Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist

49 N.J.L. 232

Mooney v. Peck

Supreme Court of New Jersey

Decided November 15, 1886

Supreme Court of New Jersey · decided 1886-11-15

<p>1. In an action upon a mechanics’ lien claim, it was not error to permit the lien claim filed in the case, and containing a statement of the particulars of the plaintiff s demand, to go to the jury, when, upon the trial, it was shown to the witness who ordered the goods, and who testified that it was a correct statement of the goods furnished pursuant to his order.</p> <p>2. A mere objection to evidence, specifying no ground of objections, will not sustain an exception.</p>

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1886-11-15

How this case has been cited

Cited by 12 later decisions — most recently July 1989

4 federal appellate · 6 state decisions

4018861890190019101920193019401950196019701980decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1The opinion of the court was delivered by

The Chancellor.

¶2Two only of the errors assigned are relied upon for reversal. One is that the court, upon the trial, permitted the lien claim filed in the cause to go to the jury; and the other is that a telegram offered by the plaintiff, and objected to by the defendant, was illegally admitted in evidence. As to the first objection, the lien claim contained a statement of the particulars of the plaintiff’s demand. Upon the trial it was shown to the witness who ordered the goods, and he testified that it was a correct statement of the goods furnished pursuant to his order, and to recover the price whereof the suit was brought.

¶3There is no substance in the objection.

¶4As to the telegram, it does not appear what the ground of objection to its admission was. That the paper offered was not the original message, may perhaps be inferred from the fact that it was called upon the trial a telegram, but, on the other hand, the witness by whom it was proved swore positively and unqualifiedly not only that he received it from the defendant, but that it was signed by the defendant. The defendant’s counsel specified no ground of objection to the evidence in question, but merely objected to it. It is established that such an objection will not sustain an exception. It may be added that the evidence of the telegram was superfluous. It was introduced with a view to establishing thereby that the witness by whom it was proved had authority from *234the defendant to order the goods for and on account of the latter, but he had testified to that already. The judgment should be affirmed.

For affirmance — The Chancellor, Depue, Knapp, Scudder, Van Syckel, Brown, Cole, McGregor. 8.For reversal — Dixon, Clement. 2.
/49/njl/232 · .json · Public domain