Replevin, brought by J. H. Sleeper & Go. against J. D. Osgood, for goods, wares, and merchandise, taken by said defendant, at Warren, in the county of Grafton, on the 26th day of July, 1870. The writ was made returnable to, and was entered at this term in said county of Belknap. The defendant plead in abatement “ that this court ought not to take further cognizance of the action aforesaid, because he says that the supposed cause of action, if any the plaintiffs have, accrued to the said plaintiffs out of the jurisdiction of this court, that is to say, at Warren, in the county of Grafton, within the jurisdiction of the supreme judicial court for the western judicial district of said county of Grafton, and not at Gilford, in the county of Belknap, or elsewhere within the jurisdiction of this court. And this he is ready to verify. Wherefore he prays judgment whether this court can or will take further cognizance of the action aforesaid.”

To this plea there was a demurrer, and joinder in demurrer. The court,pro forma', overruled the demurrer, and sustained the plea in abatement, and plaintiffs excepted.

The questions of law were reserved.

It may be conceded that at common law replevin must be brought in the county where the taking was, but in this State the question is regulated by statute. Replevin is a personal action. Whether it is a local action is left undecided in Olaggett v. Richards, 45 N. H. 364. ByR. S., ch. 180, sec. 1 (C. S. ch. 191, sec. 1), “all personal or transitory actions, where both parties are inhabitants of this State, may be commenced in the county where either of the parties to the writ may be an inhabitant, and not elsewhere.” It is difficult to see how there could be any doubt that under this section replevin in a county in which neither party resided would be prohibited. By G-. S., ch. 201, sec. 1, “ transitory actions, in which both parties are inhabitants of the State, may be brought in the county of which either party is an inhabitant, and not elsewhere.” This is only a revision of the section first cited. We do not find “ in the revision such a change of the language as to indicate a clear intention to change the law.” The alteration was made simply “ to render the provisions more concise.” See Jewell v. JSolderness, 41 N. H. 163. See, also, G-. S., ch. 273, sec. 13.

…

Citation profile

How this case has been treated — in progress