¶1concurring opinion in Support of Affirmance.
¶2How often it has been said that the home is one of our most cherished possessions, “a man’s home is his castle,” and the Chief Justice waxes eloquently in repeating this sentiment in his Concurrence in Support of Reversal. But, in our zeal to protect the rights of an accused, has this sentiment become nothing more than a smokescreen behind which the nefarious schemes of the wicked are hatched and carried out?
¶3*192Do we really mean to protect those “homes” which are nothing more than warehouses for the storage of drugs which are to be illegally sold, or for storerooms in which these drugs are illegally sold, or kitchens in which these drugs are cooked and manufactured for illegal sale, or places of illegal prostitution in which the sellers of flesh reside, or places in which illegal gambling activities take place, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera.
¶4We decry, and demand to protect against, the stormtroopers’ tactics while, at the same time, we accept the draping of the Constitution around these criminal employments much as the Axis Powers in World War II were wont to drape their munitions’ factories and arms stockpiles with Red Cross, or other hospital, insignia in order to fool the tender-hearted Allies who would never dream of bombing a hospital.
¶5Surely, I have no problem with the need of probable cause to exist before a police officer enters any private structure, be it a “home” or otherwise. I do have a problem, however, reconciling the need for a warrant issued by a magistrate upon the affidavit of the police officer, with the lack of a warrant when probable cause actually exists. Either a police officer has probable cause or he doesn’t. The failure to obtain a warrant does not alter the fact that probable cause exists. And if probable cause does not exist, it matters not that a warrant was issued.
¶6In the final analysis, it is the testimony of the police officer which controls the propriety of the event. It matters not that a magistrate was or was not involved because the entire event can, and most likely will be, reviewed by a suppression court which can find the existence, or lack thereof, of probable cause to support the entry of the police officer into an occupied structure. The existence of a warrant issued by a magistrate upon the affidavit of the police officer is not unassailable as has been shown in so many cases in which the warrant has been found defective for so many reasons, procedural and substantive.
¶7*193I think the time has arrived when we must take a serious look at the meaning of “the sanctity of the home” and the necessity of a warrant when probable cause exists to warrant the police in entering suspected premises to search and/or make an arrest. What is the nature of this “home” we so desperately seek to protect from the intrusion of governmental stormtroopers?
¶8In the case at hand, Officer Chavez witnessed, and participated in, the sale and purchase of drugs. He saw the participants, seller, agent, and buyer (himself as an undercover agent) and had every right to make the necessary arrest on the spot. In the excercise of caution, however, he chose to call back-up police who were waiting in the wings. Together they made the necessary entry into premises known to be the retail outlet for the sale of drugs, made the necessary search of all contraband in plain view, and executed the appropriate arrest. The delay in obtaining a warrant would not have changed the facts but may have given time to the evil protagonists to dispose of the “goods.”
¶9I have no hesitancy in joining the Opinion in Support of Affirmance.
¶10OPINION IN SUPPORT OF REVERSAL
¶11The sanctity of the home is one of the hallmarks of our basic concept of a free society. It distinguishes our form of government from the totalitarian rule where the state can intrude upon the private life of its subjects at its slightest whim. Further, our society is not rendered impotent in situations where immediate entrance is justified by exigent circumstances. The instant case provides a clear illustration of the type of precipitous police behavior which, if permitted and justified, would quickly transform our society to a police state and dismantle the tradition this nation was founded to establish.
¶12*194It is true that the scourge of drugs is of alarming concern and its continued presence in our midst with its attended violence cannot be tolerated. The validity of this concern, however, should not be allowed to ignite a hysterical response that could disturb the entire fabric of the society to which we are committed..
¶13In this instance the law enforcement officers, through an emissary, had obtained a purchase of cocaine from the suspect inside the premises which was under surveillance. The police could have maintained their vigil until a search warrant was obtained. There was, in this case, no indication that the occupant of the dwelling was making any effort to leave the premises; thus there were no exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless entry and arrest. Regrettably, I can find no basis for the precipitous action taken here and the grant of the motion to suppress should be reinstated.
¶14OPINION IN SUPPORT OF REVERSAL
¶15We granted Appellant’s Petition for Allowance of Appeal requesting that we review the order and memorandum opinion of the Superior Court reversing the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County which had suppressed physical evidence seized from the Appellant at the time of his arrest. Because the Superior Court exceeded its scope of review I would reverse.
¶16The proper scope of review in determining the propriety of a suppression order is limited to determining whether the factual findings of the suppression court are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are in error. Commonwealth v. Webb, 491 Pa. 329, 421 A.2d 161 (1980). In reviewing the determination of the suppression court, the Superior Court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. Com*195monwealth v. Robinson, 518 Pa. 156, 541 A.2d 1387 (1988). Viewing these facts in the light most favorable to the Appellant as the prevailing party, it appears that on April 21,1986, at 4:00 p.m., Officer Chaves, an undercover policeman, was approached by Charlie Garcia regarding the sale of $10.00 worth of cocaine. Garcia informed Officer Chaves that he would purchase the drugs for the Officer. Garcia then walked to 2749 North Howard Street, knocked on the door, and while remaining outside the screen door received a small package. In return, Garcia gave the male occupant, now identified as the Appellant, a pre-recorded $20.00 bill and received a $10.00 bill in change. This whole transaction was observed by Officer Chaves. Garcia then proceeded back to where Officer Chaves was parked and gave him the packet and a $10.00 bill in change. Officer Chaves then drove around the corner and informed his back-up units surrounding the house to move in.
¶17Officers McDonald and Kane then proceeded to the residence. The outside door was opened a couple of inches while the inside door was opened about a foot. Officer Kane observed the Appellant in the living room fixing the ceiling while standing on a board that was laying across two ladders. Without knocking and identifying themselves or otherwise receiving any permission to enter, the police officers entered the premises and placed Appellant under arrest. At that time, the Appellant had a hammer in his hand and was surrounded by other equipment. Officer Kane ordered the Appellant to put down the hammer, which he did, and then Officer Kane cleared the board of the equipment. On that board was a brown paper bag which Officer Kane believed contained nails. When he removed the bag, Officer Kane noticed that it contained money, removed the money and discovered clear plastic packets of a white powder later identified as cocaine. Officer Kane then frisked the Appellant and found a wad of money, which contained the pre-recorded $20.00 bill.
¶18Appellant was arrested for delivery of a controlled substance, possession with intent to deliver a controlled sub*196stance, knowing and intentional possession of a controlled substance and criminal conspiracy. He filed a timely motion to suppress the physical evidence arguing that the arrest was illegal and that seizure of all the physical evidence seized was done without a proper .search warrant. After taking testimony, the suppression court found that although there may have been probable cause to arrest the Appellant, no exigent circumstances were present to justify either the warrantless arrest or search of the Appellant in his home.
¶19On appeal, the Superior Court reversed, determining that the suppression court erred in its application of Commonwealth v. Williams, 483 Pa. 293, 396 A.2d 1177 (1978), cert. denied 446 U.S. 912, 100 S.Ct. 1843, 64 L.Ed.2d 266 (1980), to the record facts. Because the Superior Court has exceeded the proper scope of review and has substituted its discretion for that of the suppression court I would reverse.
¶20In Commonwealth v. Williams, supra, we held that a warrant is required to validly arrest someone in his home unless exigent circumstances exist to justify a warrantless intrusion. We also adopted a weighing process of the following factors in determining whether exigent circumstances existed:
1. Whether a grave offense is involved, particularly one that is a crime of violence;
2. Whether a suspect is reasonably believed to be armed;
3. Whether there exists not merely the minimum of probable cause that is requisite even when a warrant has been issued, but beyond that a clear showing of probable cause to believe that the suspect committed the crime;
4. Strong reason to believe that the suspect is on the premises being entered;
5. A likelihood that the suspect will escape if not swiftly apprehended; and
6. Whether the entry, although not consented, is made peaceably.
¶21*197The Williamstest was relied upon by both lower courts in disposing of this matter. Having considered these factors in light of the testimony, the suppression court suppressed the physical evidence finding that exigent circumstances did not exist to excuse the lack of a warrant for either the arrest or the search. The Superior Court, however, viewed the evidence differently and based upon Williamsjustified the warrantless search. Reviewing the record in light of Williams, I cannot agree with the Superior Court. It is clear that the crimes involved were not crimes of violence. Furthermore, there was no testimony establishing that the Appellant was armed. Although Officer Kane did testify that he believed that the equipment surrounding the Appellant could be used as a weapon, this observation occurred after entry and arrest and not before. In discussing this factor, the Superior Court concluded that since the Appellant was engaged in observable drug selling it was reasonable to believe that he was indeed armed. Under this record this speculation is not sufficient to satisfy the second factor.
¶22The suppression court did find that probable cause existed for Appellant’s arrest and the record appears to support its conclusion that there was a clear showing of probable cause. Although there was no question that the Appellant was in his residence, there was no evidence to support the contention that the Appellant was likely to escape. Like the second factor, the Superior Court concocted a contrary conclusion on the basis of its own assumptions. Finally, it is arguable as to whether the entry was accomplished through peace or force. The purpose of the sixth factor is to give the suspect the opportunity to surrender prior to an invasion of his privacy. In this instance, the police did not knock and announce their presence, but rather “squeezed” through an opening in the Appellant’s screen door and front door. Once again, under this record, satisfaction of the sixth factor is questionable.
¶23Weighing these factors under this record, there is no basis for finding that the suppression court abused its *198discretion in suppressing the evidence. Although the suppression court did not specifically cite to the Williamstest, it is clear from its discussion on the record that it evaluated the Commonwealth evidence in light of Williamsand determined that the weight of the evidence supported suppression because exigent circumstances did not exist for seizure without a warrant. As such, the Superior Court erred in substituting its own judgment for that of the suppression court.