IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 49950
STATE OF IDAHO, )
) OPINION Filed: September 18, 2024
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
v. )
)
MICHAEL ELTON MCCARROLL, )
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
)
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho,
Elmore County. Hon. Jonathan Medema, District Judge.
Judgment of conviction and life sentence, with fifteen years determinate, and order
denying motion to suppress, affirmed.
Erik R. Lehtinen, State Appellate Public Defender; Sally J. Cooley, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.
Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Justin R. Porter, Deputy Attorney
General, Boise, for respondent.
________________________________________________
HUSKEY, Judge
Michael Elton McCarroll appeals from his judgment of conviction and sentence for lewd
conduct with minor child under sixteen. McCarroll argues the district court erred in denying his
motion to suppress his confession because it was involuntary. Alternatively, McCarroll argues the
district court abused its discretion in sentencing him to a unified term of life, with fifteen years
determinate. McCarroll’s confession was voluntary, and the sentence imposed is not excessive.
The order denying McCarroll’s motion to suppress and his judgment of conviction and sentence
are affirmed.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
After receiving a report from the Department of Health and Welfare, a detective began
investigating a claim of sexual contact between McCarroll and six-year-old K.T. At the request
1
of police officers, McCarroll’s grandmother drove McCarroll to the police station where he met
with a detective in an interview room. Before the interview began, the detective filled in some of
McCarroll’s personal information on a Miranda1 waiver form and handed the form to McCarroll
to sign. The detective asked McCarroll if he understood his rights or had any questions, and
McCarroll indicated his understanding by nodding his head. During questioning, the detective
challenged McCarroll’s version of events. Based on prior information the detective received
regarding the incident, the detective told McCarroll he was leaving things out and not telling the
truth. At that point, McCarroll requested the presence of a lawyer. After this request, the detective
ended the questioning, told McCarroll to “hang tight,” and left the interview room. The detective
returned about thirty minutes later and told McCarroll he was willing to continue the interview if
McCarroll was willing to answer his questions. Although initially reluctant, McCarroll agreed to
continue the interview. Eventually, McCarroll confessed to the sexual touching between himself
and K.T. McCarroll was arrested and charged with lewd conduct with minor child under sixteen,
Idaho Code § 18-1508.
McCarroll filed a motion to suppress his statements, arguing he did not knowingly and
voluntarily waive his right to be free from self-incrimination, his confession was involuntary, and
his invocation of his right to counsel was not scrupulously honored, all in violation of his Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 13, of
the Idaho State Constitution.2 After a hearing, the district court denied McCarroll’s motion to
suppress. The district court found that while McCarroll voluntarily met with the police, after the
detective told McCarroll to “hang tight,” McCarroll was effectively in custody. However, the
district court found that McCarroll had already been provided with, and voluntarily and knowingly
waived, his Miranda rights and voluntarily confessed to committing the charged offense.
McCarroll entered an Alford3 plea to lewd conduct with minor child under sixteen and reserved
1
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2
Although McCarroll contends that both constitutions were violated, he provides no cogent
reason why Article I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution should be applied differently than the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution in this case. Therefore, this
Court will rely on judicial interpretation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments in its analysis
of McCarroll’s claims. See State v. Schaffer, 133 Idaho 126, 130,
982 P.3d 961, 965 (Ct. App.
1999).
3
See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
2
his right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. The district court imposed
a unified life sentence, with a minimum period of incarceration of fifteen years.
McCarroll timely appealed.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a motion
to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by
substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts
as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561,
916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). At a
suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts,
weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina,
127 Idaho 102, 106,
897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers,
132 Idaho 786, 789,
979 P.2d
659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999).
Sentencing is a matter of discretion. When a trial court’s discretionary decision is reviewed
on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine whether the lower court:
(1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the boundaries of such
discretion; (3) acted consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before
it; and (4) reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 270,
429
P.3d 149, 158 (2018).
III.
ANALYSIS
McCarroll argues the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress because his will
was overborne by police coercion and, as a result, his confession was not voluntary. More
specifically, McCarroll argues the district court did not consider the totality of the circumstances,
including his personal characteristics and the details of the interrogation because the district court
only considered the interview techniques when determining that McCarroll’s confession was
voluntary. Alternatively, McCarroll argues that even if the district court considered the totality of
the circumstances, it still erred in finding the confession was voluntary. Finally, McCarroll argues
his sentence is excessive. The State argues the district court correctly held that McCarroll’s
confession was voluntarily given and did not abuse its discretion in imposing sentence.
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A. The District Court Did Not Limit Its Analysis to Only the Interview Techniques
The State bears the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
a confession is voluntary. State v. Culbertson, 105 Idaho 128, 130,
666 P.2d 1139, 1141 (1983).
If the defendant’s free will is undermined by threats or through direct or implied promises, then
the statement is not voluntary and is inadmissible. State v. Samuel,
165 Idaho 746, 766,
452 P.3d
768, 788 (2019). To determine whether a confession is voluntary, a court must examine the totality
of the circumstances and ask whether the defendant’s will was overborne by police conduct. State
v. Kent,
167 Idaho 689, 698,
475 P.3d 1211, 1220 (2020). “The due process test takes into
consideration ‘the totality of all the surrounding circumstances--both the characteristics of the
accused and the details of the interrogation.’”
Id. (quoting Dickerson v. United States,
530 U.S.
428, 434 (2000)). Additional factors in the voluntariness determination include: (1) whether
Miranda warnings were given; (2) the youth of the accused; (3) the accused’s level of education
or low intelligence; (4) the length of the detention; (5) the repeated and prolonged nature of the
questioning; and (6) the deprivation of food or sleep. State v. Radford,
134 Idaho 187, 191,
998
P.2d 80, 84 (2000).
McCarroll argues that the district court failed to analyze the personal characteristics of
McCarroll and all the details of the interrogation and, instead, only evaluated the police interview
techniques, compared the tactics used in his interview to the tactics used by the officers in Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and concluded the confession was voluntary. This claim is belied
by the record as the district court considered both McCarroll’s personal characteristics and the
details of the interrogation.
In determining whether McCarroll’s confession was not coerced and, thus, voluntarily
given, the district court specifically referenced McCarroll’s personal characteristics. The district
court specifically noted the evaluation that assessed McCarroll’s “mental condition at the time of
the examination, his personality, his intellectual capabilities, his cognitive functioning, his reading
and speaking abilities, his memory, and his susceptibility to coercion or influence by authority
figures.” Throughout its memorandum decision, the district court referenced McCarroll’s mental
condition and the expert’s testimony regarding McCarroll’s personal characteristics. For example,
the district court referred to McCarroll as someone with “severe mental conditions [who] was
living with [a family member] for assistance.” The district court stated that McCarroll has an IQ
of sixty-three and, according to his expert, can pronounce words about as well as the average
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seventh grader, but he does not understand what many of those words mean. Further, the district
court cited the testing methods of McCarroll’s expert and believed the expert was credible, i.e.,
that the expert truthfully recited the results of those tests, but that without foundation, the
conclusions were not particularly reliable. Ultimately, the district court concluded, “McCarroll
was read his Miranda warnings and as discussed above the [court] is persuaded that he understood
them and made a voluntary choice to talk with the detective.” The record indicates the district
court considered McCarroll’s personal characteristics when evaluating whether his confession was
voluntarily given.
McCarroll also argues the district court failed to consider all the details of the interrogation
in determining that McCarroll’s confession was voluntarily given. Again, this claim is belied by
the record. The district court’s memorandum decision detailed the interview, included specific
time stamps of events that occurred, and set forth the detective’s pertinent statements to McCarroll.
Like its analysis of McCarroll’s personal characteristics, many of the district court’s findings
regarding various details about the interrogation were addressed throughout the district court’s
memorandum, indicating that the district court considered more than just the interview tactics in
assessing the details of the interrogation. Thus, the record reflects there is substantial evidence
that the district court considered both McCarroll’s personal characteristics and the details of the
interrogation in finding that McCarroll’s confession was voluntary.
B. The District Court Did Not Err in Concluding the Confession Was Voluntary Under
the Totality of the Circumstances
McCarroll argues that even if the district court considered the totality of the circumstances,
it nonetheless erred because the State did not meet its burden of proving, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that his confession was voluntarily given. To demonstrate his personal
characteristics should weigh in favor of involuntariness, McCarroll argues he was twenty-six years
old at the time of the interrogation, he was living with family members because he suffers from
multiple mental and physical health conditions, and he is intellectually disabled. To show the
details of the interview should weigh in favor of coercion, McCarroll argues that: (1) the interview
was ninety-minutes in length; (2) the interview was an unfriendly conversation that included
harassing and provocative behavior from the detective; and (3) after McCarroll invoked his right
to counsel, the detective left him sitting in the room for thirty minutes, then essentially told him he
would not be allowed to leave because the detective “had some things to finish up,” but the
5
detective implied that McCarroll potentially could leave if he started speaking with the detective
again.
Here, besides reciting the district court’s findings, McCarroll’s personal characteristics, his
expert’s findings on those characteristics, and details from the interrogation, McCarroll fails to
provide any relevant citation to authority or argument explaining why the district court erred in
determining those factors did not render his confession involuntary. Instead, McCarroll relies on
his expert’s statements as dispositive evidence that his confession was involuntary and contends
that the district court should have accepted that conclusion.
However, the district court explicitly rejected some of the expert’s conclusions, that
without foundational evidence regarding the validity of the expert’s conclusions, the conclusions
were not particularly reliable. In his opening brief, McCarroll makes no argument that the district
court erred in rejecting the expert’s conclusion. Similarly, McCarroll makes no argument that
when the district court rejects a conclusion of an expert, that expert’s conclusion is nonetheless the
relevant factual finding that this Court should accept. Thus, we decline to address the arguments.
See State v. Lankford, 172 Idaho 548, 559,
535 P.3d 172, 183 (2023) (finding that general attack
on findings and conclusions of district court, without specific reference to legal errors, is
insufficient to preserve issue). While McCarroll argues these issues in his reply brief with citation
to authority, arguments made for the first time in a reply brief are insufficient to merit appellate
review. Suitts v. Nix,
141 Idaho 706, 708
117 P.3d 120, 122 (2005). Nevertheless, even if we
address McCarroll’s arguments regarding his expert, they fail.
When evaluating an accused’s personal characteristics, the court should consider the age
of the accused and the accused’s level of education or low intelligence. Radford, 134 Idaho at
191,
998 P.2d at 84. McCarroll’s age does not weigh in favor of finding his confession was
involuntary because, at the time of the interview, McCarroll was twenty-six years old. State v.
Andersen,
164 Idaho 309, 314,
429 P.3d 850, 855 (2018) (finding that Andersen’s age did not
weigh in favor of involuntariness because she was an adult); Radford,
134 Idaho at 191,
998 P.2d
at 84 (holding that because Radford was twenty-nine years old at time of interview, it did not weigh
in favor of a finding of involuntariness); State v. Troy,
124 Idaho 211, 215,
858 P.2d 750, 754
(1993) (finding confession not coerced where Troy was twenty-five years old at time).
Next, regarding McCarroll’s expert testifying about McCarroll’s level of education or low
intelligence and that McCarroll was coerced into making the confession because he “presented
6
with really classical characteristics of a vulnerable person who tends to make coerced confessions
or false confessions. He has a severe mental condition. He has a severe mental defect. He has
impaired neuropsychological functioning, and he’s acquiescent to questioning by whomever.”
The district court found the expert to be credible, i.e., that the expert was truthfully
reporting the conclusions of his testing. The district court nonetheless rejected many of the
expert’s conclusions because there was no foundational testimony for the conclusions, rendering
the conclusions unreliable. The district court found that without the foundation underlying the
conclusions, the conclusions carried very little weight. Similarly, although the expert opined that
McCarroll was not able to understand the Miranda warnings, there was no testimony regarding
which terms McCarroll did or did not understand, McCarroll’s inability to understand the Miranda
waiver form, or how McCarroll found the language on the form confusing. The district court
reviewed the expert’s testimony and the video of McCarroll’s interview and held: “Having
considered [the expert]’s opinion and the reasons stated therefore, the Court finds the evidence
suggesting Mr. McCarroll did not understand his Miranda warnings and did not knowingly and
voluntarily waive those rights is substantially outweighed by the evidence that he did.”
On appeal, McCarroll does not challenge that he was provided with Miranda warnings,
understood them, and knowingly and voluntarily waived them. We agree with McCarroll that his
low level of education and intelligence should be considered in the totality of the circumstances
and may weigh in favor of finding he did not voluntarily waive his rights. However, the district
court considered those factors, weighed them against the other evidence, and found McCarroll’s
education and intelligence did not adversely affect his ability to knowingly and voluntarily waive
his Miranda rights, which weighs against a finding that McCarroll’s confession was coerced.
The details of the interrogation comprise the remaining factors and do not weigh in favor
of finding McCarroll’s confession was a product of coercion. First, the presence of Miranda
warnings is a particularly significant factor to determine whether a confession was voluntarily
given. Andersen, 164 Idaho at 314, 429 P.3d at 855. In this case, after McCarroll entered the
interview room, and when asked by the detective, McCarroll indicated that he had been arrested
before and understood what his Miranda rights were. After the detective handed McCarroll a
notification of rights form that contained Miranda warnings, McCarroll read the form, signed it,
and nodded when the detective asked if he understood it. Because McCarroll was provided with
Miranda warnings, that factor weighs against a finding the confession was involuntary.
7
The length of detention is another factor that weighs against finding the confession was
involuntary. McCarroll’s interview lasted ninety minutes, which is insufficient, on its own, to
weigh in favor of finding McCarroll’s confession was coerced, as it was neither repeated nor
prolonged. Andersen, 164 Idaho at 314, 429 P.3d at 855 (interview of approximately one hour
weighed against finding confession coerced); Radford,
134 Idaho at 191,
998 P.2d at 84 (interview
of two hours weighed against finding confession coerced); State v. Valero,
153 Idaho 910, 912,
285 P.3d 1014, 1016 (Ct. App. 2012) (interview of three hours and twenty-five minutes weighed
against finding confession coerced). Further, although the detective repeated some of the same
questions or repeatedly told McCarroll he was not telling the truth, those facts do not automatically
render the interview techniques coercive. State v. Samuel,
165 Idaho 746, 767,
452 P.3d 768, 789
(2019) (holding that although officers repeated some of same questions, because it appeared to
have been done in effort to obtain honest answers and clarify sequence of events, interview was
not coercive); State v. Troy,
124 Idaho 211, 214-15,
858 P.2d 750, 753-54 (1993) (finding that
although officer repeatedly told Troy that he knew Troy was not telling truth, interrogation was
not coercive).
Finally, the detective in this case did not deprive McCarroll of food or sleep, which is the
last factor in the totality of the circumstances analysis. The district court made several findings
relevant to this inquiry, finding that:
Sleep deprivation, lack of food and water, and infliction of physical pain or
the threat of pain are not relevant here. While Mr. McCarroll at a few points in the
interview says his stomach hurts from acid reflux and that he is thirsty, the argument
that he was compelled to say anything due to lack of food or water or because his
stomach hurts is absurd given what can be seen on the video.
We agree with the district court. Substantial evidence supports the district court’s conclusion that
McCarroll was neither deprived of food, water, or sleep nor subjected to any infliction of physical
or mental pain while he was being questioned. Rather, when the detective returned to speak to
McCarroll, he inquired if McCarroll needed anything. Thus, the last factor does not weigh in favor
of finding the interrogation was coercive.
In sum, only McCarroll’s low level of education and intelligence weighs as a factor in favor
of finding his confession was involuntary. However, this factor does not outweigh the other
factors. The district court reviewed the video of the interview and concluded that McCarroll did
not display many of the characteristics identified by his expert during the interrogation. To the
contrary, McCarroll coherently answered questions from the detective; clearly recalled events that
8
occurred from the incident resulting in the charged offense; and understood the seriousness of the
allegations. The district court stated: “Watching the interview, the overall impression the court
has of Mr. McCarroll is not confused or disabled, but savvy. He strikes the Court as behaving
virtually identically to many other suspects in many other police interrogations who eventually
confess to a crime.”
Substantial evidence supports the district court’s findings. Additionally, the district court
was in the best position to evaluate the expert’s testimony, determine its reliability, and assess it
after comparing it to McCarroll’s statements and behavior in the video of McCarroll’s interview.
As a result, we decline to disturb the district court’s factual findings. Thus, the district court did
not err in determining that McCarroll’s personal characteristics and the details of the interrogation
did not render his confession involuntary.
McCarroll next argues the interview was coercive because, while the detective provided
him with Miranda warnings, those warnings were not honored. The State argues that because
McCarroll knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel before the detective asked him
any further questions that were likely to elicit an incriminating response, the detective did not
violate McCarroll’s rights. Additionally, the State argues that because McCarroll knowingly and
voluntarily reinitiated the conversation with the detective, the interview was not coercive.
Where an individual asserts his right to counsel, the interrogation must cease until counsel
has been made available to him, or until he himself “initiates further communication, exchanges,
or conversations with the police.” State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 469,
272 P.3d 417, 441 (2012)
(quoting Edwards v. Arizona,
451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981)). Any responses to further
interrogation are admissible only when it is shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the
accused initiated further discussions and that he knowingly and intelligently waived his right to
counsel which he earlier invoked. State v. Cheatham,
134 Idaho 565, 574-75,
6 P.3d 815, 824-25
(2000). Interrogation includes not just words, but also conduct that is reasonably and likely to
elicit an incriminating response.
Id. at 575,
6 P.3d at 825.
McCarroll argues that the interview was coercive because the detective told McCarroll he
could have an attorney present but when McCarroll asked for a public defender, the detective told
McCarroll he could not get a public defender unless one was appointed by the court. According
to McCarroll, the detective did not otherwise assist McCarroll in obtaining counsel and he did not
permit McCarroll to leave; as a result, McCarroll claims his subsequent statements were coerced
9
because McCarroll had no reason to believe the initial protections promised in the Miranda waiver
would be provided. McCarroll asserts the detective should have provided him with new Miranda
warnings once he was subjected to a custodial interrogation.
The district court held that McCarroll was in custody at the point of the interview when he
requested an attorney, and the detective told McCarroll to “hang tight” and left the interview room
for nearly thirty minutes. The State does not contest that McCarroll was in custody after he
requested an attorney, so for purposes of appeal, we accept the district court’s finding that
McCarroll was in custody when the detective told him to “hang tight.” The district court found
that, at this point in the interview, the State would have been required to give McCarroll his
Miranda warnings had it not already done so. When the detective reentered the room after leaving
McCarroll, the district court summarized the colloquy as follows:
[Detective]: You all right? You want anything?
[McCarroll]: I’m just wondering when I’ll be getting out of here?
[Detective]: I still have some things to do man. I’ll tell you this much, if you
want me to go get a phone book, we can arrange for you to call an
attorney and have an attorney here and we can continue questioning.
[McCarroll]: The only one I know of is a public defender, [name of attorney].
[Detective]: Yeah, if you are gonna request the assistance of a public defender
you have to do that through the court. So, yeah. But I just want to
check on you make sure you are ok. Like I said, if you change your
mind, I’d be more than happy to listen to you.
[McCarroll]: I’d be more than glad to continue this conversation; more or less.
[Detective]: It’s a yes or no.
[McCarroll]: Yes.
After agreeing to speak to the detective, McCarroll eventually confessed to sexually
touching K.T. The district court recognized the interaction between McCarroll and the detective
as subtly coercive because of the implied opportunity the detective provided to McCarroll: either
keep talking to try and talk his way out of the situation or be brought in front of a court to request
the services of a public defender. At that point in the interview, the district court stated, “The
Court infers from [McCarroll’s] body language and his pause before answering that Mr. McCarroll
is thinking about his choice at that point,” i.e., that McCarroll was thinking about whether he
should continue to talk to the detective or wait and get a court-appointed public defender.
McCarroll decided to talk to the detective. After finding that McCarroll was weighing his options,
the district court found that while McCarroll’s decision to continue to talk to the detective may
have been unwise from a legal perspective, it was clearly a knowing and voluntary choice and,
10
thus, McCarroll was not coerced into confessing. We agree, as a review of the record supports the
district court’s findings. As the district court held, while it may have been an unwise decision
from a legal perspective, McCarroll was not coerced into continuing the conversation with the
detective.
McCarroll further argues the detective subverted McCarroll’s Miranda warnings. In
support of his argument, McCarroll cites State v. Person, 140 Idaho 934, 941,
104 P.3d 976, 983
(2004) for the proposition that an accused’s statements should be suppressed when an officer does
not scrupulously honor an accused’s request for counsel but instead requests multiple
confirmations of the defendant’s intent to cease the interview and consult his attorney. The facts
of this case are distinguishable from Person. In Person, rather than terminating the interrogation
after Person invoked his right to counsel, the detectives repeatedly requested confirmation of
Person’s intent to cease the interview and consult his attorney. Person,
140 Idaho at 941,
104 P.3d
at 983. In this case, after McCarroll invoked his right to counsel, the detective immediately left
the room. When the detective returned, he offered McCarroll the opportunity to contact an
attorney, advised him that a public defender would need to be appointed by the court, and gave
him the option to continue to talk if wished to do so. Thus, unlike the detectives in Person, in this
case there is substantial evidence to support the district court’s conclusion that the detective in
McCarroll’s case did not continuously ask McCarroll to confirm his request to consult an attorney
before continuing the interview.
McCarroll also cites United States v. Bautista, 145 F.3d 1140 (10th Cir. 1998) as instructive
for the proposition that, although a suspect cannot anticipatorily invoke his Miranda rights, the
facts weigh in favor of finding coercion when the officer provides Miranda warnings and then
refuses to honor them. The facts of Bautista are also distinguishable from McCarroll’s case. In
Bautista, the federal agents interrogating Bautista advised him of his Miranda rights before he was
in custody but continued to question him after he invoked his Miranda rights. Bautista,
145 F.3d
at 1144. In this case, when McCarroll invoked his Miranda rights, the detective immediately
ceased questioning him. It was only after McCarroll knowingly and voluntarily agreed to speak
with the detective that the detective asked McCarroll more questions which led to McCarroll’s
11
confession.4 As a result, the district court did not err in concluding the detective did not subvert
McCarroll’s Miranda warnings. Therefore, the district court did not err in determining that
McCarroll’s confession was knowing and voluntary.
C. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Imposing Sentence
Last, McCarroll argues his sentence of life, with fifteen years determinate, is excessive.
Specifically, McCarroll argues that had the district court properly considered the mitigating
factors, such as McCarroll’s status as a first-time offender, his remorse, his intellectual impairment,
his severe mental disabilities, and his family support, it would have imposed a less severe sentence.
The State responds that the district court properly considered mitigating factors when sentencing
McCarroll by referencing McCarroll’s presentence investigation report, the various competency
evaluations, the victim-impact statements, and a letter of support written by McCarroll’s mother.
Sentencing is a matter for the trial court’s discretion. Both our standard of review and the
factors to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of the sentence are well established and
need not be repeated here. See State v. Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114, 117-18,
822 P.2d 1011, 1014-
15 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Lopez,
106 Idaho 447, 449-51,
680 P.2d 869, 871-73 (Ct. App. 1984);
State v. Toohill,
103 Idaho 565, 568,
650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). When reviewing the
length of a sentence, we consider the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver,
144 Idaho 722,
726,
170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). Our role is limited to determining whether reasonable minds could
reach the same conclusion as the district court. State v. Biggs,
168 Idaho 112, 116,
480 P.3d 150,
154 (Ct. App. 2020). Applying these standards, and having reviewed the record in this case, we
cannot say that the district court abused its discretion.
IV.
CONCLUSION
In denying McCarroll’s motion to suppress his confession, the district court properly
considered the factors in the totality of the circumstances analysis. In doing so, the district court
did not err because an analysis of the factors indicates that McCarroll’s confession was not coerced
and, thus, was voluntarily given. The detective did not fail to honor McCarroll’s Miranda rights
4
We note here that in the district court’s memorandum decision, the court found McCarroll’s
decision to speak with the detective again was knowing and voluntary. Because McCarroll does
not contest this finding on appeal, we will not address it. As a result, the detective did not, contrary
to what McCarroll suggests, ignore McCarroll’s invocation of his Miranda rights.
12
by continuing to question him after McCarroll indicated his interest in continuing to talk rather
than call an attorney or seek the appointment of a public defender. Finally, the district court did
not abuse its discretion in sentencing McCarroll to a unified life sentence, with fifteen years
determinate. Thus, the district court’s order denying McCarroll’s motion to suppress and his
judgment of conviction and sentence are affirmed.
Judge LORELLO and Judge TRIBE CONCUR.
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