¶1dissenting.
¶2Mr. Justice Montemuro’s well-reasoned opinion notwithstanding, I must dissent. Fundamentally at issue in this case is whether juries are to have the freedom to believe all, part or none of the evidence presented at trial, as we instruct them they are free to do, or whether, in fact, they must believe at least so much of the evidence as we, the appellate courts, say they must believe. Because juries must, in my view, retain their freedom to evaluate the evidence and to accept or reject it as they see fit, I would not award a new trial on damages in this case. The jury here has evaluated the evidence and has spoken as to damages. We should not interfere.
¶3I agree with Mr. Justice Montemuro that this case is different from Catalano in that here there was no evidence presented to refute the expert’s opinion as to the decedent’s future earnings, whereas in Catalano there was evidence presented to controvert Catalano’s claim of damages. But if this difference controls the case, then we need not even have trials in cases like this. The plaintiff need only produce expert opinion of lost earnings and pain and suffering, and if the defendant has no evidence to controvert such expert opinion, the court’s only remaining task would be to enter judgment in the amount of the expert opinion. Any other result, we might say, would “shock the conscience.”
¶4The sum of the problem is that existing caselaw, which Mr. Justice Montemuro has so ably summarized, has presented us with an anomaly: it has simultaneously held that juries may not be restricted in their evaluation of evidence and also that when juries reject evidence which appellate courts would not reject, the appellate court’s evaluation of the evidence must *236prevail. I believe that this result needlessly undermines the function of trial by jury, and I would overrule existing caselaw to the extent necessary to restore to juries the traditional authority to evaluate the evidence as they see fit.