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493 S.W.2d 799

Mennis v. State

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas · decided 1973-05-01

Cited by 3 later decisions — most recently December 1973

3 state decisions

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

““The recitations in the instrument entitled ‘Order Revoking Probation’ are not sufficient that the instrument may also serve as the sentence in this case. It does not reflect that the appellant was present when the sentence was imposed, as required by Article 42.02, V.A.C.C.P. and see Garbs v. State, [supra].” (Emphasis added.)”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Casias v. State

““There appears no fixed or inflexible form to be used for the sentence. The one mandatory provision is that it ‘shall be pronounced in the presence of the defendant * * *.’ Art. 768, C.C.P. [Now Art. 42.03].””

quoted by 1 later decision, including Casias v. State

Relies on Clemons v. State · 155 Tex. Crim. 290 - Garbs v. State · Millman v. State

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1973-05-01

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1OPINION

DALLY, Commissioner.

¶2This is an appeal from an order revoking probation. The State has filed a motion moving the dismissal of this appeal. The appellant was convicted for the misdemeanor offense of driving and operating a motor vehicle on a public highway while intoxicated. The punishment assessed by the court was forty-five days confinement in the County Jail and a fine of $200.00. Probation was granted under the provisions of Article 42.13, Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P.

¶3On October 3, 1972, after a hearing on the State’s motion to revoke probation, an order revoking probation and a judgment were entered.

¶4The recitations in the instrument entitled “Order Revoking Probation” are not sufficient that the instrument may also serve as the sentence in this case. It does not reflect that the appellant was present when the sentence was imposed, as required by Article 42.02, V.A.C.C.P. and see Garbs v. State, 155 Tex.Cr.R. 290, 234 S.W.2d 869 (1950).

¶5In Botley v. State, 467 S.W.2d 267 (Tex.Cr.App.1971), this court pointed out that “It must be remembered that a “judgment” and “sentence” are not the same thing; the two are distinct and independent.” See also Clemons v. State, 414 S.W.2d 940 (Tex.Cr.App.1967) and Black v. State, 473 S.W.2d 469 (Tcx.Cr.App.1971).

¶6The appellant urges in his brief that there is a sufficient sentence and that it need not show that the appellant was present when it was imposed,1 because Article 42.14, V.A.C.C.P. provides that: “The judgment and sentence in a misdemeanor case may be rendered in the absence of the defendant.”

¶7In Millman v. State, 487 S.W.2d 750 (Tex.Cr.App.1972), this court recognized that there was a partial conflict between Articles 42.02 and 42.14, V.A.C.C.P. In construing these statutes it was held that a sentence in a misdemeanor case must be pronounced in the presence of the defendant where the maximum possible punishment could have been confinement in jail. *801The court further held that the provisions of Article 42.14 applied to misdemeanor cases where the maximum possible punishment was by fine only.

¶8For the reason that the sentence in this record is insufficient, the appeal will be dismissed. See Article 42.04, V.A.C. C.P. and Woods v. State, 473 S.W.2d 945 (Tex.Cr.App.1971). The State’s motion to dismiss this appeal will be granted.

¶9It is so ordered.

¶10Opinion approved by the Court.

¶11. The docket sheet in the record reflects the appellant was sentenced in abstentia.

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