552 So. 2d 879 - Young v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

14 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 14 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “'[P]robation revocation proceedings may properly be initiated after the actual probation period has expired where there has been no formal discharge from probation.'”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Smitherman v. State · 589 So. 2d 790 - McCaskey v. State

2. ““We begin by noting that a probationary period does not end until: (1) the probationer satisfactorily fulfills all the conditions of probation and the actual probationary term ordered by the court expires, see § 15-22-54(a), Ala.Code 1975 (“When the conditions of probation or suspension of sentence are fulfilled, the court shall, by order duly entered on its minutes, discharge the defendant.’), and Rule 27.3(c), Ala. R.Crim. P. (‘Probation automatically terminates upon successful completion of the term of probation set by the court’); (2) if the probationer has not satisfactorily fulfilled all the conditions of probation, the maximum period of probation allowed by law expires, see § 15-22-54(a), Ala. Code 1975 (‘in no case shall ... the maximum probation period of a defendant guilty of a felony exceed five years’); or (3) the probationer is formally discharged from probation by the court, see § 15-22-54(b), Ala.Code 1975 (‘The court granting probation may, upon the recommendation of the officer supervising the probationer, terminate all authority and supervision over the probationer prior to the declared date of completion of probation upon showing a continued satisfactory compliance with the conditions of probation over a sufficient portion of the period of probation.’), and Rule 27.3(b), Ala. R.Crim. P. (‘At any time during a term of probation, the sentencing court may terminate probation and discharge the probationer absolutely, after notice to the prosecutor. Early termin”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Jones v. State

3. “"If . . . the probationer is not at liberty when his probation violation is discovered, and he is already in lawful custody as a result of some other proceeding (such as an arrest for another offense), the method of detention authorized by § 15-22-54 (c) or (d) is 'not necessary under the circumstances to secure [his] arrest.' Jent v. State , 495 So.2d 123 , 125 (Ala.Cr.App. 1986) (wherein custody of probationer was lawfully obtained by virtue of § 15-10-3 , a warrantless arrest upon probable cause to believe that probationer had committed felony assault). Compare Jordan v. State , 481 P.2d 185 (Okla.Cr.App. 1971), wherein the court held that failure to comply with a statute (similar to § 15-22-54 ) directing issuance of a probation violation warrant did not divest the court of jurisdiction to revoke. The Jordan court noted: " 'It is true that [the statute] sets out a procedure by which the Division of Probation and Parole can issue a warrant for the arrest of a probationer. . . . However, we find no indication from the statutes that this was intended to be an exclusive method to arrest and confine a probationer when revocation . . . is sought.' 481 P.2d at 186 . "Sections 15-22-54 (c) and (d) provide a method of detaining a probationer who is at liberty and depriving him of that liberty pending a revocation hearing. See Ex parte Dietz , 474 So.2d [127] at 131 [(Ala. 1985)]. They do not, however, provide the only means of 'initiating' revocation proceedings for a probationer ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 572 So. 2d 508 - Patterson v. State