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← 546 U.S. 333 - Rice v. Collins

Rice v. Collins’s Empirical Analysis

2006

Citation profile

1,140
cited by 1,140 later decisions
10
cited 10 times by the Supreme Court
27
states following
May 2026
most recently cited

368 federal appellate · 21 district · 337 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 1,140 later decisions (10 by the Supreme Court) — most recently May 2026 · most notably Davis v. Ayala (2015), 950 So. 2d 583 - State v. Draughn (2007)

368 federal appellate · 21 district · 337 state decisions — followed in 27 states

7260200620102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Appellate journey

reviewedCollins v. Rice (from Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals)

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)

Relies on Batson v. Kentucky · Swain v. State of Alabama · Hernandez v. New York · Purkett v. Elem · JEB v. Alabama Ex Rel. TB

Cited together with Batson v. Kentucky · Miller-El v. Dretke · Hernandez v. New York · Purkett v. Elem · Williams v. Taylor

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 1,140 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “A defendant’s Batson challenge to a peremptory strike requires a three-step inquiry. First, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has made a prima facie showing that the prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge on the basis of race. Second, if the showing is made, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to present a race-neutral explanation for striking the juror in question. Although the prosecutor must present a comprehensible reason, the second step of this process does not demand an explanation that is persuasive, or even plausible; so long as the reason is not inherently discriminatory, it suffices. Third, the court must then determine whether the defendant has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination. This final step involves evaluating the persuasiveness of the justification proffered by the prosecutor, but the ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike. [Internal quotations and citations omitted.]”
    16 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “The trial judge is best placed to consider the factors that underlie credibility: demeanor, context, and atmosphere. And the trial judge is best placed to determine whether, in a borderline case, a prosecutor's hesitation or contradiction reflect (a) deception, or (b) the difficulty of providing a rational reason for an instinctive decision. Appellate judges cannot on the basis of a cold record easily second-guess a trial judge's decision about likely motivation. These circumstances mean that appellate courts will, and must, grant the trial courts considerable leeway in applying Batson.”
    10 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “[t]he second step of this process does not demand an explanation that is persuasive or even plausible”
    10 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.