¶1OPINION
¶2This is an appeal from a conviction for the offense of possession of heroin. The jury assessed punishment at twenty-five (25) years’ imprisonment.
¶3Christie Lou Faubian, Arnold Neal, Jr., and Ronald William Arnott, the appellant, were jointly charged as acting together in a three-count indictment for the possession of heroin, marihuana and narcotic paraphernalia. Only the charge for the possession of heroin was submitted to the jury. Christie Lou Faubian and Arnott, the appellant, were tried jointly.
¶4The main contentions of the appellant are that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction and that the court erred in admitting into evidence the narcotics and notebooks found as the result of a search under a warrant.
¶5*168The record reflects that on September 3, 1970, Miss Faubian, the co-defendant, using the name of Orbitt, made arrangements for the lease of the apartment where the contraband was later found. The next day, the appellant, also using the name of Orbitt, signed a lease for the apartment. Some twelve days later officers of the Austin Police Department went to the apartment where they arrested Neal, Miss Faubian and the appellant and made a search under a search warrant. Capsules of heroin were found on the table where the appellant was seated. Neal, who was apparently asleep, was in another room. The appellant and Miss Faubian had needle marks on their arms, some of which were red, indicating that they were fresh.
¶6The officers testified to finding a large amount of heroin, marihuana, other drugs and narcotic paraphernalia.
¶7It is shown by the testimony of the Department of Public Safety chemist who analyzed the material found in the apartment and submitted to him that State’s Exhibit No. 2 found on the table where the appellant and Miss Faubian were seated contained thirty-nine capsules or 1.61 grams of 20.5 percent heroin.
¶8State’s Exhibit No. 5 consisted of four balloons which contained a total of 3.69 grams of 20.5 percent heroin. These were found in a closet near where Arnold Neal was found asleep. This would amount to enough heroin to make over 86 capsules, and added with the heroin found at the table, the officers found enough for a total of over 125 capsules of 20.5 percent heroin in the apartment.
¶9In State’s Exhibits Nos. 7 and 23, traces of heroin were found in envelopes in the apartment. State’s Exhibit No. 14 contained fourteen capsules of lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD).
¶10A small foil package containing opiate was found. The chemist described the opiate as a sort of base for heroin.
¶11Some mescaline was also found in the apartment. Much of the contraband was found in a large duffle bag in a closet in the room where the appellant was arrested. Several other containers of contraband were in the bag. The notebooks in question were also found there.
¶12In what was described as a large army haversack, the officers found 844.87 grams of marihuana. Other marihuana found is set out below:
A paper bag in the duffle bag contained 329.98 grams.
Thirteen “lids” or small bags contained 277.92 grams.
Two smaller bags contained 91.40 grams.
Another container had 54 grams.
Two peanut cans found in another closet contained 59.72 grams.
The contents of eleven plastic baggies were 3,635 grams.
Two paper bags contained 665.30 grams.
An envelope contained 70 grams.
¶13The chemist testified that the average marihuana cigarette contained .2 of a gram. Based on his testimony, there was enough marihuana found to make more than 29,500 cigarettes.
¶14Also introduced as found in the duffle bag and its containers were apparently a large number of empty plastic capsules. These were described by an officer as being No. 5 capsules, the kind used for heroin and the same kind as found on the table in front of the appellant and Miss Faubian.
¶15One page of State’s Exhibit No. 16, a spiral notebook photocopied for the record, bears the date of August 27, 1970. It contains a column headed “Money out.” Some of the entries under this column are:
¶16“Sam - Ft. Hood 20.00
¶17Rooster 30.00
¶18Clyde 100.00
¶19Dave 380.00
¶20Apfe 495 49r09 [Pd]”
¶21Some of the entries under the other column, designated “Personal debts Money I owe,” are:
¶22Hemphills o o in LO
¶23Uncle Vans o o co i — I
¶24[Paid]
¶25Arnold
¶26*169The next page of Exhibit No. 16 under “money out” shows “Bill EarM-GRMS [pd]” and directly below that appears “Billy Earl $30.00” as well as other names and amounts.
¶27The next column under “Money I owe” includes: “Arnold 130.00.” Further in the spiral notebook, the following page is found:
¶29Then another page is as follows:
¶31Another page lists “P2P Methalene.”
¶32A following page lists:
¶33“Sales Cash Profits
¶34Aug. 26 2 Ids 40.00
¶35Aug. 28 60 Ids 600.00
¶36Aug. 29 7 Ids 70.00
¶37Aug. 30 7 grms Hsh 35.00
¶38Aug. 31 9 Ids 120.00
¶39Ids 50.00
¶40Total
¶41Sept. 1 3 Combined 635.00”
¶42State’s Exhibit 17 starts with August 29, 1970. Apparently dated September 3, the following notation is found: “find a house for rent.” (This is the date the co-defendant Miss Faubian negotiated for the lease, and the day before it was signed by appellant.)
¶43The entry under debts September 3, 1970, shows “Mark T.” apparently another name, and “HSH $50.00” and “55+4 cps.” It also shows a telephone number and “Mr. King.” (The record shows that Miss Fau-bian first negotiated the lease and put up the deposit on September 3 with Mr. King.)
¶44Another page is as follows:
¶46Deposit $50.00
¶471 yr 40.00
¶48Arnold 30.00
¶49“ 35.00
¶50N.S.C. 20.00
¶51A following page reflects the following entry: “I owe Arnold $80.00.”
¶52State’s Exhibit 18 contained bookkeeping entries similar to those in the other two exhibits.
¶53State’s Exhibits 21, 21A, 21B, 21C and 21D, which were found in the front bedroom near where Neal was found, were all introduced.
¶54The first of these exhibits was correspondence addressed to Arnold James Neal
¶55*170at 607 E Baylor in Austin. The next exhibit was a change of address card bearing the signature “Arnold Neal,” 607 E Baylor St. from 807 E 30 St., both in Austin. (This latter address was shown to have been the one where Miss Faubian had clothes and evidence was offered through her stepfather and that apartment owner in an effort to show she did not live at Baylor Street.)
¶56State’s Exhibit 21C, apparently from a larger spiral notebook, is a photocopy of a page appearing in the record and is as follows :
¶58The second page is as follows:
¶62Rick $5
¶63Mark $2
¶64Ron $105
¶65“ 9/8/70
¶661. 4 G $160
¶672. $140 My Money 9/8/70
¶683. first G 23 pills $115 = $75 profit
¶694. 3 G at $50 = $30 profit
¶705. second G 20 pills = $100 = $60 profit
¶716. third G 21 pill $105 = $65
¶727. four G 20 pill $100 60
¶73Ron = $30 for rug $75
¶74$25 for speed $30 paying the $30 dollar for Tom
¶75$15 for food $105
¶76$40 $15 dollars payment on 3 pills that were lost
¶77$10 for G $15 for three pills 9/11/70
¶78$50 total $135
¶79$25 worth of pill 2 pills $10 9/11/70
¶80$75 2 pills $10 9/11/70”
¶81The exhibits in the 21 series were admitted without objection. The name Ron appears also in the 21 series of exhibits. (The. appellant’s first name is Ronald.)
¶82One of the officers testified that the term “hash” or HSH referred to hashish and that the term “lid” meant a one-ounce package of marihuana, and that “G” referred to a gram of either heroin or marihuana.
¶83The evidence shows all three of of the coindictees were acting together as principals and is sufficient to support the conviction of the appellant.
¶84Admissibility of Notebooks
¶85The appellant contends that the admission of the notebooks, State’s Exhibits 16, 17 and 18, was reversible error.
¶86The case was tried on the theory of principals. The three were indicted as principals. It is not necessary for those acting together as principals to be indicted as such before evidence of acts and conversations *171of each participant be admissible as to conspirators. Phelps v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 462 S.W.2d 310; Parnell v. State, 170 Tex.Cr.R. 30, 339 S.W.2d 49 (1959). The theory of principals necessarily involves conspiracy and in most cases such is shown by circumstantial evidence. Each statement or act of a co-conspirator up until the time the object of the conspiracy is completed is admissible. Phelps v. State, supra.
¶87Even if the entries in the notebook were made by Neal, Faubian, the appellant, or someone else connected with the offense, they would be admissible as an act of the conspiracy. The fact that Neal had been tried and convicted does not prevent his part in the crime from being- admissible. See Parnell v. State, supra. Acts and declarations of one co-conspirator during the furtherance of the conspiracy are admissible against other conspirators whether or not the act or declaration occurred out of the presence of and hearing of the conspirator on trial. See Phelps v. State, supra, and Saddler v. State, 167 Tex.Cr.R. 309, 320 S.W.2d 146.
¶88In the Parnell case, supra, the defendant was indicted in one count as a conspirator and in another count for embezzlement. The State dismissed the conspiracy count. Parnell argued that this was tantamount to a finding of not guilty as to his being a conspirator. The Court wrote:
“Assuming that appellant' stood acquitted of the substantive crime of conspiracy, this did not deprive the State and the jury of the evidence tending to establish the conspiracy, including the acts and declarations of his coconspirators, in considering the charge of embezzlement in pursuance of the common design or conspiracy. Richards v. State, 53 Tex. Cr.R. 400, 110 S.W. 432; Holt v. State, 39 Tex.Cr.R. 282, 45 S.W. 1016, 46 S.W. 829; and 9 Tex.Jur., § 14, p. 392 and 393,
¶89In the case of Phelps v. State, supra, the conviction was for robbery. The State was allowed to prove, even though the robbery was completed, that the purpose of the robbery was to get funds to buy arms at the Cuban Embassy in Canada. There the Court cited 23 Tex.Jur.2d, Evidence— Criminal Cases, Section 128, page 186:
“Although the existence of a motive is not essential to a conviction, nevertheless the presence or absence of a motive for a crime is obviously a factor that is related to the question of the defendant’s guilt or innocence. Consequently, proof of any existing motive for the offense is generally held admissible, . . . ”
¶90The Court also cited 23 Tex.Jur.2d, Section 199, page 309, which reads:
“Evidence of the commission of other crimes by the accused is admissible to show a possible motive for his commission of the crime with which he is charged.”
¶91The Court held that a handwritten list of weapons titled “Alex List,” which was found in the accused’s purse when she was arrested, was admissible to show motive. The list included:
¶92“1. M-l Carbines — 5 With banana clips and extra clips
¶93“2. Sub-Machine guns — 3
¶94“3. 50-calibre “ —1
¶95(( …
¶96“10. Grenades — 50”
¶97Even though this list could be construed as showing possible extraneous crimes, it was held admissible to show motive.
¶98The notes in the present case showed the motive or purpose for which the narcotics were kept. See Gonzales v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 410 S.W.2d 435; Collier v. State, 167 Tex.Cr.R. 534, 321 S.W.2d 584, and Hemmeline v. State, 165 Tex.Cr.R. 583, 310 S.W.2d 97. Cf. Greer v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 474 S.W.2d 203.
¶99Recently, in Phenix v. State, Tex.Cr. App., 488 S.W.2d 759, the accused was ar*172rested in his garage apartment and a handwritten note was found on a desk. It read: “A. P. Fri.
“More on the way. I still owe you four lids worth. I’ll check with Dan on the ISO tomorrow. C.P.”
¶100The accused’s full name was Robert Alan Phenix. The note was offered as res gestae of the offense. The Court wrote:
“A written extrajudicial utterance may be admissible in evidence to prove the truth of the assertions made; that is, for its testimonial value, if one of the many exceptions to the hearsay rule is satisfied, 5 Wigmore, Evidence § 1420, et seq. (3rd ed. 1940); McCormick, supra, at 480-625, or it may be admissible in evidence without regard to the truth of the assertions made; that is, for its non-testimonial value, as a circumstance, provided it is legally relevant. Haynes v. State, 475 S.W.2d 739 (Tex.Cr.App.1971); 6 Wigmore, supra, § 1788-1792. The latter use of the extrajudicial written utterance to which the hearsay rule does not apply has sometimes not been fully articulated and has been said to be part of the res gestae.
“The note was not offered or received in evidence for its testimonial value; that is, for the truth of the assertions made. The note was not admitted to show ‘more on the way,’ that ‘C.P.’ ‘owed’ ‘A.P.’ ‘four lids worth’ or that ‘C.P.’ was going to ‘check with Dan on the 150 tomorrow.’ ”
¶101See also Jones v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 472 S.W.2d 529.
¶102In the case of Catching v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 364 S.W.2d 691, the conviction was for abortion. A confession which showed that the accused committed other abortions was admitted over the objection that it included offenses other than that for which he was on trial. The Court held evidence of the other offenses was admissible under Housman v. State, 155 Tex.Cr.R. 49, 230 S.W.2d 541, another abortion case. In Housman, the Court wrote concerning other transactions:
“If such transactions disclosed, by inference or otherwise, that appellant was engaged in the commission of other acts of abortion, it was nevertheless admissible as a part of the res gestae.
⅜ ⅛ ⅝ ⅝ # *
“If the State’s proof of the home of appellant and the furniture, instruments, and equipment therein and the facts showing the use of such home and contents on the witness for the purpose of aborting her for pay show that appellant was a professional abortionist or that her home contained a room equipped as an abortion operating room, such result does not change the rule as to the admissibility of such evidence as a part of the res gestae.
“Nor did the evidence become inadmissible because appellant did not testify or otherwise controvert the testimony as to her acts and intent.”
¶103Article 38.22, Section 1(f), Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P., provides, in part:
“Nothing contained herein shall preclude the admissibility … of any statement that is res gestae of the arrest or of the offense.”
¶104While the meaning of this provision is not exactly clear, the Legislature apparently intended to keep in effect the previous decisions of this Court concerning the res gestae of the arrest or of the offense.
¶105In Yaffar v. State, 171 Tex.Cr.R. 341, 349 S.W.2d 730, a driving while intoxicated case, this Court held that testimony of the officers about finding a pistol in the car was admissible as res gestae.
¶106Barbiturates and a pistol found in an automobile in which an accused had been riding just before being arrested for possessing marihuana were held to be a part of the res gestae in Beeler v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 374 S.W.2d 237.
¶107*173In Vavra v. State, 171 Tex.Cr.R. 24, 343 S.W.2d 709, 712, the following is written:
“ … Acts done, statements and appearances of the participants, and other similar circumstances are all admissible as part of the res gestae when a witness narrates the events surrounding an offense.”
¶108In Denny v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 473 S.W.2d 503, (reversed on other grounds on motion for rehearing), this Court held:
“While the testimony in the present case about the appearance of the three co-defendants at the time of their arrests when they possessed marihuana added nothing toward proving their guilt or innocence, it was admissible as a part of the res gestae of the offense and arrest.”
¶109In Flores v. State, 89 Tex.Cr.R. 506, 231 S.W. 786 (1921), the conviction was for murder. The accused and others in jail killed a jailer. A short piece of iron wrapped in wire and covered by a rag was found behind a radiator in the jail. This was admitted over the objection that the weapon was not shown to have any connection with the homicide, and that the defendant was not shown to have any knowledge of the same, and therefore, could not be bound by the existence or finding of such object. Judge Lattimore, speaking for the Court, held the evidence admissible and wrote:
“It was a part of the res gestae of the transaction. We are also of [the] opinion that, when parties are charged with acting together in the commission of a crime, evidences of preparation of, or weapons found on, anyone of them, whether before, during, or so soon after the commission of the offense as to shed any fair light on the act or intent of such alleged participants, would be admissible against each or all of them.”
¶110We hold the court did not err in admitting the notebooks as a part of the res ges-tae of the transaction and arrest.
¶111Even if it could be assumed that the admission of the notebooks complained of was error, such would be harmless error. The officers found such a large amount of heroin, marihuana and other drugs in the apartment plus all of the other circumstances surrounding the arrest so that the jury could only logically conclude that these drugs were in part possessed for sale. See Phenix v. State, supra, and the cases there cited.
¶112In addition to the above, the State offered the exhibits, designated as the 21 series, and the appellant’s counsel stated he had no objection. In these exhibits found near Neal, the name of “Ron” was found in connection with narcotics. The jury, no doubt, got substantially the same impression from these exhibits as it did from those exhibits complained of.
¶113Next, the appellant complains that the court erred in admitting the notebooks heretofore discussed because the request for the search warrant was to search for such personal property described in the affidavit and that such personal property mentioned was “Heroin and Marijuana” and that the search should not have been broader than the property set out in the affidavit. As noted earlier, this Court no longer holds inadmissible “mere” evidence obtained as a result of a search warrant. In Haynes v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 475 S.W.2d 739, this Court held that an officer could testify that an envelope addressed to Haynes found in a box in which the marihuana was found was admissible. The Court also noted that the “mere evidence” rule was no longer followed by this Court.
¶114The Court, in Haynes, noted that the envelope was the connecting link between the accused and the narcotic drug.
¶115In the present case the notebooks showed a connecting link between the appellant and Arnold Neal as well as their connection with the apartment and the drugs. The notes are admissible on the theory of conspiracy or principals as well as a part *174of the circumstance of the transaction and arrest.
¶116The officers in the present case were on the premises with a search warrant and found the notebooks within the duffle bag that contained much marihuana and other contraband. They had a right to take the bag and its contents.
¶117Complaint is also made that the search was illegal because the affidavit for the search warrant does not contain a recitation that the affiants believed that the heroin and marihuana were possessed in violation of Article 725b, Section 16, Vernon’s Ann.P.C.
¶118There is no way that either of the co-in-dictees could have lawfully possessed heroin. We hold again as we did in Faubian v. State, supra, that no such recitation in the affidavit is required.
¶119Without setting out the affidavit for the search warrant, it has been reviewed and states sufficient facts for probable cause.
¶120The appellant’s contention of jury misconduct about the discussion concerning the length of time that one might have to serve under certain sentences does not present reversible error.
¶121No reversible error appears in the record. The judgment is affirmed.
¶122. Neal was tried earlier. His ease is not before us.
¶123OPINION
¶124ON APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
¶125On original submission in this case, the majority affirmed on the basis that this was a conspiracy. A conspiracy was not pled, proven, or briefed in this case. It is axiomatic that before such exhibits could be admissible there must be proof that the act or declaration is, in fact, the work of a co-conspirator. 2 Branch’s Ann.P.C., Sec. 721-722.
¶126That opinion primarily relied upon three cases to support its conspiracy theory. We have examined these cases and find the following:
¶127In Phelps v. State, 462 S.W.2d 310 (Tex.Cr.App.1970), the evidence clearly showed a conspiracy. It was proven that the accused there conspired with others to obtain funds to purchase weapons through the Cuban Embassy in Canada. There was proof that the defendant discussed the robbery with others and planned it; the purpose of the robbery was clearly established, i. e., to buy guns in Canada. The robbery was rehearsed in a house owned by the defendant. In summary, such acts and declarations were obviously the product of a co-conspirator.
¶128In the case of Parnell v. State, 170 Tex.Cr.R. 30, 339 S.W.2d 49 (1959), the offense charged was embezzlement. Again, there was evidence showing a conspiracy by the promoters of a certain stock. In addition, the jury was charged on the law of conspiracy, as well as on the law of principals.
¶129In the third case relied upon, Saddler v. State, 167 Tex.Cr.R. 309, 320 S.W.2d 146 (1959), the evidence clearly showed accused and another person acting together, in the unlawful sale of marihuana, and there was accomplice witness testimony to this effect.
¶130The conclusion reached in the original opinion is a unique one — that on appeal, and it being mentioned for the very first time, a theory of conspiracy may be developed, not by the prosecuting authorities, but by this Court, and a decision affirmed on that basis. In the cases cited, the evidence of the conspiracy is unquestioned. In the instant case, it is highly doubtful that we should even reach that question since there is not even an affirmative link shown between the “declarations” in the notebooks and the appellant. The fact re*175mains that these exhibits were never authenticated as the product of a co-conspirator. Surely, this Court cannot infer that essential element. But that is what occurred on original submission.
¶131In order to answer other arguments upon which the original opinion relied, the following facts are necessary.
¶132The evidence reflects that on September 16, 1970, four officers of the Austin Police Department executed a search warrant at a house located in the City of Austin. Three of the officers entered the house together, while one of the officers remained outside until called by one of the officers who entered. The officers entered into a living-room and passed through it to the front bedroom. In the front bedroom they saw a man, later identified as Arnold Neal, asleep on a couch. One of the officers remained in the front room while the two other officers proceeded to the back bedroom. In the back bedroom, the officers found appellant and a woman, Faubian,
¶133Appellant raised eighteen grounds of error in his brief. In his second through eleventh grounds of error, he complained of the admission into evidence of the notebooks which were found in the closet adjacent to the bedroom where appellant and Faubian were seated.
¶134The record reflects that the three notebooks in question were of the small spiral-binder type. They appear to be a record of personal expenditures by and money owing to the person to whom the books belong. Many of the entries are of a personal nature, such as “groceries $35.00.” Others consist of a large number of given names, without surnames, followed by amounts of money, such as “Rooster $30.-00.” In addition, there are a number of entries which appear to be in the nature of an inventory. For example, at several places in the books the heading “Assets” appears, followed by notations such as “Lds,” “Gms Hsh,” “Hsh,” each of which is followed by an amount and an entry designated “cash value.” One page bears the designation “Sales” and consists of a list of dates, each followed by a designation such as “7 gms Hsh” and an amount of money. The column of money is designated “Cash Profits.” At several places in the books the headings or notations “Plds Sold,” “Lds Sold,” “Pills Sold,” “One G,” “Pills Left” etc., appear. One of the officers testified that the term “hash” referred to hashish, and that the term “lid” meant a one ounce package of marihuana, and that the term “G” referred to a gram of either heroin or marihuana. Appellant’s name does not appear in the books, although the name “Ron” appears in several places, usually under the heading “Assets.” Also, the name Arnold appears in several places such as in notations “Arnold’s Money” and “I owe Arnold $80.00.”
¶135The papers which were found in the front bedroom included a University of Texas at Austin registration card, a business reply card addressed to a clothing firm, and a United States Post Office change of address card, all of which bore the name Arnold Neal (the man who was found asleep in the front bedroom) and the address of the house where the items were found. The notations on the papers were similar to those which were found in the notebooks.
¶136*176Appellant objected to the admission of the notebooks on several grounds, but did not object to the admission of the papers found in the front bedroom, apparently because the items found with the papers connected them with Neal. This was part of appellant’s defensive theory, i. e., that the narcotics belonged to Neal.
¶137Appellant contended that the papers were inadmissible for several reasons, including that (1) they were not shown to have been written by him or that they belonged to him, (2) that they were irrelevant in a prosecution for unlawful possession of narcotics, (3) that they were unduly prejudicial as tending to show sale of narcotics, an extraneous offense, (4) that they were hearsay and did not fall within an exception to the hearsay rule, (5) that the notebooks were not part of the “res gestae,” (6) that the content of the notebooks was not sufficiently identified and therefore the jury was allowed to speculate as to the meaning of the entries.
¶138The record reflects that the court admitted the evidence “on the theory that they are part of the res gestae, and on the theory of co-principals charged in this case, as to guilt or innocence . . . . ”
¶139The notebooks were improperly admitted. In light of the court’s statement, and in the face of appellant’s objection on the ground (among others) that the notebooks were hearsay, the notebooks were not admitted for the truth of the matter asserted therein, and therefore were not hearsay. Unless an out of court statement is offered for the truth of assertion contained therein, it is not hearsay. E.g., McCormick & Ray, Texas Law of Evidence, § 781; Brown v. State, 74 Tex.Cr.R. 356, 169 S.W. 437 (1913). However, an extra-judicial statement or writing may be admitted as circumstantial evidence from which an inference may be drawn, and not for the truth of the matter stated therein, without violating the hearsay rule. McCormick & Ray, supra, § 796. See Haynes v. State, 475 S.W.2d 739 (Tex.Cr.App.1972) ; Windham v. State, 169 Tex.Cr.R. 448, 335 S.W.2d 221 (1960). Therefore, assuming that the notebooks were so offered in the present case, the question which must be answered is “What was the inference to be drawn from the admission of the notebooks as circumstantial evidence?” It is obvious that the only inference to be drawn was that some person was dealing in narcotics and that the person was appellant. While it is possible that in order for such inference to be drawn it is necessary to consider the truth of the matters contained in the notebooks, we will assume, for the purpose of decision, that such inference can be drawn by considering the notebooks as circumstantial evidence only. We are therefore brought to the question of whether such an inference is relevant in a prosecution for possession of heroin and, if so, whether such evidence should be admitted or excluded as a matter of policy.
¶140In a prosecution for possession of heroin, evidence that the accused has sold narcotics is evidence of an extraneous offense. While the general rule is that extraneous offenses are inadmissible as evidence of guilt, there are certain exceptions to the general rule, such as the exception that admits evidence of extraneous offenses to show knowledge. McCormick & Ray, supra, § 1521.
¶141Knowledge (or criminal intent) is an essential element of the crime of possession of a narcotic drug. E.g., Ramos v. State, 478 S.W.2d 102 (Tex.Cr.App. 1972); Fawcett v. State, 137 Tex.Cr.R. 14, 127 S.W.2d 905 (1939). Therefore, evidence which tends to show knowledge is a relevant part of the State’s case in chief. Evidence that the accused has, in the past, sold the narcotic of which he is now alleged to have possession is of probative value in establishing knowledge. People v. MacArthur, 126 Cal.App.2d 232, 271 P.2d 914 (1954); Overton v. State, 78 Nev. 198, 370 P.2d 677 (1962). See generally, Gonzales v. State, 410 S.W.2d 435 (Tex.Cr.App.1966) *177App.1966) cert. denied 387 U.S. 925, 87 S.Ct. 2044, 18 L.Ed.2d 982. That such evidence shows another crime is not objectionable. Evidence which tends to prove any material fact in connection with the offense is admissible despite the fact that it also shows the commission of other offenses. McCormick & Ray, supra, § 1521; Gonzales v. State, 410 S.W.2d 435 (Tex.Cr.App. 1966).
¶142In light of the danger of prejudice arising from the use of evidence of the sale of narcotics, we would add one restriction on the use of such evidence in possession cases. That is, such evidence should not he introduced as part of the State’s case in chief unless the case is based upon circumstantial evidence. Of course, in the technical sense, knowledge (or criminal intent), being an intangible, can only be proved by circumstantial evidence. By circumstantial evidence, however, we mean evidence from which knowledge cannot readily be inferred. For example, where the evidence shows that the accused was in the process of injecting a narcotic, or preparing it in a manner peculiar to that particular drug, then evidence of prior sales, while still relevant on the issue of knowledge, is not needed in order to prove the State’s case, and, in light of that fact, should not be admitted because the value of such evidence is then outweighed by its tendency to prejudice the jury.
¶143Of course, the State should not be limited in its ability to offer evidence in rebuttal, as where the accused admits possession, but denied that he knew the substance was a narcotic. See People v. Howard, 150 Cal.App.2d 428, 310 P.2d 120 (1957).
¶144That being the case, evidence of a prior sale by appellant would have been admissible to show knowledge. However, we are faced with the problem of determining whether the notebooks were competent evidence of a prior sale by appellant.
¶145If the notebooks were offered for the truth of the matters stated therein, they are inadmissible as hearsay, unless they fall within an exception to the hearsay rule. If offered against appellant, in order to be admissible, proof of execution by him must first be shown. Tipton v. State, 125 Tex.Cr.R. 658, 69 S.W.2d 1111 (1934). In this case, no evidence was offered as to the execution of the notebooks.
¶146Likewise, even if offered as circumstantial evidence only, some connection to appellant must be shown. Here, it was shown that appellant had executed a lease of the premises prior to the date in question, and that he was arrested in reasonably close proximity to the notebooks. In order to connect appellant to the notebooks, it is necessary to infer that he controlled or occupied the premises and, from that inference, to infer that the items in the closet were his. This connection is too remote, in light of the potential for undue prejudice contained in the evidence. Unlike the papers in the front bedroom, no link between the notebooks and another person was found. This case is therefore easily distinguishable from our recent holding in Phenix v. State, 488 S.W.2d 759 (Tex.Cr.App.1972). in Phenix, the accused was arrested in his garage apartment and a handwritten note was found on a desk. The note read:
“A. P. Fri.
“More on the way. I still owe you four lids worth. ‘Ill check with Dan on the 150 tomorrow.
C.P.”
¶147Defendant’s full name was Robert Alan Phenix. Thus, an affirmative ownership link was established. This Court held that any error in admitting the note was harmless, in that there was an abundance of other evidence before the jury which suggested that Phenix was dealing in marihuana.
¶148*178The State contended that the notebooks were admissible as part of the res gestae of the arrest. We disagree. It is true that evidence of tangible objects found during the course of a search is often admitted as “res gestae” as is evidence of various, seemingly irrelevant details of a transaction. This is permitted, even though the relevance of the evidence may not be readily apparent, because the law recognizes that transactions do not occur in a vacuum. By being informed of all the circumstances surrounding a particular transaction, the trier of fact is enabled to put the witness’s testimony in its proper perspective, and to form a basis for judging the credibility of the witness. Some transactions are such that the “bare bones” of the occurrence might seem quite plausible, but when related in context seem very unlikely to have actually occurred (or vice versa). Therefore, such evidence is usually admitted even though its relevance is not shown, or, even if irrelevant, unless it is unduly prejudicial. McCormick & Ray, supra, § 911. In this case, the notebooks not being admissible as evidence of a prior sale, if admissible at all, must be “res ges-tae.” However, due to their prejudicial. nature, it cannot be said that their admission would be harmless.
¶149Appellant’s motion for rehearing is granted, and the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.
¶150. See Faubian v. State, 480 S.W.2d 194 (Tex.Cr.App.1972).