¶1dissenting.
¶2I agree that the trial court committed an error when it limited the defense counsel from questioning a prosecution witness about pending charges of kidnapping and attempted murder.
¶3However, I disagree with the majority’s holding that the error was harmless. The following rationale behind our ma*282jority opinion in Commonwealth v. Evans, 511 Pa. 214, 512 A.2d 626 (1986), applies equally to this case:
[WJhenever a prosecution witness may be biased in favor of the prosecution because of outstanding criminal charges or because of any non-final criminal disposition against him within the same jurisdiction, that possible bias, in fairness, must be made known to the jury.
¶4Id. at 224, 512 A.2d at 681. Once the trial judge ruled that defense counsel could not inquire into the kidnapping and attempted rape charges, which were much more grave than the charges of robbery and theft, the defendant was prejudiced in his defense.
¶5The majority notes that defense counsel in his closing argument did not emphasize the pending criminal charges against the witness at the time of his testimony. The majority fails to note that defense counsel had been prohibited from inquiring into the kidnapping and attempted rape charges. Should defense counsel have ignored that order in order to survive a harmless error analysis at the appellate level? We have no way of determining whether the jury would have believed the witness had it known of the attempted rape, and had defense counsel been able to present the entire package of pending criminal charges to the jury. The judge erroneously infringed upon the defendant’s constitutional right to confront an adverse witness, and that infringement; was prejudicial to the defendant.
¶6Therefore, I would reverse the order of the Superior Court, vacate the judgment of sentence and grant the defendant a new trial.