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← 534 So. 2d 393 - State v. Pennington

534 So. 2d 393 - State v. Pennington’s Empirical Analysis

1988

Citation profile

222
cited by 222 later decisions
3
states following
March 2017
most recently cited

3 federal appellate · 211 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 222 later decisions — most recently March 2017 · most notably Courson v. McMillian (1991), 970 So. 2d 312 - McDuffie v. State (2007)

3 federal appellate · 211 state decisions

15401988199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Benjamin v. United States · Smith v. Crouse · Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody · Santana v. United States · Cephus v. United States

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 222 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “Where the state has failed to make a prima facie case and the defendant moves for a judgment of acquittal which is denied and thereafter, during the defendant's case evidence is presented that supplies essential elements of the state's case, is it reversible error for the trial court to deny the defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal made at the conclusion of all of the evidence?”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. “a defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the state's case is not waived by the defendant's subsequent introduction of evidence if properly preserved by a motion at the close of all evidence.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  3. “The waiver doctrine is not mere formalism but is an expression of our adversary justice system which requires a defendant to accept the risks of adverse testimony that he introduces. The doctrine’s operative principle is not so much that the defendant offering testimony “waives” his earlier motion but that, if he presents the testimony of himself or of others and asks the jury to evaluate his credibility (and that of his witnesses) against the government’s case, he cannot insulate himself from the risk that the evidence will be favorable to the government. Requiring the defendant to accept the consequences of his decision to challenge directly the government’s case affirms the adversary process. But the decision of a codefendant to testify and produce witnesses is not subject to the defendant’s control like testimony the defendant elects to produce in his own defensive case, nor is such testimony within the government’s power to command in a joint trial.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.