Volume 531 — South Western Reporter, Third Series

The Board of Professional Responsibility ("Board") initiated disciplinary proceedings against attorney Paul Julius Walwyn based on a client's complaint of professional misconduct. A hearing panel ("Panel") determined that Mr. Walwyn had violated the Rules of Professional Conduct ("RPC") and ultimately entered "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Amended Judgment of the Hearing Panel" ("Amended Judgment") imposing a public censure with a practice monitor for one year and six additional hours of continuing legal education ("CLE") on subjects related to the management of a law practice and/or client communication. Mr. Walwyn did not appeal the Amended Judgment to the trial court. The Board petitioned this Court for an order enforcing the Panel's Amended Judgment. Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 15.4(b) and (c), we determined that the punishment imposed by the Panel appeared inadequate and proposed that it be increased. Mr. Walwyn subsequently requested oral argument, which we granted. We now consider whether the punishment imposed by the Panel is appropriate under the circumstances of this case and is in uniformity with prior disciplinary decisions in this state. Following a thorough review of the record and the law, we conclude that it is not. Therefore, we modify the Panel's Amended Judgment to impose a one-year suspension from the practice of law, with six months to be served on active suspension and six months to be served on probation with a practice monitor. The duties and obligations in relation to the practice monitor shall be enforced in accordance with the Panel's Amended Judgment. We also impose six additional hours of CLE on subjects related to the management of a law practice and/or client communication.

We granted this appeal to determine whether the Court of Appeals properly affirmed the trial court's decision dismissing this lawsuit involving a dispute over the right to use and control church property for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine. This doctrine derives from the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and prohibits civil courts from resolving church disputes on the basis of religious doctrine and practice. We conclude that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine does not apply in this lawsuit. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court's dismissal is reversed. Furthermore, we conclude that the undisputed facts establish that the plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment, and we remand this matter to the trial court for any other further proceedings and orders that may be necessary to afford the plaintiffs possession and control of the disputed church real property and to address the plaintiffs' requests for an accounting and control of the disputed church personal property.

The Tennessee Department of Children's Services ("DCS") removed three children from the custody of their parents and placed them with foster parents in March 2012 because one of the children, an infant, was severely malnourished. By July 2012, the children's mother was cooperating with DCS and complying with a permanency plan that set the goal for the children as reunification with their mother or another relative. The mother continued to comply with the permanency plan for the next sixteen months that the children were in foster care. On the day the children were scheduled to begin a trial home visit with the mother, July 31, 2013, the foster parents filed a petition in circuit court seeking to terminate the mother's parental rights and to adopt the children. After the foster parents filed their petition in circuit court, the juvenile court, which had maintained jurisdiction over the dependency and neglect proceeding, ordered DCS to place the children with the mother for the trial home visit. The circuit court trial on the foster parents' petition did not occur until September 2015. By that time, the children had resided with the mother on a trial basis for two years without incident. The mother, DCS, and the guardian ad litem appointed by the juvenile court in the dependency and neglect proceeding opposed the foster parents' petition. The foster parents and a guardian ad litem appointed by the circuit court sought termination of the mother's parental rights. After the multi-day trial, the trial court dismissed the petition, finding that the foster parents had proven a ground for termination by clear and convincing proof but had failed to establish by clear and convincing proof that termination is in the children's best interests. The foster parents appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed. We granted the mother's application for permission to appeal and now reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the trial court's judgment dismissing the foster parents' petition. We conclude that the trial court correctly determined that the proof does not amount to clear and convincing evidence that termination of the mother's parental rights is in the children's best interests.

We granted the application for permission to appeal of the Defendant, Antonio Henderson, in this case to determine whether the evidence is sufficient to support his conviction for especially aggravated robbery. The Defendant contends that the serious bodily injury to the victim occurred after the robbery was complete and that, as a result, he could have committed only an aggravated robbery. We hold that, under the facts and circumstances of this case, the victim's serious bodily injury was inflicted before the Defendant had completed robbing the victim with a deadly weapon. Accordingly, the evidence supports the Defendant's conviction of especially aggravated robbery. Therefore, albeit for different reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

In this action regarding injury allegedly caused by an emergency medical technician in the course of rendering medical aid, the trial court determined that the plaintiff's claims were subject to the Tennessee Health Care Liability Act ("THCLA") and dismissed the claims with prejudice based on the plaintiff's failure to file a certificate of good faith pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-122. The plaintiff has appealed, conceding that his claims sounded in health care liability but asserting that they should not have been dismissed with prejudice because a certificate of good faith was not required. Following our review of the complaint, we conclude that the plaintiff's claims were subject to the common knowledge exception such that a certificate of good faith was not required pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-122. We therefore reverse the trial court's dismissal with prejudice and remand this matter to the trial court for entry of an order dismissing the plaintiff's claims without prejudice based upon his failure to provide pre-suit notice.