546 US 333 Rice v Collins

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Case TextSyllabus

RICE, WARDEN, et al. v. COLLINS

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the ninth circuit

No. 04—52. Argued December 5, 2005–Decided January 18, 2006

After the prosecutor struck a young, African-American woman, Juror 16,
from the panel at respondent Collins’ state-court drug trial, Collins objected
that the strike was made on account of Juror 16’s race. As raceneutral
explanations for the strike, the prosecutor said that Juror 16
had rolled her eyes in response to a question from the court; that she
was young and might be too tolerant of a drug crime; and that she was
single and lacked ties to the community. In rejecting Collins’ challenge,
the trial court declared that it did not observe the complained-of demeanor
by Juror 16, but noted that she was youthful, as was a white
male juror also dismissed by peremptory challenge, and stated it would
give the prosecutor “the benefit of the doubt.” The prosecutor had also
referred to Juror 16’s gender in explaining the strike, but the trial court
disallowed any reliance on that ground. The California Court of Appeal
upheld the conviction and the trial court’s ruling on the peremptory
challenge, finding that the prosecutor permissibly excluded Juror 16
based on her youth. Even if youth was not a legitimate reason to exercise
a peremptory challenge, said the court, Juror 16’s demeanor supported
the strike; nothing in the record suggested the trial court failed
to conduct a searching inquiry of the prosecutor’s reasons for striking
her. The California Supreme Court denied review. The Federal District
Court dismissed Collins’ habeas petition with prejudice, but the
Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, concluding that, under the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), the State
Court of Appeal’s affirmance was based on an unreasonable factual determination
in light of the evidence presented at trial.

Held: The Ninth Circuit’s attempt to use a set of debatable inferences to
set aside the state court’s conclusion does not satisfy AEDPA’s requirements
for granting habeas relief. Pp. 338—342.

(a) Under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79, 98, a defendant’s challenge
to a peremptory strike allegedly based on race requires, inter
alia, that the trial court determine whether the defendant has carried
his burden of proving purposeful discrimination. This involves evaluating
“the persuasiveness of the [prosecutor’s proffered] justification” for
the strike, but “the ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation
rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike.”

Syllabus

Purkett v. Elem, 514 U. S. 765, 768. Because, under AEDPA, a federal
habeas court must find the state-court conclusion “an unreasonable determination
of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State
court proceeding,” 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d)(2), a federal court can only grant
Collins’ petition if it was unreasonable to credit the prosecutor’s raceneutral
explanations for the Batson challenge. P. 338.

(b) Though the Ninth Circuit recited the proper standard of review,
it improperly substituted its evaluation of the record for that of the
state trial court, which, under § 2254(d)(2), did not make an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. Noting
that the trial court had not witnessed Juror 16’s purported eye rolling,
the Ninth Circuit concluded that no reasonable factfinder could have
accepted the prosecutor’s rendition of the alleged incident because the
prosecutor had completely undermined her own credibility based on
three considerations: her erroneous statement that another prospective
African-American juror, Juror 19, was “young” when, in fact, she was a
grandmother; the prosecutor’s improper attempt to use gender as a
basis for exclusion; and the Court of Appeals’ skepticism toward the
prosecutor’s explanation that she struck Juror 16 in part because of her
youth and lack of ties to the community. As to the first reason, because
the prosecutor’s reference to Juror 19’s youth occurred during a discussion
of three prospective jurors, two of whom were, indeed, young, it is
quite plausible that the prosecutor simply misspoke. It is a tenuous
inference to say that an accidental reference with respect to one juror
undermines the prosecutor’s credibility with respect to another. Second,
the Ninth Circuit assigned the prosecutor’s reference to Juror 16’s
gender more weight than it can bear, given that the prosecutor provided
a number of other permissible and plausible race-neutral reasons for
excluding her. Collins provides no argument why this matter demonstrates
that a reasonable factfinder must conclude the prosecutor lied
about the eye rolling and struck Juror 16 based on her race. Finally,
even if the prosecutor’s concerns about Juror 16’s youth and lack of
community ties were overly cautious, her wariness could be seen as race
neutral, for she used a peremptory strike on a white male juror, Juror
6, with the same characteristics. Viewing the foregoing concerns together,
the most generous reading would suggest only that the trial
court had reason to question the prosecutor’s credibility regarding Juror
16’s alleged improper demeanor. That does not, however, compel the
conclusion that the trial court had no permissible alternative but to reject
the prosecutor’s race-neutral justifications and conclude Collins had
shown a Batson violation. Reasonable minds reviewing the record
might disagree about the prosecutor’s credibility, but on habeas review

Opinion of the Court

that does not suffice to supersede the trial court’s credibility determina

tion. Pp. 339—342.
365 F. 3d 667, reversed and remanded.

Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Breyer,
J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Souter, J., joined, post, p. 342.

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General of California, argued the
cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Manuel

M. Medeiros, State Solicitor General, Robert R. Anderson,
Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka,
Senior Assistant Attorney General, Kristofer Jorstad, Deputy
Attorney General, Erika D. Jackson, Deputy Attorney
General, and Donald E. De Nicola, Deputy Solicitor General.

Mark R. Drozdowski, by appointment of the Court, post,

p. 807, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the
brief were Maria E. Stratton and Karyn H. Bucur.*

Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court.

Concerned that, in this habeas corpus case, a federal court
set aside reasonable state-court determinations of fact in
favor of its own debatable interpretation of the record, we
granted certiorari. Our review confirms that the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit erred, misapplying settled
rules that limit its role and authority.

*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Arizona
et al. by Brian Sandoval, Attorney General of Nevada, David K.
Neidert, Senior Deputy Attorney General, by Christopher L. Morano,
Chief State’s Attorney of Connecticut, and by the Attorneys General for
their respective States as follows: Terry Goddard of Arizona, John W.
Suthers of Colorado, Lawrence G. Wasden of Idaho, Tom Miller of Iowa,
Thomas F. Reilly of Massachusetts, Mike Cox of Michigan, Jim Petro of
Ohio, Hardy Meyers of Oregon, Henry D. McMaster of South Carolina,
Larry Long of South Dakota, Paul G. Summers of Tennessee, Greg Abbott
of Texas, Mark L. Shurtleff of Utah, and Rob McKenna of Washington;
and for the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation by Kent S. Scheidegger and
Charles L. Hobson.

Opinion of the Court

I

After a 4-day trial in the Superior Court of California for
the County of Los Angeles, a jury convicted Steven Martell
Collins on one count of possessing cocaine. The conviction
was all the more serious because it subjected him to California’s
three strikes rule for sentencing. The question at issue
in this federal habeas corpus action, however, is the California
courts’ rejection of Collins’ argument that the prosecutor
struck a young, African-American woman, Juror 16, from the
panel on account of her race. A second African-American
juror was also the subject of a peremptory strike, and although
Collins challenged that strike in the trial court, on
appeal he objected only to the excusal of Juror 16.

Even prior to this Court’s decision in Batson v. Kentucky,
476 U. S. 79 (1986), California courts barred peremptory challenges
to jurors based on race. People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal.
3d 258, 583 P. 2d 748 (1978). Although our recent decision
in Johnson v. California, 545 U. S. 162 (2005), disapproved
of the manner in which Wheeler and Batson were implemented
in some California cases, the state courts in this case
used the correct analytical framework in considering and ruling
upon the objection to the prosecutorial strike.

As race-neutral explanations for striking Juror 16, the
prosecutor said that Juror 16 had rolled her eyes in response
to a question from the court; that Juror 16 was young and
might be too tolerant of a drug crime; and that Juror 16 was
single and lacked ties to the community. A further, more
troubling part of the prosecutor’s unorganized explanation
was her reference to Juror 16’s gender. The trial court, correctly,
disallowed any reliance on that ground. The trial
court, furthermore, which had the benefit of observing the
prosecutor firsthand over the course of the proceedings, rejected
Collins’ challenge.

“With regard to 016, the court, frankly, did not observe
the demeanor of Ms. 016 that was complained of by

Opinion of the Court

the District Attorney; however, Ms. 016 was a youthful
person, as was [a white male juror the prosecutor also
dismissed by peremptory challenge]. And one or more
prospective jurors also.

“The Court is prepared to give the District Attorney
the benefit of the doubt as to Ms. 016.” 2 App. 14—15.

The California Court of Appeal upheld the conviction and
the trial court’s ruling on the peremptory challenge. People

v. Collins, No. B106939 (Dec. 12, 1997), App. H to Pet. for
Cert. 112—117. In its view, youth was a legitimate reason
to exercise a peremptory challenge; and, even if it were not,
Juror 16’s demeanor also supported the strike. Id., at 116.
According to its review of the record, nothing suggested the
trial court failed to conduct a searching inquiry of the prosecutor’s
reasons for striking Juror 16. Id., at 116—117. The
appeals court thus upheld the trial court’s ultimate conclusion
to credit the prosecutor. Ibid. Without comment, the
Supreme Court of California denied Collins’ petition for review.
App. F, id., at 96.

Collins sought collateral relief on this claim in federal
court. The United States District Court for the Central
District of California dismissed with prejudice Collins’ petition
for a writ of habeas corpus. App. D, id., at91. Adivided
panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reversed and remanded with instructions to grant the petition.
348 F. 3d 1082 (2003), amended and superseded by 365

F. 3d 667 (2004). Noting that the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) governed Collins’
petition, the panel majority concluded that it was an unreasonable
factual determination to credit the prosecutor’s
race-neutral reasons for striking Juror 16. Id., at 679.
Judge Hall dissented, id., at 687—691; and later, over the dissent
of five judges, the Court of Appeals declined to rehear
the case en banc, id., at 670—673. Though it recited the
proper standard of review, the panel majority improperly
substituted its evaluation of the record for that of the state

Opinion of the Court

trial court. We granted the petition for certiorari, 545 U. S.
1151 (2005), and now reverse.

II

A defendant’s Batson challenge to a peremptory strike
requires a three-step inquiry. First, the trial court must
determine whether the defendant has made a prima facie
showing that the prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge
on the basis of race. 476 U. S., at 96—97. Second, if
the showing is made, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to
present a race-neutral explanation for striking the juror in
question. Id., at 97—98. Although the prosecutor must
present a comprehensible reason, “[t]he second step of this
process does not demand an explanation that is persuasive,
or even plausible”; so long as the reason is not inherently
discriminatory, it suffices. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U. S. 765,
767—768 (1995) (per curiam). Third, the court must then
determine whether the defendant has carried his burden of
proving purposeful discrimination. Batson, supra, at 98.
This final step involves evaluating “the persuasiveness of the
justification” proffered by the prosecutor, but “the ultimate
burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with,
and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike.” Purkett,
supra, at 768.

On direct appeal in federal court, the credibility findings a
trial court makes in a Batson inquiry are reviewed for clear
error. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U. S. 352, 364—366 (1991)
(plurality opinion) (holding that evaluation of a prosecutor’s
credibility “lies ‘peculiarly within a trial judge’s province’ ”).
Under AEDPA, however, a federal habeas court must find
the state-court conclusion “an unreasonable determination of
the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court
proceeding.” 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d)(2). Thus, a federal habeas
court can only grant Collins’ petition if it was unreasonable
to credit the prosecutor’s race-neutral explanations for
the Batson challenge. State-court factual findings, more

Opinion of the Court

over, are presumed correct; the petitioner has the burden of
rebutting the presumption by “clear and convincing evidence.”
§ 2254(e)(1). See Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U. S.
231, 240 (2005). Although the Ninth Circuit assumed
§ 2254(e)(1)’s presumption applied in this case, 365 F. 3d, at
677, the parties disagree about whether and when it does.
We need not address that question. Even assuming, arguendo,
that only § 2254(d)(2) applied in this proceeding, the
state-court decision was not an unreasonable determination
of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state
court.

Because the California Court of Appeal accepted the trial
court’s credibility finding, the panel majority inquired
whether the appellate court made an unreasonable factual
determination. See id., at 682. The panel majority’s analysis
and conclusions, however, depended entirely on its view
of the trial court’s credibility holding. The panel majority
found no error in the trial court’s proceedings or rulings in
the first two steps of the Batson inquiry. 365 F. 3d, at 677—

678. It disagreed, however, with the trial court’s conclusions
on the third step, holding that it was unreasonable to
accept the prosecutor’s explanation that Juror 16 was excused
on account of her youth and her demeanor. Id., at
678—687. We conclude the Ninth Circuit erred, for the trial
court’s credibility determination was not unreasonable.

Noting that the trial court had not witnessed Juror 16’s
purported eye rolling, the panel majority concluded that no
reasonable factfinder could have accepted the prosecutor’s
rendition of the alleged incident because the prosecutor’s
conduct completely undermined her credibility. Id., at 683.
Having before it only the trial court record, the Court of
Appeals majority drew this conclusion based on three considerations:
first, the prosecutor’s erroneous statement concerning
another prospective African-American juror’s age; second,
the prosecutor’s improper attempt to use gender as a
basis for exclusion; and third, the majority’s skepticism to

Opinion of the Court

ward the prosecutor’s explanation that she struck Juror 16
in part because of her youth and lack of ties to the community.
Id., at 683—684.

The first reason the panel majority noted for rejecting the
trial court’s credibility finding pertained not to Juror 16,
the subject of Collins’ claim on appeal, but to another prospective
African-American juror, Juror 19. The prosecutor
referred to Juror 19 as “young” even though she was a
grandmother. This reference to youth took place during a
discussion about three prospective jurors, Jurors 6, 16, and

19. Jurors 6 and 16 were both young. As Judge Hall observed,
it is quite plausible that the prosecutor simply misspoke
with respect to a juror’s numerical designation, an
error defense counsel may also have committed. Id., at 688;
2 App. 9. It is a tenuous inference to say that an accidental
reference with respect to one juror, Juror 19, undermines the
prosecutor’s credibility with respect to Juror 16. Seizing on
what can plausibly be viewed as an innocent transposition
makes little headway toward the conclusion that the prosecutor’s
explanation was clearly not credible.

Second, the panel majority concluded that the trial court
should have questioned the prosecutor’s credibility because
of her “attempt to use gender as a race-neutral basis for excluding
Jurors 016 and 019.” 365 F. 3d, at 684. Respondent’s
trial occurred in August 1996, over two years after our
decision in J. E. B. v. Alabama ex rel. T. B., 511 U. S. 127
(1994), made clear that discrimination in jury selection on
the basis of gender violates the Equal Protection Clause.
Although the record contains a somewhat confusing colloquy
on this point, it can be read as indicating that one of the
prosecutor’s aims in striking Juror 16 was achieving gender
balance on the jury. Concerned about the constitutionality
of such a strike, the trial court made clear that it would not
accept gender as a race-neutral explanation. The panel majority
assigned the gender justification more weight than it

Opinion of the Court

can bear. The prosecutor provided a number of other permissible
and plausible race-neutral reasons, and Collins provides
no argument why this portion of the colloquy demonstrates
that a reasonable factfinder must conclude the
prosecutor lied about the eye rolling and struck Juror 16
based on her race.

Finally, the panel majority believed to be unsupportable
the prosecutor’s stated concern that Juror 16 might, as a
young and single citizen with no ties to the community, be
too tolerant of the crime with which respondent was charged.
365 F. 3d, at 680—682, 684. This was so, the majority concluded,
because during voir dire Juror 16 replied affirmatively
when asked if she believed the crime with which respondent
was charged should be illegal and disclaimed any
other reason she could not be impartial. Id., at 680. That
the prosecutor claimed to hold such concerns despite Juror
16’s voir dire averments does not establish that she offered
a pretext. It is not unreasonable to believe the prosecutor
remained worried that a young person with few ties to the
community might be less willing than an older, more permanent
resident to impose a lengthy sentence for possessing a
small amount of a controlled substance. Accord, id., at 690
(Hall, J., dissenting). Even if the prosecutor was overly cautious
in this regard, her wariness of the young and the rootless
could be seen as race neutral, for she used a peremptory
strike on a white male juror, Juror 6, with the same characteristics.
2 App. 5, 14.

Viewing the panel majority’s concerns together, the most
generous reading would suggest only that the trial court
had reason to question the prosecutor’s credibility regarding
Juror 16’s alleged improper demeanor. That does not,
however, compel the conclusion that the trial court had no
permissible alternative but to reject the prosecutor’s raceneutral
justifications and conclude Collins had shown a
Batson violation. Reasonable minds reviewing the record

Breyer, J., concurring

might disagree about the prosecutor’s credibility, but on habeas
review that does not suffice to supersede the trial
court’s credibility determination.

The panel majority did not stop at the conclusion that the
trial court rendered an unreasonable factual determination
in light of the evidence presented. It further concluded that
the state courts had unreasonably applied clearly established
federal law as determined by this Court. 365 F. 3d, at 679;
28 U. S. C. § 2254(d)(1). The question whether a state court
errs in determining the facts is a different question from
whether it errs in applying the law. In this case there is no
demonstration that either the trial court or the California
Court of Appeal acted contrary to clearly established federal
law in recognizing and applying Batson’s burden-framework.
See 2 App. 14—15; App. H to Pet. for Cert. 114—116. The
only question, as we have noted, is whether the trial court’s
factual determination at Batson’s third step was unreasonable.
For the reasons discussed above, we conclude it
was not.

III

The panel majority’s attempt to use a set of debatable inferences
to set aside the conclusion reached by the state
court does not satisfy AEDPA’s requirements for granting
a writ of habeas corpus. The judgment of the Court of
Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Souter joins,
concurring.

Twenty years ago Justice Thurgood Marshall warned that
the test of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (1986), would fail
to ferret out unconstitutional discrimination in the selection
of jurors. Id., at 102—103 (concurring opinion) (“The decision
today will not end the racial discrimination that peremptories
inject into the jury-selection process”). In my view,

Breyer, J., concurring

history has proved Justice Marshall right. See Miller-El v.
Dretke, 545 U. S. 231, 266—267 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring).
And today’s case, like Miller-El, helps to illustrate
Batson’s fundamental failings.

For one thing, the prosecutor’s inability in this case to provide
a clear explanation of why she exercised her peremptory
challenges may well reflect the more general fact that
the exercise of a peremptory challenge can rest upon instinct
not reason. Insofar as Batson asks prosecutors to explain
the unexplainable, how can it succeed? Miller-El, 545 U. S.,
at 267—268 (Breyer, J., concurring).

For another thing, the trial judge’s uncertainty about the
legal validity of the exercise of peremptory challenges in this
case may reflect the more general fact that, sometimes, no
one, not even the lawyer herself, can be certain whether a
decision to exercise a peremptory challenge rests upon an
impermissible racial, religious, gender-based, or ethnic stereotype.
Ibid. See also Batson, supra, at 106 (Marshall,
J., concurring) (noting unconscious internalization of racial
stereotypes). How can trial judges second-guess an instinctive
judgment the underlying basis for which may be a form
of stereotyping invisible even to the prosecutor? Miller-El,
supra, at 267—268 (Breyer, J., concurring).

Finally, the case before us makes clear that ordinary mechanisms
of judicial review cannot ensure Batson’s effectiveness.
The reasons are structural. The trial judge is best
placed to consider the factors that underlie credibility: demeanor,
context, and atmosphere. And the trial judge is
best placed to determine whether, in a borderline case, a
prosecutor’s hesitation or contradiction reflect (a) deception,
or (b) the difficulty of providing a rational reason for an instinctive
decision. Appellate judges cannot on the basis of
a cold record easily second-guess a trial judge’s decision
about likely motivation. These circumstances mean that appellate
courts will, and must, grant the trial courts considerable
leeway in applying Batson. See Hernandez v. New

Breyer, J., concurring

York, 500 U. S. 352 (1991). As the present case illustrates,
considerations of federalism require federal habeas courts to
show yet further deference to state-court judgments. See
28 U. S. C. § 2254(d)(2) (state-court factual determination
must stand unless “unreasonable”).

The upshot is an unresolvable tension between, on the one
hand, what Blackstone called an inherently “ ‘arbitrary and
capricious’ ” peremptory challenge system, Miller-El, supra,
at272 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting 4 W. Blackstone,
Commentaries on the Laws of England 346 (1769)), and, on
the other hand, the Constitution’s nondiscrimination command.
Given this constitutional tension, we may have to
choose. Miller-El, supra, at 273 (Breyer, J., concurring);
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 202, 244 (1965) (Goldberg, J.,
dissenting) (“Were it necessary to make an absolute choice
between the right of a defendant to have a jury chosen in
conformity with the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment
and the right to challenge peremptorily, the Constitution
compels a choice of the former”); Batson, supra, at 107
(Marshall, J., concurring) (same).

I have argued that legal life without peremptories is
no longer unthinkable. Miller-El, supra, at 272 (concurring
opinion) (citing, inter alia, the experience of England).
I continue to believe that we should reconsider Batson’s test
and the peremptory challenge system as a whole. Nonetheless,
because the Court correctly applies the present legal
framework, I concur in its opinion.

546 U.S. 333 - Rice v Collins

546 US 333 Rice v Collins