¶1The single issue is whether the defendants were denied a speedy trial.
¶2Both the Wisconsin and the United States Constitutions provide for a speedy trial.
¶3Art. I, sec. 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution reads:
“In all criminal prosecutions [by indictment or information] the accused shall enjoy the right ... to a speedy public trial . . . .”
¶4The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution reads:
“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, . . .”
¶5*566The armed-masked robbery in question was committed on April 24, 1967, and defendants were convicted on July 23,1969.
¶6The procedural facts material to a determination of the speedy trial issue, presented chronologically and in quite some detail, are as follows:
¶7On April 24, 1967, the crime in question was committed. On June 19, 1967, a complaint and warrant were issued for this offense.
¶8In September of 1967, the defendants were arrested on a federal charge of bank robbery and have been in federal custody since that time, except for two days when defendants were at large after an escape.
¶9In October, 1967, the first indictment against defendants for a federal offense was dismissed because of a misnomer of one of the defendants; however, they were held in custody and rearrested shortly thereafter.
¶10An attorney, Richard B. Surges, was appointed to represent the defendants as indigents in federal court. On November 17, 1967, Surges, by letter to the Milwaukee county district attorney, notified the district attorney that the defendants were federal prisoners and were being held at the Waukesha county jail. He further, on behalf of the defendants, demanded a speedy trial. On December 5, 1967, the defendants were arrested and appeared in a state court in Milwaukee county. They were found indigent and the same attorney, Surges, was appointed to represent them. On December 12, 1967, they appeared in county court of Milwaukee county and upon the motion of the defendants’ attorney, Surges, the preliminary hearing was adjourned to January 4, 1968.
¶11On the same day, December 12, 1967, the defendants escaped from the Ozaukee county jail and were at large for two days. During the escape one of the guards was quite brutally beaten up. After apprehension the defendants were placed in the Kenosha county jail because *567it was the most secure jail available to federal authorities.
¶12The defendants did not appear for the January 4, 1968, preliminary hearing date and the matter was continued until January 10,1968; nor did they appear on the January 10th date, but their attorney, Surges, did. The federal marshal, who had custody of the defendants was requested to produce the defendants in the state court for both, the January 4th and January 10th proceedings. He refused to honor the request upon the advice of an assistant United States attorney that because of the escape attempts the defendants were poor security risks. Mr. Surges, knowing the defendants would not appear in the state court, persisted in moving for a dismissal of the complaints because of a delay beyond the statutory period for a preliminary hearing without a waiver by the defendants. The motion to dismiss was granted without prejudice.
¶13On January 17, 1968, a new complaint and warrant were issued but not served by Milwaukee county authorities.
¶14On January 23, 1968, after pleas of guilty, both defendants were sentenced in federal court for bank robbery and escape. The defendants were immediately sent to federal prison at Leavenworth, Kansas, and their official custody transferred from the United States Marshal for the Eastern District of Wisconsin to the Attorney General of the United States and the Bureau of Prisons.
¶15On January 24, 1968, a detainer was filed against defendants with the warden of Leavenworth. Both defendants were advised of the detainer about March 6, 1968. Both defendants testified that as soon as they were advised of the detainer they wrote to the chief of police of Milwaukee demanding a speedy trial. Other than the defendants’ statements, there is no proof of such a letter or demand.
¶16*568In May of 1968, Kwitek was transferred to the federal penitentiary at Marion, Illinois. Crisp remained in Leavenworth, Kansas.
¶17On July 22,1968, Crisp prepared and sent a motion for a speedy trial to the clerk of court of Milwaukee county demanding a speedy trial.
¶18On August 2, 1968, Ben J. Wiener, a deputy district attorney for Milwaukee, responded as follows:
“I am checking into the matter of the cases pending here against you and will advise you within the next several days as to what procedure we will take.
“In the meantime will you kindly advise what your pleas will be so that we may more conveniently arrange with the court for setting your matters on the calendar.”
¶19Crisp responded to Wiener’s letter, again demanding a speedy trial. The letter did not mention Kwitek. Wiener replied to this letter on October 28,1968. He stated:
“This will acknowledge your last letter with reference to returning you to Milwaukee to stand trial on the several charges that are pending against you.
“I am preparing the necessary papers to effectuate your return but in the meantime I wish you would advise me more definitely, if you so wish, as to what your plea will be to the matters pending here. In one letter you stated to me that your plea would be satisfactory to the court. I am not demanding that you advise what your plea will be but if you desire to so inform me then such information will aid in setting your matters for hearing.”
¶20On December 6, 1968, Wiener prepared an affidavit and a writ for habeas corpus ad 'prosequendum to produce Kwitek from Marion, Illinois, and Crisp from Leavenworth, Kansas. These documents were not served nor filed. Three days later, December 9, 1968, Wiener prepared a memorandum for David J. Cannon, the district attorney for Milwaukee county, which contained the following:
“That memo says. T heretofore advised you I prepared the necessary petition and writ for the return of *569each of the above named individuals and then learned that their convictions were vacated in the Federal Court because of some error in the indictment and that they, therefore, were released from the institutions from which we were seeking to have them returned to Milwaukee for trial.
“ ‘It appears to me that there isn’t anything we can do until the federal authorities get through with proceedings in the Federal Court.’ ”
¶21In December of 1968, the federal bank robbery conviction was set aside because of a defect in the charge, i.e., it was not alleged the bank was a federally insured bank. On January 29, 1969, both defendants were returned to the custody of the federal marshal for the Eastern District of Wisconsin and held at various times in the county jails of three counties — Kenosha, Waukesha and Ozaukee (Port Washington). The marshal at this time concluded they were no longer unusual security risks.
¶22On January 31, 1969, a letter was written by both defendants requesting that the Wisconsin charges be dismissed because of lack of a speedy trial.
¶23On March 3, 1969, Kwitek prepared and sent a motion to Judge Coffey, circuit judge of Milwaukee county, and to Ben Wiener requesting a speedy trial.
¶24On April 2, 1969, both defendants were arrested and made initial appearances in the county court. Preliminary examinations were held on April 8th and both defendants were bound over to the circuit court for trial. On April 17, 1969, defendants were arraigned in circuit court and a jury trial was set for July 9, 1969.
¶25In the interval between April and June, both Crisp and Kwitek were retried separately in jury trials in federal court. Kwitek had two jury trials during this period because the first one resulted in a mistrial. They were both found guilty and resentenced by the federal court.
¶26It is also significant that during the interval between the original federal sentence and their retrials the defendants were pursuing postconviction remedies in fed*570eral court challenging their federal convictions. These proceedings included petitions treated as motions to reconsider and reduce their sentences which were considered and denied, and their successful challenge which resulted in the new trials.
¶27On July 9 and 16, 1969, in response to motions, the circuit court for Milwaukee county, by Judge Coffey, heard and denied motions to dismiss the charges because of lack of a speedy trial.
¶28The defendants then waived a jury trial. The cases were heard by the court on July 23, 1969, and the defendants were found guilty. Sentence was imposed on August 8, 1969, after a presentence investigation.
¶29A postconviction motion to set aside the conviction on the ground of lack of a speedy trial was heard and denied on May 1, 1970. This appeal was taken June 23, 1970.
¶30There can be no doubt that an accused is entitled to a speedy trial by virtue of the provisions of the Wisconsin Constitution (art. I, sec. 7, supra), and the sixth amendment of the United States Constitution as made applicable to the states by the fourteenth amendment.
¶31The rule in Wisconsin is that the defendant must demand “that his case be brought on for trial as a condition precedent to requesting dismissal of the charge on the ground that he has been denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial.” Kopacka v. State (1964), 22 Wis. 2d 457, 460, 126 N. W. 2d 78. See also, Commodore v. State (1967), 33 Wis. 2d 373, 147 N. W. 2d 283; State v. Stoeckle (1969), 41 Wis. 2d 378, 164 N. W. 2d 303.
¶32Although urged to do so, we are not persuaded that we should abandon the demand rule. This is especially true because of the new statutory provision for interstate cases in sec. 976.05, Stats. 1969 (not effective in this case), which provides in substance that the defendant must notify the prosecuting attorney and the court of his *571place of imprisonment and demand a final disposition of the charges against him.
¶33We do not believe the self-serving statement of the defendants that they sent a letter to the chief of police of Milwaukee in May of 1967 while they were in Leavenworth, without any additional proof as to mailing or receipt of the letter, compels a finding upon review that a demand was made at that time. It is clear, however, that Crisp did make a demand for a speedy trial on July 22, 1968, by his motion sent to the clerk of court. The trial court found that any demand made by Crisp also applied to Kwitek. This finding will not be disturbed and we conclude a sufficient demand was made on July 22,1968.
¶34It also appears without dispute that the defendants were arrested and brought before the state court on April 2, 1969. The defendants do not seriously contend there was any undue delay between the initial appearance on April 2, 1969, and the trial on July 23, 1969. We calculate the delay then to be from July 22, 1968, to April 2, 1969 — a period of about eight and one-half months.
¶35We are urged to adopt the “180-day rule” as it now appears in the interstate extradition sections of the statute.
¶36In United States v. Ewell (1966), 383 U. S. 116, 120, 86 Sup. Ct. 773, 15 L. Ed. 2d 627, the United States Supreme Court stated:
*572“We cannot agree that the passage of 19 months between the original arrests and the hearings on the later indictments itself demonstrates a violation of the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of a speedy trial. This guarantee is an important safeguard to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration prior to trial, to minimize anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation and to limit the possibilities that long delay will impair the ability of an accused to defend himself. However, in large measure because of the many procedural safeguards provided an accused, the ordinary procedures for criminal prosecution are designed to move at a deliberate pace. A requirement of unreasonable speed would have a deleterious effect both upon the rights of the accused and upon the ability of society to protect itself. Therefore, this Court has consistently been of the view that ‘The right of a speedy trial is necessarily relative. It is consistent with delays and depends upon circumstances. It secures rights to a defendant. It does not preclude the rights of public justice.’ Beavers v. Humbert, 198 U. S. 77, 87. ‘Whether delay in completing a prosecution . . . amounts to an unconstitutional deprivation of rights depends upon the circumstances. . . . The delay must not be purposeful or oppressive,’ Pollard v. United States, 352 U. S. 354, 361. ‘[T]he essential ingredient is orderly expedition and not mere speed.’ Smith v. United States, 360 U. S. 1, 10.”
¶37In Kopacka v. State, supra, at page 460, we stated:
“. . . Each case involving the issue of denial of a speedy trial turns on its own facts, although the general rule is stated to be that the right to a speedy trial is a right to be tried as soon as is reasonably possible. A motion to dismiss for lack of speedy trial will be denied where the accused is tried as soon as the orderly conduct of the business of the court permits. . . .”
¶38The defendants cite a recent United States Supreme Court case, Dickey v. Florida (1970), 398 U. S. 30, 90 Sup. Ct. 1564, 26 L. Ed. 2d 26. We not only accept the majority opinion of Dickeyas we must, but applaud it as an excellent statement of the law. However, the facts in Dickeyare so drastically different that we do not believe it is compelling authority to overrule the judgments *573in this case. In Dickeythe determinative facts are stated at page 36, as follows:
“The record in this case shows that petitioner was available to the State at all times during the seven-year period before his trial. The State suggests no tenable reason for deferring the trial in the face of petitioner’s diligent and repeated efforts by motions in the state court in 1962, 1963, and 1966 to secure a prompt trial. In the interval two witnesses died and another potential defense witness is alleged to have become unavailable. Police records of possible relevance have been lost or destroyed.”
¶39Wiener did make a diligent and good-faith effort to secure the defendants.
¶40In this case we are of the opinion that the delay was not unreasonable or prejudicial to the accused.
¶41There is no evidence or contention that the defendants were in any way prejudiced in the trial of this matter. There is no claim of deceased or unavailable witnesses, or witnesses with hazy recollections, or loss of records.
¶42The delay was not, as suggested, the result of prosecu-torial delay or indifference. The defendants were confined in the federal jurisdiction and were pursuing post-conviction remedies. When Deputy District Attorney Wiener advised the district attorney, “It appears to me that there isn’t anything we can do until the federal authorities get through with proceedings in the Federal Court,” he had reasonable grounds for such a belief. This is apparent from the recitation of the facts as stated above.
¶43*574In January of 1969, the defendants were returned to Wisconsin for the specific purpose of participating in new trials on the federal charges. It is inconceivable that the federal authorities would or should interrupt their proceedings and release the defendants to the state authorities during February, March, April, May or June while a multitude of pretrial motions were presented and heard and new trials conducted.
¶44It is further significant that the delay here could have been considerably less except for the intentional acts of the defendants in having the original proceedings dismissed because of the delay of preliminary examinations when the defendants knew they could not appear because the federal authorities would not allow them to do so. This is not to say that their actions were illegal or improper — but the fact remains it was their act that terminated the original proceedings and contributed to the delay.
¶45We conclude that there was not an unreasonable delay caused by the state, that the defendants were not prejudiced, and that because of the seriousness of the crimes charged the rights of the public demanded a trial and not a dismissal of the charges.
¶46By the Court. — Judgment and order affirmed.
¶47See Klopfer v. North Carolina (1967), 386 U. S. 213, 87 Sup. Ct. 988, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1.
¶48 Sec. 976.05 (1), Stats. 1969.
¶49 See Diekey v. Florida, supra,and Smith v. Hooey (1969), 393 U. S. 374, 89 Sup. Ct. 575, 21 L. Ed. 2d 607.