¶1with whom ROBERTS, J., joins concurring.
¶2I cannot agree that on the evidence presented at trial the jury rationally could find the essential elements of gross sexual misconduct without also finding the element of penetration that constitutes rape. Pinkham’s acquittal on the charge of rape, however, does not require his acquittal on the charge of gross sexual misconduct any more than his conviction on the latter requires his conviction on the former. There was sufficient evidence for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt all the elements of gross sexual misconduct. No more is required to affirm that conviction regardless of the disposition of the rape charge. Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393, 52 S.Ct. 189, 190, 76 L.Ed. 356 (1932); State v. DiPietro, 420 A.2d 1233, 1237 (Me.1980) (dictum); see State v. Snow, 513 A.2d 274, 277 (Me.1986) (“This Court has never decided that inconsistent verdicts do require reversal.”). I therefore agree that the judgment should be affirmed.