Volume 537 — United States Reports

This is a list of all the United States Supreme Court cases from volume 537 of the United States Reports:

The Supreme Court of the United States handed down twelve per curiam opinions during its 2002 term, which began October 7, 2002 and concluded October 5, 2003.

Held: Well-established administrative-law principles required the Ninth Circuit to remand the "changed circumstances" question to the BIA.

Held: The Ninth Circuit's decision exceeds § 2254(d)'s limits on federal habeas review. First, that court erred in holding that the state court applied the wrong standard for evaluating prejudice. Under Strickland, a defendant need only establish a "reasonable probability" that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of his sentencing proceeding would have been different. Id., at 694.

Held: The All Writs Act does not furnish removal jurisdiction. That Act, alone or in combination with the existence of ancillary enforcement jurisdiction, is not a substitute for § 1441's requirement that a federal court have original jurisdiction over an action in order for it to be removed from a state court. Pp. 31-34. (a) The All Writs Act—which provides, in § 1651(a), that "courts established by . . .

Held: The Michigan Supreme Court erred in holding that, under § 14504(c)(2)(B)(iv)(III), only a State's "generic" fee is relevant to determining the fee that was "collected or charged as of November 15, 1991." States may not renounce or modify a reciprocity agreement so as to alter any fee charged or collected as of that date.

Held: The FBSA does not pre-empt state common-law claims such as petitioner's. Pp. 56-70. (a) The FBSA was enacted to improve boating safety, to authorize the establishment of national construction and performance standards for boats and associated equipment, and to encourage greater uniformity of boating laws and regulations as among the States and the Federal Government.

Held: The absence of an actual denial by ATF of a felon's petition precludes judicial review under § 925(c). The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to grant relief from a firearms disability if certain preconditions are met, and an applicant may seek federal-court review if the Secretary denies his application.

Held: An NASD arbitrator should apply the time limit rule to the underlying dispute. Pp. 83-86. (a) "[A]rbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit." Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U. S. 574, 582.

Held: There was no double-jeopardy bar to Pennsylvania's seeking the death penalty on retrial. Pp. 106-110, 113-115.

Held: This Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the tort portion of the case but has jurisdiction to hear the PDA portion. Certain state-court judgments can be treated as final for jurisdictional purposes even though further proceedings are to take place in the state courts. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469, 477-483 (outlining four exceptions to the finality rule).

Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149 (2003), was a Supreme Court of the United States case. The case was to determine if a law instructing a government agent "shall" perform an action by a given date was intended as a 'spur to action' or a limit on whether the agent could act after the date. In this case the court held the agent could still act even after the date.

Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003), was a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States upholding the constitutionality of the 1998 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA). Plaintiffs, led by Internet publisher Eric Eldred, argued that the statute was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court disagreed and allowed the statute to remain in effect.

Held: A conspiracy does not automatically terminate simply because the Government has defeated its object. Thus, the Ninth Circuit is incorrect in its view that a conspiracy ends through "defeat" when the Government intervenes, making the conspiracy's goals impossible to achieve, even if the conspirators do not know that the Government has intervened and are totally unaware that the conspiracy is bound to fail.

Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280 (2003), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that the Fair Housing Act imposes strict liability on residential real estate corporations for racial discrimination, but the officers and owners of the corporation generally will not be held vicariously liable for offenses committed by the corporation's employees of agents. In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Court held that the Fair Housing Act "imposes liability without fault upon the employer in accordance with traditional agency principles, i. e., it normally imposes vicarious liability upon the corporation but not upon its officers or owners."

Held: Section 525 prohibits the FCC from revoking licenses held by a bankruptcy debtor upon the debtor's failure to make timely payments to the FCC for purchase of the licenses. It is undisputed that the FCC is a "governmental unit" that has "revoke[d]" a "license," and that NextWave is a "debtor" under the Bankruptcy Act. Pp. 301-308.

Held: The Fifth Circuit should have issued a COA to review the District Court's denial of habeas relief to petitioner. Pp. 335-348. (a) Before a prisoner seeking postconviction relief under §2254 may appeal a district court's denial or dismissal of the petition, he must first seek and obtain a COA from a circuit justice or judge, § 2253. This is a jurisdictional prerequisite.

Held: The State's use of respondents' Social Security benefits to reimburse itself does not violate 42 U. S. C. § 407(a). Pp. 382-392. (a) Neither the department's effort to become a representative payee, nor its use of respondents' Social Security benefits when it acts in that capacity, amounts to employing an "execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process" under § 407(a).

Scheidler v. National Organization for Women, 537 U.S. 393 (2003), is a United States Supreme Court case involving whether abortion providers could receive damages from protesters under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. National Organization for Women (NOW) obtained class status for women seeking the use of women's health clinics and began its court battle against Joseph Scheidler and PLAN et al. in 1986. In this particular case, the court's opinion was that extortion did not apply to the defendants' actions because they did not obtain any property from the respondents (NOW and the class of women).

Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003), is a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States holding that, under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, a claim of trademark dilution requires proof of actual dilution, not merely a likelihood of dilution. This decision was later superseded by the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006 (TDRA).

Held: Section 1.861-8(e)(3) is a proper exercise of the Secretary of the Treasury's rulemaking authority. Pp. 446-457.

United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465 (2003), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held in a 5–4 decision that when the federal government used land or property held in trust for an Indian tribe, it had the duty to maintain that land or property and was liable for any damages for a breach of that duty. In the 1870s, the White Mountain Apache Tribe was placed on a reservation in Arizona. The case involved Fort Apache, a collection of buildings on the reservation which were transferred to the tribe by the United States Congress in 1960. Although the tribe owned the Fort Apache buildings, they were held in trust and used exclusively by the federal government for an Indian school.

Held: United States v. Mitchell, 445 U. S. 535 (Mitchell I), and United States v. Mitchell, 463 U. S. 206 (Mitchell II), control this case. The controversy here falls within Mitchell I 's domain, and the Tribe's claim for compensation from the Government fails, for it does not derive from any liability-imposing provision of the IMLA or its implementing regulations. Pp. 502-514.

Held: For the purpose of starting the clock on § 2255's one-year limitation period, a judgment of conviction becomes final when the time expires for filing a petition for certiorari contesting the appellate court's affirmation of the conviction. Pp. 527-532.