¶1dissenting.
¶2I dissent from the Majority Opinion because I believe that Commonwealth v. Frisbie, 506 Pa. 461, 485 A.2d 1098 (1984), should not be read into Pa.R.Crim.P. 229 on these facts.
¶3Frisbieallows for separate offenses (and sentences) to be rendered against a criminal actor who injures multiple victims with a single act in certain crimes. The specific issue in Frisbiewas “whether the legislature intended that each injury constitute a separate offense.” The decision there held that, as to the crime of recklessly endangering another person, “a separate offense is committed for each individual person placed in danger.” 485 A.2d at 1100 (emphasis added in each quotation). The Majority rightly indicates that similar results would obtain for the crimes of arson and assault and concludes from this analysis that “the number of offenses depends on the number of victims rather than on the number of acts committed by the defendant.”
¶4As to Rule 229, which controls amendments to information, there is a prohibition against charging “an additional or different offense.” The Rule is clear on this point.
¶5*42Hypothetically, therefore, the Commonwealth in the instant case could have charged the Appellant with five counts each of the offenses. Frisbiewould have validated that procedure. Also, hypothetically, if the Commonwealth, in its amendment, had added an offense or charged a different offense, Rule 229 would have been offended.
¶6That, however, is not what happened here. The Commonwealth did not add any separate offenses in its amendment. Appellant remained charged with one count each of recklessly endangering another person and assault throughout the entire judicial process. That the Commonwealth earlier could have increased the counts of each crime to coincide with the number of victims is clear under Frisbie. For whatever reason, that course was not chosen by the prosecution.
¶7Nor did the Commonwealth add any different offense in its amendment. Appellant remained charged with the same offenses, and I fail to see how Rule 229 applies to this specific point.
¶8The Majority’s fatal confusion lies in its incorrect assumption that by listing the names of the other victims in the car, the Commonwealth automatically was putting on additional charges as defined by Frisbieand in violation of Rule 229. That assessment is wrong.
¶9The correct focus should follow the Superior Court’s argument that, at least under its own cases, the amendment worked an irreparable prejudice by forcing the Appellant to prepare a defense without adequate notice or sufficient time. That is the only issue in this case, and it is noteworthy that Frisbie, decided three years earlier, played no role in the decisions or dissent of the courts below.
¶10As to the issue of prejudice, nevertheless, I conclude that Appellant’s defense remained unaltered by the amendments. Prior to the amendments, at the preliminary hearing, he was fully informed of the fact that there were other frightened passengers in the car. He knew at that point that he had committed the crimes against some person or persons. The Commonwealth’s failure to charge him with *43separate offenses for each party is not germane. At trial he remained charged with one offense each underlying both the original and amended information. The elements of the offenses and the cognate factual situation were identical before and after. A careful reading of the Superior Court’s majority opinion would support this conclusion.
¶11Nothing in this case persuades me that either the trial court or the Superior Court were incorrect in affirming the judgment of sentence.