¶1with whom CLIFFORD, Justice, joins, dissenting.
¶2I respectfully dissent. I am persuaded that the Superior Court abused its discretion in denying plaintiff’s motion for enlargement of time. I would vacate the order.
¶3The unchallenged facts presented in support of plaintiff’s motion are set forth in affidavits submitted by plaintiff’s counsel and his secretary. The relevant part of the attorney’s affidavit reads as follows:
On June 10, 1986, this Court directed a verdict in favor of the Defendant and my client instructed me to file an appeal.
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On July 3, 1986 at noon, I left for a planned vacation to last until July 21, 1986. I left work with my secretary to complete in my absence including a Notice of Appeal in the Lane v. Williams case prior to July 10, 1986.
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Upon returning from vacation on July 21, 1986,1 learned that my secretary had not filed the Notice of Appeal prior to July 10, 1986 because she left abruptly on the 7th day of July and did not return to the office until the 14th day of July, four *709days after the Notice was due. (emphasis added)
¶4The secretary’s affidavit contains the following relevant information:
On July 3, 1986, Joseph M. Jabar left for a vacation to return on July 21, 1986. He left me mth work to do including the filing of a Notice of Appeal in the case of Lane v. Williams by July 10, 1986.
I planned on preparing the Notice of Appeal during the first part of the week of July 7, 1986.
Before I got to the preparation of the Notice of Appeal, I received a frantic call from my eight year old daughter ... that my grandmother ... who was babysitting her, had collapsed. I immediately left my desk to rush to my grandmother’s for help. She was pronounced dead at her home.
This unexpected tragedy had a profound effect on me and my eight year old daughter who was with her when she died.
I was very close to my grandmother because my mother was her only child and she had been my daughter’s babysitter for eight years.
During the week of July 7, 1986,1 never returned to the office nor did I inform Joseph M. Jabar or any other attorney or secretary in the office that the appeal that was due on the 10th had not been filed. ...
I only worked for three days during the week of July 14, 1986 due to my need to be home to help my mother and daughter.
When Joseph M. Jabar returned from vacation on July 21, 1986, he was informed that the Notice of Appeal had not been filed prior to July 10th. (emphasis added)
¶5On these facts the Superior Court denied plaintiffs motion without explanation. It is my judgment that these facts constitute an extraordinary circumstance. If M.R.Civ.P. 73(a) is to retain any meaning or significance, a finding of excusable neglect must be made in this case. First of all, it should be recognized that a major portion of an attorney’s work is accomplished by dictation and instruction to his secretary. Such a procedure is hardly a deviation from accepted practice. Any reliable office procedure is ultimately dependent on human beings. In this case, whether the attorney relied on his secretary or one of his partners, he would not have avoided the possibility of personal tragedy. There are no reasonable office procedures that are capable of guarding against the extraordinary-event described in the secretary’s affidavit.
¶6The Court’s ad hoc analysis of the means available to avoid this occurrence reveals a startling disregard of the realities of a law practice. It is true that the attorney could have filed the notice before he left for vacation. It must be remembered, however, that presumably this was not the only matter of business that the attorney was handling. Beyond that, we have recently sought to impress upon counsel the need to avoid a knee-jerk reaction to an unfavorable ruling and to act judiciously in filing an appeal, notwithstanding instructions received from the client. Kirkpatrick v. City of Bangor, 517 A.2d 320, 321 (Me.1986). With the number of factors that are involved in a decision to appeal, surely we cannot fault the attorney for failing to file the notice of appeal in haste. With the benefit of hind-sight, it is also apparent that the problem could have been avoided if the matter had been referred to another attorney, or anyone other than this particular secretary. Such a conclusion, however, ignores the fact that it is impossible to predict in advance who will be struck by personal tragedy and the same possibility exists, no matter who is selected. Finally, I reject the conclusion that an attorney is duty-bound to double check the performance of routine tasks by a telephone call. By any standard of reasonableness, plaintiff’s counsel was justified in believing that he had made adequate provision for the preparation of the notice of appeal. If attorneys are required to anticipate the extraordinary events that occurred in this case, and guard against them, even a telephone call will not suffice.
¶7I would vacate the order.