United States v. Freeman

¶4OPINION

¶5KOELSCH, Circuit Judge:

¶6Linda Jean Freeman appeals from the judgment convicting her of “bail jumping” (18 U.S.C. § 3150) following a court trial. That charge was based upon her failure to appear in the district court on May 20, 1974 — the time fixed for sentencing her on a narcotics conviction.

¶7Freeman was represented by the same attorney in both the narcotics and bail jumping proceedings; her assignments all center on the government’s calling of her attorney at the latter trial to give evidence on the issue of notice, i. e., whether Freeman knew she had been ordered to appear for sentencing on the 20th of May.

¶8The district court did not err in requiring counsel to testify. The evidence sought to be elicited from him was not of a confidential nature and hence was not protected by the attorney-client privilege. It simply related to whether he had advised his client of the court’s order to appear. We think the Second Circuit aptly appraised the matter when it said:

“The relaying of this message is not in the nature of a confidential communication. [Citations omitted.] Defense counsel served merely as a conduit for transmission of a message. … Defendant’s counsel had a duty to relay the instructions to his client in his capacity as an officer of the court, and this in no way was inconsistent with his obligation to his client.”

¶9United States v. Hall, 346 F.2d 875, 882 (2d Cir. 1965); see also United States v. Woodruff, 383 F.Supp. 696, 698 (E.D.Pa. 1974).

¶10Nor are we persuaded of error by appellant’s due process and effective assistance of counsel contentions. Merely requiring a defendant’s lawyer to testify does not alone constitute a material interference with his function as an advocate or operate to deprive the accused of a fair trial. Cohen v. United States, 297 F.2d 760, 763 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 865, 82 S.Ct. 1029, 8 L.Ed.2d 84 (1962); Hall, supra, at 882-883. Here the matter was treated with considerable circumspection. The government first proposed that the fact sought to be prov*69en be stipulated; when defense counsel rejected that method, the court appointed an associate counsel pro tempore, who stated objections to the several questions put the witness and enabled the latter to devote his attention to his temporary testimonial role.

¶11However, we do agree with appellant that the testimony elicited by the government from her counsel was inadmissible hearsay. Counsel was not asked whether he had advised appellant of the order that she appear on May 20th; instead, he was asked whether, on that date, he had stated to the court that he had done so. An affirmative response to the former question, insofar as it constituted evidence of utterances and writings offered to show the effect on the hearer or reader, would not have been subject to attack as hearsay. See, e. g., McCormick, Evidence § 249 (2d ed. 1972). But an affirmative response, to the latter inquiry — the response here given — was clearly evidence of out-of-court statements offered to prove the truth of the matters asserted therein.1

¶12*70While an attorney’s considered, across-the-bench representations to the court are presumably trustworthy, such statements are made neither under oath nor subject to cross-examination. Moreover, those here were uttered under circumstances in which counsel’s own interests were arguably in conflict with the interests of his absent client. Faced with the court’s inquiry, counsel would presumably perceive some compulsion to respond in order to demonstrate that he had fulfilled his duty, as an officer of the court, to communicate the appearance order to his client. In addition, counsel would be aware that his answer might be compelled by the court’s contempt power.

¶13True enough, unequivocal admissions by an attorney, clearly acting within the scope of his authority, may indeed be binding on his client. See, e. g., Glick v. White Motor Company, 458 F.2d 1287, 1291 (3d Cir. 1972); United States v. Dolleris, 408 F.2d 918, 921 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied 395 U.S. 943, 89 S.Ct. 2014, 23 L.Ed.2d 461 (1969); Rhoades, Inc. v. United Air Lines, Inc., 340 F.2d. 481, 484 (3d Cir. 1965); State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Porter, 186 F.2d 834, 841, 52 A.L.R.2d 499 (9th Cir. 1950); Mangual v. Prudential Lines, Inc., 53 F.R.D. 301, 302 (E.D.Pa.1971). And such admissions may be received in evidence, even if they are hearsay, under the admissions exception to the hearsay rule.

¶14But here, where counsel made the statements under some degree of compulsion and outside the presence of his client — who was, under the circumstances, a putative defendant — and where the information sought was in essence an element of a potential criminal charge, we think counsel’s statements are not binding on his client as adopted or judicial admissions in the ensuing criminal prosecution. See generally 4 Wigmore, Evidence §§ 1063, 1078 (Chadbourn rev. 1972); McCormick, Evidence § 267 (2d ed. 1972). Were we to hold otherwise in the absence of evidence of appellant’s express authorization to her counsel to make the representations, we might well be ratifying a violation of her privilege against self-incrimination or other substantial rights. Compare Himmelfarb v. United States, 175 F.2d 924, 931 (9th Cir. 1949), cert. denied 338 U.S. 860, 70 S.Ct. 103, 94 L.Ed. 527 (1949), with United States v. Adams, 422 F.2d 515, 518 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied 399 U.S. 913, 90 S.Ct. 2213, 26 L.Ed.2d 569 (1970).2

¶15Reversed and remanded.