¶1(dissenting).
¶2The majority say this plea of guilty which resulted in the punishment of ten years cannot stand because the court admonished the appellant that the punishment which he might receive was not less than two nor more than 20 years, when under the law at the time of the entry of the plea the punishment for which he was eligible was not less than two nor more than life.
¶3It would appear that this question has divided this Court before. See Valdez v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 479 S.W.2d 927; Jorden v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 500 S.W.2d 117, and Cameron v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 508 S.W.2d 618.
¶4Surely if an accused would voluntarily plead guilty thinking his punishment might *523be life (which is the admonishment the majority say should have been given), then his plea based upon the assumption that his punishment could be no higher than 20 years would likewise be voluntarily made.
¶5Logic dictates that the Legislature by the enactment of Art. 26.13, V.A.C.C.P., required that an accused be admonished of the consequences of his plea of guilty to avoid a situation where an accused thought his possible punishment could be a certain number of years and then (after he had entered his plea of guilty) learn that he had been assessed a greater punishment. Such a situation did not arise in the case at bar.
¶6We should adopt the holding in the cases cited above and hold that this appellant was not misled to his prejudice and that the error of the court in his admonishment was a harmless error.
¶7I dissent to the reversal of this plea of guilty.