State v. Yanni

                                                                      Office of the
                                                                          Director        New Mexico
                                                                                          Compilation
                                                                       2023.10.31         Commission
                                                                  '00'06- 16:36:15
          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

Opinion Number: 

Filing Date: August 22, 2023

No. A-1-CA-40354

STATE OF NEW MEXICO,

      Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

LUANNE YANNI,

      Defendant-Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE METROPOLITAN COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY
Maria Dominguez, Metropolitan Court Judge

Raúl Torrez, Attorney General
Emily C. Tyson-Jorgenson, Assistant Attorney General
Santa Fe, NM

for Appellee

Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender
Joelle N. Gonzales, Assistant Appellate Defender
Santa Fe, NM

for Appellant

                                       OPINION

BUSTAMANTE, Judge, retired, sitting by designation.

{1}     After a bench trial, Defendant Luanne Yanni was convicted in metropolitan court
of driving while under the influence of drugs, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 66-8-
102(B) (2016). Defendant presents a two-part challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence on appeal. First, Defendant contends that the State did not present sufficient
evidence to establish that she drove a vehicle the day she was arrested; therefore,
Defendant argues, the corpus delicti of the offense was not established. Second,
Defendant submits that the State did not present sufficient evidence to establish she
was impaired by drugs or that such impairment was to a degree that she could not
safely operate a motor vehicle. We agree with Defendant on the first issue and we
reverse.

BACKGROUND

{2}     Officer Shatto arrived at the parking lot where the events of this case unfolded
around 5:00 p.m. He testified at trial that he was dispatched to the scene in response to
a 911 call that reported a vehicle collision at the parking lot. Neither the call nor the
identity of the caller was ever verified or entered into evidence. Upon Officer Shatto’s
arrival, he observed Defendant standing alone, and he testified that other individuals at
the scene informed him that Defendant may have been involved in the reported
incident. None of these individuals testified at trial. Officer Shatto stated that he
approached Defendant and asked what she was doing and why she was present at the
scene. Officer Shatto stated that Defendant admitted to having driven a U-Haul truck
into two parked vehicles, and she physically pointed at the two vehicles in the parking
lot. Defendant further informed Officer Shatto that her brother had driven the U-Haul
truck away from the parking lot after the collision. Officer Shatto did not observe the U-
Haul truck at the scene and he did not closely examine the vehicles nor observe
whether there was any physical damage to them as a result of the collision. Rather,
Officer Shatto stated that his attention was predominantly focused on Defendant and
another officer at the scene, Officer Weatherspoon, was investigating the vehicles.
Officer Weatherspoon was not called to testify, and the findings from his purported
investigation were not admitted into evidence.

{3}    Officer Shatto testified that Defendant presented signs of intoxication during their
interaction. In response, Officer Shatto conducted a driving while intoxicated (DWI)
investigation. During the investigation, Defendant admitted to smoking marijuana and
taking two oxycodone pills earlier that morning. Following the investigation, Officer
Shatto placed Defendant under arrest for driving while under the influence of drugs.

{4}     After a bench trial, the metropolitan court found Defendant guilty of violating
Section 66-8-102(B). At trial, the court specifically noted in its oral findings that the State
presented “an admission [to crashing the U-Haul truck,] . . . the officer’s observations,
[an] admission [to] taking OxyContin and smoking marijuana . . . the [Defendant’s]
refusal to [consent to a breath] test . . . and then the fact [that Defendant was] incapable
of driving given that she did crash into vehicles.” The court further noted that it “cannot
speculate, but [it] can use [its] common sense.” Defendant appealed.

DISCUSSION

I.     Standard of Review

{5}    When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we assess
“whether substantial evidence of either a direct or circumstantial nature exists to support
a verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to every element essential to
a conviction.” State v. Montoya, 

, 

 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). “We view the evidence in the light most favorable
to supporting the verdict and resolve all conflicts and indulge all permissible inferences
in favor of upholding the verdict.” State v. Morrison, 

, 

, 

 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We do not “weigh the
evidence [or] substitute [our] judgment for that of the fact[-]finder so long as there is
sufficient evidence to support the verdict.” State v. Sutphin, 

, ¶ 21, 

, 

. “We review de novo any claim that the State failed to prove
the corpus delicti of the charged offense.” State v. Bregar, 

, 

. However, to the extent that the underlying facts are disputed, we must defer
to the determinations of the fact-finder, provided such findings are supported by
substantial evidence. State v. Wilson, 

, 

, 

, overruled on other grounds by State v. Tollardo, 

, ¶ 37 n.6, 

.

II.    The State Failed to Establish the Corpus Delicti of Driving

{6}    The metropolitan court found Defendant guilty of driving while under the influence
of drugs in violation of Section 66-8-102(B). In order to do so, it was required to find, in
relevant part, that Defendant operated a motor vehicle. See UJI 14-4502 NMRA.
Defendant claims that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to establish the
corpus delicti of driving under the influence of drugs. Specifically, Defendant argues that
the State failed to supply evidence outside of extrajudicial statements to establish that
she operated a motor vehicle, thereby violating New Mexico’s modified trustworthiness
rule.

{7}    Our state’s modified trustworthiness rule provides that “a defendant’s
extrajudicial statements may be used to establish the corpus delicti when the
prosecution is able to demonstrate the trustworthiness of the confession and introduce
some independent evidence of a criminal act.” State v. Martinez, 

, 

 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, a defendant’s
admission alone cannot sustain a conviction without independent, corroborating
evidence of that criminal act. State v. Weisser, 

, 

, 

, abrogated on other grounds as recognized by Bregar, 

; see 

 (holding that multiple extrajudicial admissions does not establish the
trustworthiness of statements by a defendant for the corpus delicti rule). “This
independent evidence can consist of either direct or circumstantial evidence, but such
evidence must be independent of a defendant’s own extrajudicial statements.” Martinez,

 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

{8}    The State argues it presented the following evidence at trial to corroborate
Defendant’s admission that she operated a motor vehicle: a 911 call was made that
reported a vehicle collision at the parking lot; Defendant was physically present at the
parking lot when Officer Shatto arrived; Officer Shatto observed the cars Defendant
claimed to hit; and Officer Shatto observed a crash investigation being conducted by
Officer Weatherspoon. We must review the record to determine whether the State
presented sufficient independent evidence to corroborate Defendant’s admission that
she drove and crashed a U-Haul truck into two parked vehicles.

{9}    We start with the State’s claim that the 911 call was corroborating evidence. The
911 call was admitted into evidence to explain why Officer Shatto was located at the
parking lot and to inform the metropolitan court as to his then-existing state of mind.
Apart from this, the call was hearsay and inadmissible to prove Defendant drove and
crashed a U-Haul truck. See Rule 11-801(C) NMRA (stating hearsay is a statement the
declarant makes while testifying at trial that a party offers to prove the truth of the matter
asserted); Rule 11-802 NMRA (stating hearsay is inadmissible unless a valid exception
applies). “Inadmissible evidence by itself is insufficient to admit a confession” for
purposes of establishing the corpus delicti. State v. Hardy, 

, 

 (emphasis added); see State v. Powers, 

 (Wash. Ct.
App. 2004) (holding that the corpus delicti was not established because only
inadmissible evidence corroborated the defendant’s admission) (cited with approval in
Hardy, 

).

{10} The State also submits that Defendant’s physical presence at the scene of the
reported collision effectively corroborates her admission. Our appellate courts have
recognized that a defendant’s presence at the scene of an accident can corroborate
their admission to driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol—even when the
arresting officer does not directly observe the defendant’s driving. See State v. Owelicio,

, 

, 

 (holding that the defendant’s
admission to driving while intoxicated was corroborated by circumstantial evidence that
the defendant and a third party who denied driving were the only people in the vicinity of
a disabled vehicle); Bregar, 

 (holding that the defendant’s
admission to driving while intoxicated was corroborated by evidence that the defendant
was the only licensed driver at the scene, there were photos indicating the driver’s seat
of the vehicle was reclined significantly, and the defendant had a leg brace which
required the seat to be significantly reclined for her to drive); see also State v. Mailman,

, 

, 

 (concluding that the
defendant’s admission to recently driving after consuming alcohol was supported in part
by his presence behind the wheel of a parked vehicle).

{11} Although the arresting officer did not witness the defendant drive in any of these
cases, the defendant was always in close proximity to the vehicle that they admitted to
driving or other circumstances linked the defendants to driving the vehicle. See
Owelicio, 

 (considering that the defendant was present in the
vehicle, she and one other person were the only people in the vicinity, the other person
denied driving, and the car was disabled in a way that indicated impaired driving);
Bregar, 

 (noting that the defendant was found on the ground
near a crashed vehicle and that the driver’s seat was reclined in a way that inferred the
defendant was driving); Mailman, 

 (noting that the defendant
was found sitting in the driver’s seat of the vehicle). By contrast, Defendant in this case
was found alone and the vehicle she admitted to driving was not at the scene or nearby.
No witness testimony indicated Defendant operated a motor vehicle in the parking lot.
Nothing in the record suggests that the vehicle Defendant was alleged to have driven
was found or associated with Defendant in any capacity. While we agree Defendant
was present in the parking lot, the State must provide additional evidence connecting
Defendant to the commission of the crime. As such, Defendant’s presence at the
parking lot alone is only corroborative of her admission insofar as the State has
otherwise established that a collision occurred there.

{12} The State also proffers the testimony of one of the investigating officers. Officer
Shatto testified that he observed Officer Weatherspoon investigating the vehicles
Defendant claimed to hit, and that he did not closely examine the vehicles nor observe
whether there was any physical damage to them as a result of the collision. As to the
vehicles, the State did not seek testimony from Officer Weatherspoon, and Officer
Shatto did not testify as to any of the circumstances of Officer Weatherspoon’s
investigation or the physical status of the struck vehicles. Thus, no admissible testimony
other than Defendant’s confession was presented as to a collision between a vehicle
driven by Defendant and the two other vehicles.

{13} With the State’s failure to produce either the findings from Officer
Weatherspoon’s crash investigation or any additional witness testimony, Officer Shatto’s
observations are the only available evidence connecting the collision to the parking lot.
Yet, Officer Shatto’s mere observation of the crash investigation being conducted—
without any information as to the investigation’s findings—provides no information as to
whether the vehicles were impacted in a manner indicative of a collision or impaired
driving. To infer from Officer Shatto’s testimony that Defendant drove and crashed a
motor vehicle, a fact-finder would have to speculate that the physical status of the
vehicles was indicative of a collision or impaired driving, which we cannot permit. See
State v. Vigil, 

, 

, 

 (“For the [fact-finder]
to have reached the conclusions necessary to the verdict, it had to speculate. This it
may not do.” (alterations, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted)).

{14} The evidence presented by the State lacks operative facts that would link the
charged offense to Defendant’s admission. Outside of Defendant’s extrajudicial
statement, there is no evidence that the two parked vehicles were damaged, that a
collision occurred in the parking lot, or that Defendant ever was in the vicinity of—much
less operated—the vehicle she purportedly crashed. When we evaluate the
trustworthiness of a defendant’s extrajudicial statement, we “look not at the
circumstances surrounding the statement, but instead at the actual content of the
statement and evidence that corroborates the information contained in the statement.”
Owelicio, 

. The metropolitan court, as the fact-finder in this case,
could not infer the trustworthiness of Defendant’s admission without an impermissible
reliance on circumstances surrounding her extrajudicial statements.

{15} For the foregoing reasons, the State has failed to present sufficient evidence to
establish the corpus delicti of driving under Section 66-8-102(B). Because the corpus
delicti of driving was not established, we need not address Defendant’s second
argument on appeal. See State v. Consaul, 

, 

(reversing the defendant’s conviction and ordering the charge be dismissed with
prejudice after concluding the conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence).

CONCLUSION

{16} For the foregoing reasons, we reverse and remand with instructions to vacate
Defendant’s conviction for driving under the influence of drugs and dismiss the charges
against her.

{17}   IT IS SO ORDERED.

MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge,
retired, sitting by designation

WE CONCUR:

ZACHARY A. IVES, Judge

SHAMMARA H. HENDERSON, Judge