney, nor of the answers to such questions, touching matters which are not in dispute, and which though immaterial to the issue, could not have injured the defendant.</p> <p>10. Section 1Í21 Revised Statutes of 1892, providing for a comparison of handwriting applies as well .to criminal as civil .cases, and its previsions cover, for the purpose of camparison, not only the genuine writings of the party whose signature is alleged to be forged, but the genuine writings of the alleged forger.</p> <p>11. The omission of a duty by the county superintendent of public instruction to post a school warrant in a “warrant registry book is competent evidence tending to show a fraudulent intent on the part of the county superintendent on a trial of -the latter in which he is charged with the forgery of said school warrant, and the warrant registry book may be introduced in evidence to show such omission.</p> <p>12. Where the accused is on trial for the forgery of a school warrant, he being at the time of such alleged forgery the county superintendent of public instruction, it is competent to show that about the time of the alleged forgery, other similar warrants were forged by the accused, in pursuance of a general scheme to defraud.</p> <p>13. Where, in a prosecution for forgery, evidence is introduced by the State, the effect of which was to show flight or concealment by the accused, and the accused subsequently testifies as a witness on his own behalf, and on cross-examination admits facts which show his flight or concealment in view of the probable discovery of the alleged forgery, objections to the evidence introduced by the State for the purpose of showing what is thus admitted, will not- be considered by this court.</p>

This case was decided by Division B. Writ of Error to the Circuit Court for Escambia County. ' STATEMENT. The plaintiff in error sued the defendant in error in the Circuit Court of Escambia County and filed the following declaration, omitting the caption: “The plaintiff by its attorney, John B. Jones, sues the defendant: 1.

This case was decided by Division A. Writ of Emif to the Circuit Court for Citrus County. The fads in the case are stated in the opinion of the Court.

<p>Judgment affirmed upon the authority of State ex rel. Hampton v. Mc.Olung, 47 Fla,......77 South Rep. 51 ; Commercial Bank v. Towers, 4 7 Fla.......77 South Rep. 742.</p>

<p>This case was decided by Division A.</p> <p>Writ of Error to the Circuit Court for Holmes County.</p> <p>The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the Court.</p>

This .case was decided by Division A. Writ of Error to. the Circuit Court for Columbia County. The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Tliis case was decided by Division A. Writ of Error to the Circuit Court for Volusia County. The facts in the case are stated, in the opinion of the Couri. '

This case was decided by Division A. Writ of Error to the Circuit Court for Marion County. STATEMENT.

This case was decided by Division A. Writ of Error to the -Circuit Court for Marion County, The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the Court. ,

This ease was decided by Division A. Writ of Error to the Circuit Court for Duval County. The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court.

This case was decided by Division B. Writ of Error to the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County. The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the Court.

This case was decided by Division A. Writ of Error to the Circuit Court for Volusia County. The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the Court.

This case was decided by the Court En Banc. Writ of Error to the Circuit Court for Columbia County. The facts in the case are stated in the opinon of the Court.

This case was decided by the Court En.Bauc. Writ of Error to the Circuit Court for Jackson County. The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the Court.

This case was decided by Division B. .Writ of Error to the Circuit Court for Escambia County. The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of - the Court.

This case was decided by Division A. Writ of Error to the Circuit Court for Brevard County. STATEMENT.

<p>This case was decided by Division B.</p> <p>Writ of Error to the Circuit Court for Jackson County.</p> <p>The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the Court.</p>

<p>CONSTITUTIONAL LAW — ELIGIBILITY OF MEMBER OF LEGISLATURE TO OFFICE CREATED DURING THEIR TERM OF OFFICE. CIVIL OFFICE.</p> <p>1. Under the provisions of section 5 of Article III of the constitution no senator or member of the house of representatives is eligible for appointment or election, during the time for which he was elected, to any civil office under the constitution of this State, that has been created, or the emoluments whereof shall have been increased' during such time. Such ineligibility continues during the entire time for which such member was elected, and such member cannot render himself eligible during such time , by resigning his legislative membership.</p> <p>2. Members of a board of control • created by law who are charged with the duty of locating, and continuously and permanently controlling and managing State institutions of learning, whose terms of office are definitely fixed, with provision for removal and appointment by the Governor to fill vacancies on such board, the office being continuous and permanent, and remaining to be filled though the incumbents may die or resign, are civil officers under the constitution of this,State. The fact that there is no salary or emolument affixed to such office does not make it any the less a civil office, since salary or emolument, like an oath of office, is an incident to office merely and not a necessary element in the determination of its character.</p>

This case was decided by Division B. Appeal from the Circuit Court for Manatee County. The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the Court.

This case was decided by Division B. Appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County. STAl'EMEM.

<p>This case was decided by Division B.</p> <p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Jackson County.</p> <p>STATEMENT.</p> <p>On the 8th day of December, 1903, C. C. Liddon & Company filed a bill to foreclose a mortgage against J. W. Braxton in the Circuit Court of Jackson county, which is based on an instrument in writing made a part of the bill, which instrument is in the following words and figures :</p> <p>“Marianna, Fla., Apr. 17, 1903. 8611-65</p> <p>On or before October 1st, 1903, I promise to pay C. C. Liddon & Company, Agents for Goulding Fertilizer Company, Six Hundred, Forty-one and 65-100 Dollars for value received.</p> <p>This note is to bear interest from maturity at the rate of ten per cent, per annum, and if collected by an attorney after maturity twenty per cent, of the amount due thereon, shall be added thereto for the fees of such attorney, judgment for same to be included in judgment on note. This note is given for 211 sacks of fertilizer known as Bone Comp, and 80 sacks of fertilizer known as C. S. Mixture and 20 sacks of fertilizer known as Phosphate, advanced to aid me in my business of farming in Jackson county, Florida, the present year; and in order to secure the payment of same, according to its terms, I do hereby create both mortgage and a statutory lien upon all the crops of every kind grown or gathered by me in Jackson county, Florida, the present year.</p> <p>It is expressly covenanted and agreed that the vendors do not warrant the aforesaid fertilizers as to quality or its effects upon crops or otherwise, but that the same is bought on my judgment with all faults at my risk. I admit that I have personally examined each and every package of said fertilizer, and that it has been duly analyzed and inspected and is labeled and tagged as required by law, and that the manufacturer of said fertilizer has filed with the Commissioner of Agriculture of this State a paper giving the name of the principal agent in this State and the name and guaranteed analysis of said fertilizer upon oath, and has in every other respect complied with the law regulating the sale of commercial fertilizers in this State. ,</p> <p>I further declare that I have never failed or refused to pay for any fertilizers bought by me; that the aforesaid fertilizers are bought for personal use by me upon my own crops, and the sale of these fertilizers to me upon credit is made upon the faith of these declarations.</p> <p>Iii testimony whereof I have hereunto set my hand and seal this the 17th day of April, A. D. 1903.</p> <p>The above instrument executed in our presence. HUGH G. SMITH. J. W. BRAKTON (Seal).</p> <p>Jackson County, Florida.</p> <p>Personally appeared before me, Hugh G. Smith, who being duly sworn, says that he saw J. W. Braxton execute the following instrument for the uses and purposes ■therein expressed, and that he, Hugh G. Smith, signed the same as a witness.</p> <p>Witness my hand and official seal this April 24th, A. D. 1903.</p> <p>MOSES GUYTON,</p> <p>Clerk of Circuit Court.</p> <p>On the back of said exhibit ‘A’ was the following endorsement, which is as follows:</p> <p>‘Filed for record April 24, 1903, Jackson County, . Fla. Filed for record April 24th, 1903. and duly recorded in Book ‘V. V., page 266, and record verified. Moses, Guyton, Clerk of Cir. Ct., By Moses Guyton, Jr., D. C.’ ”</p> <p>The appellant Braxton answered the bill, and, among others, set up the following defense: 1. “It is true that he made and executed the note or obligation sued on in the bill of complaint. That said note or obligation was given by the defendant to the complainants solely and exclusively for the purchase of 211 sacks of guano or commercial fertilizer known as Bone Compound, and 80 sacks of guano or commercial fertilizer known as O. S. Mixture, and 20 sacks of guano or commercial fertilizer known as phosphate. That such fertilizer was advanced by the complainants to the defendant for the purpose of aiding the defendant in making and growing his crop in Jackson county, Florida, for the year 1908. That the defendant used said fertilizer in the usual manner in which guano or commercial fertilizers are ordinarily used, and such fertilizer was wholly worthless and was of no benefit whatever to defendant’s said crop; but on the contrary was an injury to his said crop, in that it damaged the defendant’s crop to such extent that very little crop was made by the defendant, and the crop which was made by the defendant where such fertilizer was used was less than would have been made on the same land if no fertilizer at all had been used; defendant alleges that said fertilizer so advanced to him by complainants for which this suit is brought, not only damaged his ci’op, but has damaged the productiveness of his land and it has caused him to suffer great damage in the loss of his crop for the year 1903, and all of such damage to defendants crop was the direct result of using said fertilizer for which the note sued on was given, wherefore the defendant alleges that the consideration for such said note was given has wholly failed, and the defendant has received no benefits for the giving of such note or'obligation. And the defendant, by reason of the fact herein before and hereinafter stated, alleges that there was' no consideration for the giving of said note sued upon herein.</p> <p>2nd. The defendant further alleges that the complainants represented to him before he purchased- the guano for which the note sued on was given, that such guano was a high grade guano and was a good guano, and was the best, and the defendant relied upon such representations of the complainants and purchased such guano, but after placing such guano in the ground under his crop defendant found that such guano was not benefitting his crop, but on the contrary was injuring his said crop -and continued to injure his said crop during the whole of the season, and was a great detriment to the land and prevented the defendant from making a crop o'f any value on the land on which said guano was used. That said guano was not a high grade guano, but was a worthless and spurious article, wholly unfit for the use of defendant in aiding him to grow a crop. That said fertilizer fell short of and did not compare with the guaranteed analysis as represented upon the tags which were placed upon sacks of such fertilizer. The defendant attached hereto marked exhibit A,’ a copy of the tag taken from four of ten sacks of fertilizer. A portion -of the fertilizer taken from four of -these same sacks of fertilizer was forwarded to the Commissioner of Agricultura of the State of Florida, on or about the 11th day of August, A. D. 1903, such Sample was sent by Wm. Barnett, a disinterested person, and placed in package in presence of two other disinterested persons, and in that manner forwarded!» the said' Commissioner of Agriculture, as required by law. And on or about August 2,6th, 1903, H. F. Addison received a copy of tbe analysis, a copy of which is hereto attached, marked exhibit ‘B,’ which shows a great variance between the guaranteed analysis on the tag and the analysis made by the State Chemist. At the same time and in the same manner a sample of the other fertilizer bought from complainants by defendant, the tag upon which was the guaranteed analysis, or a copy thereof, is hereto attached marked exhibit ‘C,’ and the analysis made by the State Chemist, or a copy thereof, is hereto attached, marked exhibit ‘D/ showing a variance between the guaranteed analysis and the analysis made by the State Chemist. Defendant also attached hereto marked exhibit ‘E,’ a copy of the letter of the State Commissioner of Agriculture at the time' he sent the analysis to said Addison. The said analysis shows that said fertilizer is not the high grade fertilizer it was represented to be by complainants.</p> <p>5th. The defendant, as is customary, purchased his guano on credit, and that while he signed the note sued on with all the stipulations in it, yet at the same time he was required to sign it in order to get the fertilizer which was represented to- him to be good and of a high grade, and the complainants refuse to sell defendant his guano without his signing the obligation herein; that it was not his intention to release the said complainants from their representation to him that said guano was a good guano and of high grade, nor did he intend to buy said guano upon his own judgment and his own risk, nor did he intend to consent that he knew the fertilizer had been analyzed, fpr he did not know as a matter of fact whether it had been analyzed or not, or whether or not the manufacturer had complied with the laws of Florida in regard to the vending of same, and -as to this part of said obligation prays the court to consider the defendant’s demurrer, the said stipulations being against public policy and therefore void in law. That all of the aforesaid stipulations were embraced in a printed note which he signed for said guano and were not put in such note with his knowledge or consent, but were printed in the notes when they were made by the printer, and it was the only note that the defendant could sign and get the guano on credit; that he did not read it over before signing it because he knew he would be required to" sign it before he could get the guancf on credit; he did not know that it contained the stipulations that he bought it at his own risk and that it hád been duly analyzed.”</p> <p>A replication was filed to this answer on December 2Gth, 1903, and after it was filed che appellant Braxton without any leave or order of the court filed a supplementary answer to the bill. A motion was made to strike this supplementary answer. Afterwards the case was set down for hearing upon bill, answer and replication on the 25th of April, 1904, no evidence having been taken by either party. There is some confusion in the dates of filing of the papers, but we think it reasonably certain that the time for taking testimony had expired when the case was set down for final hearing.</p> <p>The Circuit Judge decreed that the supplementary answer be stricken, and also decreed that complainants entitled to foreclosure, the amount due them for principal, interest and attorneys’ fees to be $839.33 and costs, and in default of payment within five days that the defendant and all persons claiming by, through or under him be forever barred and foreclosed of all right and equity of redemption in and to the personal property described in the bill and that the same be sold, &c.. An appeal was taken from this decree to this court.</p>

This case was decided by Division B. Appeal from the Circuit Court for Escambia County. The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the Court.

This case was decided by Division B. Writ of Error to the Circuit Court for Marion County. The facts in the .case are stated in the opinion of the Court.

This case was decided by Division A. Appeal from the Circuit Court for Dade County. The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the Court.

<p>This case was decided by Division A.</p> <p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Dade County.</p> <p>STATEMENT.</p> <p>Appellees, who are citizens of Dade county, and tax payers upon real and personal property situated therein, filed their bill of complaint against appellants in the Circuit Court of that county on November 21, 1902, alleging that Lainhart, Sewell, McDonald, Belcher and Aichor were the duly qualified county commissioners, Dimick the county treasurer, and Brooker, Gautier and Shone the bond trustees of said county; that a special fund had been created for building a court house, &c., and the disbursement of the same was allowed by law to be done by the bond trustees upon warrants drawn by the county commissioners ; that on November 3rd, 1902, the county commissioners audited and allowed as a claim against the county an account preferred by a partnership . styled Lummus & Sewall of which said John Sewall was a member- for supplies furnished the county, a copy of the account being attached as an exhibit to the bill; that accounts against the county in which the commissioners or one of them was personally interested had been theretofore audited and allowed by the commissioners and paid by the treasurer upon warrants issued in pursuance of such allowance, copies of which were attached as exhibits to the bill; that tlie claims so audited, allowed and paid were in behalf of fir-ms in which one of the commissioners was a partner at the time the items were alleged to have been furnished and at the time the claims were audited, allowed andjmid; that on- November 3rd, 1902, the commissioners audited and' allowed certain other claims in favor of partnerships of which some one of them was a member, viz: R. E. McDonald & Co., for supplies and feed $53.40, Lummus & Sewell on the bond fund for dynamite $200, but that said amounts had not yet been paid; that several other items specifically set forth in favor of firms of which one of the commissioners was a member had been allowed and either had been or would be paid by the treasurer'or the bond trustees unless enjoined, and that there were thousands of dollars in the hands of the bond trustees belonging to the tax payers of -the county subject to the order of the county commissioners, liable at all times to be diverted by them, which was about to be expended contrary to law and against the interests of the, tax payers of the county. The bill contains other allegations not material to the errors assigned upon this appeal, and prays, among other things, that an injunction issue enjoining the commissioners®irom issuing warrants based upon the auditing had November 3rd, 1902, of accounts presented 'by the firms' of which some one of the commissioners was a member, and enjoining the treasurer and bond trustees from paying the warrants if issued; that an account be taken of the monies in the treasury of Dade county heretofore by the action of the defendants so appropriated by the commissioners upon the alleged auditing and allowance by themselves of claims in favor of themselves, or some one of them, and that the said commissioners be decreed to restore the trust funds so illegally disposed of to the treasury of the county. There is also a prayer for general relief and for relief in respect to other matters not material to the assignments of error upon this appeal.</p> <p>On November 27th, 1902, the county commissioners filed their answer to the bill. They allege they do not know if complainants are tax payers as alleged and demand strict proof of same. They allege that Commissioner Sewall is a member of the firm of Lummus & Sewall, which was organized in 1899 to deal in dynamite and blasting supplies and that the firm is the agent of the Aetna Dynamite Co.; that Sewall was appointed commissioner in July, 1901; that before said date the firm sold dynamite, caps and fuses to the county, and continued to do so after the appointment and qualification of Sewall as commissioner, upon orders given by agents of the county upon like terms, prices and conditions as such articles were sold to other customers of the firm; that when necessary the commissioners have authorized county agents having county road work in charge to purchase supplies and such agents have purchased such supplies from whom they pleased and from time to time have placed orders with Lunuuus & Sewall and the bills therefor have been audited and paid when found correct «¡ft like manner as other valid claims against the county; that all bills for supplies rendered by Lummus & Sewall against the county have been found correct, and that the price of each article therein charged has always been found to be the regular retail selling price of such article; that the different dynamite companies doing business in this State.have established a uniform price list for blasting supplies which the agents handling such" goods may not depart from without violating their contract with the dynamite companies, and all bills rendered the county by Lummus & Sewall have been in accordance with such graded price list and furnished as cheaply as goods could have been obtained from any source whatever; that the agents of the commissioners were not required by them to purchase supplies of Lummus & Sewall, and no improper or fraudulent use of their powers as commissioners has been exercised for the personal benefit of any member; that valid claims against the county have b'een audited and paid in which a member was interested, but all such claims have been examined by the board in regular session, and those audited and paid have always been found to be correct as to items, good as to quality and fair and reasonable as to price. The answer also admits that members of the board are also members of the firms of R. E. McDonald & Co,, John Sewall & Bro., Lain-hart & Potter; that the county agents having the county convicts, and county road work in charge have purchased supplies for the county from these firms as alleged in the bill, ’ but alleges that the supplies were necessary, the prices reasonable; that no fraud on influence was used by any member of the board to secure the orders, and that in no instance was the county charged more than it would have had to pay if purchased elsewhere, while in some instances it was charged less, and in no instance had the county been charged more than other customers for like articles.</p> <p>The answer admits that the firm of R. É. McDonald & Co., is composed of R. E. McDonald, a county commissioner, and J. R. O’Neal, who is supervisor of the county convict camp and engaged in working convicts on the county roads, and that O’Neal has purchased from the firm supplies for the convicts and feed for the county mules, but alleges that such purchases were made without coercion or pressure of any kind from the commissioners, and only when the same could be procured as conveniently and cheaply as at other places. The defendants deny that any part of the bond fund will be diverted from its proper nse as alleged in the bill. They deny that they have ever at any time contracted with themselves for the purchase of county supplies, and alleged that such supplies have always been purchased by other officers and agents of the county. They allege that they have never at any time, either as individuals or as a board, used any coercion or brought any pressure to bear upon such officers and agents to cause them to trade with the firms of which some one of the commissioners was a member. They allege further that they, have not used or exercised any undue influence upon said county officers or agents, or offered any corrupt or unlawful inducements, such as rebates, divisions of profits, promises of promotion or continuous employment to secure a share of trade in county-supplies; that such supplies have been purchased from such firms by the county officers and agents when it appeared convenient and to the best ihterest of the county to do so, or when in the discretion of the county officers it seemed fair and reasonable that said firms, other things being fair and equal, should have their fair and just proportion of the county trade; that the county officers and agents have purchased and are purchasing large quantities of .county supplies, including clothing, shoes, medicines, provisions, feed and building materials from other firms in Dade county, and that the bills for same when correct are audited and paid in the same manner and form as the bills specifically set out and attached to the bill of complaint; that the present method of procuring county supplies has been fully enquired into and investigated by the last two grand juries of Dade county, and in each •case the grand jury has failed and refused to recommend a change in said method or to require that the board advertise for bids.</p> <p>; On November 29th, 1902, at a hearing had upon bill, answer and affidavits, the court made an order granting the provisional injunction as prayed for.</p> <p>On December 20, 1902, Dimick, the county treasurer, • filed his separate answer, admitting that he as treasurer paid the various warrants drawn on him by the county commissioners in favor of the firms of,which some one of the commissioners were members, as alleged in,the bill, but alleging that'as soon as advised that warrants so drawn were illegally issued he refused further payment thereof, and as to the other allegations of the bill the answer admitted their truth upon the personal knowledge and information of the respondent.</p> <p>On February 7, 1903, the bond trustees filed their answer, alleging that they were appointed by resolution of the county commissioners, a financial committee styled “Trustees of County Bonds” for the purpose of receiving and disbursing the proceeds of certain county bonds in the sum of $150,000, issued by the board upon an election held for that purpose, to build a county court house and jail and paved or hard surfaced roads in said county; and for the further purpose of receiving from the tax collector all interest money collected by him and paying same over to the holders of said bonds; and also receiving from said collector the money collected by taxation to create a sinking fund to pay off and discharge said bonds at maturity and to investigate said funds as required by law; that warrants have been drawn from time to time by the county commissioners against the bond fund in the custody and control of the bond trustees, which have been paid by W. J. Shone, treasurer of said bond trustees, and that a certain warrant No. 19 for $200.05 in favor of Lummus & Sewall for dynamite used or to be nsed on the public roads issued by the commissioners at their regular meeting in November,, 1902, was presented and paid in regular course of business before defendants had notice of any application for a restraining order against its payment. The answer denies that any part of the fund in the hands of the bond trustees has been improperly paid out on the order of the county commissioners, or has been or is about to be diverted from its proper use, and alleges that every warrant drawn by the county commissioners against said fund has been in settlement of claims and demands contracted by the board pursuant to the purposes for which the bonds were sold; that the bond trustees have not only the custody of the fund, but also the disbursement of same for the purposes already stated.; that the present arrangement of disbursing the proceeds of said county bonds upon warrants issued by .the county commissioners has grown out of the confidence of defendants in the executive ability and personal integrity of the individual members of the board of county commissioners; that all accounts and vouchers upon which warrants have been issued have been and are subject to the inspection and approval of defendants, and to their best knowledge and belief .no part of said bond fund has been diverted from its proper use or purpose, or carelessly or extravagantly disbursed or expended.</p> <p>General replications were filed to the answers of the defendants, and a special master was appointed to take testimony.</p> <p>On March 17th, 1904, the cause was heard upon the pleadings and testimony, and the court entered its decree to the following effect:</p> <p>1st. That the equity of complainants to the relief and accounting prayed is adjudicated and established, and the provisional injunction heretofore granted is perpetuated.</p> <p>2nd. That the several transactions set up in complainants bill “whereby on alleged auditings and allowings” by the county commissioners of claims in favor of some of their number, warrants were drawn and moneys taken from the county treasury, constituted an unlawful taking and appropriation of said funds, and the county commissioners, naming each of them, by and through whom the unlawful taking and appropriation of such funds were consummated are required and decreed to account for the same and for lawful interest accruing thereon from the dates of payment of said warrants and upon such accounting to pay the aggregate amount thereof into the registry of the court.</p> <p>3rd. That it is referred to Mitchell D. Price who is master pro Jmo vice in the cause, to take and state an account of said funds so taken and appropriated by said commissioners, and to report to the court with all convenient speed, an itemized statement and the aggregate' amount thereof, with interest so accrued thereon for the further action of the court. From this decree an appeal has been taken to the present term of this court, and the errors assigned are based upon the several provisions'of this decree.</p>

This case was decided by Division A. Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County, STATEMENT. The appellant filed his bill in chancery in the Circuit Court for Hillsborough county against the apellee on the 22nd day of October, 1903, for the reformation of the description of certain lots of land embraced in a deed executed by the appellant to the appellee on or about the 12th day of October, 1903.

This case was decided by Division A. Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County. STATEMENT. On the 2Gtk day of November. 1902, E. J. Hills filed his bill in- chancery in the Circuit Court for Hillsborough county against the appellees, for the foreclosure of a mortgage executed by the appellees.upon certain lands in said county, also making as parties defendant the appellant and certain others who claimed-some interest as judgment creditors or otherwise.

This case was decided by Division A. Appeal from Circuit Court for Marion County. STATEMENT.

This case was decided by the Court En Banc. Appeal 'from the Circuit Court for Pasco County. STATEMENT.

This case was decided by the Court En Banc. This is a case of original jurisdiction. The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the Court.

This case was decided by the Court En'Banc. This is a case of original jurisdiction. . The facts in the case are' stated in the opinion of the Court.

This case was decided by the Court En Banc. Appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County. The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the Court.

<p>Appeal from Circuit Court, DeSoto county; Joseph B. Wall, Judge.</p>

<p>Appeal from Circuit Court, Hernando county; William S. Bullock, Judge. ' •</p>

<p>Writ of Error to Circuit Court, Duval county; Rhydon M. Call, Judge</p>