Commonwealth v. Samuels

¶1concurring.

¶2This appeal provides the opportunity for the Court to reexamine its decisions in the area of mens rea, a core concept *114of the criminal law. Like Madame Justice Newman, I do not believe that the General Assembly intended to require a specific finding of criminal negligence by a trier of fact to support a conviction for the offense of homicide by vehicle while driving under the influence. Careful review persuades me that the decisions, relied upon by the majority in reaching a contrary conclusion are not supportable on their own accord for the reasons which follow.

¶3I. Background — Mens Rea and Strict Liability

¶4The problem of determining the degree of culpability required to establish elements of criminal offenses in the absence of express legislative prescription has proved to be a difficult one for the courts.1 The offense of homicide by vehicle/DUI, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3735, presents a particular challenge, as, for example, this Court’s past expressions are divided concerning whether, on what basis, and to what extent criminal liability is intended to and may be imposed without regard to fault in the context of the predicate offense of driving under the influence, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3731 (“DUI”), including the extent to which such imposition would meet constitutional requirements. See Commonwealth v. Mikulan, 504 Pa. 244, 260, 470 A.2d 1339, 1347 (1983)(plurality).

¶5Many jurisdictions hold that the offense of driving while intoxicated, as well as related offenses providing for more severe grading where actual harm results from a DUI, are intended to impose liability without requiring a specific finding that the defendant possessed a culpable state of mind.2 Criminal liability in the absence of intention, belief, recklessness, or *115negligence is generally termed strict or absolute liability. See generally Kenneth W. Simons, When is Strict Criminal Liability Just?, 87 J.Crim. L. & Criminology 1075, 1080 (Summ.1997).3 Strict liability is unique in the criminal law, in that wrongful intent ordinarily is an element of a crime, this principle being embodied in the fundamental concept of mens rea. See United States v. Cordoba-Hincapie, 825 F.Supp. 485, 489 (E.D.N.Y.1993)(Weinstein, J.)(explaining that “[t]he term, ‘mens rea,’ meaning ‘a guilty mind; a guilty or wrongful purpose; a criminal intent,’ is a shorthand for a broad network of concepts encompassing much of the relationship between the individual and the criminal law”).4 Because of this intrinsic connection between culpability and condemnation, statutes *116imposing strict liability are not favored. See generally Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605-06, 114 S.Ct. 1793, 1797, 128 L.Ed.2d 608 (1994); Commonwealth v. Barone, 276 Pa.Super. 282, 290, 419 A.2d 457, 462 (1980)(plurality)(describing a “strong common law tradition against strict penal responsibility”). Indeed, commentators have strongly suggested, and in some instances courts have held, that there are constitutional limitations upon the ability of the legislative branch to impose criminal liability without fault. See Cordoba-Hincapie, 825 F.Supp. at 505-06, 515-16 (reviewing federal jurisprudence on the subject and characterizing such as “uncertain” and “uneven”).5

¶6While the imposition of strict liability is disfavored and of questionable validity in some contexts, there are recognized exceptions. For example, it is widely accepted that the legis*117lative branch may impose absolute liability for “public welfare offenses” to promote the public welfare by enforcing compliance with regulatory schemes. See Morissette, 342 U.S. at 255, 72 S.Ct. at 246; Commonwealth v. Koczwara, 397 Pa. 575, 580, 155 A.2d 825, 827-28 (1959)(“[s]uch so-called statutory crimes are in reality an attempt to utilize the machinery of criminal administration as an enforcing arm for social regulation of a purely civil nature, with the punishment totally unrelated to questions of moral wrongdoing or guilt”). The justification for the application of strict liability in this context includes the observation that penalties for regulatory offenses, as well as impact upon reputation, are generally minimal. See id.6A limited number of serious offenses, such as statutory rape and felony murder, have also been treated, in various jurisdictions, as entailing strict liability elements. See generally Cordoba-Hincapie, 825 F.Supp. at 497.7 In many jurisdictions, as noted, it is also recognized that offenses analogous to Pennsylvania’s homicide by vehicle, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3732, DUI, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3731, and homicide by vehicle/DUI, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3735, entail strict liability elements, see supra note 2, which, as further discussed below, does not square easily with the traditional justifications for the imposition of absolute liability and implicates concerns of constitutional dimension.

¶7*118II. The Present Interpretation of Sections 3732 and 3735 of the Vehicle Code as Embodying a Requirement of Criminal Negligence

¶8Neither Section 3732 (homicide by vehicle) nor 3735 (homicide by vehicle/DUI) contains an express culpability element;8 therefore, both are candidates for further examination to determine whether strict liability was intended, as many jurisdictions hold. The majority avoids such review, however, by divining from the statutes an intent requirement in the form of criminal negligence. Two sources of authority are offered in support of such requirement: 1) Section 302(a) of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code, derived from the Model Penal Code; and 2) the decisions of this Court concluding that a requirement of criminal negligence applies to the offense of homicide by vehicle, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3732. See Commonwealth v. Field, 490 Pa. 519, 417 A.2d 160 (1980); Commonwealth v. Heck, 517 Pa. 192, 535 A.2d 575 (1987). Although the majority’s holding has the effect of avoiding difficult issues of statutory construction and, to a substantial degree, preempting questions of constitutional compliance associated with imposing absolute liability for such serious offenses, its inherent weakness is that neither the Crimes Code nor the cited *119decisions provides persuasive support for the requirement of criminal negligence imposed.

¶9A. Section 302(a) of the Crimes Code and Associated Culpability Provisions

¶10As the majority notes, Section 302(a) of the Crimes Code does, in fact, establish an elemental, minimum culpability requirement of criminal negligence in order to support a conviction for criminal offenses as a general rule.9 However, the attachment of criminal negligence to individual offenses as a culpability element is closely limited. Indeed, Section 302 itself establishes a requirement of greater culpability, recklessness, as the default in instances in which the General Assembly has not specified culpability and no intent to impose absolute liability can be discerned. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 302(c).10 Negligence, on the other hand, is treated as “an exceptional basis of liability,” and is therefore generally excluded from the bases that will support culpability for an offense unless explicitly prescribed by the legislature. See Model Penal Code *120§ 2.02 cmt. (Official Draft 1962).11 Since neither Section 3732 nor 3735 of the Vehicle Code designates criminal negligence as a culpability standard, Section 302 of the Crimes Code simply does not supply this culpability requirement as an element of those offenses.

¶11There is, however, a plausible argument to be made that other aspects of the Crimes Code’s culpability scheme operate to supply the element of criminal negligence. To understand this line of reasoning, a closer review of the MPC culpability scheme, from which that of the Crimes Code is derived, is necessary.

¶12In addition to supplying the default culpability provision of recklessness, the MPC places express and substantial constraints upon the application of strict or absolute liability to criminal offenses. Indeed, the MPC would expressly limit absolute liability offenses to “violations,” see Model Penal Code § 2.05(l)(a), defined as infractions punishable by fine or forfeiture but not by any possible incarcerative sanction, see id. § 1.04(5),12 as well as offenses defined by other statutes insofar as a legislative purpose to impose absolute liability plainly appears, see id. § 205(l)(b). Correspondingly, the MPC would reduce the grade of any offense defined by another statute, as to which absolute liability is imposed with respect to any material element, to a violation. See id. § 205(2)(a). The MPC nonetheless allows for the charging *121and proof of the “culpable commission” of such an offense, see id. § 205(2)(b); in such instances, culpability must be established on the order of at least criminal negligence. See id. By their terms, these provisions operate either to reduce the grade of offenses or to implicate a culpability requirement of criminal negligence “unless a subsequent statute otherwise provides.” See id. § 205(2).

¶13Such restraints are described in the MPC commentary as reflecting a compromise between the legislative desire to enact absolute liability crimes and preservation of the elemental fairness ensured by the association of a mens rea element with serious offenses, see Model Penal Code § 2.05 comment (Official Draft 1962), with the MPC, like the common law, eschewing strict liability for offenses punishable by imprisonment. See generally Model Penal Code § 2.05 comment (characterizing Section 2.05 of the MPC as a “frontal attack” upon strict liability “whenever the offense carries the possibility of criminal conviction, for which a sentence of probation or imprisonment may be imposed”).

¶14The scheme established by Pennsylvania’s comprehensive Crimes Code mirrors the MPC, with the substantial exception that the General Assembly replaced the concept of “violations” under the Model Penal Code with “summary offenses,” see 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 302, 305, which carry a maximum term of imprisonment of ninety days. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 106(c). Thus, in Pennsylvania, while absolute liability generally may be imposed only on a limited basis (summary offenses and offenses defined by statutes other than the Crimes Code where “a legislative purpose to impose absolute liability ... plainly appears,” 18 Pa.C.S. § 305(a)(1), (2)),13 pursuant to the terms *122of the Crimes Code, such offenses may be punishable with imprisonment of up to 90 days as a general rule, and culpable commission may be established by proof of negligence to support the imposition of greater incarcerative sanctions. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 305(b).14 The official commentary explains that *123Section 305, like its corollary in the MPC, serves to “ ‘tone down’ absolute or strict liability in penal law as a whole,” since such responsibility “cannot be readily defended where the offense carries a possible jail sentence.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 305, official cmt.15 Also of significance, these provisions (like those of the MPC) are operative “unless a subsequent statute otherwise provides.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 305(b).

¶15If Section 305(b)(2) applies, therefore, homicide by vehicle/DUI is a summary offense, unless the culpable commission of the offense is charged and proved, in which case the elements would carry the minimum culpability requirement of criminal negligence. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 305(b)(2). The viability of such construction, however, depends upon the interpretation of the phrase “unless a subsequent statute provides,” as it conditions the applicability of Section 305(b). See 18 Pa.C.S. § 305(b), supra note 13. See generally Commonwealth v. Parmar, 551 Pa. 318, 331, 710 A.2d 1083, 1089 (1998)(opinion in support of affirmance)(explaining that “[w]hen the General Assembly plainly indicates a legislative purpose to impose absolute liability, pursuant to Section 305(a)(2), the Commonwealth does not have to establish a mens rea element”).16 In *124State v. Cho, 297 Or. 195, 681 P.2d 1152 (1984), the Oregon Supreme Court determined that, in order for a subsequent statute to surpass Oregon’s equivalent to Section 305(b)(2), the subsequent statute must, on its face, clearly indicate an intent to dispense with a culpable mental state requirement. See id. at 1152. Under the Chointerpretation, Section 305(b)(2) of the Crimes Code would apply to restrict the application of Section 3735 absent proof of culpability, since a legislative intent to dispense with a culpable mental state requirement is not clearly indicated upon an examination of the terms of the provision alone. However, in State v. Miller, 309 Or. 362, 788 P.2d 974 (1990), the Oregon court would appeal1 to have disregarded its Choconstruct in the process of determining that the state’s DUI statute constituted a strict liability offense. Indeed, a dissenting jurist highlighted the court’s divergence from Choand advocated abandonment of Cho’s reasoning. The dissent argued that the Oregon equivalent to Section 305(b) :

says to me that in statutes enacted outside the crimes code after January 1, 1972 [its effective date], whereiri no culpable mental state is required ..., the offense is a violation, unless the legislature “otherwise provides.” ... I would assert that the legislature, by establishing that violation of the DUII statute is a Class A misdemeanor, has; otherwise provided; that is, the exception referent is to constituting a violation, not to the presence or absence of á culpable mental state requirement. Thus, under [the Oregon equivalent to Section 305(b)(2) ] — which is the applicable provision — DUII is a strict liability crime because (a) the statute requires no culpable mental state, and (b) the legislature has otherwise provided that DUII is a Class A misdemean- or. Under this approach, the legislature has done all it must do to make a post-1971 statute outside the criminal code a strict liability crime. 1

¶16Miller, 788 P.2d at 982-83 (Carson, J., dissenting),

¶17*125I agree with this analysis.17 Indeed, in order for Section 305(b)(2) to apply in the first instance, there must be a threshold determination that the General Assembly intended to impose strict liability with respect to at least some material element of the offense. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 305(b)(2); see also supra note 13. Once such intent is discerned from a subsequently enacted statute, it is rational to conclude that the General Assembly also intended the application of specified grading. Presumably, it is aware of the policies and precepts incorporated into the Crimes Code and could thus directly prescribe penalty provisions for post-1972 offenses corresponding with these policies if such were its intent. The most reasonable interpretation, then, is that the Legislature intended to allow itself a reasonable degree of flexibility in prescribing subsequent offenses, rather than burdening itself with a cumbersome series of required disclaimers to avoid the effect of prior statutes.

¶18To summarize the above, contrary to the majority’s conclusion, Section 302(a) of the Crimes Code does not support the attachment of a criminal negligence requirement associated with the offenses of homicide by vehicle or homicide by vehicle/DUI, nor do other provisions of the Crimes Code afford persuasive support.

¶19B. This Court’s Homicide By Vehicle Decisions

¶20In addition to the Crimes Code’s culpability provisions, the majority’s rationale is predicated upon prior determinations of this Court in the homicide by vehicle setting, principally Field, 490 Pa. at 519, 417 A.2d at 160, and Heck, 517 Pa. at 192, 535 A.2d at 575. First, in Field, in addressing the argument that Section 3732 of the Vehicle Code violated constitutional precepts, the Court reasoned that the statute in fact included a culpability requirement deriving from the underlying summary Vehicle Code violation (there, driving on sidewalk, 75 *126Pa.C.S. § 3703), thus avoiding any constitutional impediment. See id. at 524-25, 417 A.2d at 163.18Fieldwas vague in terms of identifying the precise nature of the culpability requirement discerned. See Heck, 517 Pa. at 197, 535 A.2d at 578 (noting that, in Field, “the question of what culpability was required was left unresolved”).

¶21Field, however, simply is unsupportable. Section 3703 of the Vehicle Code (like all other summary offenses under provisions of the Vehicle Code which lack a specific penalty term) constitutes a summary offense punishable solely by the imposition of a $25 fine. See 75 Pa.C.S. § 6502. Pursuant to the MPC and Section 305(a) of the Crimes Code, the culpability provisions are therefore wholly inapplicable to such infraction. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 305(a). Together with the strict limitation on the penalty, the absence of any express or default culpability requirement places such offense squarely among the purest forms of violations intended to be treated as absolute liability offenses and which are, almost beyond question, within the justifiable and permissible scope of absolute liability. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. See generally Parmar, 551 Pa. at 331, 710 A.2d at 1089 (opinion in support of affirmance)(stating that “[a] criminal statute that imposes absolute liability typically involves regulation of traffic or liquor laws”). Since the violation at issue clearly lacked any culpability requirement, Field’s attempt to derive a culpa*127bility requirement for homicide by vehicle from the underlying driving on sidewalk infraction lacks justification.

¶22Fieldcaused confusion in Pennsylvania courts on account of its flawed reasoning and by virtue of its failure to designate the degree of culpability necessary to support a conviction for homicide by vehicle. See Heck, 517 Pa. at 198-99, 535 A.2d at 578. Ultimately, this culminated in a divided, en banc decision of the Superior Court, Commonwealth v. Koch, 297 Pa.Super. 350, 443 A.2d 1157 (1982)(plurality). In the lead opinion, after expressing his disagreement with Field’s reasoning, see id. at 355, 443 A.2d at 1160 (stating that, “[i]n effect, our supreme court has saved section 3732 from the due process challenge of criminal liability without fault by a bootstrap analysis”), Judge Wickersham concluded that this Court had effectively inserted a culpability requirement akin to civil negligence into Section 3732. See id. at 354-57, 443 A.2d at 1159-61. Judge Spaeth filed a concurring opinion also identifying errors in Field’s reasoning, see Koch, 297 Pa.Super. at 362-66, 443 A.2d at 1162-65 (Spaeth, J., concurring), and arguing that the decision represented “neither a persuasive precedent, nor one that forecloses further attack on the constitutional validity of the statute creating the crime of homicide by vehicle.” Id. at 359, 443 A.2d at 1162 (Spaeth, J., concurring).

¶23This Court attempted to answer such criticisms and provide clarification in Heck, 517 Pa. at 192, 535 A.2d at 575, the second of the decisions relied upon by the majority in the present case. Although acknowledging the confusion, the Court admitted to no flaw in Field, but rather, maintained that Field“definitively answered the issue of whether § 3732 requires culpable conduct to sustain a conviction.” See id. at 197, 535 A.2d at 578. The Court then stated that the confusion occurred as a result of the Superior Court’s reliance upon dicta from Fieldand another decision, Commonwealth v. Houtz, 496 Pa. 345, 437 A.2d 385 (1981). See id.19Specifical*128ly, in responding to the criticism concerning the erroneous derivation of a culpability requirement from the offense underlying the homicide by vehicle charge, the Court stated, “[t]his criticism was unwarranted because the discussions of culpability in Field ... were not relevant to the issues which had been presented.” Id. at 199, 535 A.2d at 579. Further, the Court indicated that its past decisions upholding the constitutionality of Section 3732 had effectively resolved the culpability question. See id. at 200, 535 A.2d at 579 (stating that, “without ever having been presented with the issue of the level of culpability required under § 3732, the tenor of our prior opinions rejecting constitutional challenges to the statute would appear to have resolved the issue” (citing Commonwealth v. Hicks, 502 Pa. 344, 466 A.2d 613 (1983))). The Court nonetheless indicated that it would not permit such a critical question to be answered by implication and offered the following conclusion:

We now hold that ordinary negligence will not sustain a conviction for the offense of homicide by vehicle. The applicable mens rea requirements of culpability are those enumerated in 18 Pa.C.S. § 302(a).

…

The Official Comment to § 302 states that “ ‘Negligently5 as used in Subsection (b)(4) is intended to mean criminal negligence.” The Legislature clearly did not intend the phrase “negligently” to encompass the tort liability concept of negligence. To the extent that decisions in this Commonwealth may be construed otherwise, they are expressly overruled.

¶24*129Heck, 517 Pa. at 200-01, 535 A.2d at 580 (emphasis in original).

¶25In my view, the reasoning of Heck, like that of Field, merits critical review. Upon such examination, I would conclude that Heck’s reasoning suffers, in the first instance, for its initial reliance upon Field, as definitively answering the culpability question presented by Section 3732, since, as noted, Field’s reasoning is unsound.20Heck’s reference to Section 302(a) of the Crimes Code is conclusory; further, as discussed above, see supra § IIA, Section 302 of the Crimes Code does not employ criminal negligence as a default culpability requirement, nor do its provisions apply at all to subsequently enacted offenses as to which the General Assembly intended to impose absolute liability (rather, in such instances, Section 305 contains the relevant provisions). Accordingly, Fieldand Hecklack a critical element of the required analysis, namely, the application of principles of statutory construction to determine whether the General Assembly intended to apply strict liability in a subsequently enacted offense contained in a provision of Pennsylvania law outside the Crimes Code. Cf. Commonwealth v. Cheatham, 419 Pa.Super. 603, 610, 615 A.2d 802, 806 (1992)(Cirillo, J.)(observing that, in Heck, “[t]he Pennsylvania Supreme Court rehabilitated the [homicide by vehicle] statute by adding a mens rea requirement to what is, on its face, a strict liability statute”). See generally Parmar, 551 Pa. at 331, 710 A.2d at 1089 (opinion in support of affirmance)(setting forth the pertinent analytical principles vis-avis the determination of legislative intent in relation to absolute liability).

¶26In summary of the above, contrary to the majority’s present analysis, neither Fieldnor Heckprovides persuasive support for the proposition that the General Assembly intended for a *130requirement of criminal negligence in the homicide by vehicle or homicide by vehicle/DUI contexts.

¶27III. Did the General Assembly Intend to Include Strict Liability Elements in the Homicide By Vehicle and Homicide By Vehicle/DUI Statutes?

¶28As noted, since the present question involves Vehicle Code provisions enacted after promulgation of the Crimes Code, and such provisions lack express culpability requirements attaching to their elements, it is necessary to examine the intent of the General Assembly to determine whether strict liability was intended.

¶29A. Homicide by Vehicle

¶30Prior to this Court’s decision in Field, a divided en banc panel of the Superior Court undertook just such an examination in a comprehensive fashion in the context of Section 3732. See Commonwealth v. Barone, 276 Pa.Super. 282, 419 A.2d 457 (1980)(plurality).21 The lead opinion, authored by then-President Judge Cercone, endorsed the proposition, advocated by the majority herein, that the General Assembly did not intend to impose absolute liability for homicide by vehicle, but rather, incorporated a culpability requirement of criminal negligence. See Barone, 276 Pa.Super. at 297, 419 A.2d at 465 (Cercone, P.J.). President Judge Cercone opened his discussion by noting the strong common law tradition against strict penal responsibility, and the embodiment of such tradition within the Model Penal Code, and, correspondingly, the culpability provisions of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code. See id. at 290-91, 419 A.2d at 462. Regarding the directive of Section 305(a)(2) to the effect that the Crimes Code’s culpability requirements do not apply to offenses defined by other statutes “insofar as a legislative purpose to impose absolute liability for such offenses or with respect to any material element thereof plainly appears,” 18 Pa.C.S. § 305(a)(2)(em-*131phasis added); see supra note 13, President Judge Cercone found no such intent apparent in Section 3732’s proscription. In the first instance, he deemed significant the use of the word “homicide” in the title to the enactment, given the traditional association between the concept of criminal homicide and fault. See Barone, 276 Pa.Super. at 291-93, 419 A.2d at 462-63.22 While acknowledging the placement of the word “unintentionally” within the statute, see 75 Pa.C.S. § 3732, supra note 8, a focus of the dissenting opinion, see infra, President Judge Cercone concluded that, taken in context, the word denoted solely that the conduct causing the death was not undertaken with purpose or design. See Barone, 276 Pa.Super. at 292, 419 A.2d at 463 (Cercone, P.J.). Addressing the positions taken by concurring and dissenting judges to the effect that strict liability was intended by the Legislature, President Judge Cercone reasoned that such position lacked grounding in reasoned social policy, and, therefore, its effectuation was not likely within the scope of the intended purpose underlying the statute.23

¶31*132Further, in light of the General Assembly’s failure to specify a culpability element for the offense, President Judge Cercone invoked specific principles of statutory construction, examining the circumstances surrounding the enactment, the harm sought to be regulated and prevented, the object sought to be obtained, the consequences of particular constructions, and the germane legislative history. See id. at 293, 419 A.2d at 463. Pertaining to the circumstances surrounding the enactment, President Judge Cercone recognized its derivation from the Uniform Vehicle Code in connection with an effort to reform Pennsylvania’s comprehensive scheme of traffic regulation. See id. at 294-95, 419 A.2d at 464 (reasoning that, “[i]n retrospect, ... the subject legislation was not an isolated amendment to the Motor Vehicle Code motivated solely by the carnage on our roadways and the ‘inadequacy’ of our involuntary manslaughter statuteQ] [rjather, the vehicular homicide proviso was but one aspect of a massive overhauling of all Pennsylvania rules of the road”). Addressing the concurring and dissenting positions that the General Assembly chose to enact a distinct offense governing vehicular homicides to reduce fatalities on Pennsylvania roadways, President Judge Cercone reasoned that:

these weighty concerns are not jeopardized by reading the subject statute as not dispensing with the requirement that the harm causing violation must nevertheless be culpable. More directly, to credit the legislature with an intent to deter life endangering conduct on our roadways is to acknowledge that in order for punishment to be efficacious and just under this provision, it must be predicated upon the accused’s awareness of the factors which made his conduct criminal. Thus, conviction, punishment, and sentence may well provide inadvertent violators with an additional incentive to take more care in both evaluating the *133risks thsy consciously create and those which they unreasonably fail to perceive. In either case, however, the assumption which underlies the punishment is that the actor ignored the operative factors in creating a risk of harm to others. Confronted with imprisonment, the violator may indeed think twice prior to speeding through a densely populated neighborhood. On the other hand, to suggest as the [djissent does that our legislature intentionally chose to disregard the social utility of the driver’s conduct is to impute to the legislature a harshness and shortsightedness which we cannot. While there is always some risk associated with driving an auto, we do not think that the legislature in its collective wisdom intended to abrogate the possibility of a finding that the risk taken was reasonable under the particular circumstances.

¶32Barone, 276 Pa.Super. at 295-96, 419 A.2d at 464-65 (Cercone, P.J.).24 President Judge Cercone ultimately acknowledged that the General Assembly’s purpose in effectuating the statute likely related to perceived inadequacies in the involuntary manslaughter statute relative to vehicular homicides. He concluded, however, that the General Assembly intended to fill such void by criminalizing only such violations as entailed a “gross deviation” from the required standard of care, or, in other words, criminal negligence as defined by the culpability provisions of the Crimes Code, 18 Pa.C.S. § 302(b)(4). See Barone, 276 Pa.Super. at 297, 419 A.2d at 465-66.25

¶33*134Contrary to the view expressed in the lead opinion, Judge Spaeth, in concurrence, concluded that the General Assembly’s intent was to impose absolute liability pursuant to Section 3732 of the Vehicle Code. See Barone, 276 Pa.Super. at 301, 419 A.2d at 467-68 (Spaeth, J., concurring).26 From federal and state cases, Judge Spaeth discerned a practice, in resolving the intertwined questions of whether the imposition of strict criminal liability was intended by the legislature and the consistency of such imposition with constitutional due process, of examining: the policy and intent of the legislature; the origins of the offense; the reasonableness of the standards imposed; and the punishment and stigma attached to a conviction. See id. at 306-07, 419 A.2d at 470.27 In implementing such test, Judge Spaeth first noted that the mere omission of any mention of intent should not be construed as dispensing with it, see id. at 311, 419 A.2d at 473, and proceeded to focus upon the general policy of the Legislature toward strict liability crimes; the common law origins and history of the specific crime at issue; and the relevant legislative history. See id.

¶34In evaluating these considerations, Judge Spaeth discerned an even balance between factors for and against the conclusion that the legislature intended to apply strict criminal liability in the implementation of the Section 3732 offense. See id.In *135addition to the general principle that penal statutes are to be strictly construed, he acknowledged several other factors militating against the conclusion that the legislature intended to impose strict criminal liability, including: the legislative policy against strict criminal liability;28 the history of the term “homicide” as described in the lead opinion, see supra note 22 and accompanying text; as well as the discussions of legislators connected with the General Assembly’s decision not to create the crime of careless driving, see id. at 316-18, 419 A.2d at 475-76.29

¶35In favor of the strict liability construction, Judge Spaeth elaborated upon the derivation of the statute from the Uniform Vehicle Code in terms of the development of the uniform law provision, tracking its modification from 1956 through 1962 from one proscribing “reckless disregard,” to “negligent homicide,” to “violation of any state law or municipal ordinance.” See Barone, 276 Pa.Super. at 319, 419 A.2d at 477 (Spaeth, J., concurring). According to Judge Spaeth, such changes made it “clear that the drafters of the Uniform Vehicle Code intended to change the character of the crime, and to make it into a strict liability crime, requiring proof of no more than a mere violation of any traffic ordinance that resulted in the death of another.” Id.(citing Commentary, Homicide by Vehicle 1 (1978)). Contrasting Pennsylvania’s efforts with the experience of other states that have preserved express elements of culpability within their vehicular homicide statutes (or the equivalent), Judge Spaeth indicated:

*136We must assume, I believe, that when the Pennsylvania legislature enacted section 3732, it was aware of the history of that section in Ohio and the other states that added or retained some requirement that the defendant act negligently or recklessly. Yet, although it very easily could have done so, the legislature did not add any requirement of negligence or recklessness to the section, nor did it enact the 1956 version of section ll-903(a) of the Uniform Vehicle Code. Thereby the legislature indicated its intent to adopt the 1962 revision, requiring proof of no more than a traffic violation causing death.

¶36Barone, 276 Pa.Super. at 319-20, 419 A.2d at 477 (Spaeth, J., concurring). Finally, Judge Spaeth observed that, if the General Assembly had intended to limit criminal violations under Section 3732 to reckless or negligent actors, it need not have enacted the section at all, since those defendants already were subject to prosecution for involuntary manslaughter. See id. at 320-21, 419 A.2d at 477-78 (citing 18 Pa.C.S. § 2504). In this regard, he indicated:

a consideration of the crime of involuntary manslaughter provides what seems to me a probably correct explanation of why the legislature intended to create strict criminal liability under section 3732. The cases demonstrate that the Commonwealth has had difficulty in obtaining convictions for involuntary manslaughter, for proof of a traffic violation may not be proof of recklessness or gross negligence. It seems probable that in enacting section 3732, the legislature intended to overcome this difficulty by broadening the scope of liability to include those persons who merely violated traffic ordinances. The North Carolina court in State v. Freeman[, 31 N.C.App. 93, 228 S.E.2d 516 (1976),] attributed just such an intent to the North Carolina legislature.

¶37Barone, 276 Pa.Super. at 320-21, 419 A.2d at 478 (Spaeth, J., concurring)(footnotes and citations omitted).30

¶38*137Judge Spaeth concluded his substantive analysis by returning to the “plainly appears” language of Section 305(a)(2), see supra note 13 and accompanying text, concluding that, in view of the history of the statute and in contemplation of the General Assembly’s probable purpose of broadening liability beyond that contained in the involuntary manslaughter provision of the Crimes Code, “for me, it appears plainly enough.” Barone, 276 Pa.Super. at 322, 419 A.2d at 478 (Spaeth, J., concurring). He acknowledged that he regarded his decision in this regard as “exceedingly close.” Id,.31

¶39Judge Wieand dissented, opening with the observation that the statutory language does not require culpability further than that associated with the underlying violation, Barone, 276 Pa.Super. at 335, 419 A.2d at 486 (Wieand, J., dissenting)(“the legislature determined to make criminal responsibility dependent upon violation of a traffic law and not necessarily on *138culpable or criminal negligence”), and emphasizing the legislative authority to define a crime so that proof of criminal intent is not necessary, particularly in an area of unique legislative concern, such as highway safety. See id. at 335-36, 419 A.2d at 485-86. Judge Wieand observed that comparable statutes adopted in other jurisdictions similarly have been construed to eliminate a requirement of culpable conduct; further, he cited Superior Court precedent to the effect that the Legislature intended to reduce the degree of culpability necessary to support a conviction of homicide by vehicle. See id. at 337, 419 A.2d at 486 (citing Commonwealth v. Trainor, 252 Pa.Super. 332, 337 n. 4, 381 A.2d 944, 947 n. 4 (1977)). Referencing the derivation of the statute from the Uniform Vehicle Code, Judge Wieand indicated that “[ujnder this section, the gravamen of the offense was intended to be the violation of a traffic law which resulted in death.” Id. at 338, 419 A.2d at 487. Judge Wieand agreed with Judge Spaeth’s view that “the history of the provision in other states merely confirms that the legislature in Pennsylvania deliberately chose to premise criminal responsibility solely upon a traffic violation,” id.; however, contrary to his colleague’s view, Judge Wieand concluded that the statute comported with constitutional precepts. See id. at 338-40, 419 A.2d at 487-88.

¶40It seems, at least to me, that each of the positions expressed in Baronerepresents a defensible view displaying due and reasoned consideration of the pertinent legislative intent.32 Ultimately, I would endorse the essential position of Judges Spaeth and Wieand to the effect that the General Assembly in fact intended to create a strict liability offense, placing particular emphasis upon the derivation of the statute from the Uniform Vehicle Code as it had evolved from one grounded in reckless conduct to one containing no culpability requirement; the juxtaposition of the offense to the existing crime of *139involuntary manslaughter; the experience of other states which have added an express culpability requirement, see Barone, 276 Pa.Super. at 319-20, 419 A.2d at 477 (Spaeth, J., concurring); and the decisions of other jurisdictions finding that similarly worded provisions embody an attempt to impose absolute liability based upon the strong legislative purpose of encouraging safe driving. See, e.g., Freeman, 228 S.E.2d at 519.33 While certainly such statutes providing for serious penalties represent a marked departure from the MPC paradigm, it is quite clear that since the introduction of the MPC into state crimes legislation, the penal law and its underlying policies have changed with the proliferation of offenses, more severe grading, and sentencing enhancements. See generally Markus Dirk Dubber, Penal Panopticon: The Idea of a Modem Model Penal Code, 4 Buff.Crim. L.Rev. 53, 53-54 (2000)(arguing that “[sjince its publication in 1962, the conceptual foundation of the Model Code has collapsed in form and in substance”). Notably, by replacing the MPC conception of violations (to which no term of imprisonment may attach) with summary offenses (permitting imprisonment of up to 90 days), see 18 Pa.C.S. § 106(c), even upon enactment of the Crimes Code in 1972, the Pennsylvania General Assembly conveyed a substantially broader view of strict or absolute liability than the drafters of the MPC envisioned. See supra § IIA.34*140Staples, 511 U.S. at 616, 114 S.Ct. at 1802 (“[hjistorically, the penalty imposed under a statute has been a significant consideration in determining whether the statute should be construed as dispensing with mens rea”).

¶41Finally, as Justice Newman emphasizes, last year the General Assembly inserted a specific culpability requirement into the homicide by vehicle statute. It could be argued that such constitutes a manifestation of its prior intent. This change, however, occurred in connection with an enhancement in the grading of the offense from a first-degree misdemeanor to a third-degree felony. It could also be argued, therefore, that the Legislature believed that the culpability requirement was necessary to the imposition of a greater penalty. The legislative history, however, would suggest that neither of the above may be the case. For example, prior to the Senate vote on the legislation, the Honorable Robert J. Mellow, a do-sponsor, advocated its passage with emphasis upon the enhanced penalties provided and the salutary effect of such enhancement in terms of encouraging safe driving.35 The pertinent bill analy*141sis suggests that the insertion of a culpability requirement was predicated upon an interpretation of what the courts had determined was required rather than a reflection of the General Assembly’s own prior intentions.36

¶42B. Stare Decisis

¶43I have suggested above that this Court’s decisions in Fieldand Fleck contain inadequate reasoning and fail to address the central consideration of whether the General Assembly intended to impose strict liability in Section 3732 via principles of statutory construction and conventional absolute liability analysis. I acknowledge, however, that such decisions constitute precedent, and that there are sound reasons to adhere to such authorities even if not perfectly reasoned. See generally Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 2609, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991)(emphasizing the role of precedent in furthering “the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, ... reliance on judicial decisions, *142and ... the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process”). There are also instances, however, which call for reconsideration of prior decisions. For example, as this Court has stated:

[t]he doctrine of stare decisis was never intended to be used as a principle to perpetuate erroneous principles of law. While we fully ascribe to Lord Coke’s evaluation of the importance of certainty in the law, this end obviously cannot outweigh the necessity of maintaining the purity of the law. The court’s function is to interpret legislative enactments and not to promulgate them. Where, as here, by our decisions ... the Court distorted the clear intention of the legislative enactment and by that erroneous interpretation permitted the policy of that legislation to be effectively frustrated, we now have no alternative but to rectify our earlier pronouncements and may not blindly adhere to the past rulings out of a deference to antiquity.

¶44Mayhugh v. Coon, 460 Pa. 128, 135, 331 A.2d 452, 456 (1975); see also Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd. of Pub. Ed., 453 Pa. 584, 606, 305 A.2d 877, 888 (1973)(“the doctrine of stare decisis is not a vehicle for perpetuating error, but rather a legal concept which responds to the demands of justice and, thus, permits the orderly growth processes of the law to flourish”). See generally Cordobar-Hincapie, 825 F.Supp. at 501 (warning of the “dangers in patchwork criminal codes and decisions that lack internal consistency and leave basic questions unanswered”).

¶45Given the above, the expressions by jurists engendered by Fieldand Heck>37 the Court’s continuing reliance upon these *143decisions to assess culpability requirements of other statutes, the desirability of an analysis employing principles of statutory construction and related precepts developed in the strict liability context, and the constitutional implications of the presence or absence of mens rea requirements, I believe that this Court would be well served in providing a fuller assessment of culpability in the homicide by vehicle and homicide by vehicle/DUI context.

¶46In summary, I would hold that the offense of homicide by vehicle was intended by the General Assembly to embody absolute liability, although, in light of this conclusion, I would reserve decision concerning the constitutionality of the statute for an appropriate case.

¶47C. Homicide by Vehicle/DUI

¶48Since I have concluded that homicide by vehicle was intended by the General Assembly to operate as a strict liability offense, it follows that homicide by vehicle/DUI should be construed likewise. Recently, in his dissenting opinion in Commonwealth v. Collins, 564 Pa. 144, 764 A.2d 1056 (2001), Mr. Justice Nigro summarized the derivation of Section 3735 from Section 3732 and described the relationship between the provisions as follows:

Although, mechanically, the General Assembly reposited the homicide by vehicle/DUI provisions in a separate section of the Vehicle Code, the essential import of this act was to increase the grading of homicide by vehicle/DUI ... and provide a mandatory minimum sentence of three years imprisonment. Further, the act amended Section 3732 (homicide by vehicle) by adding the words “except Section 3731(DUI).” Thus, the Legislature clearly indicated that while the commission of any traffic violation that resulted in the loss of human life was a serious offense, driving under the influence implicated a greater social evil and therefore warranted a concomitantly greater and more certain penalty.

¶49*144Collins, 564 Pa. at 153, 764 A.2d at 1061.38 The statutes operated identically, with the only material difference being the nature of the predicate offense, and, in the case of Section 3735, the predicate offense itself would generally implicate a greater degree of blameworthiness.39 Accordingly, I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the culpability assessment should be the same; my difference is merely in the nature of the assessment in the first instance.40

¶50*145IV. Conclusion

¶51According to one commentator, the complexities involved in statutory construction and constitutional analysis in the strict criminal liability arena reflect “the complexity of our moral blaming judgements and of the legal structure in which those judgements are embedded.” Simmons, When Is Strict Criminal Liability Just?, 87 J.Crim. L. & Criminology at 1137. The Pennsylvania General Assembly has clearly moved beyond the comparatively comfortable framework of the MPC in terms of the imposition of absolute liability in the criminal law context. Correspondingly, and as gradations are enhanced and penalties are increased, the constitutional stakes are raised. See Cordoba-Hincapie, 825 F.Supp. at 515 (recognizing that “[t]he cases, despite their uneven nature, impart a clear message that there is a continuing constitutional importance to the mens rea principle^] [t]he outer limits of what is permissible have not been drawn, but such limits certainly exist”).41 The *146majority, and Fieldand Heckbefore it, successfully surmounted the complexities here involved by divining a culpability requirement where none was indicated, doing so without reference to the conventional tools of statutory construction or strict liability analysis. The salutary effect is an approximation of the common law and MPC restraints upon strict liability by inserting the middle-ground concept of negligence into the pertinent offenses. See generally Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 Sup.Ct. Rev. at 110 (1962)(argu-ing that “the idea of criminal responsibility based upon the actor’s failure to act as carefully as he should affords an important and largely unutilized means for avoiding the tyranny of strict liability in the criminal law”). The difficulty, however, is that, based upon the reasoning provided, there is no assurance that the General Assembly intended such middle ground to be achieved, and, indeed, much of the evidence not expressly taken into account by the Court simply is to the contrary. Thus, the appearance arises that the Court may be functioning as a lawmaker, rather than within its constitutional role as interpreter of the lawful enactments of the Legislature. This problem is compounded as it becomes increasingly apparent in various contexts that some form of strict liability is legislatively intended, for example, in instances in which per se methods of proof are employed. Ultimately, in light of the breadth of criminal offenses reposited in the Crimes Code and other statutes, I believe that the constitutional questions will need to be squarely confronted.

¶52As I would hold that the General Assembly intended strict liability in the present case, no constitutional challenge is raised, and, on the facts as stated by the majority (and based upon his conviction for involuntary manslaughter), Appellant’s moral blameworthiness can hardly be disputed, I believe that the trial court’s instructions were sufficient.

¶53Accordingly, I join in affirming the Superior Court’s order.

¶112concurring and dissenting.

¶113I respectfully disagree with the conclusion of the majority that criminal negligence is the mens rea for homicide by *147vehicle while driving under the influence of alcohol, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3735. I believe that an examination of the legislative enactment of 75 Pa.C.S. § 3735.1, governing aggravated assault by vehicle while driving under the influence, and the recent amendment of the homicide by vehicle statute, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3732, demonstrates a legislative intent not to require proof of criminal negligence in order to sustain a conviction for 75 Pa.C.S. § 3735.

¶114In Commonwealth v. McCurdy, 558 Pa. 65, 735 A.2d 681 (1999), we described 75 Pa.C.S. § 3735 as requiring proof: (1) of a conviction for driving under the influence pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S. § 3731, and (2) that this violation caused the death. Id. at 685. In the present case, the majority, relying on Commonwealth v. Heck, 517 Pa. 192, 535 A.2d 575 (1987), holds that Heck’s questionable premise that the former 75 Pa.C.S. § 3732 required proof of criminal negligence, notwithstanding that statute’s “unintentionally causes” language, controls this case. Consequently, because 75 Pa.C.S. § 3735 similarly penalizes a driver who “unintentionally causes” the death of another while driving under the influence, the majority engrafts onto McCurdy’s two elements the requirement that the Commonwealth also prove that the defendant acted with criminal negligence.

¶115As a matter of statutory construction, I believe the majority’s position is incorrect. Section 3735 provides that “any person who unintentionally causes the death of another person as the result of a violation of section 3731 (relating to driving under the influence of alcohol or controlled substance) and is convicted of violating section 3731 is guilty of a felony of the second degree when the violation is the cause of death.... ” Noticeably absent from this definition is the word “negligence.”

¶116The absence of the term “negligence” is not a mere legislative oversight. As evidenced by the legislative amendments to 75 Pa.C.S. § 3732 and the enactment of 75 Pa.C.S. § 3735.1, when the legislature intends to require proof of criminal negligence for an offense, it puts the words in the statute. In 1996, the legislature enacted 75 Pa.C.S. § 3735.1, which creat*148ed a new criminal offense for “aggravated assault by vehicle while driving under the influence.” Section 3735.1 provides:

[a]ny person who negligently causes serious bodily injury to another person as the result of a violation of section 3731 (relating to driving under influence of alcohol or controlled substance) and who is convicted of violating section 3731 commits a felony of the second degree when the violation is the cause of the injury.

¶11775 Pa.C.S. § 3735.1(a) (emphasis added). The inclusion of the term “negligence” in this statute demonstrates a clear legislative intent to require proof of criminal negligence for a conviction. More tellingly, in December of 2000, the legislature amended the statute for homicide by vehicle, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3732.1 Formerly, the statute read:

[a]ny person who unintentionally causes the death of another person while engaged in the violation of any law of this Commonwealth or municipal ordinance applying to the operation or use of a vehicle or to the regulation of traffic except section 3731 (relating to driving under the influence of alcohol or controlled substance) is guilty of homicide by vehicle, a misdemeanor of the first degree, when the violation is the cause of death.

¶118Effective February 18, 2001, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3732 now' provides:

[a]ny person who recklessly or with gross negligence causes the death of another person while engaged in the violation of any law of this Commonwealth or municipal ordinance applying to the operation or use of a vehicle • or to the regulation of traffic except section 3731 (relating to driving under influence of alcohol or controlled substance) is guilty of homicide by vehicle, a felony of the third degree, when the violation is the cause of death.

¶1192000 Pa. Legis. Serv. Act 2000-108 (S.B.1312) (Purdon’s) (emphasis added). The deletion of “unintentionally causes” from the former statute and its replacement with “recklessly or with gross negligence” further illustrates that when the legislature intends proof of criminal negligence as part of the *149elements of an offense, specifically in connection with violations of the Vehicle Code, it does so in clear and unmistakable language.

¶120As a matter of statutory construction, therefore, we should not supply additional elements to a criminal offense where the legislature has not sought fit to include them in the statute. Respecting 75 Pa.C.S. § 3735, we should read the legislature’s decision to leave this section unchanged as indicative of a legislative intent not to require proof of criminal negligence. If the legislature wished to require proof of criminal negligence to establish a violation of 75 Pa.C.S. § 3735, it could have done so either in 1996, when it enacted 75 Pa.C.S. § 3735.1 to require proof of negligence for aggravated assault by vehicle while driving under the influence, or in 2000, when it amended 75 Pa.C.S. § 3732 to require proof of criminal negligence for a conviction for homicide by vehicle. The legislature, however, made no such change.

¶121I also find this Court’s decision in Heckto be of doubtful utility to the present matter. If one reads Heckas involving only statutory interpretation, then I believe the actions of the legislature since Heckshow that we erred in concluding that the definition of criminal negligence contained in the Crimes Code, 18 Pa.C.S. § 302(b)(4), must be read into the statute.2 If, however, one reads Heckas holding that due process requires criminal negligence as the mens rea for a violation of the former 75 Pa.C.S. § 3732, then I would use the present case as an opportunity to disavow this interpretation of Heckas inconsistent with previous decisions upholding the constitutionality of 75 Pa.C.S. § 3732. Cf. Commonwealth v. Hicks, 502 Pa. 344, 466 A.2d 613 (1983) (rejecting equal protection challenge ,to former 75 Pa.C.S. § 3732); Commonwealth v. Field, 490 Pa. 519, 417 A.2d 160 (1980) (rejecting vagueness challenge to former 75 Pa.C.S. § 3732). But cf. Commonwealth v. O’Hanlon, 539 Pa. 478, 653 A.2d 616, 618 (1995) *150(interpreting Heck as requiring, on due process grounds, proof of criminal negligence to sustain a conviction for violation of former 75 Pa.C.S. § 3782). Due process does not mandate that criminal negligence be the mens rea for a crime for which the statute describes the degree of culpability as “unintentionally causes,” and which otherwise clearly and adequately describes the prohibited conduct. Accordingly, to the extent that the Heckopinion suggests this due process requirement and the majority follows this rationale with respect to 75 Pa.C.S. § 3735,1 must disagree.

¶122For these reasons, I concur in the decision of the majority to affirm but do not join its analysis of the mens rea requirement of 75 Pa.C.S. § 3735.