Volume 538 — United States Reports

Held: The Second Circuit's judgment must be reversed because due process does not require the opportunity to prove a fact that is not material to the State's statutory scheme. Mere injury to reputation, even if defamatory, does not constitute the deprivation of a liberty interest. Paul v. Davis, 424 U. S. 693.

Held: State employees may recover money damages in federal court in the event of the State's failure to comply with the FMLA's family-care provision. Congress may abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court if it makes its intention to abrogate unmistakably clear in the language of the statute and acts pursuant to a valid exercise of its power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Held: Consistent with this Court's precedent and the First Amendment, States may maintain fraud actions when fundraisers make false or misleading representations designed to deceive donors about how their donations will be used. The Illinois Attorney General's allegations against Telemarketers therefore state a claim for relief that can survive a motion to dismiss. Pp. 8-21.

This is a list of all United States Supreme Court cases from volume 538 of the United States Reports:

Held: The controversy is not yet ripe for judicial resolution. Determining whether administrative action is ripe requires evaluation of (1) the issues' fitness for judicial decision and (2) the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136, 149.

Held: The Tribe may not sue under §1983 to vindicate the sovereign right it here claims. Section 1983 permits "citizen[s]" and "other person[ s] within the jurisdiction" of the United States to seek legal and equitable relief from "person[s]" who, under color of state law, deprive them of federally protected rights.

Held: ERISA does not require plan administrators to accord special deference to the opinions of treating physicians. The "treating physician rule" imposed by the Ninth Circuit was originally developed by Courts of Appeals as a means to control disability determinations by administrative law judges under the Social Security Act.

Held: Respondent did not meet the statutory requirements for habeas relief. The parties do not dispute the underlying facts, and respondent is therefore entitled to relief only if he can demonstrate that the state court's adjudication of his claim was "contrary to" or an "unreasonable application of" this Court's clearly established precedents. 28 U. S. C. §2254(d)(1).

Held: The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded. 270 F. 3d 852 , reversed and remanded. JUSTICE THOMAS, joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE O'CONNOR, and JUSTICE SCALIA, concluded in Part II-A that Chavez did not deprive Martinez of his Fifth Amendment rights. Pp. 4-12. 1 (a) An officer is entitled to qualified immunity if his alleged conduct did not violate a constitutional right.

Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003), is one of two cases upholding a sentence imposed under California's three strikes law against a challenge that it constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. As in its prior decision in Harmelin v. Michigan, the United States Supreme Court could not agree on the precise reasoning to uphold the sentence. But, with the decision in Ewing and the companion case Lockyer v. Andrade, the Court effectively foreclosed criminal defendants from arguing that their non-capital sentences were disproportional to the crime they had committed. Ewing was represented in the Court by Quin Denvir. The Attorney General of California argued for the State of California.

Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003), decided the same day as Ewing v. California (a case with a similar subject matter), held that there would be no relief by means of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus for a claim that a sentence imposed under California's three strikes law was an unconstitutionally disproportionate punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments. The decision weakened proportionality review for prison sentences.

Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003), was a court case in the United States which questioned the constitutionality of the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act's retroactive requirements. Under the Act, any sex offender must register with the Department of Corrections or local law enforcement within one business day of entering the state. This information is forwarded to the Department of Public Safety, which maintains a public database. Fingerprints, social security number, anticipated change of address, and medical treatment after the offense are kept confidential.

Held: Local governments are "persons" amenable to qui tam actions under the FCA. Pp. 125-134. (a) While § 3729 does not define the term "person," its meaning has remained unchanged since the original FCA was passed in 1863. Stevens, supra, at 783, n. 12. There is no doubt that the term then extended to corporations.

Held: Mental anguish damages resulting from the fear of developing cancer may be recovered under the FELA by a railroad worker suffering from the actionable injury asbestosis caused by work-related exposure to asbestos. Pp. 145-159.

Held: Respondents have not presented an equal protection claim that can survive summary judgment. Proof of racially discriminatory intent is required to show an Equal Protection Clause violation. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 265.

Held: For purposes of applying the Lindh rule, a case does not become "pending" until an actual application for habeas relief is filed in federal court. Respondent's application is subject to AEDPA's amendments because it was not filed until after AEDPA's effective date. Pp. 205-210.

Held: A state law requiring that client funds that could not otherwise generate net earnings for the client be deposited in an IOLTA account is not a "regulatory taking," but a law requiring that the interest on those funds be transferred to a different owner for a legitimate public use could be a per se taking requiring the payment of "just compensation" to the client. Pp. 231-235.

Held: The judgment is affirmed. 189 F. Supp. 2d 548, affirmed.

Held: A debt for money promised in a settlement agreement accompanied by the release of underlying tort claims can amount to a debt for money obtained by fraud, within the nondischargeability statute's terms. Pp. 318-323.

Held: Kentucky's AWP statutes are "law[s] ... which regulat[e] insurance" under § 1144(b)(2)(A). Pp. 334-342. (a) For these statutes to be "law[s] ... which regulat[e] insurance," they must be "specifically directed toward" the insurance industry; laws of general application that have some bearing on insurers do not qualify. E. g., Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U. S. 41, 50.

Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003), is a landmark decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in which the Court held, 5–4, that any state statute banning cross burning on the basis that it constitutes prima facie evidence of intent to intimidate is a violation of the First Amendment to the Constitution. Such a provision, the Court argued, blurs the distinction between proscribable "threats of intimidation" and the Ku Klux Klan's protected "messages of shared ideology". In the case, three defendants were convicted in two separate cases of violating a Virginia statute against cross burning. However, cross-burning can be a criminal offense if the intent to intimidate is proven. It was argued by former Solicitor General of Virginia, William Hurd and Rodney A. Smolla.

Held: It is unclear whether the agreements actually prevent an arbitrator from awarding treble damages under RICO. This Court's cases have placed different statutory treble damages provisions on different points along the spectrum between purely compensatory and strictly punitive awards.

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003), was a case in which the United States Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause usually limits punitive damage awards to less than ten times the size of the compensatory damages awarded and that punitive damage awards of four times the compensatory damage award is "close to the line of constitutional impropriety".

Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates, P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440 (2003), was a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States on April 22, 2003. The court held that in deciding whether the physician-shareholders should be considered employees for purposes of coverage under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), the common law element of control is the main guidepost.

Held: Section 1367(d)'s application to claims brought against a State's political subdivisions is constitutional. Pp. 461-467. (a) The Court rejects respondent's contention that § 1367(d) is facially invalid because it exceeds Congress's enumerated powers.

Held: The writ of certiorari is dismissed in No. 01-593, as the Dole petitioners did not seek review in this Court of the Ninth Circuit's ruling on the federal common law of foreign relations. P. 472. 2. A foreign state must itself own a majority of a corporation's shares if the corporation is to be deemed an instrumentality of the state under the FSIA.

Franchise Tax Board of California v. Hyatt (short: Hyatt I), 538 U.S. 488 (2003), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court unanimously held that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not require Nevada state courts to give full faith and credit to California statutes that immunize its tax agencies from suit. It was followed by Hyatt II in 2016 and Hyatt III in 2019, ultimately overturning precedent set by the 1979 Supreme Court case, Nevada v. Hall.

Held: An ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim may be brought in a collateral proceeding under § 2255, whether or not the petitioner could have raised the claim on direct appeal.

Held: Section 1226(e) — which states that "[t]he Attorney General's discretionary judgment regarding the application of this section shall not be subject to review" and that "[n]o court may set aside any action or decision by the Attorney General under this section regarding the detention or release of any alien" — does not deprive the federal courts of jurisdiction to grant habeas relief to aliens challenging their…

Held: Consent to a magistrate judge's designation can be inferred from a party's conduct during litigation. Roell's and Garibay's general appearances before the Magistrate Judge, after they had been told of their right to be tried by a district judge, supply the consent necessary for the Magistrate Judge's "civil jurisdiction" under § 636(c)(1).

Held: Consistent with this Court's precedent and the First Amendment, States may maintain fraud actions when fundraisers make false or misleading representations designed to deceive donors about how their donations will be used. The Illinois Attorney General's allegations against Telemarketers therefore state a claim for relief that can survive a motion to dismiss. Pp. 611-624.

Held: Kaupp was arrested within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment before the detectives began to question him.

Held: Respondent did not meet the statutory requirements for habeas relief. The parties do not dispute the underlying facts, and respondent is therefore entitled to relief only if he can demonstrate that the state court's adjudication of his claim was "contrary to" or an "unreasonable application of" this Court's clearly established precedents. 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d)(1).

Held: The judgment is affirmed. 249 F. 3d 66, affirmed.

Held: Section 216(b) does not bar removal of a suit from state to federal court. Breuer's case was properly removed under § 1441. Pp. 694-700. (a) Breuer unquestionably could have begun his action in the District Court under § 216(b), as well as under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and § 1337(a). Removal of FLSA actions is thus prohibited under § 1441(a) only if Congress expressly provided as much.

Inyo County v. Paiute-Shoshone Indians of the Bishop Community, 538 U.S. 701 (2003), was a United States Supreme Court case.

Held: The Due Process Clause does not prohibit an agency from imposing the kind of procedural delay experienced here when holding hearings to consider claims such as David's. The three factors that normally determine whether an individual has received the "process" that the Constitution finds "due" — which were set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 335, and applied in FDIC v. Mallen, 486 U.

Chittister v. Department of Community & Economic Development, 226 F.3d 223 (3rd Cir. 2000) was a U.S. legal case about whether states may be subjected to money damages for failing to comply with the family care provision in the federal Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). A decision by the lower circuit court of appeals in favor of the state was overturned by the Supreme Court of the United States.

Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003), was a decision of the United States Supreme Court, which held that a police officer does not deprive a suspect of constitutional rights by failing to issue a Miranda warning. However, the court held open the possibility that the right to substantive due process could be violated in certain egregious circumstances and remanded the case to the lower court to decide this issue on the case's facts.

Held: The controversy is not yet ripe for judicial resolution. Determining whether administrative action is ripe requires evaluation of (1) the issues' fitness for judicial decision and (2) the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136, 149.

Held: ERISA does not require plan administrators to accord special deference to the opinions of treating physicians. The "treating physician rule" imposed by the Ninth Circuit was originally developed by Courts of Appeals as a means to control disability determinations by administrative law judges under the Social Security Act.

Held: The Florida Supreme Court erred in failing to determine whether the "common pocketknife" exception encompassed Bunkley's pocketknife at the time his conviction became final. The result here is controlled by Fiore v. White, 531 U. S. 225, which involved a Pennsylvania criminal statute that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court interpreted for the first time after Fiore's conviction had already become final.