¶1concurring.
¶2While I concur with the result reached by the majority, I feel compelled to once again express my deep regret that the majority of this Court is content to blindly accept the death-qualification process. The prosecution-proneness of death qualified jurors has been firmly established by a number of reliable studies. See Commonwealth v. Maxwell, 505 Pa. 152, 170, 477 A.2d 1309, 1331, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 971, 105 S.Ct. 370, 83 L.Ed.2d 306 (1984) (Nix, C.J., dissenting). As I stated in Maxwell, supra:
In the intervening fifteen years, the Witherspoon Court’s understandable hesitancy has generated numerous studies of increasing reliability and precision in support of the dual hypothesis that death qualified juries are both prosecution-prone and unrepresentative. These studies now demonstrate convincingly that persons favoring the death penalty are significantly more likely to vote for conviction in capital cases and that persons excluded from jury service on the basis of their unwillingness to impose the death penalty represent a distinct and sizeable group in the community. Thus it would appear that Witherspoon no longer presents a valid obstacle to the challenge raised herein.
Id., 505 Pa. at 171-72, 477 A.2d at 1319.
¶3See also Commonwealth v. Simon, 509 Pa. 548, 506 A.2d 392 (1986) (Nix, C.J., dissenting); Commonwealth v. Morales, 508 Pa. 51, 73, 494 A.2d 367, 379 (1985) (Nix, C.J., dissenting); Commonwealth v. Colson, 507 Pa. 440, 470, 490 A.2d 811, 826 (1985) (Nix, C.J., dissenting); Commonwealth v. Szuchon, 506 Pa. 228, 260, 484 A.2d 1365, 1382 (1984) (Nix, C.J., dissenting).
¶4Since this Court is apparently content to accept Wither-spoon at face value and since the majority of the United States Supreme Court has concluded that the Witherspoon approach is compatible with federal constitutional standards, see Lockhart v. McCree, — U.S. —, 106 S.Ct. 1758, 90 L.Ed.2d 137 (1986), I have no alternative but to defer to this approach.
¶5*331I am also concerned with the majority’s suggestion that an issue in a death penalty case can be waived. Recognizing the irrevocable nature of the death penalty, this Court has, in the past, firmly adhered to the rule that there can be no waiver in these cases. See Commonwealth v. Pirela, 510 Pa. 43, 507 A.2d 23 (1986); Commonwealth v. Pursell, 508 Pa. 212, 495 A.2d 183 (1985); Commonwealth v. Stoyko, 504 Pa. 455, 475 A.2d 714, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 963, 105 S.Ct. 361, 88 L.Ed.2d 297 (1984); Commonwealth v. Frey, 504 Pa. 428, 475 A.2d 700, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 963, 105 S.Ct. 360, 83 L.Ed.2d 296 (1984); Commonwealth v. Zettlemoyer, 500 Pa. 16, 454 A.2d 937 (1982); rehearing denied, 463 U.S. 1236, 104 S.Ct. 31, 77 L.Ed.2d 1452 (1983); Commonwealth v. McKenna, 476 Pa. 428, 383 A.2d 174 (1978). In this instance, however, the record reflects that the challenge to the exclusion was without merit.