This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter
2025 UT 3
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Petitioner,
v.
CHAD HINTZE,
Respondent.
No. 20221057
Heard September 4, 2024
Filed March 13, 2025
On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals
Third District Court, Salt Lake County
The Honorable Heather Brereton
No. 181903394
Attorneys:
Derek E. Brown, Att’y Gen., Andrew F. Peterson, Deputy Solic.
Gen., Salt Lake City, for petitioner
David Ferguson, Salt Lake City, for respondent
JUSTICE POHLMAN authored the opinion of the Court, in which
CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT, ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE PEARCE,
JUSTICE PETERSEN, and JUSTICE HAGEN joined.
JUSTICE POHLMAN, opinion of the Court:
INTRODUCTION
¶1 In 2016, Chad Hintze, a registered sex offender, visited a
public park in violation of his sex offender registry conditions.
Hintze was charged with a class A misdemeanor for that conduct
in 2018, by which time he was serving a prison sentence for a
separate offense. But the State did not notify Hintze of the charge
against him until two years later. Hintze first learned about the
pending charge in March 2020, when he claims he was being
STATE v. HINTZE
Opinion of the Court
considered for parole on the separate offense. It was not until June
2020 that the State began prosecuting the class A misdemeanor,
apparently prompted by a letter Hintze wrote to the district court
requesting a hearing.
¶2 Shortly after Hintze was appointed counsel, he moved to
dismiss that charge against him on the basis that his Sixth
Amendment right to a speedy trial had been violated. He argued
that he was prejudiced by the State’s two-year delay, claiming he
would have been granted parole in March 2020 had the pending
charge been timely resolved. The district court disagreed. Applying
a four-factor framework first articulated by the United States
Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), it determined
that Hintze’s prejudice claim was speculative and that, based on
the totality of the circumstances, his speedy trial right was not
violated.
¶3 After entering a conditional guilty plea, Hintze appealed,
and a divided court of appeals reversed. It concluded that the four
Barker factors weighed in Hintze’s favor and required dismissal of
the case on Sixth Amendment grounds.
¶4 The State petitioned this court for certiorari review. We
granted its request and now decide whether the court of appeals
erred in concluding that the State violated Hintze’s Sixth
Amendment right to a speedy trial by failing to prosecute his case
for two years. Although the delay was significant, we conclude that
the Barker factors, appropriately weighed, do not establish a speedy
trial right violation. Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals’
decision, reinstate Hintze’s conviction, and remand to the court of
appeals for further proceedings.
BACKGROUND 1
¶5 In April 2011, Chad Hintze pleaded guilty to one count of
attempted unlawful sexual activity with a minor, a class A
misdemeanor. As a result of this conviction, Hintze was required
to register as a sex offender in the state of Utah. See UTAH CODE
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1 Hintze pleaded guilty as charged, so we recite the facts
relevant to the 2016 park incident as stated in the information and
as depicted in the body camera footage of Hintze’s police
encounter. Further, we recite the facts relevant to Hintze’s speedy
trial claim based on the district court’s oral findings.
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Opinion of the Court
§ 77-27-21.5(1)(n)(i)(V), (12)(a) (2011). 2 Since 2011, and at all
relevant times in this case, Hintze has been registered as a sex
offender in Utah.
¶6 Under Utah law, it is unlawful for registered sex offenders
to “be in any protected area.” Id. § 77-27-21.7(2) (2016). 3 The
definition of “protected area” includes “a community park that is
open to the public.” Id. § 77-27-21.7(1)(a)(iv) (2016).
The 2016 Park Incident
¶7 In June 2016, Hintze was sitting with a teenage girl on a
park bench along the Jordan River Parkway. Officers who were
patrolling the area approached them and began asking questions.
During their exchange, Hintze told the officers that he was
twenty-three years old, and the girl reported that she was thirteen.
Hintze initially claimed that the two were siblings, but he later
admitted that they weren’t related.
¶8 After asking for Hintze’s name and birthdate, the first
officer radioed dispatch for a records check and learned that Hintze
was a registered sex offender. The officer informed Hintze that it
was unlawful for him to be in the park because of his sex offender
status. See id. § 77-27-21.7(1)(a)(iv), (1)(c), (2) (2016). Hintze
acknowledged that the situation “look[ed] bad,” but he insisted
that nothing untoward was going on.
¶9 After the girl’s mother picked her up from the park, the
officers told Hintze that they could arrest and take him to jail for
the violation, but they instead allowed Hintze to walk home. The
State did not file any charges against Hintze based on the June 2016
park incident until March 2018.
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2 We cite the version of the statute requiring Hintze to register
as a sex offender that was in effect at the time of his 2011 conviction.
It has since been repealed and rehoused in Utah Code
section 77-27-21.7. See H.B. 17, § 27, 2012 Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah
2012).
3 We cite the version of section 77-27-21.7 that was in effect in
2016 when Hintze violated his sex offender registry conditions.
Since 2020, the legislature has made minor changes to the
numbering and wording of the statute.
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Opinion of the Court
Hintze’s 2017 Conviction and Related Parole Hearing
¶10 In June 2017, Hintze pleaded guilty to one count of
attempted forcible sexual abuse, a third-degree felony, based on
conduct unrelated to the 2016 park incident. In August 2017, Hintze
was sentenced on that count to an indeterminate prison term not to
exceed five years.
¶11 On March 15, 2018, Hintze attended an initial parole
hearing for the 2017 felony. The Utah Board of Pardons and Parole
chose not to release Hintze, and the Board’s notes reflect that it
anticipated a rehearing sometime in March 2020. The Board
instructed Hintze to complete a sex-offender treatment program
before the rehearing.
The Charge for the 2016 Park Incident
¶12 On March 26, 2018, the State filed an information charging
Hintze with one count of “violation by sex offender of protected
area,” a class A misdemeanor, arising from the 2016 park incident.
See id. § 77-27-21.7(2) (2016). But after the information was filed and
an arrest warrant was issued, the case stalled. As a result, Hintze
did not learn of the charge until two years later, in the spring of
2020. The cause of the delay is unclear, but no evidence suggests
that the State knowingly delayed the prosecution.
¶13 Hintze testified before the district court that he completed
his sex-offender treatment program in January 2020. Though it is
not clear from the record whether Hintze received a parole
rehearing, he testified that he “anticipat[ed]” being paroled after
treatment but that he was “stopped” from getting parole because
the pending charge “needed to be adjudicated.” The court,
however, did not accept this representation, stating that what the
Board would have done had his pending charge been resolved by
March 2020 was “speculative.” 4
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4 The court of appeals stated that “at [Hintze’s] March 2020
parole hearing, the Board denied his request for parole.” State v.
Hintze, 2022 UT App 117, ¶ 13,
520 P.3d 1. But we haven’t seen
anything in the record confirming that the March 2020 rehearing
was actually scheduled or ever held, much less that the Board
affirmatively denied Hintze’s parole request at any such hearing.
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Opinion of the Court
The Prosecution of Hintze’s Pending Charge and
His Motion to Dismiss
¶14 In March 2020, shortly after learning about the
outstanding warrant, Hintze mailed a letter to the district court,
stating: “I have a case pending/warrant and would like to set up
video court. Case #181903394. I can’t afford an attorney and would
like to be appointed one. I am located at The Kane County Jail.”
¶15 After Hintze sent his letter, litigation surrounding the 2016
park incident moved along at a steady clip. Hintze made his initial
appearance before the court in early June, and the court appointed
counsel, who filed a demand for a jury trial that same month.
Hintze was bound over at a preliminary hearing in early July, and
he entered a plea of not guilty.
¶16 About one month later, in early August, Hintze filed two
motions: a motion to dismiss based on an alleged violation of his
Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial, and a motion to suppress
based on an alleged violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be
free from unreasonable seizures.
¶17 In support of his Sixth Amendment claim, Hintze cited
Barker v. Wingo, a landmark case that “identif[ied] some of the
factors . . . courts should assess in determining whether a particular
defendant has been deprived of his right [to a speedy trial],”
including (1) the “[l]ength of delay,” (2) “the reason for the delay,”
(3) “the defendant’s assertion of his right,” and (4) “prejudice to the
defendant.” 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972). Analyzing these factors,
Hintze asserted that there had been an “excessive delay in the
prosecution” that was due to “negligence on the part of the State,”
that his March 2020 letter to the court invoked his Sixth
Amendment right to a speedy trial, and that the delay prejudiced
him because he was “denied parole once this case was filed” and
because the case “weighed on [his] mind.”
¶18 The State opposed Hintze’s speedy trial motion, asserting
that he “failed to establish unreasonable delay caused by the state,
failed to properly assert his speedy trial rights[,] and failed to
establish any harm caused by the delay.”
¶19 At a hearing on the motion, the defense tried to prove
prejudice through Hintze’s testimony. He explained that in 2018,
the Board denied him parole because he had not yet completed a
sex-offender treatment program. Hintze further testified that he
then anticipated being paroled—after completing the treatment
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STATE v. HINTZE
Opinion of the Court
program in January 2020—but that “what stopped [him] from
being paroled” was the existence of the pending warrant. He also
asserted that the pending case caused him to experience “[a]nxiety,
depression, [and] frustration.”
¶20 After hearing arguments from the parties, the district court
analyzed each of the Barker factors and denied Hintze’s motion.
¶21 Regarding the first factor, length of the delay, the court
agreed with the parties that the delay was long enough to trigger a
full speedy trial analysis. The court further noted that it was
“troubled by the fact that the case was filed in March of 2018 and
Mr. Hintze was not brought to court until . . . 2020.”
¶22 Regarding the second factor, the reason for delay, the court
noted that this was “a somewhat neutral factor” because nothing
“suggest[ed] that the delay occurred purposefully.”
¶23 With respect to the third factor, Hintze’s assertion of his
right, the court observed that, although “[n]othing in [Hintze’s
March 2020] letter . . . assert[ed] a right to a speedy trial,” he
asserted the right in August 2020 when he filed his motion to
dismiss. The court also noted that this case was different from the
typical speedy trial case because “there’s not been really any delay
in moving the proceedings forward once the right to a speedy trial
was invoked.”
¶24 Lastly, the court determined that the delay did not harm
Hintze. The court rejected Hintze’s argument that the delay
prejudiced him by interfering with his parole, reasoning that “what
the [B]oard would do or not . . . is somewhat speculative.” The
court further rebuffed Hintze’s claims of “generalized anxiety,”
describing it as something felt by “anyone who’s facing criminal
charges.”
¶25 The court then weighed the totality of the circumstances
and determined that the State did not violate Hintze’s speedy trial
right. Thus, the court denied his motion to dismiss. It also
separately denied his motion to suppress.
¶26 Soon afterward, Hintze pleaded guilty, reserving his right
to appeal the court’s denial of his motions. Based on the parties’
recommendation, the court subsequently closed the case without
imposing a sentence.
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Opinion of the Court
Hintze’s Appeal
¶27 Hintze appealed the district court’s denials of his motion
to dismiss and motion to suppress. In a split decision, the court of
appeals concluded that Hintze’s Sixth Amendment speedy trial
right was violated. State v. Hintze, 2022 UT App 117, ¶¶ 3, 70,
520
P.3d 1. The court of appeals reversed Hintze’s conviction and
remanded the case to the district court with instructions to dismiss
the charge.
Id.
¶28 In its analysis, the court considered each of the four factors
described in Barker. Id. ¶¶ 27–67. First, it determined that the two-year delay between the filing of the charge and the State’s
prosecution of Hintze “trigger[ed] the full four-factor Barker
inquiry.” Id. ¶ 27. The court then concluded that the first Barker
factor—the length of the delay—“weighs clearly in favor of Hintze”
given that “the State did nothing for two years . . . in a relatively
simple case that could have easily been resolved well within that
time period.” Id. ¶ 28.
¶29 On the second Barker factor—the reason for the delay—the
court observed that the blame for the two-year delay “rests entirely
with the State” and that the “State’s reason for delaying this case
was simple negligence.” Id. ¶¶ 30–31. The court determined that
“negligence is an example of a neutral reason for delay,” which
“weighs quite clearly against the State[,] . . . albeit less heavily than
if there had been evidence of deliberate intent to harm Hintze’s
defense.” Id. ¶¶ 31, 33 (cleaned up).
¶30 On the third factor—the defendant’s assertion of the
speedy trial right—the court viewed Hintze’s March 2020 letter to
the district court as “a clear attempt to get the case moving more
speedily toward trial.” Id. ¶ 38. It reasoned that a defendant’s
assertion of the right need not necessarily include a specific
mention of a “trial,” and that the court should instead look at
“whether the defendant’s behavior during the course of the
litigation evinces a desire to go to trial.” Id. ¶ 41 (cleaned up).
Applying this standard, the court considered the circumstances
surrounding the letter, such as that it was written and filed pro se
and that Hintze “quickly follow[ed] that request up with a request
for a preliminary hearing and a specific motion invoking the Sixth
Amendment.” Id. ¶ 39. The court remarked that “given the facts of
this case, the arrow on this factor’s Weigh-O-Meter is flatlined
toward Hintze’s side.” Id. ¶ 41.
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Opinion of the Court
¶31 On the fourth factor—prejudice—the court determined
Hintze was harmed by the delay because “it is at least reasonably
probable that, under the specific circumstances presented here,
Hintze would have been afforded the opportunity for parole in
March 2020 if this case had been resolved in 2018.” Id. ¶ 59. In
reaching its conclusion, the court initially relied on Hintze’s
testimony “that ‘what stopped [him] from being paroled’ was the
presence of this unresolved case.” Id. ¶ 52 (alteration in original).
Because “[t]hat testimony stands unrebutted on the record,” the
court reasoned it had “no evidence-based reason to believe that, if
this case had been resolved in Hintze’s favor prior to March 2020,
he would have been denied parole.” Id.
¶32 The court then “indulge[d] in extra-record speculation”
and hypothesized about what would have happened at a March
2020 parole hearing had the pending charge timely been resolved.
Id. ¶¶ 53–59. It expressed concern about basing a speedy trial
violation on the “mere possibility of prejudice,” observing that “a
defendant’s right to a speedy trial is not violated if his claims of
prejudice are insubstantial, speculative, and premature.” Id. ¶ 60
(cleaned up). So it instead adopted a “reasonable probability of
prejudice” standard as a threshold against which to judge speedy
trial prejudice claims. Id. ¶¶ 61–64 (cleaned up). It explained that,
as “[a]pplied to the speedy trial context, this means that a
defendant—in cases where the causal link for prejudice is at issue—
must demonstrate at least a reasonable probability that he or she
sustained actual prejudice as a result of the State’s failure to
prosecute the case in a timely manner.” Id. ¶ 64.
¶33 Finally, the court took up the task of balancing the four
factors, concluding that Hintze’s speedy trial right was violated
because “all four factors weigh in Hintze’s favor.” Id. ¶ 68. The
court further noted that “Hintze should win the balancing test
unless the prejudice analysis points convincingly toward an
absence of prejudice” because “the first three Barker factors so
clearly line up in Hintze’s column.” Id. ¶ 69. Because the court of
appeals reversed Hintze’s conviction on speedy trial grounds, it
did not resolve whether the district court erred in denying Hintze’s
motion to suppress. 5 Id. ¶ 24 n.3.
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5 The court noted, however, that it did “not disagree” with
Judge Tenney’s conclusion in his dissenting opinion that Hintze’s
(continued . . .)
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Opinion of the Court
¶34 Judge Tenney dissented, writing that he did not “believe
that Hintze’s speedy trial right was violated under the
circumstances of this case.” Id. ¶ 74 (Tenney, J., dissenting). Judge
Tenney specifically disagreed with the majority’s assessment of the
third and fourth Barker factors. See id. ¶¶ 80–122.
¶35 Regarding the third, Judge Tenney noted that even though
Hintze made “a relatively prompt assertion” of his speedy trial
right, id. ¶ 94, this factor was “something of a wash” because “the
State promptly responded to [his] motion, the court ruled on the
motion in September 2020, and the case was then resolved by way
of a plea that very same month,” id. ¶ 139.
¶36 Judge Tenney also disagreed with the majority’s
conclusion that Hintze had shown prejudice. He reasoned that the
“mere possibility of prejudice is not sufficient” to show a speedy
trial violation, and that Hintze’s claim that he was denied parole
because of the pending charge “fails for lack of proof.” Id. ¶¶ 117,
122 (cleaned up). Judge Tenney also declined to decide whether the
“reasonable probability standard” should be adopted in this
context, id. ¶ 122 n.10, but he resolved that even if the standard
applied, “there’s just too much maybe at the heart of the majority’s
conclusion that Hintze was prejudiced” to deem the standard met,
id. ¶¶ 121–22. 6
¶37 We granted the State’s petition for certiorari review.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶38 The State asks us to review whether the court of appeals
erred in holding that Hintze’s Sixth Amendment speedy trial right
was violated. “On a writ of certiorari, we review the decision of the
court of appeals, not that of the district court, and apply the same
standard[] of review used by the court of appeals.” State v. Wilder,
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motion to suppress should have been granted. Hintze, 2022 UT App
117, ¶ 52. But the court expressly declined to “incorporate any
analysis” of Hintze’s arguments regarding the propriety of the
district court’s denial of his motion to suppress into its opinion.
Id.
¶ 24 n.3.
6 Because he would not have dismissed Hintze’s case based on
a speedy trial violation, Judge Tenney addressed Hintze’s appeal
of the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress and
concluded that the district court erred in denying that motion. See
id. ¶¶ 142–73 (Tenney, J., dissenting).
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Opinion of the Court
2018 UT 17, ¶ 15,
420 P.3d 1064 (cleaned up). Whether a defendant’s
right to a speedy trial has been violated is “a question of law
reviewed for correctness.” State v. Younge,
2013 UT 71, ¶ 10,
321
P.3d 1127.
ANALYSIS
I. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL
¶39 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
establishes a criminal defendant’s right to a speedy trial. The Sixth
Amendment guarantees that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial.” U.S.
CONST. amend. VI. The right is “designed to minimize the
possibility of lengthy incarceration prior to trial, to reduce the . . .
impairment of liberty imposed on an accused while released on
bail, and to shorten the disruption of life caused by arrest and the
presence of unresolved criminal charges.” United States v.
MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 8 (1982).
¶40 Although the right to a speedy trial is “fundamental,” State
v. Younge, 2013 UT 71, ¶ 16,
321 P.3d 1127 (cleaned up), it “is
generically different from any of the other rights enshrined in the
Constitution,” Barker v. Wingo,
407 U.S. 514, 519 (1972). The right
has been described as “amorphous, slippery, and necessarily
relative. It is consistent with delays and dependent upon
circumstances.” Vermont v. Brillon,
556 U.S. 81, 89 (2009) (cleaned
up). “[A] speedy trial does not mean an immediate trial because . . .
‘pretrial delay is often both inevitable and wholly justifiable.’” State
v. Samora,
2022 UT App 7, ¶ 18,
504 P.3d 195 (quoting Doggett v.
United States,
505 U.S. 647, 656 (1992)). And the “only possible
remedy” for a violation of the speedy trial right is the
“unsatisfactorily severe remedy of dismissal of the indictment.”
Barker,
407 U.S. at 522; accord Younge,
2013 UT 71, ¶ 16.
¶41 The framework for analyzing Sixth Amendment speedy
trial claims comes from the United States Supreme Court’s decision
in Barker v. Wingo, which established a “balancing test, in which the
conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant are
weighed.”407 U.S. at 530. In Barker, the Supreme Court declined to
adopt various “rigid approaches” to evaluating the speedy trial
right, such as “requir[ing] a criminal defendant to be offered a trial
within a specified time period” or “restrict[ing] consideration of the
right to those cases in which the accused has demanded a speedy
trial.” Id. at 522–24. Instead, the Court instructed courts evaluating
Sixth Amendment speedy trial right claims to “engage in a difficult
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and sensitive balancing process,” id. at 533, assessing the totality of
relevant circumstances and approaching each case “on an ad hoc
basis,” id. at 530.
¶42 To that end, the Supreme Court identified “some of the
factors which courts should assess” in a speedy trial analysis,
including the “[l]ength of delay, the reason for the delay, the
defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant.”
Id. But the Court also made clear that none of the four factors is
“either a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a
deprivation of the right of speedy trial. Rather, they are related
factors and must be considered together with such other
circumstances as may be relevant.” Id. at 533.
¶43 With these instructions in mind, we discuss the unique
circumstances of this case and apply the Barker factors. 7 As
explained below, we agree with the district court that, based on the
totality of circumstances, Hintze’s right to a speedy trial was not
violated by the State’s two-year delay in prosecuting his 2016
offense. We therefore conclude that the court of appeals erred in
concluding that Hintze’s speedy trial rights were violated.
A. Length of Delay
¶44 The first Barker factor, length of the delay, “is actually a
double enquiry.” Doggett, 505 U.S. at 651. To trigger a Sixth
Amendment speedy trial analysis, an accused must allege that the
length of time between formal accusation and trial has “crossed the
threshold dividing ordinary from presumptively prejudicial
delay.”
Id. at 651–52 (cleaned up). “If the delay is not uncommonly
long, the inquiry ends there.” Younge,
2013 UT 71, ¶ 18 (cleaned
up); see also Doggett,
505 U.S. at 652 (explaining that where the
initial threshold is not met, the inquiry ends because the defendant
“cannot complain that the government has denied him a ‘speedy’
trial if it has, in fact, prosecuted his case with customary
promptness”). Generally, a delay approaching one year is sufficient
to clear this hurdle and trigger a full Barker inquiry. Doggett,
505
U.S. at 652 n.1; Younge,
2013 UT 71, ¶ 18.
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7 The parties agree that the first two Barker factors—the length
of and reason for the delay—weigh in Hintze’s favor. But because
they disagree about how the two factors should be weighted with
the other two factors in the overall analysis, we discuss all four.
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¶45 In the second part of the inquiry, courts examine “the
extent to which the delay stretches beyond the bare minimum
needed to trigger judicial examination of the claim.” Doggett, 505
U.S. at 652. This step is important because “the presumption that
pretrial delay has prejudiced the accused intensifies over time.”
Id.
¶46 The significance of this factor in the overall speedy trial
analysis depends on the circumstances of the case. For instance, a
lengthy delay in a case involving complex charges is less significant
in the totality of circumstances than it would be in a relatively
simple case. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 531 (“[T]he delay that can be
tolerated for an ordinary street crime is considerably less than for a
serious, complex conspiracy charge.”).
¶47 In this case, the length of delay is just over two years. The
State filed charges against Hintze in March 2018, but it failed to take
any steps to prosecute the case until after March 2020. 8 Both parties
agree that the two-year delay in this case is long enough to trigger
a full Barker analysis.
¶48 Regarding the second part of the inquiry, the two-year
delay is double the length of time that triggers a Barker analysis.
Although a two-year delay may be perfectly reasonable in a case
involving complex charges, this case involved a straightforward
status offense that ordinarily could be resolved in well under two
years. Thus, given the relatively simple nature of this case, the two-year delay weighs in favor of finding a violation of Hintze’s Sixth
Amendment speedy trial right.
B. Reason for the Delay
¶49 The second Barker factor asks “whether the government or
the criminal defendant is more to blame for [the] delay.” Doggett,
505 U.S. at 651. In considering this factor, courts must assign
“different weights . . . to different reasons.” Barker,
407 U.S. at 531.
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8 The initial delay between the 2016 park incident and the
information filed against Hintze in 2018 does not factor into our
speedy trial analysis because the Sixth Amendment speedy trial
right “does not attach until . . . a defendant is arrested or formally
accused.” Betterman v. Montana,
578 U.S. 437, 441 (2016). And
although Hintze’s case was not resolved until September 2020, he
does not assert that the time between March 2020 and September
2020 is relevant to his claim.
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In Barker, the Supreme Court drew a distinction between deliberate,
neutral, and valid reasons for delay:
A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to
hamper the defense should be weighted heavily
against the government. A more neutral reason such
as negligence . . . should be weighted less heavily but
nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate
responsibility for such circumstances must rest with
the government rather than with the defendant.
Finally, a valid reason, such as a missing witness,
should serve to justify appropriate delay.
Id. (cleaned up).
¶50 The Court elaborated in Doggett that “the weight we assign
to official negligence compounds over time as the presumption of
evidentiary prejudice grows.” 505 U.S. at 657. Thus, where the
reason for delay is a “more neutral” one such as negligence, courts
should consider the length of the delay in deciding how much
weight the factor deserves. See Barker,
407 U.S. at 531.
¶51 In this case, both parties agree that Hintze played no role
in the delay and that the delay is solely attributable to the State’s
negligence. And although the record does not reveal why the
prosecution was delayed, Hintze does not contend that the State
deliberately stalled the prosecution, and the district court found no
evidence of a knowing delay.
¶52 Because the State’s negligence was the sole cause of the
delay, the second Barker factor weighs in favor of a Sixth
Amendment speedy trial violation, though not as heavily as it
would if the State had deliberately delayed Hintze’s prosecution.
Further, the length of delay impacts the weight we give to this
factor. While the two-year delay in this case is substantial, it is not
one that we would call “extraordinary.” See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652
(delay of eight and a half years is extraordinary); see also Barker,
407
U.S. at 533 (delay of over five years is extraordinary); Younge,
2013
UT 71, ¶ 18 (delay of nine and a half years is extraordinary). Thus,
the length of delay here does not warrant affording this factor
heavy weight.
¶53 In sum, the second Barker factor weighs in favor of a
speedy trial violation, though the circumstances of the case do not
support affording this factor significant weight.
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C. Assertion of the Right
¶54 The third Barker factor asks whether and how the Sixth
Amendment right to a speedy trial was asserted. Barker, 407 U.S. at
531–32. A defendant’s assertion—or nonassertion—can carry
“strong evidentiary weight in determining whether the defendant
is being deprived of the right.” Id. This is because “[t]he more
serious the deprivation, the more likely a defendant is to
complain.” Id. at 531. In other words, because a defendant is more
likely to assert the right when the delay is unreasonable and
prejudice is likely to ensue, the assertion of the right can be
probative of the violation’s severity.
¶55 Conversely, if a defendant does not assert the right to a
speedy trial, proving a violation will be more difficult. Id. at 532.
This is in part because of the right’s unique nature. In some cases,
“deprivation of the right may work to the accused’s advantage,”
and a defendant may acquiesce to delays for strategic reasons. Id.
at 521. By not asserting the right, a defendant may suggest that the
defendant did not actually want a trial or, at a minimum, that the
delay is not causing harm. So, “barring extraordinary
circumstances,” courts are usually reluctant to identify a speedy
trial right violation “on a record that strongly indicates . . . that the
defendant did not want a speedy trial.” Id. at 536.
¶56 In this case, upon learning of the outstanding charge
against him in March 2020, Hintze promptly mailed a letter to the
district court requesting “to set up video court” and the
appointment of legal counsel. The court set a hearing, counsel was
appointed, and, by early July 2020, Hintze was bound over. Hintze
then filed a motion to dismiss in August 2020, asserting that his
Sixth Amendment speedy trial right had been violated by the two-year delay. He asked that his nonassertion of the right during the
two-year delay not be held against him given that he had been
unaware of the pending charge. But he invited the court to deem
the third Barker factor “satisfied” based on his March 2020 letter,
which reflected his “desire to be seen and heard on this case.”
¶57 In assessing this factor, the district court declined to
recognize the March 2020 letter as an assertion of Hintze’s speedy
trial right, but it credited him for asserting the right in his August
2020 motion. Ultimately, however, the factor did not appear to
carry much weight—positive or negative—in the court’s overall
analysis. In discussing the factor, the court observed that this case
differed from the typical scenario where a defendant is aware of the
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delay and the assertion of the speedy trial right may inform
whether the defendant was sincerely interested in receiving a
speedy trial.
¶58 In the court of appeals, Hintze challenged the district
court’s view and argued that his March 2020 letter was the
functional equivalent of a Sixth Amendment speedy trial right
assertion for purposes of Barker. That challenge generated
considerable debate between the court’s majority and dissent. See
State v. Hintze, 2022 UT App 117, ¶¶ 35–42,
520 P.3d 1 (majority
opinion);
id. ¶¶ 85–92 (Tenney, J., dissenting).
¶59 The majority emphasized Hintze’s efforts to move his case
along after he learned of the charge against him and ultimately
opined that, viewed in context, the letter was “a clear attempt to get
the case moving more speedily toward trial.” Id. ¶ 38. The majority
further reasoned that Hintze, having “quickly follow[ed]” up his
pro se request with a “specific motion invoking the Sixth
Amendment, ha[d] taken actions that result in the third factor
weighing in his favor.” Id. ¶ 39.
¶60 In contrast, the dissent opined that “to gain the benefit of
this factor, . . . a defendant must do something that puts the court
and the State on notice that he would prefer to be tried as soon as
possible.” Id. ¶ 90 (Tenney, J., dissenting) (cleaned up). It thus
determined that because the March 2020 letter “did not request a
trial” or “somehow invoke the Sixth Amendment,” it was not an
assertion of Hintze’s speedy trial right. Id. ¶ 85. Still, the dissent did
not “hold it against Hintze that he didn’t assert the speedy trial
right from the filing of the charge in March 2018 until March 2020,”
nor did it condemn Hintze for “fail[ing] to assert the right from
March 2020 to June 2020,” while he was unrepresented. Id. ¶ 93.
Instead, it credited Hintze with having made a “relatively prompt
assertion of the right” in the August 2020 motion, id. ¶ 94, and it
ultimately viewed the factor “as something of a wash,” id. ¶ 139.
¶61 Now, on certiorari review, the State agrees with the court
of appeals that Hintze’s nonassertion of his speedy trial right
during the two-year delay should not be held against him. The
State also accepts that Hintze asserted his speedy trial right in his
August 2020 motion to dismiss. 9 Yet the State contends that the
__________________________________________________________
9 The State makes this concession while observing that it could
argue that a motion to dismiss for a speedy trial violation should
(continued . . .)
15
STATE v. HINTZE
Opinion of the Court
court was wrong to weigh the third Barker factor in Hintze’s favor,
arguing that it erred in concluding that Hintze effectively asserted
his speedy trial right in his March 2020 letter. The State concedes
that “implicit assertions [of the speedy trial right] are not out of the
question, so long as context makes the specific desire to go to trial
clear.” But it argues that because Hintze’s letter did not mention a
trial, it does meet this standard. And although the State credits the
August 2020 motion as an assertion of the right, it says the factor
weighs against Hintze—or, at most, is neutral—because the
assertion was made “just once” and “was short-lived.”
¶62 We agree with the State in part. We agree that for this
factor to weigh in a defendant’s favor, a defendant should, “[a]t the
very least, . . . manifest his desire to be tried promptly.” United
States v. Duran-Gomez, 984 F.3d 366, 378 (5th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up).
This does not require that a defendant use specific words or
manifest that desire in one particular way, so long as the defendant
demonstrates a desire for a speedy trial.
¶63 But we do not accept the State’s invitation to weigh this
factor against Hintze, nor do we resolve whether the March 2020
letter is an assertion of the speedy trial right. Instead, we conclude
that this is one of those cases where the third Barker factor weighs
neutrally because Hintze was unaware of the charges during the
relevant delay. See, e.g., United States v. Richards, 707 F.2d 995, 997
(8th Cir. 1983) (explaining that the third Barker factor “has no
application” when a defendant was unaware of the pending charge
until his arrest); United States v. Vaughan,
643 F. App’x 726, 731 (10th
Cir. 2016) (deeming the third Barker factor neutral where the
defendant had no knowledge of his indictment during a delay of
twenty-two months).
¶64 As explained, the third Barker factor’s usefulness primarily
depends on how it illuminates the extent to which a defendant is
harmed by the deprivation of a speedy trial. See supra ¶¶ 54–55. But
where the defendant is unaware of the pending charge during the
delay, there is no real meaning to attribute to a subsequent
__________________________________________________________
not be viewed as an assertion of the speedy trial right if, as in this
case, the motion is unaccompanied by an alternative request for a
jury trial. The State explains that it is not making that argument
here because, in August 2020, jury trials had been suspended due
to the COVID-19 pandemic and an alternative request for a trial
setting arguably would have been futile.
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Opinion of the Court
assertion or nonassertion of the right. Thus, we disagree with the
court of appeals’ view that this factor weighs “quite clearly in
Hintze’s favor,” Hintze, 2022 UT App 117, ¶ 42, and we, like the
district court and the dissent, afford it no weight in the overall
Barker analysis.
D. Prejudice to the Defendant
¶65 The fourth Barker factor asks whether the defendant was
prejudiced by the delay. In Barker and subsequent cases, the
Supreme Court “expressly rejected the notion that an affirmative
demonstration of prejudice was necessary to prove a denial of the
constitutional right to a speedy trial.” Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25,
26 (1973) (per curiam); see also Barker,
407 U.S. at 533 (regarding
“none of the four factors . . . as either a necessary or sufficient
condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy
trial”). In practice, however, prejudice is often the “most
important[]” factor in a speedy trial analysis. State v. Ossana,
739
P.2d 628, 631 (Utah 1987). As our court of appeals recognized,
“although a showing of prejudice may not be absolutely necessary
in order to find a Sixth Amendment violation, courts have great
reluctance to find a speedy trial deprivation where there is no
prejudice.” Hintze,
2022 UT App 117, ¶ 43 (cleaned up); see also
United States v. Aquart,
92 F.4th 77, 99 (2d Cir. 2024) (“[T]his court
generally has been reluctant to find a speedy trial violation in the
absence of genuine prejudice.” (cleaned up)); United States v.
Martinez,
776 F.2d 1481, 1483 (10th Cir. 1985) (“[I]n the absence of
prejudice, we have great reluctance to dismiss an indictment for
prosecutorial delay.”).10
__________________________________________________________
10 To be sure, courts have discerned speedy trial right violations
in the absence of particularized prejudice. But that generally occurs
only when the length of delay is extreme. See Doggett, 505 U.S. at
655–58 (relying on presumptive prejudice to find a speedy trial
right violation where the government negligently delayed
defendant’s prosecution for six years, reasoning that “excessive
delay presumptively compromises the reliability of a trial in ways
that neither party can prove or, for that matter, identify”); see also
United States v. Muhtorov,
20 F.4th 558, 653 (10th Cir. 2021)
(“Generally, the court requires a delay of six years before allowing
the delay itself to constitute prejudice.” (cleaned up)); Goodrum v.
Quarterman,
547 F.3d 249, 260 (5th Cir. 2008) (stating “the Doggett
(continued . . .)
17
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Opinion of the Court
¶66 The Supreme Court has instructed that prejudice “should
be assessed in the light of the interests of defendants which the
speedy trial right was designed to protect.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 532.
Specifically, those interests are: “(i) to prevent oppressive pretrial
incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused;
and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired.”
Id. “Of these, the most serious is the last, because the inability of a
defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the
entire system.”
Id. The Court has also observed that “[b]ecause
‘prejudice’ may take many forms, such determinations must be
made on a case-by-case basis in the light of the facts.” United States
v. Taylor,
487 U.S. 326, 341 n.13 (1988).
¶67 Here, Hintze defends the court of appeals’ view that he
was prejudiced because “he spent additional time behind bars as a
result of the State’s delay in prosecuting this case.” Hintze, 2022 UT
App 117, ¶ 59. The district court rejected that assertion, stating that
what the Board would have done had his pending charge been
resolved by March 2020 was “speculative.” But the court of appeals
disagreed and ultimately determined that “the important fourth
Barker factor . . . weighs, at least to some extent, in Hintze’s favor.”
Id. ¶ 67.
¶68 In making its assessment, the court of appeals
acknowledged that, generally, “a defendant’s right to a speedy trial
is not violated if his claims of prejudice are insubstantial,
speculative, and premature.” Id. ¶ 60 (cleaned up). But in contrast
to the district court, it accepted Hintze’s testimony that the pending
charge was the reason he wasn’t paroled in March 2020. Id. ¶ 52.
The court reasoned that because Hintze’s testimony was
“unrebutted on the record,” it had “no evidence-based reason to
believe” that Hintze would have been denied parole “if this case
had been resolved in Hintze’s favor prior to March 2020.” Id.
¶69 Recognizing that “a mere possibility of prejudice” is
insufficient to sustain a speedy trial right violation, the court
ultimately adopted a reasonable probability of prejudice standard
__________________________________________________________
presumption applies only where the delay is at least 5 years”); State
v. Labrecque, 307 A.3d 878, 891–92 (Vt. 2023) (observing that
presumptive prejudice under a Barker analysis is generally not
triggered “for delays less than 5 or 6 years”). Hintze does not argue
that prejudice should be presumed in this case based on the two-year delay.
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Opinion of the Court
as a threshold against which to judge speedy trial prejudice claims.
Id. ¶¶ 60–64 (cleaned up). With that standard in mind, the court
hypothesized about what would have happened had the pending
charge been resolved in time for a March 2020 parole hearing.
Id.
¶¶ 53–59, 66–67. It observed that “in many cases in which a
defendant claims prejudice from something like a lost chance at
parole[,] . . . the defendant’s claims may be too speculative to
credit.” Id. ¶ 67. But it concluded that Hintze’s claim was
“sufficiently supported by the facts of the case, by reasonable
inferences to be drawn therefrom, and by common experience,” to
“rise above mere speculation” and sustain the conclusion that “it
[is] at least reasonably probable that Hintze sustained actual
prejudice in the form of longer incarceration as the result of the
State’s delay.” Id.
¶70 Before us, the parties wage separate challenges against the
court of appeals’ analysis of Barker’s prejudice prong. The State
endorses the court’s adoption of a “reasonable probability of
prejudice” standard for speedy trial right prejudice claims, but it
argues that Hintze’s assertion of prejudice fails to meet that
threshold and that the prejudice factor should be weighed against
him.
¶71 In contrast, Hintze argues that the court of appeals
“reached the right conclusion, although not entirely for the right
reasons.” Hintze faults the court’s adoption of a “reasonable
probability of prejudice” standard, arguing that it places “an
unduly high burden on [him] that is inconsistent with speedy trial
caselaw” and “puts Utah on a different playing field than every
other jurisdiction.” Still, Hintze argues that regardless of how
prejudice is assessed, the court was right to weigh the fourth Barker
factor in his favor because he “easily steps over” whatever
“threshold” the court applies.
¶72 As we explain below, we conclude that the court of
appeals erred in adopting a “reasonable probability of prejudice”
standard to judge a defendant’s claim of prejudice in the speedy
trial context. We also conclude that the court erred in weighing the
prejudice factor in Hintze’s favor. Instead, we agree with the State
that the district court got it right—that Hintze’s prejudice claim was
too speculative to support a speedy trial right violation in this case.
1. The Reasonable Probability of Prejudice Standard
¶73 Although courts have applied the Barker factors in
thousands of cases over the past five decades, the Supreme Court
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STATE v. HINTZE
Opinion of the Court
offers little concrete guidance on how prejudice claims should be
judged. As the court of appeals aptly observed, some courts, in
some circumstances, have concluded that a “mere possibility of
prejudice” is insufficient to demonstrate prejudice in this context,
id. ¶ 60 (cleaned up) (citing cases), and others have expected
defendants to show at least a “reasonable possibility” of prejudice,
a “plausible claim of prejudice,” or “actual prejudice apparent on
the record” to sustain their speedy trial right claims, id. ¶ 61
(cleaned up) (citing cases).
¶74 These standards derive in some part from statements the
Supreme Court has made before and after Barker. In evaluating a
pre-Barker speedy trial claim in United States v. Ewell, the Court
rejected a speedy trial claim, in part, because the defendants’ “claim
of possible prejudice in defending themselves [was] insubstantial,
speculative and premature.” 383 U.S. 116, 122 (1966). In particular,
the Court rejected the defendants’ claims of prejudice where they
failed to specify what evidence was lost or which witnesses had
disappeared.
Id.
¶75 In Moore v. Arizona, decided in the year after Barker, the
Court again referred to “possible prejudice,” this time instructing
that “no court should overlook the possible impact pending charges
might have on [a defendant’s] prospects for parole and meaningful
rehabilitation.” 414 U.S. at 26–27 (cleaned up) (emphasis added).
But the Court remanded the case for the lower court to conduct a
Barker analysis and did not explain what showing was required. See
id.
¶76 Finally, in United States v. Loud Hawk, the Court noted that
the appellate court had given “little weight” to the fourth Barker
factor based on “the possibility” that a defense might be impaired
due to the loss of witnesses’ memories during the delay.11 474 U.S.
302, 315 (1986) (cleaned up). Without elaboration, the Court stated:
“That possibility of prejudice is not sufficient to support [the
__________________________________________________________
11 The defendants in Loud Hawk based their prejudice claim on
the absence or loss of memory of witnesses, but apparently there
was no showing that the witnesses would have been favorable to
the defense. United States v. Loud Hawk,
741 F.2d 1184, 1193 (9th Cir.
1984), rev’d,
474 U.S. 302 (1986). The appellate court gave little
weight to this factor, noting that the showing was “somewhat
speculative.”
Id.
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Opinion of the Court
defendants’] position that their speedy trial rights were violated.”12
Id.
¶77 Seeking a more definable standard against which to judge
speedy trial prejudice claims, the court of appeals adopted a
“reasonable probability” test—a legal standard appellate courts
regularly use in evaluating claims of trial error or prosecutorial
misconduct. Hintze, 2022 UT App 117, ¶ 62 (cleaned up) (citing
cases). The court concluded that it was logical to apply this
standard because it’s applied “in other similar contexts,” Utah
courts are familiar with it, and we have “a robust body of case law
. . . setting out the contours of what a defendant must show to meet
it.” Id. ¶ 63.
¶78 Hintze, however, urges us to reject this standard, arguing
that it fails to “correctly capture the mandates of Barker or its
progeny” and “depart[s] without a significant reason . . . from other
. . . courts whose decisions adhere more closely to Supreme Court
discussion of the right.” Hintze contends that we “should decline
to set a hard line on prejudice at the ‘probability of prejudice’
standard promulgated” by the court of appeals and instead assess
prejudice along a spectrum. He suggests, for example, that a
showing that prejudice is possible should “tip[] the prejudice factor
in favor of the defendant,” while a showing that prejudice is
reasonably probable would add to the factor’s weight. He further
submits that “[c]oncrete prejudice would weigh more heavily still,
permitting a court to grant a dismissal even when other Barker
factors present fewer concerns.”
¶79 We agree with Hintze that the “reasonable probability”
standard, while familiar, does not align with Barker and the
Supreme Court’s uniquely flexible balancing test. Although we’ve
had limited guidance from the Supreme Court since it adopted the
__________________________________________________________
12 In the State’s view, the Supreme Court held in Loud Hawk that
“possibility of prejudice” is “inadequate” in a speedy trial claim.
We don’t read the Supreme Court’s statement the same way.
Immediately after describing the claimed prejudice—that the
defense may well be impaired due to the delay—the Supreme Court
said, “That possibility of prejudice is not sufficient.” Loud Hawk, 474
U.S. at 315 (emphasis added). In other words, the Supreme Court
rejected the defendants’ particular showing as insufficient to
sustain their claim. The Court did not state that the “possibility of
prejudice” is never enough to sustain a speedy trial right violation.
21
STATE v. HINTZE
Opinion of the Court
Barker factors, the Court has rejected invitations to adopt hard lines
against which to judge speedy trial right claims. The prejudice
factor in Barker is a factor to be weighed with and against other
factors. And unlike prejudice requirements in other contexts, it is
not a component of a claim that must be proven to secure relief.13
See, e.g., Doggett, 505 U.S. at 655 (stating that “consideration of
prejudice is not limited to the specifically demonstrable, and . . .
affirmative proof of particularized prejudice is not essential to
every speedy trial claim”).
¶80 Thus, we are not prepared to say that defendants must
meet a certain threshold showing to have their prejudice claims
considered as part of the “difficult and sensitive balancing”
required by Barker. 407 U.S. at 533. Instead, we view prejudice in
this context as existing along a spectrum. The more significant the
prejudice and more certain the proof, the more weight the factor
should be given. In contrast, the less significant or more speculative
the prejudice, the less weight, if any, it deserves. See State v.
Holtslander,
629 P.2d 702, 709 (Idaho 1981) (stating that the
“speculativeness [of the prejudice claim] warrants the limiting of
the weight, if any, given to” Barker’s prejudice factor).
¶81 And ultimately, a claim of prejudice based on nothing
more than a possibility is unlikely to support a speedy trial claim
__________________________________________________________
13 The three contexts the court of appeals pointed to where a
“reasonable probability” standard applies all require a defendant
to show prejudice before the defendant can secure relief. See Hintze,
2022 UT App 117, ¶ 62. Specifically, to prove ineffective assistance
of counsel under the Sixth Amendment, a defendant must
demonstrate prejudice flowing from an attorney’s deficient
performance. See, e.g., State v. Garcia,
2017 UT 53, ¶¶ 35–37,
424 P.3d
171. Similarly, to establish a Brady violation for the prosecution’s
failure to disclose exculpatory evidence, “prejudice must have
ensued.” Strickler v. Greene,
527 U.S. 263, 281–82 (1999); see also
Tillman v. State,
2005 UT 56, ¶ 28,
128 P.3d 1123 (identifying
prejudice as one of “three components of a Brady prosecutorial
misconduct claim”). And an appellate court will not reverse a trial
court’s erroneous evidentiary decision unless the error was
harmful. See, e.g., State v. Richardson,
2013 UT 50, ¶¶ 40, 40 n.8,
308
P.3d 526; see also UTAH R. EVID. 103(a) (“A party may claim error in
a ruling to admit or exclude evidence only if the error affects a
substantial right of the party . . . .”).
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Opinion of the Court
unless other factors weigh heavily in the defendant’s favor. See, e.g.,
Doggett, 505 U.S. at 657–58 (finding a speedy trial right violation
despite unspecified prejudice where government’s negligence
“cause[d] delay six times as long as that generally sufficient to
trigger judicial review”). Although this standard is less precise than
the one adopted by the court of appeals, we ultimately view it as
consistent with Barker and the ad hoc approach to analyzing this
“amorphous, slippery, and necessarily relative” right. Brillon, 556
U.S. at 89 (cleaned up).
2. Hintze’s Prejudice Claim
¶82 With this standard in mind, we conclude that the court of
appeals erred in weighing Barker’s prejudice factor in Hintze’s
favor.
¶83 The district court rejected Hintze’s claim that the two-year
delay prejudiced him by interfering with his parole, reasoning that
what the Board would have done had his charge been resolved
sooner “is somewhat speculative.” The court of appeals
acknowledged that assessing Hintze’s prejudice—which is
necessarily based on an unknown—requires engaging in some
speculation. See Hintze, 2022 UT App 117, ¶¶ 50, 67. But based on
Hintze’s unrebutted testimony that “what stopped [him] from
being paroled” was the pending charge, it saw “no choice but to
conclude that it is more likely than not that” Hintze would have
been paroled had the charge been timely resolved. Id. ¶ 52
(alteration in original). The court of appeals also separately
concluded that Hintze’s claim satisfied the “reasonable
probability” standard it adopted, stating that his claim was
“sufficiently supported by the facts of the case, by reasonable
inferences to be drawn therefrom, and by common experience” to
“rise above mere speculation.” Id. ¶¶ 66–67. We disagree with the
court of appeals’ assessment for two reasons.
¶84 First, the court of appeals accepted Hintze’s testimony that
the pending charge “stopped” him from being paroled on the basis
that it was unrebutted. Id. ¶ 52. But the district court was not
obligated to accept that testimony as true. “In a . . . proceeding in
which the judge serves as fact finder, the court has considerable
discretion to assign relative weight to the evidence before it,
including the right to minimize or even disregard certain
evidence.” SA Grp. Props. Inc. v. Highland Marketplace LC, 2017 UT
App 160, ¶ 24,
424 P.3d 187 (cleaned up). Because the judge, as a
fact finder, “is in the best position to judge the credibility of
23
STATE v. HINTZE
Opinion of the Court
witnesses,” the judge is “free to disbelieve their testimony.” Id.
(cleaned up).
¶85 Here, although the district court did not make an express
credibility ruling or a factual finding regarding the reason Hintze
was not granted parole in March 2020, it appeared to have rejected
his testimony as unreliable when it deemed his claim speculative.
And that’s not surprising. There are no facts in the record from
which to infer that Hintze was denied parole in March 2020 because
of his pending charge. The only evidence presented on this point
was (1) Hintze’s testimony that he “anticipat[ed]” being paroled
after completing the treatment program in January 2020, (2) the
notes from his initial parole hearing indicating the Board planned
to schedule a rehearing sometime in March 2020, and (3) his
testimony that he was “stopped” from being paroled because of the
pending charge. But there’s no evidence that the rehearing was, in
fact, scheduled; there’s no evidence that a rehearing was held; and,
apart from Hintze’s unsubstantiated claim, there’s no evidence that
the Board elected not to hold the rehearing or that it denied him
parole because of the pending charge. Without more, the district
court was right to reject Hintze’s testimony and his prejudice claim
as speculative.
¶86 Second, even assuming that the Board canceled a March
parole rehearing because of the pending charge, Hintze’s claim that
the Board would have granted him parole had the hearing been
held is still too speculative to warrant weighing the prejudice factor
in his favor. The court of appeals indulged in a series of
hypotheticals based on its assessment of how Hintze’s request for
parole would have been received had this case been timely
resolved. Hintze, 2022 UT App 117, ¶¶ 53–59. And the dissent, in
turn, challenged those hypotheticals, assessing it unlikely the
Board would have exercised its discretion to grant Hintze parole
even if the case had been resolved.
Id. ¶¶ 115–22 (Tenney, J.,
dissenting).
¶87 We ultimately share Judge Tenney’s view that “there’s just
too much maybe at the heart of the majority’s conclusion” to weigh
the prejudice factor in Hintze’s favor. Id. ¶ 121. Hintze made an
unsubstantiated claim that he would have been paroled had the
pending charge been resolved. Although we can devise scenarios
under which he may have been released sooner had this charge
been timely resolved, Hintze did not provide any facts upon which
the district court could have relied to find that his claim was
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anything but speculative. Cf. Prince v. Alabama, 507 F.2d 693, 707–
08 (5th Cir. 1975) (finding prejudice where defendant introduced
specific evidence demonstrating that a pending charge against him
“was having an adverse effect upon his being considered for the
most favorable rehabilitation and parole programs”).
¶88 In other words, it’s possible that Hintze would have been
paroled sooner had this case been timely resolved, but there’s
nothing in the record upon which to conclude that parole was
anything more than a possibility. Thus, the prejudice factor does
not weigh in his favor. 14
E. Balancing the Factors
¶89 The final task for courts evaluating speedy trial claims is
to balance the relevant factors. There is no one-size-fits-all formula
for balancing the factors. As noted, Barker instructs courts to take a
flexible and fact-dependent approach to balancing:
We regard none of the four factors identified above
as either a necessary or sufficient condition to the
finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial.
__________________________________________________________
14 Hintze also contends that aside from whether he would have
been paroled in March 2020, he was prejudiced by the State’s delay
because that delay interfered with his “due process right to make
his case for parole in March 2020.” But, as we have explained, it is
not clear from the record that a parole hearing was actually
scheduled for March 2020, much less that the hearing was canceled
because of Hintze’s pending charge. See supra ¶ 85. Further, even
assuming that the delay caused Hintze’s parole hearing to be
canceled, his loss of an opportunity to be heard at a parole hearing
does not, on its own, constitute weighty evidence of prejudice.
Although an inmate enjoys due process protections for certain
parole hearings at which an inmate’s release date is fixed, see Neel
v. Holden, 886 P.2d 1097, 1101 (Utah 1994), the Board retains full
discretion to grant or deny parole, and its decisions “in cases
involving paroles are final and are not subject to judicial review,”
Blanke v. Utah Bd. of Pardons & Parole,
2020 UT 39, ¶ 18,
467 P.3d 850
(quoting UTAH CODE § 77-27-5(3)). Thus, absent evidence that
Hintze would have been paroled if he were given an opportunity
to be heard at a parole hearing in March 2020, Hintze’s alleged loss
of an opportunity to be heard is not significant enough to tip this
factor in his favor.
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STATE v. HINTZE
Opinion of the Court
Rather, they are related factors and must be
considered together with such other circumstances as
may be relevant. In sum, these factors have no
talismanic qualities; courts must still engage in a
difficult and sensitive balancing process.
407 U.S. at 533.
¶90 Strict reliance on the limited considerations described in
Barker is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s admonition that
“these factors have no talismanic qualities.” Id. The Barker factors
are intended to serve as suggested considerations for courts. They
do not represent a mathematical formula to be calculated. See Perez
v. Sullivan,
793 F.2d 249, 254 (10th Cir. 1986) (“We note at the outset
that the factors set forth in Barker are guidelines, not rigid tests.”).
¶91 Among other things, some Barker factors may be
particularly probative in one case but not in another. And in some
cases, it may be necessary to look at factors beyond those described
in Barker. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 530 (“A balancing test necessarily
compels courts to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis.
We can do little more than identify some of the factors which courts
should assess in determining whether a particular defendant has
been deprived of his [speedy trial] right.” (emphasis added)).
Courts should consider all factors that are relevant to the specific
case before them and give each relevant factor appropriate weight
based on the circumstances.
¶92 Further, courts must balance the relevant factors together
as “related factors,” determining “on an ad hoc basis” whether the
overall weight of the evidence supports finding a speedy trial
violation. Id. at 530, 533. The Barker analysis requires engaging in a
“difficult and sensitive balancing process,” taking the unique
circumstances of each case into account.
Id. at 533. The factors are
not simply numbers to be tallied.
¶93 With this framework in mind, we now balance the Barker
factors in the context of Hintze’s case.
¶94 We begin with the third Barker factor—the assertion of the
speedy trial right. As noted, given the unusual circumstances in
this case, this factor carries no weight—positive or negative—in our
speedy trial analysis.
¶95 Next, the first and second Barker factors—the length of the
delay and the reason for the delay—weigh in Hintze’s favor. A two-year delay was too long, considering the relative simplicity of the
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Opinion of the Court
charge. But because the length was not extraordinary, the factor
does not carry significant weight. Similarly, the reason for the delay
weighs in Hintze’s favor, but because the delay was not knowing
or intentional, it weighs less heavily than it otherwise would.
¶96 Finally, the fourth Barker factor—prejudice—does not
weigh in Hintze’s favor given his failure to show that his alleged
harm was based on anything more than speculation.
¶97 To recognize a speedy trial right violation, the combined
weight of all relevant factors must be significant enough to justify
the extraordinary remedy that accompanies such a result. And
although prejudice is not required to make out a speedy trial right
violation, it is a critical factor that weighs heavy in the analysis
absent extraordinary delay or intentional conduct on the part of the
State. Thus, on balance, we conclude that the two-year delay caused
by the State’s negligence, without strong evidence of prejudice to
Hintze, does not weigh heavily enough in Hintze’s favor to amount
to a speedy trial violation warranting the extraordinary remedy of
dismissal in this case.
CONCLUSION
¶98 We conclude that the weight of the evidence in this case
does not support dismissal on speedy trial grounds. Although the
two-year delay caused by the State’s negligence is significant,
Hintze’s claim that he suffered prejudice from the delay was
speculative. Without more, the length and nature of the delay are
not sufficiently extraordinary to constitute a speedy trial violation.
Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals’ decision ordering the
dismissal of the charge and remand to the court of appeals for
further proceedings on Hintze’s motion to suppress.
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