State v. Goin

No. 588             August 28, 2024                  497

          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                  STATE OF OREGON

                STATE OF OREGON,
                 Plaintiff-Respondent,
                           v.
                 CHRISTIAN GOIN,
              aka Christian Joseph Goin,
                 Defendant-Appellant.
              Marion County Circuit Court
                 21CR49716; A181383

  James C. Edmonds, Judge.
  Submitted July 12, 2024.
  Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate
Section, and Marc Brown, Senior Deputy Defender, Oregon
Public Defense Commission, filed the brief for appellant.
  Jennifer S. Lloyd, Assistant Attorney General, waived
appearance for respondent.
  Before Lagesen, Chief Judge, and Egan, Judge.
  LAGESEN, C. J.
  Affirmed.
498                                                           State v. Goin

           LAGESEN, C. J.
         Defendant appeals a judgment of conviction for
escape in the first degree, ORS 162.165, robbery in the first
degree, ORS 164.415, kidnapping in the second degree, ORS
163.225, and possession of a weapon by an inmate, ORS
166.275. Defendant pleaded guilty to those charges. The
trial court sentenced defendant to a total of 95 months in
prison. Defendant’s appointed counsel filed a brief pursuant
to ORAP 5.90 and State v. Balfour, 

, 

(1991). The brief does not contain a Section B. See ORAP
5.90(1)(b). We affirm.1
         Having reviewed the record, we note that, before
entering his plea, defendant moved to remand the case to
juvenile court on the ground that the juvenile court had
exclusive jurisdiction because defendant was under the age
of 18 when he escaped from MacLaren Youth Correctional
Facility. Defendant was still under 18 when he was arrested
and returned to that facility. However, by the time the
state charged defendant, he had turned 18. After holding
a hearing on the motion, the trial court ruled that it had
jurisdiction because defendant was returned to MacLaren
on his original charges, and he was not in “protective custody” on the new charges at that time. See Brown v. Zenon,

, 

 (1995) (“[J]urisdiction
attaches when a child is taken into protective custody. ORS
419B.157; ORS 419C.094. If a child is not taken into protective custody, jurisdiction attaches when other steps are
taken to initiate judicial proceedings.”).
         In 1997, ORS 419C.094 was amended to delete the
word “protective.” Or Laws 1997, ch 727, § 4. ORS 419C.094
now provides, in part, that “the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court of the county in which a youth is taken into custody
… shall attach from the time the youth is taken into custody.” Because the statute no longer refers to protective custody, there are reasons to question the trial court’s ruling
denying the motion to remand the case to juvenile court.

   1
     As authorized by ORS 2.570(2)(b), this matter is determined by a two-judge
panel. See, e.g., State v. Yother, 

, 

 (2021) (deciding
matter submitted through Balfour process by two-judge panel); Ballinger v.
Nooth, 

, 

 (2012), rev den, 

 (2013) (same).
Cite as 

 (2024)                              499

Whether or not he was taken into protective custody before
he turned 18, the statute now appears to provide that juvenile court jurisdiction attaches in delinquency cases when
the youth is taken into custody.
         However, after the ruling denying the remand,
defendant pleaded guilty to four charges associated with
his escape from MacLaren. Defendant did not enter a conditional plea pursuant to ORS 135.335(3) reserving his right
to challenge the trial court’s ruling. Instead, in his petition
to enter his pleas, defendant indicated that he understood
that he was giving up all rights of appeal to this court, other
than certain challenges to his sentence. As a result, we have
no authority to reach the question of whether the trial court
erred in denying the motion to remand. See ORS 138.105(5)
(“The appellate court has no authority to review the validity
of the defendant’s plea of guilty or no contest, or a conviction
based on the defendant’s plea of guilty or no contest[.]”); see
also State v. Belzons, 

, 

(1996), rev den, 

 (1997) (defendant who pleaded no
contest in district court could not, on appeal, challenge the
district court’s alleged lack of jurisdiction).
        Although we have no authority to reach the issue,
defendant may not be without recourse to raise the issue of
whether the 1997 statutory amendments altered the jurisdictional analysis in Brown, on which the trial court relied.
See ORS 138.530.
        Affirmed.