Volume 530 — South Western Reporter, Third Series

This case is on appeal from a trial court judge's decision not to recuse herself based on a telephone call to a university department director concerning a potential expert witness' qualifications. Upon the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion for recusal of the trial court judge, the defendant filed an accelerated interlocutory appeal in the Court of Appeals pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, section 2. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, holding that recusal of the trial judge was necessary. We granted the plaintiff's accelerated application for permission to appeal to this Court. Having thoroughly reviewed the filings of both parties and the applicable law, we conclude that the trial court's denial of the motion to recuse was appropriate in this case. Therefore, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.

This appeal addresses the authority of a county election commission to make a factual determination on the qualifications of a candidate seeking to be placed on a ballot. In this case, the defendant filed a petition to run for circuit court judge. A registered voter filed a complaint with the county election commission arguing that the defendant did not reside in the judicial district and, consequently, should not be placed on the ballot. The election commission held a hearing on the complaint and voted unanimously to place the defendant on the ballot. The defendant won the election. The plaintiff, the defendant's defeated opponent in the election, filed this election contest based solely on the defendant's alleged failure to meet the residency requirement. The trial court and the Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint. Both held that the substance of the plaintiff's complaint was a challenge of the election commission's administrative decision on the defendant's residency, governed by the 60-day statute of limitations in Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-9-102 for a petition for a writ of certiorari. Because the complaint was not filed within sixty days of the county election commission's final decision, it was dismissed as untimely. On appeal to this Court, we hold that, by necessary implication, the county election commission had the authority under Tennessee's election statutes to hold a quasi-judicial hearing to make a factual determination to resolve the voter's complaint challenging the defendant's residency. We also hold that the county election commission's decision to certify the defendant as a qualified candidate on the ballot was a final administrative decision subject to judicial review by common-law writ of certiorari. The plaintiff, who had actual notice of the county election commission's actions, was "aggrieved" by the election commission's final administrative decision within the meaning of Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-9-101 and, thus, had standing to file a petition for a writ of certiorari. Though the plaintiff's complaint was styled as an election contest, the gravamen of the complaint is a request for judicial review of the county election commission's decision, reviewable through a petition for a writ of certiorari and subject to the 60-day statute of limitations for such a petition. Because the plaintiff filed his complaint well after expiration of the 60-day period, we affirm the lower courts' dismissal of the complaint as untimely.

This is a child support action involving one child, who was born in 1995 and had reached the age of majority by the time of trial. Upon the father's voluntary acknowledgment of paternity, the trial court entered an order of legitimation in April 1996. The State of Tennessee ("the State"), acting on behalf of the mother, filed a petition to modify a child support order in April 2002. The father filed a motion to dismiss, and the State subsequently withdrew the petition because no prior child support order had been established. The mother then filed a petition for child support in September 2014. Following a bench trial before a special judge, the trial court established the father's retroactive child support obligation in the amount of $79,647.00, giving credit to the father for $59,229.00 he previously had paid toward the child's support and expenses. The court incorporated three income shares worksheets representing three different time periods during the child's minority. The father has appealed, asserting, inter alia, that the trial court erred by finding that the child had resided with the mother for 285 days per year during the time period of January 1, 2010, through May 31, 2014, because the child resided with the mother's stepfather on weekdays while attending high school. To correct an apparent mathematical error in the judgment, we modify the number of months for which the first income shares worksheet is to be applied from eighty-one to ninetytwo and the number of months for which the third income shares worksheet is to be applied from sixty-four to fifty-three, resulting in a total reduction in the father's retroactive child support obligation from $79,647.00 to $74,818.00. We affirm the trial court's judgment in all other respects.

The Tennessee Department of Safety and Homeland Security forfeited a finance company's interest in a vehicle after determining that the finance company failed to timely file a claim to contest the forfeiture after receiving notice. The finance company thereafter filed a petition for judicial review. The trial court reversed the forfeiture on the basis that the Tennessee Department of Safety and Homeland Security failed to prove that it sent proper notice to the finance company. We vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings before the administrative agency.