State v. Ornelas

                                                                       Office of the
                                                                                              New Mexico
                                                                           Director           Compilation
                                                                                              Commission
                                                                        2024.08.30
                                                                   '00'06- 13:20:35
          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

Opinion Number: 

Filing Date: May 14, 2024

No. A-1-CA-40501

STATE OF NEW MEXICO,

       Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

FERNANDO ORNELAS,

       Defendant-Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY
Cindy Leos, District Court Judge

Raúl Torrez, Attorney General
Maris Veidemanis, Assistant Attorney General
Santa Fe, NM
Meryl E. Francolini, Assistant Attorney General
Albuquerque, NM

for Appellant

Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender
Allison H. Jaramillo, Assistant Appellate Defender
Santa Fe, NM

for Appellee

                                        OPINION

YOHALEM, Judge.

{1}     This appeal requires this Court to consider when a plea bargain not yet approved
by the district court can be specifically enforced by a defendant. In State v. Bourland,

, ¶ 7, 

, 

, this Court acknowledged that the
state may not withdraw a plea agreement not yet approved by the district court when
the defendant shows that they have detrimentally relied on the agreement or the
prosecution took unfair advantage. At issue in this case is the district court’s conclusion
that a two or three month delay in the trial of Defendant Fernando Ornelas caused by
the State’s last-minute decision to withdraw its plea offer, combined with the burden on
the district court of rescheduling a jury trial during the COVID-19 pandemic, constituted
detrimental reliance supporting specific enforcement of the plea agreement. We reverse
and remand.

BACKGROUND

{2}    Defendant was arrested on February 24, 2021, and charged with felony driving
while under the influence of intoxicating liquor (DWI), contrary either to NMSA 1978,
Section 66-8-102(A) or -102(C)(1) (2016), and with misdemeanor driving with a revoked
license (DWI related), contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 66-5-39.1 (2013). Defendant
had eight prior convictions for DWI. A ninth conviction for DWI is punishable by twelve
years imprisonment, ten years of which can be suspended, deferred or taken under
advisement. See § 66-8-102(K).

{3}     Defendant was taken into custody at the time of his arrest. The State’s motion for
pretrial detention filed soon thereafter was granted, and the district court ordered that
Defendant remain in custody pending trial. The district court determined that
Defendant’s case was of simple complexity, and assigned it to Track 1, pursuant to the
Second Judicial District’s pilot program setting time limits by local rule for the resolution
of criminal cases. See LR2-308(F)(3)(a) NMRA (2018). 1 The local rule requires Track 1
cases to be tried within 210 days (approximately seven months) from arraignment,
absent a finding of exceptional circumstances. See LR2-308(F)(5)(a). Relying on the
exceptional circumstances created by the COVID-19 public health emergency, the
district court rescheduled Defendant’s original trial date, set within the rule’s 210-day
period for simple cases, for November 19, 2021, nearly nine months after Defendant’s
arraignment, and imposed a plea deadline of October 29, 2021.

{4}    Just two weeks before the plea deadline, the district court approved the public
defender’s request to substitute new counsel for Defendant. Defendant’s new counsel
emailed the State about the possibility of a plea agreement a few days after his
appointment—approximately a week before the plea deadline. The State responded on
the morning of the plea deadline by emailing a plea offer to Defendant’s counsel.
Apologizing for the delay, the State offered to permit Defendant to plead guilty to
aggravated DWI (seventh offense), together with misdemeanor driving on a revoked
license. The State would agree to recommend a sentence of five years in prison, minus
one day. This sentence was significantly less than the maximum sentence of twelve
years’ incarceration Defendant could have received if he had been convicted as
charged of a ninth DWI. See § 66-8-102(K) (stating the sentence for a ninth DWI
offense).

{5}   On the morning of November 9, 2021, the district court confirmed that
arrangements for Defendant’s scheduled November 17 trial had been made and asked

1All citations to LR2-308, the special pilot rule governing time limits for criminal proceedings in the
Second Judicial District Court, are to the 2018 amendment, which was in place in 2021 when these
proceedings took place.
both parties whether a plea agreement had been reached. Defense counsel notified the
prosecutor that Defendant wished to accept the State’s plea offer, and the State and the
Defendant jointly filed a plea certification with the district court the next day, November
10, stating that “[t]he parties . . . have reached a plea agreement, and request the
[c]ourt set the matter for a plea hearing.” Based on the certification, the district court
vacated the trial setting.

{6}      On November 15, 2021, which was five days after certifying the plea to the
district court, the State withdrew the plea offer. The prosecutor later explained to the
district court that the State offered a plea because the prosecutor had not been able to
contact the DWI officer and believed that the officer would not be available to testify at
trial, raising a question about the strength of the State’s case against Defendant. About
an hour after the prosecutor spoke with defense counsel, agreeing that the trial should
be vacated based on the plea agreement, and before the certificate of plea and joint
motion to vacate the trial were filed, the DWI officer called the prosecutor and indicated
he would be available for trial. It was this telephone call and the State’s reevaluation of
its chances at trial that the State represented prompted it to withdraw from the plea
agreement with Defendant.

{7}     Defense counsel filed a motion to enforce the plea agreement. A hearing was
held on the motion to enforce on December 14. Defendant sought specific performance
of the plea agreement, contending that he had detrimentally relied on the State’s offer in
giving up his November 17 trial date. Defendant argued that as a result of his reliance
on the plea agreement, he would remain in pretrial detention. The time period would
extend well past the seven months allowed by LR2-308(F)(5)(a) for Track 1 cases.
Defendant claimed that he detrimentally relied on the plea agreement in filing the
certification and allowing his trial date to be vacated, and that therefore specific
performance of the plea agreement was required.

{8}    The State responded, arguing that a plea agreement is not enforceable until it
has been accepted by the district court, and that either party can withdraw from the plea
agreement without consequences until it is accepted by the court. At the hearing on
Defendant’s motion to enforce the plea agreement, the State continued to argue that it
was within the exercise of its prosecutorial discretion to withdraw a plea agreement at
any time before acceptance by the district court.

{9}    The district court granted Defendant’s motion to enforce the plea agreement. The
court made the following findings of fact: (1) Defendant had been held in pretrial custody
since February 23, 2021; (2) “the only reason the November 17, 2021 trial was vacated
was due to Defendant accepting the plea offer extended by the prosecutor on October
29, 2021 and the parties submitting a [p]lea [c]ertification”; (3) the district court was
confronting great difficulty in setting matters for jury trial due to the pandemic and “not
able to set in-custody cases as quickly as [it] would like”; (4) a new trial date could not
be scheduled without “at least a [two to three] month delay in Defendant’s case
proceeding to trial”; and (5) the prosecution changed its position and withdrew the plea
“without regard to the effort that was involved in initially setting the matter for trial and
without regard to Defendant’s interest in a speedy jury trial.” The district court concluded
that it “would indeed set a terrible precedent” to allow the State to change its position
and withdraw a plea in a case where Defendant is in custody and the system of setting
trials in the district court was so stressed by the COVID-19 pandemic that a significant
delay was inevitable. The court also concluded that Defendant’s reliance on the plea
agreement detrimentally impacted his right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment
of the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 14 of the New Mexico
Constitution.

{10} The State filed a motion to reconsider. At the hearing on the motion, the State
argued that the district court erred in concluding that Defendant had detrimentally relied
on the plea agreement, claiming that Defendant did not rely on any promise made by
the State, that Defendant knew that the plea agreement was an offer that could be
withdrawn until accepted by the court, and that Defendant did not suffer the kind of
detriment in reliance on the plea that makes a plea agreement enforceable. The district
court denied the motion to reconsider, emphasizing that “we’re not in ordinary
circumstances,” where trials could be quickly rescheduled with no great effort by the
court for a defendant in pretrial custody.

{11} The district court allowed the State time to file an interlocutory appeal before
scheduling Defendant’s plea hearing. The State chose not to file an interlocutory
appeal, instead waiting to appeal until the plea was accepted by the district court and a
final judgment entered.

DISCUSSION

{12} Before addressing the primary question in this appeal—the meaning of the
detrimental reliance standard and its application to Defendant’s motion for specific
enforcement of his plea agreement—we briefly address Defendant’s preliminary claim
that this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the State’s appeal.

I.     The State Has a Right to Appeal to This Court

{13} Defendant claims first that this Court lacks jurisdiction over the State’s appeal
because the appeal is untimely and then argues that, even if the appeal was filed timely,
the State has no statutory or constitutional right to appeal the district court’s
enforcement of the plea agreement. Finally, Defendant argues that, even if the State
has a right to appeal, double jeopardy and due process concerns foreclose the State’s
requested relief. We address each argument in turn.

A.     The State’s Appeal Is Timely

{14} Defendant claims that the State’s appeal is an interlocutory appeal from the
district court’s order agreeing to enforce the plea. Because the State’s notice of appeal
was not filed within thirty days from the entry of that order, Defendant claims the appeal
is untimely.
{15} In claiming that this is an untimely interlocutory appeal, Defendant
mischaracterizes the nature of the State’s appeal as interlocutory. The State did not file
an interlocutory appeal; it instead waited until the district court entered a judgment and
sentence after accepting the plea, and then appealed from the final judgment and
sentence. The State’s notice of appeal was timely filed, within thirty days of the entry of
the judgment and sentence.

B.     The State’s Right to Appeal Is Recognized by the New Mexico Constitution

{16} The State acknowledges that it has no statutory right to appeal from the final
judgment entered in this case. The State contends, however, that it has a constitutional
right to appeal under Article VI, Section 2 of the New Mexico Constitution. That section
provides, in relevant part, that “[i]n all other cases, criminal and civil, the [S]upreme
court shall exercise appellate jurisdiction as may be provided by law; provided that an
aggrieved party shall have an absolute right to one appeal.” N.M. Const. art. VI, § 2.
The State’s constitutional right to appeal turns on whether the State is an “aggrieved
party” under Article VI, Section 2 of the New Mexico Constitution. See State v. Aguilar,

, ¶ 3, 

, 

 (“[T]he key question presented is
whether the [s]tate is an ‘aggrieved party’ in this case for the purpose of an appeal.”).

{17} Our Supreme Court has cautioned that “the [s]tate does not have an absolute
right to appeal in every situation in which it may feel ‘aggrieved’ by a trial court’s ruling.”
Id. ¶ 7. The state must claim that the challenged disposition by the district court is
contrary to law, or “affects matters of grave importance.” State v. Horton, 2008-NMCA-
061, ¶ 9, 

, 

. In this case, the issues on appeal are questions of
grave importance concerning the parameters that define prosecutorial discretion in
entering into plea agreements. New Mexico courts have long recognized the important
state interest in plea bargains in the criminal justice system. See State v. Trujillo, 1980-
NMSC-004, ¶ 18, 

, 

 (observing that guilty pleas are an
essential part of the New Mexico criminal justice system); State v. Baca, 1984-NMCA-
056, ¶ 9, 

, 

 (“[T]he policy of this state [is] to promote plea
bargaining.”). This Court has recognized that the nature of the limits on prosecutorial
discretion to withdraw from a plea bargain has a significant impact and must be carefully
considered so as not to discourage prosecutors from offering plea agreements.
Bourland, 

, ¶¶ 6-7.

{18} Because the State seeks review of what it claims is legal error by the district
court affecting an interest of grave importance, it is an “aggrieved party” under the New
Mexico Constitution and has a constitutional right to appeal. See Horton, 2008-NMCA-
061, ¶ 9.

C.     Neither Double Jeopardy Principles nor Due Process Principles Preclude
       the Requested Relief

{19} Defendant argues that he had an expectation of finality in the sentence imposed
following his plea of guilty to aggravated DWI and that the relief sought on appeal,
which would result in a longer sentence, enhanced by an additional prior DWI
conviction, is prohibited by both double jeopardy and due process considerations.

{20} Defendant first contends that “[i]ncreasing a defendant’s sentence after a
defendant begins serving the sentence implicates double jeopardy concerns if a
defendant’s objectively reasonable expectations of finality in the original sentencing
proceedings are violated.” State v. Redhouse, 

, 

.
Determining whether a defendant’s expectation of finality in the original sentencing
proceeding is objectively reasonable requires an examination of the terms of the written
plea agreement and the circumstances surrounding the plea. See State v. Banghart-Portillo, 

, ¶ 14, 

. Where a defendant has no reasonable
expectation of finality under the circumstances, and where the district court sentences
the defendant improperly based on a legal error, double jeopardy does not preclude an
increase in the sentence. Redhouse, 

.

{21} We agree with the State that Defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of
finality in his sentence under the terms of this plea agreement. Defendant was
repeatedly put on notice in this case of the State’s intention to appeal his sentence on
the basis that imposing a lesser sentence than required by statute without the State’s
agreement was illegal. The plea and disposition agreement signed by Defendant plainly
states that the State is reserving its right to appeal Defendant’s sentence. At the
sentencing hearing itself, the State clearly stated that it would appeal the sentence. The
State noted that Defendant had eight prior DWI convictions, but that the contested plea
agreement allowed him to be sentenced for a seventh offense. The State noted its
preservation of its appeal rights and read into the record the paragraph in the plea and
disposition agreement stating the State’s intent to appeal. The district court noted that
the State had made its record, and then proceeded to accept the plea, and then to
sentence Defendant. Under these circumstances, we conclude that Defendant did not
have a reasonable expectation of finality in his sentence.

{22} Defendant also argues, rather perfunctorily, that reversing and allowing a longer
sentence to be imposed would be unfair because Defendant will have served a
significant portion of his sentence by the time he is resentenced. We do not agree. Due
process may bar an increase to an almost completed sentence where the State delays
raising an illegality until near the end of a defendant’s prison term. See Redhouse,

. Where the sentence is illegal when imposed and the State acts
expeditiously, we are not persuaded that resentencing is fundamentally unfair.

II.    The Principles of Law Governing Enforcement of a Plea Agreement Prior to
       Its Approval by the District Court

{23} This appeal requires us to review the district court’s application and interpretation
of the principles of New Mexico law that govern when a plea bargain is binding on the
State, so that it cannot be withdrawn, even though it has not yet been accepted by the
district court. We note that there is no challenge on appeal to the district court’s findings
of fact. This appeal, therefore, focuses on the application of the law to the undisputed
facts in this case. “We review de novo the district court’s application of law to the facts.”
Giant Cab, Inc. v. CT Towing, Inc., 

, 

; see State v.
Ochoa, 

, 

, 

 (“The application and
interpretation of law is subject to a de novo review.”).

A.     The Nature of a Plea Agreement Under New Mexico Law

{24} We begin with the principles of law governing plea agreements. “[A] criminal
defendant has no constitutional right to a plea bargain, and the decision whether to offer
a plea bargain is a matter within the prosecutor’s discretion.” State v. Estrada, 2001-
NMCA-034, ¶ 20, 

, 

. Because a defendant has no
constitutional right to a plea bargain, and only the right to a trial with full due process
protections, courts generally analyze plea bargains by analogy to contract law, while at
the same time acknowledging that this analogy is less than perfect. See Bourland,

, ¶ 4; see also United States v. Ocanas, 

 (5th Cir.
1980) (recognizing that while principles of contract law “cannot be blindly incorporated
into the area of plea bargaining,” they “provide a useful analytical framework”),
abrogated on other grounds as recognized by United States v. Grant, 

 (5th
Cir. 1997).

{25} “Plea bargaining has two aspects: the entering into an agreement and its
acceptance by the court.” State v. Taylor, 

, ¶ 23, 

, 

, overruled on other grounds by Gallegos v. Citizens Ins. Agency, 1989-NMSC-
055, ¶ 28, 

, 

. Generally, a plea bargain is viewed in contract
terms as an offer “until the defendant enters a court-approved guilty plea.” Reed v.
Becka, 

 (S.C. Ct. App. 1999). By analogy to contract law, a
defendant is viewed as accepting the offer by pleading guilty. Id.; accord Mabry v.
Johnson, 

 (1984) (holding that generally the plea bargain is “a mere
executory agreement”). Because a plea bargain is viewed as an offer, and not a
contract between the state and the defendant, courts have generally concluded that
“either party should be entitled to modify its position and even withdraw its consent to
the bargain until the plea is tendered and the bargain as it then exists is accepted by the
court.” Ocanas, 

; see State v. Mares, 

, ¶ 12, 

, 

 (“A plea agreement is a unique form of contract the terms of which
must be interpreted, understood, and approved by the trial court.” (emphasis added)).
Consistent with these principles, our Supreme Court has cautioned that “neither party
should rely on a [plea] bargain not specifically approved by the trial court.” State v.
Willis, 

, 

, 

.

{26} Although a plea agreement prior to its acceptance by the district court is often
described as an offer by the state, which does not deprive the defendant “of liberty or
any other constitutionally protected interest,” Mabry, 

, the United States
Supreme Court, our Supreme Court, and this Court have all acknowledged that a plea
agreement has fairness implications and cannot properly be viewed solely through the
lens of contract law. See id.; Taylor, 

, ¶ 23; see also Bourland, 1993-
NMCA-117, ¶ 3 (“‘Plea negotiations between [a] defendant and the state must be
governed by fair play on both sides.’” (quoting Taylor, 

, ¶ 23)).

{27} This Court, together with the courts of many other states, 2 has recognized two
exceptions to the general rule allowing a prosecutor to withdraw a plea before it is
accepted: when the prosecutor withdraws a plea agreement seeking to deceive or take
unfair advantage of a defendant, or the defendant has detrimentally relied on the plea
agreement. See Bourland, 

, ¶ 7 (holding that a defendant may not
specifically enforce a plea agreement absent “any evidence of detrimental reliance or
the prosecutor’s seeking to take unfair advantage”).

B.      “Detrimental Reliance” on a Plea Agreement Defined

{28} There is no claim here of misrepresentation, deception, or taking of unfair
advantage by the prosecution in entering into the plea agreement or in seeking to
withdraw it. We focus, therefore, on the alternative ground for specifically enforcing a
plea agreement—detrimental reliance by the defendant.

{29} This Court has indicated that a defendant detrimentally relies on a plea when
they cannot “be returned to their original position by withdrawing their plea.” Id. ¶ 3. We
have reasoned that without a showing of detrimental reliance, a defendant is in no
worse position following the withdrawal of a plea than they would be in if no plea
bargain had been made in the first instance. Id. Because a defendant has no right to a
plea bargain, a jury trial with full due process protections returns the defendant to their
original position before the plea was offered and provides “a sufficient remedy.” Id. The
concept of fairness in plea negotiations does not “protect a defendant against shattered
expectations,” which result when a prosecutor withdraws a plea bargain after a
defendant’s acceptance but before a guilty plea is entered. State v. Beckes, 

 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980). There is detrimental reliance by a defendant, therefore,
only when the defendant has suffered prejudice as a result of an action taken in reliance
on the plea agreement that cannot be corrected by the usual remedy of allowing the
state to withdraw the plea agreement and proceed to trial. See Bourland, 1993-NMCA-
117, ¶ 3 (citing Gov’t of the Virgin Islands v. Scotland, 

 (3d Cir.
1980)).

{30} There is no New Mexico precedent applying the detrimental reliance standard to
a specific situation. In State v. King, 

, 

, our Supreme
Court does not use the term detrimental reliance even though it addresses a factual
situation that would support a finding of detrimental reliance based on defendant giving
up their Fifth Amendment right to not incriminate themselves. The Court instead focuses
its analysis on the State’s obligation to fulfill its promise where the defendant has relied
on that promise. Id. ¶ 15. The defendant in King offered to find and turn over to the state

2See 5 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 21.2(f) (4th ed. 2023) (“The prevailing doctrine is
that the [s]tate may withdraw from a plea bargain agreement at any time prior to, but not after, the actual
entry of the guilty plea by the defendant or other action by him constituting detrimental reliance upon the
agreement.”).
a weapon used to commit a crime if the state agreed to dismiss a tampering with the
evidence charge. Our Supreme Court construed this offer as the defendant proposing a
plea agreement to the State. Id. ¶¶ 13-14, 18. When the “prosecutor’s response . . . led
[the d]efendant reasonably to understand that they had an agreement,” and the
defendant produced the weapon, our Supreme Court held that there had been an
exchange of promises, the defendant had performed his promise and the prosecutor
had not. The defendant was therefore entitled to specific performance of the agreement
they made with the prosecutor. Id. ¶¶ 18-19.

{31} King does not use the term “detrimental reliance” or analyze the nature or extent
of the detriment to the defendant, but instead focuses on the defendant taking
significant action to fulfill his part of a bargain with the state. We do note, however, that
the facts of the case clearly show that the defendant’s action significantly impacted his
Fifth Amendment right to remain silent and would have undermined his defense to the
tampering charge, thereby amounting to detrimental reliance by as the term is used by
other state courts.

{32} We next turn to decisions of other state courts, which have more explicitly
applied the detrimental reliance standard. These out-of-state cases, like King, uniformly
conclude that a plea agreement not yet accepted by the court is enforceable based on
the defendant’s reliance on a commitment or promise made by the State in return for
the defendant taking some action which is detrimental to their interests. The facts in
many of the cases are strikingly similar to those in King. In State v. Brockman, 

 (Md. 1976), for example, the plea bargain at issue provided that, in exchange for
the plea offered by the state, the defendant would assist the prosecution by providing
evidence against other defendants. Because the defendant complied with that
agreement, giving a deposition to the state and providing incriminating information to
the prosecution, the Maryland Court of Appeals held that “fairness and equity require
that the [s]tate be held to its bargain if the defendant has to a substantial degree and in
a proper manner performed his obligations and is willing, . . . to fulfill the remainder of
his promises.” 

.

{33} In Custodio v. State, 

 (S.C. 2007), the South Carolina Supreme
Court similarly held that the defendant in that case “relied on the plea offer to his
detriment by taking the substantial step of cooperating with law enforcement, i.e., by
performing some part of the bargain, before the [s]olicitor withdrew the plea offer.” On
this basis, the court enforced the plea agreement.

{34} In People v. Macrander, 

 (Colo. 1988), the defendant agreed
to waive his right to a preliminary hearing in return for the prosecution’s agreement to
not prosecute him for other crimes and to accept pleas of guilty to the crimes currently
charged. The Colorado Supreme Court held that the defendant was entitled to specific
performance of the plea agreement based on his detrimental reliance in giving up a
preliminary hearing, because “no other remedy is appropriate to effectuate the
accused’s legitimate expectation engendered by the governmental promise.” 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Colorado Supreme Court also held
that giving up a preliminary hearing in reliance on a promise from the state, which is not
a constitutional right in Colorado unlike New Mexico, was sufficient detrimental reliance
to be able to enforce a plea agreement. 

 (holding that “a defendant’s
detrimental reliance need not implicate constitutional rights”).

{35} In In re Kenneth H., 

 (Ct. App. 2000), the defendant waived
certain procedural guarantees and voluntarily submitted to a polygraph examination.
The California appellate court held that the defendant had performed some part of the
bargain agreed to by the prosecutor, and, therefore, the prosecution was bound by their
plea agreement. 

.

{36} In all of these cases, the defendants agreed to take a substantial step detrimental
to their interest in return for the state’s promise of a particular plea. Rather than focusing
on the prejudice to the defendant, these courts, like our Supreme Court in King, focused
primarily on the defendant’s fulfillment of some part of a bargained-for exchange with
the prosecution that went beyond the mere agreement by the defendant to plead guilty.
Where, in contrast, a plea did not demand any action by the defendant other than
pleading guilty, courts have held that the plea was not enforceable until the defendant’s
guilty plea was accepted by the district court. See, e.g., State v. Therriault, 

, 991 n.7 (Me. 1984) (rejecting the passage of time as amounting to detrimental
reliance, where the defendant did not engage in any acts promised in the plea
agreement in the nine months that elapsed between the state’s first proffered plea
agreement and modified plea agreement).

III.   The District Court Erred in Enforcing the Plea Agreement

{37} The district court enforced Defendant’s plea agreement in this case, even though
Defendant’s plea had not yet been accepted by the court. The district court based its
decision on its findings that Defendant had been in pretrial detention since February 23,
2021, approximately nine months, and a trial could not be rescheduled for at least two
to three months, due to the restrictions imposed on jury trials by the COVID-19
pandemic. The district court found that “the only reason the November 17, 2021 trial
was vacated was due to Defendant accepting the plea offer extended by the prosecutor
on October 29, 2021 and the parties submitting a [p]lea [c]ertification,” and concluded
that the enforcement of the plea agreement was justified based on the prosecution’s
disregard for both the impact of its decision to withdraw the plea on Defendant’s right to
a speedy trial and the burden imposed on the court in rescheduling a jury trial during the
COVID-19 pandemic.

{38} We do not agree that these factual findings by the district court rise to the level of
detrimental reliance required for enforcement of a plea bargain that has not yet been
approved by the district court. There is no evidence showing that the prosecution in this
case made a promise to Defendant, contingent on Defendant’s performance of some
action apart from pleading guilty, or that Defendant took some significant action to his
detriment in reliance on the plea agreement. Therefore the plea bargain in this case
does not fit the model of an enforceable plea agreement in King, 

, or
the out-of-state cases previously discussed. The district court’s findings of fact describe
a routine plea bargain, in the nature of an offer by the prosecution, intended to be
accepted and to become binding and enforceable only when the district court approved
the plea. No promise was made to Defendant in return for his agreement to vacate his
trial and schedule a plea hearing. The trial was vacated at the mutual request of the
parties simply to allow the plea process to move forward.

{39} Although the district court raised important concerns about the efficient
administration of justice and Defendant’s right to a speedy trial, these concerns are not
properly resolved through enforcement of a plea agreement the State wishes to
withdraw in the legitimate exercise of its prosecutorial discretion. See Bourland, 1993-
NMCA-117, ¶ 6 (holding that the interests in judicial efficiency and the administration of
justice the district court was attempting to enforce here are not served by not forcing
prosecutors to abide by their initial offers). 3

CONCLUSION

{40} For the above reasons, we reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with
this opinion.

{41}    IT IS SO ORDERED.

JANE B. YOHALEM, Judge

WE CONCUR:

MEGAN P. DUFFY, Judge

KATHERINE A. WRAY, Judge




3We note that it appears to be within the discretion of the district court on remand to consider the
prosecution’s reasons for delaying the trial date, and to impose sanctions authorized by LR2-308(H) if it
determines that the prosecution’s reasons for delaying the trial are inadequate or amounted to negligence
on the part of the prosecution.