Volume 49 — Wisconsin Reports

The case is thus stated by Plr. Justice Taylob: “ The plaintiffs brought' their action to recover the sum of $2,701.37 and interest, which, they allege they had been compelled to pay under the provisions of a contract made by the parties for the exchange of real estate situate in the city of Chicago, owned by the Griswolds, for property situated in Door county, owned by the Sellecl&s, and which, by the terms of such contract, the defendants were bound to repay to the…

In this action, which was on contract, an order was made July 9, 1878, on defendant’s motion, changing the place of trial to Jefferson county, under sec. 4, ch. 123, R. S. 1858. An appeal from this order was perfected August 6, 1S78; the order was affirmed here February 4, 1879; and the remittitur was filed in the circuit court on the 11th of April following.

Defendant appealed from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff. ' The case is stated in the opinion. They contended, 1. That Celluyham was authorized to make the contract alleged in the complaint, or had at least such apparent authority that his acts were binding on his principal in favor of one who dealt with him in good faith.

The action was for the foreclosure of a mortgage; and, without any answer or appearance on the part of the defendants, judgment of foreclosure was entered on the 8th of June, 1877, with the usual order of sale.

This action is upon a policy of insurance issued January 16, 1879, by the defendant company to the plaintiff livfus P. Harriman, insuring him in the sum of $3,000 against loss or injury by fire to his three-story brick hotel building, situated on certain lots therein described, in the city of Green Bay.

The case is thus stated by Mr. Justice Tatloe: “ This was an action upon a policy of insurance against loss by fire.

Action to set aside certain conveyances. On tbe 28th day' of August, 1871, Andrew Reid and bis wife conveyed to tbe defendant Persons, by warranty deed, nine lots in tbe village of West Depere in said county, “ with tbe steam planing-mill and all other buildings and improvements thereon or to be thereafter constructed, or appertaining thereto,” excepting the engine house situated upon one of said lots and belonging to the village of.

Defendant appealed from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The case is stated in the opinion. 1. According to the referee’s own theory and that of the plaintiff, defendant’s act was simply an unwarrantable use by one eotenant of the joint property. Defendant does not dispute tlie joint tenancy; be made no claim to any portion of the property except his four-ninths interest, and no attempt at an ouster of the plaintiff. Under these circumstances trespass will not lie.

<p>APPEAL from the Circuit Court for Outagamie County.</p> <p>Defendant appealed from a judgment in favor of tbe plaintiff. The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

APPEAR from, the Circuit Court for Outagamie County. Action to recover charges for boomage. The plaintiff offered in evidence certain depositions, to the admission of which the defendant objected, because it appeared by the certificate of the commissioner by whom the depositions were taken, that they were taken to be used in an action pending in the county court of said county, whereas this cause was pending in the circuit court; but the objection was overruled.

Action to recover moneys paid by plaintiff to defendant on a promissory note executed by the former to the latter. The judgment of this court on reversing a former appeal herein is reported in 46 Wis., 313-316. The evidence and the instructions given to the jury, at the second trial, will sufficiently appear from the opinion. There was a verdict and judgment in favor of the plaintiff; and defendant appealed from the judgment.

This action was brought in the circuit court by husband and wife to recover damages for injuries to the wife, received by her when walking over the sidewalk of one of the public streets in the defendant city, and alleged to have been caused by a defect in such sidewalk. No questions are raised on the pleadings, and there is no exception to any ruling of the court on the admission of testimony. The evidence tends to prove the allegations of the complaint.

Sec. 1, ch. 195, Laws of 1859, provided that, in case of a sale of mortgaged lands under a judgment of foreclosure, it should be the duty of the sheriff or other officer malting the sale, within ten days thereafter, to execute to the purchaser a certificate of sale in writing, under seal, setting forth each tract or parcel of the lands sold, the sum paid therefor, and the time when the purchaser would be entitled'to a deed thereof unless the land should be-redeeined as…

This action was commenced in July, 1877, in Taylor county, and removed to Columbia county for trial.

' Action to recover possession of a strip 100 feet wide through certain described tracts of land, and damages for entering and cutting timber upon the remainder of sncli tracts. The action was commenced in the circuit court for Chippewa county, December 18,1878, the lands being then situated partly in Ashland county and partly in Chippewa county. The answer was served February 6, 1879.

This is a suit or proceeding instituted in the circuit court by the railroad company, under the statute (R, S., 539, secs. 1846-7), for the purpose of acquiring a right of way two hundred feet wide for its railroad, across certain lands of the university in Ashland county.

The questions in this 'case arose upon demurrer to the complaint.

In this case there was a personal judgment against the defendant Patrick O’Neill, for $768.73, and it was further adjudged that plaintiff had a lien for that amount upon certain logs and timber described in the complaint. Gushing and others, co-defendants of O’Neill, appealed from the latter part of the judgment.

Trespass to the close. Answer, that the loetos was part of a state road duly laid out, opened and traveled in pursuance of ch. 136, P. & L. Laws of 1872, as amended by ch. 54 of 1873 and ch. 256 of 1875; arid that the acts complained of were committed by defendant as overseer of roads, by direction of the proper town board.

<p>APPEAL from tbe Circuit Court for Jefferson County.</p>

<p>APPEAL from the Circuit Court for Jefferson County.</p>

Action for rent. Plaintiff’s intestate, to whom the premises belonged, died in May, 1878. At that time defendant had been in possession of the premises for a number of months, and had been pajdng at the rate of $700 per annum, the payments being made monthly in advance. After the death of his intestate, plaintiff went lawfully into possession of the premises as administrator.. After May 1, 1878, it vras agreed that the monthly payments should be at the rate of $650 per annum.

Action to foreclose a mortgage given by J. Maurice Smith and wife to William Maeloon.

<p> (1) Verdict in equity. (2) Reversal upon preponderance of evidence. </p> <p>1. In equity causes, the verdict of a jury is only in aid of the court, and has not the same effect as a verdict at law.</p> <p>2. In this cause, which was foreclosure of a mortgage securing a note, a judgment for defendant is reversed because this court is satisfied that a clear preponderance of evidence shows, contrary to the verdict and finding below, that the note was not fully paid.</p>

This cause was here on two former appeals, and is last reported in 44 Wis., 342. This appeal is by the defendant from an order of the circuit court allowing an amendment of the complaint and relieving the plaintiff from a stipulation. The complaint had already been twice amended.

Defendant appealed from a judgment of the circuit court reversing a judgment rendered in his favor by the justice before whom the action was commenced. The nature of the action, and the ground of reversal, will appear from the opinion. contended that the evidence in dispute was admissible on two grounds: 1. As apart of the res gestee. 1 G-reenl., § 108 and notes 1 and 2; PARK, J., in Bcmsonv. Haigh, 2 Bing., 99; 1 Phillipps on Ev., 205; 1 Starkie on Ev., 47; Bexv.

Action to foreclose a mechanic’s lien. The premises claimed to be subject to the lien were owned by the defendant Alice A. Rood,, and were occupied by her and her husband, the defendant Samuel Rood. The complaint alleges that materials were furnished and work done upon the premises in pursuance of a contract made by plaintiff with Samuel Rood as agent for his wife.

The motion was heard on an order to show cause why the writ should not issue. It is alleged in the affidavits in support of the motion, among other things, that the appellants were arbitrarily expelled from the society without cause and without any opportunity to be heard in their defense.

The common council of the defendant city passed an order for building a sidewalk contiguous to the lot of the plaintiff, described in the complaint. Such order was duly published, and a notice requiring the plaintiff to build the sidewalk within a specified time, as required by the city charter, was duly served upon her.

The complaint alleges that the defendant corporation, since 1875, has been empowered to lay water-pipes in all the alleys, streets, etc., of said city, and to-assess against the several lots or parcels of land which may front or abut. on the line of such water-pipes, the amount to which the land is specially benefited, provided that no regular lot shall be assessed more than one-half the cost, as estimated by the board of public works, of furnishing and laying a regular…

Action to recover damages for injuries received by the plaintiff while passing along one of the public streets of the defendant city.

The case is thus stated by Mr. Justice Tatlob: -“This action was commenced in the circuit court of .Milwaukee county against Samuel Howard, as executor of the last will and testament of Edward ITackett, deceased, and Bridget Hackett, widow, and others, children and heirs-at-law of the deceased.

In September, 1876, one Haas gave a mortgage on certain personal property to one Herbst, to secure the payment of a note for $166, payable in six months. Afterwards, in 1877, Haas sold tbe same property to Charles Schlitz, who took possession thereof.

Action on an account amounting in the whole to $2002.89, on which a balance is claimed to be due of $596.14, with interest; and of the latter sum $450.61 was_ claimed to be for work and labor performed for, and goods and wares delivered to, the Engelmann Transportation Company upon defendant’s-credit.

The' action was to recover damages for a trespass alleged to have been committed by the defendants in May, 1877, on certain lands owned by and in the possession of the plaintiff, in the town of Mineral Point, Iowa county; The answers of the defendants substantially admit tbe title and possession of the plaintiff to the locus in quo, as alleged in the complaint, and that they committed thereon some of the acts complained of; but aver that the place where such acts were…

The case is thus stated hv Mr. Justice TayloR: “ This was an action of ejectment, to recover possession of three tracts of land.

On the 1st of April, 1876, defendant entered into the following contract in writing with plaintiff: “I this day agree to take of Mr. J. Lindort three hundred barrels of mess pork at $22 per barrel. Said pork to be paid for from time to time when ordered. Said pork to be delivered on cars. I to pay interest and insurance on said pork until delivery of same. Interest to be ten per cent.

Peplevin, for a sewing machine. The action was commenced in justice’s court September 5th, and tried there September 23, 1878; and from a judgment there in defendant’s favor, plaintiff appealed to the county court, where the cause was tried by a jury.

One Octavius Marshall, by Carpenter & Smiths, his attorneys, obtained a judgment against a corporation or firm in Milwaukee known as the Marshall Brothers’ Church Organ Manufacturing Company. The amount of the judgment was made up of the demands of several persons against the company, which, for convenience, had theretofore been assigned to Octavius Marshall.

<p>APPEAL from tlie Circuit Court for Milwaukee County.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Action under the general mill-dam law. The complaint alleges the overflow and injury of plaintiff’s land in Dodge county, contiguous to the Crawfish river — which is described as a non-navigable stream, —by means of defendant’s mill dam across said river, located in Jefferson county.

Action for false imprisonment. There was a judgment for the plaintiffs, from which the defendant Butts appealed. The case will sufficiently appear from the opinion. 1. The constitutional limitation of the powers of a court commissioner, in the words “provided, that said powers shall not exceed those of a judge of the circuit court at chambers,” contained in art. VII, sec. 23, cannot have reference to territorial powers or territorial jurisdiction.

John SpiegeTburg, who is the administrator of the estate of Otto BL Eehland, presented to the county judge for allowance a personal claim against the estate. The claim was resisted by Ernst Dowe and the firm of Baumbach & Rosenthal, and was disallowed by the judge. The estate is insolvent. Its creditors consisted of more than twenty individuals and firms, but except those above named, none of them contested the allowance of BgpiegeTburg's claim.

<p>(1-3) New Trial: When grantcible, and on what terms.</p> <p>(4) -FENCES. Evidence. Proof of presumptive notice of defects in fence.</p> <p>1. The mere fact that there was some evidence in plaintiff’s favor, so that the court could not properly order a compulsory nonsuit or direct a ver-' diet for the defendant, does not show that there was any abuse of discretion in granting a new trial after a verdict in plaintiff’s favor; and this, where defendant had offered no evidence.</p> <p>2. Evidence offered for the party in whose favor the verdict is rendered, though improperly rejected, cannot be considered in determining the propriety of granting a now trial.</p> <p>3. Where the verdict does not appear to be perverse, a new trial should be granted only upon terms that the moving party pay the taxable costs of the former trial.</p> <p>4. In an action for injuries alleged to have resulted from the defective condition of the defendant’s fence, where actual notice to defendant of the defect is not shown, plaintiff should be permitted to prove the existence of the defect for some time previous to the accident, in order to charge defendant with notice.</p>

This action was brought by Emil ITartwig, for injuries to his person alleged to have been caused by defendant’s negligence. After, the death of said Emil, the administratrix of his estate, Mary Hartwig, was substituted as plaintiff.

This action was commenced in the.circuit court for Mani-towoc county; but the place of trial was duly changed to the circuit court for Ozaukee county. When the cause was reached on the calendar of the latter court, and called for trial, the court made an order striking it from the calendar for reasons which are stated in the opinion; and from this order plaintiff appealed.

On motion, the county court struck out the defendant’s answer as frivolous, and gave judgment for the plaintiff. This is an appeal by the defendant from the judgment. The complaint (which is in the usual form) is upon an account for goods sold, attached thereto as an exhibit. The corporate character of the plaintiff, and an express agreement by the defendant to pay interest on the account after a certain time, are alleged. The answer is as follows: “ 1.

<p>APPEAL from tlie Circuit Court for Winnebago County.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Replevin. The goods in controversy formed part of the stock in trade of F. X. Haben & Co., and are valued at about $75. Plaintiff claims them by virtue of a chattel mortgage from the firm. Defendant justifies as sheriff under an attachment sued out by certain creditors of said firm. The members of this firm were F. X. ITaben and his father-in-law, James Nagle. The business of the firm was that of a retail grocery, Nagle furnishing most of the capital.

Action against defendants as guarantors of the payment of a promissory note. The case made by the complaint was this: On the 2d of August, 1877, at Oshlcosh, one Stanley sold to one Ellsworth a large quantity of goods; and, in part payment therefor and in consideration thereof, Ellsworth executed and delivered to Stanley bis promissory note, wliereby, “ one year after date, for value received,” be promised to pay said Stanley or order $-150 with interest at a specified rate.

Action on a policy of insurance on liouseliolcL furniture destroyed by fire during tbe term of the policy. The contest related solely to the sufficiency of the notice and the proofs of loss furnished by defendant.

Action upon a policy of insurance against loss by fire. The plaintiff appealed from a judgment of nonsuit.

Action for an assault and battery alleged to have been committed by defendant’s discharging a loaded pistol at the plaintiff in such a manner that the ball discharged from the pistol penetrated and wounded the body of the plaintiff; such shooting being charged to have been done wrongfully and inten-/ tionally.

The case is thus stated by Mr. Justice Cole: “This is an appeal from an order refusing to set aside a judgment of foreclosure. The action was commenced in the circuit court of Dodge county on the 8th day of March, 1879, by service of summons and complaint. On the 28th day of that month notice of retainer was served.

In PTovember, 1873, the plaintiff company entered into a contract, in writing, with James IT. Barr and Nicholas Konrad, by which the latter became the exclusive agents of the company to sell its machines in this state, and agreed to guaranty the payment of all notes taken by them for the company for machines, and of all debts due the company on account of sales made by them.

<p>Cbimiuaí Law and Practice. Reversal of judgment for failure of trial judge to hear motion for new trial.</p> <p>1. A person accused of crime, after verdict against him, has a right to the solemn opinion of the judge before whom the cause was tried, after a careful hearing of all that may be alleged against the justice of the verdict, that it ought to stand.</p> <p>2. Where, therefore, the evidence upon which a verdict of guilty of murder in. the first degree was found, was not overwhelming, and the accused was unable to obtain a proper hearing of his motion for a new trial, because it was inconvenient for the trial judge (who sat in place of the judge of the circuit in which the trial was had) to remain and hear the same, and such judge erroneously supposed that the motion might properly be heard by the judge of the circuit, this court reverses the judgment and orders a new trial, without determining whether the verdict was unsupported by the evidence, or whether there was error in the instructions given to the jury.</p> <p>3. The fact that the accused, failing, after due effort, to get his motion heard by the trial judge, subsequently moved the judge 'of the circuit for the same relief, does not waive or cure the error above stated.</p>

<p>(1) Emineht Domaxh. Fntry on land of others: Statute construed. (2) Reversal for error of fact.</p> <p>1. Under cli. 183, P. & L. Laws of 18C6, the persons there empowered to dig- a race to connect the waters of certain streams and create a mill-power, etc., were not authorized to enter on the land of any other person for those purposes without having first paid the accruing damages. .</p> <p>2. The issues having been submitted to the jury upon a charge which was full, explicit and applicable to the evidence and issues, and included substantially all correct instructions asked by the appellant, which were not given in form, and there being no clear preponderance of evidence against the verdict, the judgment pursuant thereto must be affirmed*.</p>

Action upon a policy of insurance against fire, issued by the defendant company to the plaintiffs, on machinery, mill-gearing and fixtures in their mill in Prescott. The complaint is in the usual form of complaints in such cases, and contains the policy in suit and certain printed conditions of insurance indorsed upon it.

This action was brought to recover the penalty (treble damages) prescribed by sec. 9, ch. 273, Laws of 1874, for excessive freight charges. Held: on demurrer, that we had asked judgment for more than we were entitled to. They did not and will not hold that plaintiff cannot recover the actual amount of excessive freight extorted from him by defendant. But the facts on which he must rely are the same in either case.

The defendant appealed from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The case is stated in the opinion. The awai'd was void. 1. It should have conformed strictly to the statute under which it was made. Morse on Arb., 268; Darling v. Darling, 16'Wis., 644; Steel v. Steel, 1 Nev., 27. The statute requires notice to the parties in interest. This is jurisdictional, and cannot be waived.

Action to recover penalties imposed by chapter 13, Laws of 1871, entitled “ An act to protect the public against unauthorized insurance agents.” The complaint contains eighteen counts or causes of action, in each of which it is charged that at the city of Fond du Lac, in this state, on the 26th day of May, 1876, the defendant did, as the agent of a certain insurance company therein named, “ and in behalf of the said company, and for a commission, compensation and…

The defendants were John JS. Garry and one Wickert, county'clerk; and the nature of tbe action and substance of the complaint are thus stated by Mr. Justice Tatloe: “This action was brought for the… Held: inter alia, that the purchase of 'the certificates by one legally bound to pay the tax, and the transfer thereof to the owner of the land, was a payment of the tax; and that Garry was not the legal owner of the certificates, because they were never assigned to him.

Lao County. Action to foreclose a mortgage given to secure a bond in tbe penal sum of $5,000, executed by the defendants Setli E. and Leand&r B. Hills to John N. Ackerman, president of the Waupun Bank, and bis successors in office, as trustees for certain new stockholders in said bank, who had subscribed over $9,000 to the capital of said bank to enable it to resume business and meet its liabilities.

This was an action of garnishment, begun at the same time as the principal action, January 9,1879. The garnishee and the principal defendant, E. B. Hunting, answered severally, denying the garnishee’s liability; and issue was joined upon the answers.

APPEAR from the County Court of Fond du Lao County. Blackburn made a voluntary assignment of all his property, not exempt from execution, to Bowe, who took possession of the same. The assignment was in trust for the benefit of the creditors of the assignor, and was made in attempted compliance with the provisions of the statute, R. S., 497, ch. 80. The nominal value of the assigned property was considerably less than the debts of the assignor, as scheduled by him under oath.

The action was commenced in justice’s court, and the complaint was as follows: “ Plaintiff complains that defendant is indebted to him in the sum of $20 for money had and received April 15,1875, and demands judgment for that amount.” The answer was a general denial.

Action on a policy of insurance against fire. The trial was by a referee; and the defendant’s exceptions to the referee’s report were overruled, the report confirmed, and judgment rendered thereon for the plaintiff. Defendant appealed from the judgment.

Action to remove a cloud from the title of the plaintiffs to certain land described in the complaint.

This action was originally brought by Franeis F., Theodore B. and Williaw, P. Gatlin, Marguerite St. L. Loud, Caroline L^oud and George Dart, against Charles F. Wheeler and Samuel Sumner, executors of the last will and testament of Bichard Catlin, deceased. The case made by the complaint is as follows: Bichard Catlin, late of Fond du Lac county, died testate Flay 20, 1874.

The case is thus stated by Mr. Justice Taylob: “ This is an appeal from an order of the municipal court of the city of Ripon, sustaining the demurrer of the plaintiff to the answer of the defendant. This case was before this court on an appeal from a similar order, and the decision will be found in Sargeant v. Downey, 45 Wis., 498.

Action for an inj ury to plaintiff’s intestate, wbicb resulted in bis death, and which is alleged to have been caused by defendant’s negligence. After plaintiff’s evidence was in, the court, on defendant’s motion, ordered a nonsuit. Plaintiff appealed from the judgment. Submitted for the appellant on the brief of Tracy c& Bailey.

This action was commenced before the repeal of sec. 6, ch. 273 of 1874, commonly known as the “Potter Law,” and was for the penalty provided by that section for charging and receiving for the carriage of freight a sum in excess of the rates prescribed by that act.

The board of supervisors of Crawford county allowed certain claims of the principal defendant, Bryan J. Castle, against the county; and, pursuant to the direction of the board, county orders for the sum so allowed, payable to Castle, were made out by the appellant, James E. Campbell, the county clerk, and signed by the proper officers.

Plaintiff, having been, compelled in 1876, as he avers, to pay a certain sum as balance due M. E. Puller & Co., of Madison, on notes given them in 1871 by himself and defendant as partners in business (under the firm name of Trainer & Hill), brought this action to recover thé amount so paid, alleging a contract between himself and defendant, at the time the partnership was dissolved, by which the latter agreed to pay said notes.

Action to recover possession of certain personal property seized by the defendant, the sheriff of Iowa coukty, by virtue of a writ of attachment issued at the suit of one Moffett against Ann Cork and her two sons, Fred and Joseph. The plaintiff claims the property by virtue of a chattel mortgage thereon, executed to him in January, 1878, by said Corks, to secure a debt. The mortgage was duly filed in the proper office. The case is further stated in the opinion.

The verified complaint in this case alleges that defendant was indebted to plaintiff in the sum of $490.40, “balance due upon a-mutual and open account current;” and. demands judgment against him for that amount with interest thereon from January 1, 1879, and for costs, etc. Annexed to the complaint on file is the summons in due form, except that the sum for which judgment would be taken (exclusive of interest and costs) was left blank, and that the post-office address of…

<p>APPEAL from tbe Circuit Court for Milwaukee County.</p> <p>Plaintiff appealed from an order sustaining a demurrer to tbe complaint. The case is stated in the opinions.</p>

Action to recover the damages, costs and charges accruing to the.plaintiff, as owner of certain lots in the city of Milwaukee, from a change made in 1872, pursuant to a city ordinance passed in 1871, in the grade of a street on which such lots front.

The case is thus stated by JVXr. Justice TayloR: “ It appears from the record in this case that John Buckley, deceased, was in his lifetime the administrator of the estate of one Peter Allen, deceased; that a part of the estate of Peter Allen consisted of a parcel of real estate; that Peter Allen, at the time of his decease, left a widow and one child, a minor son; that John Buckley, supposing he had the right to sell the real estate of Peter Allen, entered into a written…

On a previous appeal in this case, a j udgment in favor of the defendants was reversed, and the cause remitted for a new trial. See 45 Wis., 23-30. On the second trial, plaintiff had a verdict and judgment, and the defendants appealed. A reference'to the statement of the case made in the report of the former decision will sufficiently explain the opinion on the present appeal.

After the former decision in this cause (reported in 42 Wis., pp. 643-653), and after the cause had been remitted to the circuit court, tiie defendant answered, admitting that on the 15th of July, 1S76, the officers of said city granted a license to-one Carr to exhibit a bear or bears in the city, but denying that such license authorized such exhibition to be made upon any public street, and alleging, in substance, that the license was granted with full notice and…

The action is to recover damages for injuries sustained by plaintiff while in the service of the defendant company, alleged to have been caused by its negligence. The case has been twice tried. It was before this court on a former appeal, and is reported in 46 Wis., 497. The evidence was substantially the same on both trials. A sufficient statement of the principal facts in the case will be found in that report.

<p>Pbactioe: Opening Jud&jient to let in answer. (1) Good answer must he tendered. (2) Newiy discovered evidence.</p> <p>1. Where judgment is rendered upon a frivolous answer, without leave to answer over, and afterwards defendant files affidavits and asks leave to answer on the ground of newly discovered evidence, without tendering ■ an ansteer showing a good defense, with affidavits showing1 a probability of his sustaining it, leave should be denied. .</p> <p>2. Where the action is upon a judgment, and the claim of newly discovered evidence is merely that a certain person who committed willful peijury on the trial which resulted in such judgment, will appear as a witness for defendant and give evidence of a contrary character, it is error to grant a new trial on that ground.</p>

Three insurance companies united with Swarthout in bringing this action. Defendant appealed from an order overruling its demurrer to the complaint. The case is thus stated by Mr. Justice Cole: “ This action is brought by the plaintiffs to recover of the defendant company the damages caused by the burning of the plaintiff Swarthout1 s property through the negligence of the defendant. The property destroyed is alleged to have been of the value of $6,727.

The action was commenced before a justice of the peace by attachment. The affidavit for the writ was made by one George A. Knee, in behalf of the plaintiffs. A warrant of attachment was issued by’ the j ustice, and duly and personally served on the defendant, and his property seized by virtue thereof. The warrant is in due form, except that it requires the defendant to appear at the time and jflace therein named “ to answer to G-.

Action to set aside an assignment by plaintiffs of twenty-five shares of stock, of $100 each, in the Clark County Pank, of Neilsville in this state, and to obtain a reconveyance of said stock, and to recover the earnings thereof since December 20, 1875; or, in case a reconveyance could not be had, to recover the value of said stock as well as said earnings.

The case is thus stated by Mr. Justice Taylor: “ This action was brought to recover a balance claimed to be due the plaintiff from the defendant on a contract for cutting, hauling and delivering a quantity of pine logs.

This action was brought to set aside the assessment for taxation of plaintiff’s lands in the defendant town, in 1878, and to enjoin the collection of the tax out of his personal property, or the return of the land to the county treasurer as delinquent. ' The court found certain facts, which are stated in the opinion, and held that the assessment of plaintiff’s land; and of all the other property, real and personal, in said town, in 1878, was illegal and void; that the taxes…

Action to set aside and cancel certain tax certificates issued upon sales of the plaintiffs’ lands in Marathon county for the unpaid taxes assessed thereon in the years 1874 to 1877, inclusive, on the ground that such taxes were illegally levied. Certain errors, irregularities and omissions in the assessment of property for taxation in those years, in the several towns in which the plaintiffs’ lands are situated, are specified in the complaint.

The defendants above named appealed from a judgment in plaintiff’s favor.

Action to recover a certain sum alleged to be due plaintiff from defendant, for service rendered, labor performed, money advanced and indebtedness incurred, by the former for the latter, at his request.

The action was against Prank Hughes and John Week. Hughes made no answer; but Week answered with a general denial. On the trial of the issue thus made, there was a special verdict, upon which the court rendered a judgment in Week's favor; and from this judgment the plaintiff appealed.

This action is to recover $2,800 and interest thereon, being the amount of an assessment on the capital stock of the plaintiff, which stock, the complaint alleges, was subscribed for and is owned and held by the defendant. It is also alleged that the plaintiff is a duly organized corporation.

<p>APPEAL from the Circuit Court for Portage County.</p>

The caséis thus stated by Mr. Justice Tayloe: “This action was brought for the purpose of recovering damages on account of an injury sustained by the plaintiff Fanny J. Bishop, wife of the plaiutiff Harry Bishop, by falling from a sidewalk in said city.

Action upon a promissory note for $250, without interest until after due, dated May 10, 1876, payable to Thomas Tomlinson, September 1, 1876, and executed by one Newell… Held: that plaintiff was the owner and holder of the note at the commencement of tins action, and that she was entitled to recover the amount due thereon. The defendants excepted to nearly all the findings of fact, and to the conclusions of law, and appealed from the judgment rendered in plaintiff’s favor.

<p>APPEAL from the Circuit Court for 8t. Croix County.'</p>

APPEALS from the Circuit Court for Pierce County. The defendant appealed from j udgments of foreclosure. The case is stated in the opinion. 1. The affidavit of service is fatally defective in that it fails to show the time of such service. Pollcúrd v. Wegener, 13 Wis., 569; Knox v. Miller, 18 id., 397; Sayles v. Davis, 20 id., 302: Northrujp v. Shejphard, 23 id., 513; Grander v. Poseoranoe, 27 id., 4S8; Matteson v. Smith, 37 id., 333. 2.

The City of Oconomowoc and Silas M. Sherwood, marshal of said city, the defendants herein', appealed from a judgment by which they were perpetually restrained from removing a fence and storm door in front of a building belonging to plaintiff. The case is stated in the opinion. To the point that respondent was entitled to equitable relief, his counsel cited High on Inj., §§ 393, 395, 399; Dillon on M. 0., § 728; Trustees of Ev.

APPEAL fi’om the Circuit Court for Eau Claire County. The case is thus stated by Mr. Justice Taylor: “ The plaintiff recovered a judgment in the court below for the sum of §420.06, being three times §140.02, which the plaintiff claimed to have paid the defendant as usurious interest upon a loan of money theretofore made by the plaintiff from said defendant.