Volume 57 — New Jersey Law Reports

On demurrer to replication. The declaration contains the common counts only. The second plea shows an assignment by the defendants for the benefit of their creditors, in accordance with the statute, and that the plaintiff presented to the assignee, in due form, the claim now sued on.

<p>A suit is not commenced by the signing and sealing of a summons whieh. lias been retained in the attorney’s office without any purpose of immediate service.</p>

<p>Information in the nature of a quo warranto.</p>

<p>An insurance against loss, in a certain ratio, resulting from sales on credit, containing a stipulation that only losses incurred by sales to persons whose capital as well as credit was rated in “ Bradstreets,” should be taken into the account — Held, that a loss of the kind mentioned, accruing from the failure of a corporate customer, was not within the insurance, as the capital of corporations was not rated in “Bradstreets.”</p>

<p>Suit on overdue interest coupons on coupon bonds secured by mortgage on lands in this state. Held that, under the act of March 23d, 1881, such action will-not lie until after foreclosure and sale of the mortgaged premises.</p>

<p>On error to the Passaic Oyer and Terminer.</p>

<p>1. If the plaintiff in an action of trespass quare clausum, fregit rests láscase without having offered competent proof of his possession of the-locus in quo at the time of the alleged injury, a motion to nonsuit should prevail. The nineteenth rule" of Hil. T., 16 Viet. (1853), which requires the defendant specially to traverse the plaintiff's allegation of possession if he intends to deny it, has not been adopted in the-practice of our courts.</p> <p>2. Where a parcel of land and the building thereon are conveyed by reference to the side of the building as a boundary, the presumptive-inference is that the whole of the building was meant to pass to the-grantee, and .to this end the line of overhanging eaves will be taken to be the boundary intended. This inference, however, may be controlled by other expressions in the deed or rebutted by competent evidence showing a practical location by the parties or working an - estoppel of the plaintiff.</p> <p>3. Where the terms used in the description of a deed are unambiguous, its interpretation is for the court, but where the terms themselves are-ambiguous or their presumptive meaning is rebutted by competent proof aliunde, the. question of the meaning expressed by the deed is for the jury.</p>

<p>On demurrer to pleas.</p>

<p>On error to Monmouth Pleas.</p>

<p>On error to the Essex Common Pleas.</p>

On error to the Hudson Circuit Court. Upon the trial it appeared that one George J. Carey, a contractor, on March 2d, 1892, entered into a written contract with the defendant in this action, the plaintiff in error, as owner, to furnish the materials therefor and perform the masonwork of a house on the corner of Eldridge and Delancey streets, in the city of New York, in accordance with the contract and agreeably to the plans and specifications thereto' annexed.

<p>1. Putting a corporation in charge of a receiver does not work its dissolution. The corporation continues to exist until its dissolution is effected either by surrender or judicial decision. Meanwhile the corporation exists with all its franchises, exercisable by the receiver in the management of its affairs, subject to all the duties, obligations and liabilities that rested upon the corporation itself, among which is liability to taxation, the same as the corporation itself would have been subject to in case the management and control of its affairs had not been committed to a receiver,</p> <p>.2. An assessment for taxes made by the state board of assessors on a statement returned in compliance with the statute should be a finality, and not be set aside or disturbed unless it be overcome by the most satisfactory proof that it is erroneous in fact. In a suit to set aside such assessment prosecuted by the company, it would not be allowed to gainsay the return of its officer, unless on proof of conduct on his part in fraud of the company.</p> <p>■3. A return made to the state board of assessors just before the appointment of a receiver, may justify further investigation at the instance of the creditors of an insolvent corporation.</p>

<p>1. A summons issued out of the court for the trial of small causes must be served as directed by the act, to give the justice jurisdiction.</p> <p>2. The only effect of the act of March 23d, 1892, entitled “An act constituting courts for the trial of small causes” [Revision], approved March 27th, 1874 {Pamph. L.} p. 182), was to confer on such courts jurisdiction over corporations of other states. The eighteenth section of the Small Cause act, which specifically provides for the mode of serving process on corporations, was not altered.</p> <p>•3. The eighty-eighth section of the Corporation act, which provides for service of process on a foreign corporation not holding its charter • under the laws of this state {Rev., p. 198), applies only to process issued out of the upper courts, and not to justices’ courts.</p> <p>■4. A summons issued out of the court for the trial of small causes was served on a ticket agent of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, a foreign corporation, at its Bahway station. Held, that the ticket agent was not a representative of the company within the designation, of the eighteenth section of the Justice’s Court act.</p>

<p>1. Discovery in aid of an execution by a proceeding in a court of law is a special statutory proceeding, not in the course of the common law. The jurisdiction of the court is the creation of the statute. The powers of the judge in exercising that jurisdiction are such, and such only, as are conferred by the statute, and the procedure must be in conformity with that prescribed by the statute.</p> <p>2. Section 6 of the District Court act, as amended by the act of 1889 {Pamph. L., p. 56), requires the appointment of a receiver upon proceedings for discovery in these courts, to be made upon an examination, certified by a commissioner. By the examination so certified, no property was disclosed over and above property reserved to the defendant as a married man having a family residing in this state. HM~</p> <p>1. That an ex parte affidavit of the plaintiff’s attorney, if it could be regarded as evidence at all, was a nullity.</p> <p>2. That an order convicting the defendant for contempt for refusing to deliver such property to a receiver appointed upon such affidavit, will be set aside upon appeal to this court, pursuant to the provisions of the act of April 17th, 1884. Pev. Sup., p. 814. It is not a mere irregularity, available to the defendant only on certiorari. 3. The only authority and jurisdiction conferred on the judges of the District Court to punish as for contempt, disobedience of orders in proceedings for discovery, is that contained in the act of March 25th, 1885. Rev. Sup., p. 264, § 227. By that act the judge of the District Court was empowered to enforce proceedings as for contempt in case a person subpoenaed as a witness or served with an order made on the petition for discovery should neglect or refuse to obey such subpoena or order, or to give testimony, or to answer questions, or to produce hooks, papers or documents, as required. The act affords no warrant for proceedings to fine and imprison as a punishment for disobedience of any order except those mentioned in the act.</p>

On rule to show cause why a writ of mandamus should not go to the township committee of the township of Bergen and the township committee of the township of Boiling Springs, both in the county of Bergen, commanding them to make-application to the Court of Common Pleas for the appointment of commissioners to ascertain what part of a public road dividing said townships shall be worked by each of the-respective townships.

<p>This writ brings up a petition for the building of a sidewalk on a part of a street in the township of Cranford, a resolution directing notice to be given to the abutting owners on such part to build the same, and a further resolution directing the work to be done by the township.</p>

On certiorari. A petition was presented by the city of New Brunswick to the state board of taxation. It set out that the taxable property iu that city had been assessed at its true value for the year 1893; that the taxable property in the townships of Woodbridge, of Madison and of East Brunswick had, for the same year, been assessed at less than its true value; that thereby the city was compelled to pay more than its proportion of county and state school tax.

On quo warranto. An information, in the nature of a quo warranto, was filed by certain persons who claim to be the legally-appointed-chosen freeholders of the county of Camden, to test the legal right of certain other persons to exercise the functions of aboard of chosen freeholders of such county. To this information, a plea has been filed. The motion is to strike out the-plea.

<p>1. The act concerning cities of the first class (Pamph L. 1891, p. 475), which purports to empower the mayor to fill vacancies in the common council of the city, is rendered special by the provision which limits its operation to those cities of the first class whose charters provided for a special election to fill such a vacancy, and is therefore unconstitutional.</p> <p>'2. This special limitation does not become unimportant because it does not exclude any city now standing in the first class, since it will exclude cities which may grow into that class.</p>

<p>On certiorari.</p>

<p>1. A count in a declaration charging that a municipal corporation, by its wrongful act, created a common nuisance from which plaintiff suffered special damage, discloses a good cause of action, notwithstanding the-corporation is liable to indictment for the same act.</p> <p>2. The exemption of a municipal corporation from actions by individuals suffering special damage from its neglect to perform or its negligence-in performing public duties, whereby a public wrong is done for which an indictment will lie, does not extend to actions where the ipjury is. the result of active wrongdoing chargeable to the corporation.</p>

This was an action to recover damages for an injury received by Marion (defendant in error) by reason of his ■coming in contact with a bar of iron which connected the tops of the trusses of a railroad bridge constructed by the railroad company (plaintiff in error), while he was passing the bridge upon a freight car in the performance of his duty as a brakeman in the employ of said company.

Kelly, the defendant in error, was a.“lineman” in the ■employ of the Essex County Electric Company, the plaintiff in error. This action was brought by Kelly, in the Circuit, to recover damages from the company for an injury received by him from the breaking of a pole upon which he was working by direction of an officer of the company.

<p>When an act of the legislature limits the allowance of a certiomn to contest an assessment imposed for a city improvement to a period commencing at the confirmation of such assessment by the council or governing body of such municipality, such period will not commence to-run until there has been a confirmation within the power conferred and upon the notice required.</p>

On error to the Supreme Court. The declaration is upon a contract, under seal, entered into between Daniel Runkle, now deceased, and Lino Martinez, on the 2d day of November, 1881, and demands damages for the breach thereof.

<p>On error to the Supreme Court.</p>

<p>1. If circumstances attending the commission of an offence convey to the accused knowledge necessary to render his subsequent conduct criminal, the fact that an indictment is pending for the earlier offence will not prevent the circumstances from being shown on his trial for the subsequent conduct.</p> <p>2. An error committed on trial of an indictment, which does not prejudice the defendant in maintaining his defence upon the merits, will not justify the reversal of his conviction.</p> <p>3. The order of proof at the trial, and the frequency with which an answered question may be repeated, are matters within the discretion of the trial court.</p> <p>4. If on a trial for larceny the court charges in effect that the defendant, to be guilty, must have taken the goods with a fraudulent purpose to take the property of another and a consciousness that he had no right to take them; a sufficient definition of felonious intent is laid before the jury.</p>

On error to the Supreme Court. A writ of error bringing up the judgment of the Supreme Court rendered upon certain municipal proceedings of the city ■of Beverly, brought into that court by a writ of certiorari. Eor opinion of Supreme Court, see 26 Vroom 544.

<p>1. If the state hoard of taxation, upon a complaint of a taxing district, under section 8 of “A general act concerning taxes,” approved March 19th, 1891, increases the valuation of another taxing district, it should proceed to add that increased valuation to the unchallenged valuations of all the other taxing districts of the county, and then to apportion the county and state tax to he raised among the taking districts. in the proportion of the valuation of- each to the total valuations.</p> <p>2. A taxing district, the valuation of which has, upon complaint, been increased, cannot, by certiorari, object to the determination of the state board because it has imposed on it an increáse less than its-adjudication required, nor because the board erred in apportioning the tax to be raised, when such error does no injury to it.</p> <p>8. Quiere as to what action is within the jurisdiction of the state board of taxation to review under said act.</p>

<p>On error-to the Supreme Court.,</p>

<p>On error to the Supreme Court.</p>

<p>On error to the Supreme Court.</p>

<p>On error to the Supreme Court.</p>

<p>On error to the Supreme Court. For opinion of Supreme Court, see 27 Vroom 454.</p>

<p>1. By force of the statute of this state relating to informations in the nature of a quo warranto, it is the defendant’s title that is alone 'put in issue. ■ ' -</p> <p>2. When a public office has been intruded into, without color of right, the court will impose such a fine upon the usurper as shall appear, under the circumstances, to be condign.</p>

<p>1. A trust mortgage to secure bonds thereafter to be issued will stand as a security therefor from the date of its record, and will take precedence over subsequently-accruing lien claims.</p> <p>2. In a suit on a lien claim, it is only mortgages that have been recovered since the accrual of such lien, that, by force of the statute, can be brought into the controversy. Prior mortgagees cannot be made parties.</p>

<p>On error to the Hudson Quarter Sessions.</p>

<p>On application for mandamus.</p>

<p>1. Eviction of a tenant by his landlord from part of the premises demised will effect a suspension of the whole rent during the continuance of the eviction. During that period the landlord cannot sue or distrain for the rent reserved or any part of it; nor can he recover for use and occupation although the tenant has remained in possession of the residue of the premises demised.</p> <p>2. In an action of covenant, an eviction cannot be set up unless specially pleaded; but the defence having been admitted without objection, the infirmity in the pleading will be overlooked.</p>

<p>In ejectment. On rule to show cause.</p>

<p>On writ of error to Hudson Circuit.</p>

<p>Charles Laubsch, to secure a debt to one Warren Dixon, executed to him a chattel mortgage on certain property then the subject of a suit pending between said Laubsch and the defendant silk mill company, and also by a written transfer conveyed to said Dixon his interest in said property and such sum as he should thereafter recover in said suit against said silk mill company. Laubsch subsequently recovered a judgment in said suit against the silk mill company, and thereupon the said company procured the assignment of a prior judgment, for a larger amount, recovered by one Benjamin against said Laubsch, and applied to the Hudson Circuit Court to have it set off against the first-named judgment. Held, that the mortgage to Dixon and assignment of the claim to him being before the silk mill company obtained an assignment of the Benjamin judgment, the equities of the case are with Dixon, and the set-off should be refused.</p>

<p>In error to the Hudson Circuit.</p>

<p>In error to the Hudson Circuit.</p>

<p>1. When a lease is made by the husband of the wife’s land for one year, with the privilege to the tenant of a further term of four years, without authority from her, the act of the wife in receiving the share of the farm products reserved by the lease for the first year will not operate by way of estoppel to create a term for five years; her assent must be in writing.</p> <p>2. When the tenant is granted the option of a further term for four years, notice by him to the lessor that he will take a further term for one year must be regarded as a notice that he does not elect to take for the further term agreed upon, but for a lesser term, to which his lessor has not assented.</p> <p>3. Under such circumstances the tenancy, by force of the lease, expires at the end of the first year, and no notice to quit is necessary.</p>

<p>1. The term “ corporation,” as contained in the first section of the act entitled “An act to provide for the recovery of damages in cases where the death of a person is caused by wrongful act, neglect or default,” approved March 3d, 1848 (Rev., p. 294), includes within its meaning the boards of chosen freeholders of the respective counties of this state, as public corporations, having by the act of 1860 (Rev., p. 86, l 1) imposed upon them a liability for damages for personal injuries occasioned by their neglect to erect, rebuild or repair bridges in such manner as not to be dangerous to public travel over them, and that by reason of such neglect such boards become liable in damages whenever the death shall be caused by such neglect.</p> <p>2. The act of 1848, to which reference is made, called the Death act, waS intended to give a right of action thereunder against persons or corporations upon whom a liability was imposed, if deatli had not ensued, and in the absence of any language in the act, which either expressly or impliedly excludes public corporations, it is upon principle clear that they are included within the provisions of the statute, which being remedial, must, in its nature, be liberally and beneficially interpreted.</p>

<p>On certiorari.</p>

On error to the Circuit Court of Hudson county. Proceeding by the National Docks and New Jersey Junction Connecting Railway Company against the Pennsylvania Railroad Company and another to condemn certain property for railway uses. Judgment for plaintiff.

<p>On indictment.</p>

<p>On certiorari.</p>

<p>On certiorari.</p>

<p>1. The act of March 28th, 1892 (Pamph. L., p. 293), do'es not empower boroughs to license and regulate the business of a grocer.</p> <p>2. That act does not confer upon courts for the trial of small causes jurisdiction over complaints for the violation of a borough ordinance which forbids the driving of a grocery wagon without a license.</p>

<p>'On certiorari.</p>

<p>On certiorari.</p>

<p>On, certiorari.</p>

<p>1. School trustees are officers, within article 2, paragraph 1, of the constitution, so that if they are made elective by the people, only male citizens can vote for them.</p> <p>2. The status of a de facto board of education, composed of persons actually elected as school' trustees at a school meeting, will not be destroyed by the action of the county superintendent in appointing other trustees upon the supposition that the election was illegally conducted.</p>

<p>1. Under the Traction Companies act of March 14th, 1893 (Pamph. L., p. 302), municipal consent to the route of the railway is not a necessary preliminary to an application to the municipal authorities for the location of the tracks.</p> <p>2. Under that act, the municipal authorities, in granting consent to the-location of the tracks; cannot leave it to the discretion of the company to determine whether one or two tracks shall be laid, or what part of the street they shall occupy, or where sidings, cross-overs and switches-shall be built. The municipal board must itself determine these questions in giving its consent.</p>

Three writs of certiorari bring up three ordinances of the board of public works of the city of Camden, passed on May 3d, 1894. Each of these ordinances purports to grant to the Camden Horse Car Railroad Company permission to construct its road in certain streets within the city of Camden.

On certiorari. This writ brings up the action of the common council of the city of Trenton, directing the city assessors to assess all property in a part of Ewing township annexed to said city by the terms of an act entitled “An act to annex to the city of Trenton, in the county of Mercer, certain parts of the township of Ewing, in said county.” Pamph. L. 1894, p. 595.

<p>On motion to quash an indictment</p>

<p>Appeals from a District Court are to be taken within five days after judgment is rendered, and are to be granted in the same manner as appeals are taken from justices’ courts. Held, that the action of the Court of Common Pleas, in permitting an appeal bond to be filed at a term more than five days after judgment, was erroneous.</p>

On motion to quash an indictment brought into this court, from the Hudson county Oyer and Terminer by writ of certiorari. . The indictment in substance contains the following aver-men ts:.

On certiorari bringing up an assessment for benefits and damages resulting from the building of a sewer and other improvements in Monroe street, in the city of Hoboken.

On rule to show cause why the attachment against the defendant should not, on application of the receivers of the defendants, be set aside and vacated.

<p>■On certiorari.</p>

<p>On certiorari to the Cumberland Quarter Sessions.</p>

<p>On cei'tiorari.</p>

<p>The action of a magistrate in issuing a warrant commonly called a search warrant, upon complaint, will not be questioned or reviewed by certiorari.</p>

<p>On certiorari to the Essex Common Pleas.</p>

<p>On motion to quash indictment-.</p>

<p>The council of the defendant municipality did not acquire power to grant a location for the tracks of a street railway of a company incorporated, under the act approved April -6th, 1886 (Pamph. A., p. 185), without giving notice of a time and place fixed for hearing, or without the-consent of property owners, required by said act, by virtue of the provisions of the supplement to said act, approved March 24th, 1890. Pamvph. A., p. 113.</p>

<p>The board of chosen freeholders of the county of Cumberland, by resolution, granted to a street railway company the right to lay its tracks on the centre of the Commerce street bridge in Bridgeton (which bridge was built and maintained by the board) and to run its cars thereon. It clearly appeared that, owing to the narrowness of the bridge, no ordinary vehicle could pass on either side of the cars while crossing, so that during the passage of the cars no such vehicle could cross in the opposite direction. Held, that such resolution was invalid, either because the board had no power to pass it, or because, if the board possessed such power to consent to a use of such a bridge by a street railway, the grant of such an exclusive use was, under the circumstances, unreasonable and a plain abuse of the discretion committed to the board.</p>

The certiorari in this case has brought up an assessment of taxes upon prosecutor, made by the assessor of the borough of Washington for 1893. The property assessed was thus described in the duplicate: “ Mortgage in trust for Mrs. Anna Dilts on house and lot * * * situate * * * ' in the borough of Washington.

Ou certiorari bringing np a judgment of a District Court affirming a judgment of the court for the trial of small causes. By the return and a state of the case agreed on, it appears that the action was brought upon a promissory note made by prosecutor when not of full age, to defendants. The note was given for goods which were not necessaries, sold by defendants to prosecutor.

<p>Rule to show cause for mandamus.</p>

<p>1. Under Pamph. L. 1888, p. 336, tlie board of councilmen of the city of' Bayonne is empowered to contract for a further water-supply.</p> <p>2. Where no particular mode has been prescribed by the legislature, any-authorized municipal action may be taken by resolution as effectively as by ordinance.</p> <p>3. Where bids or proposals have not been asked for, the provisions of' Pamph. L. 1894, p. 280, do not control municipal action otherwise1 honestly exercised.</p> <p>4. In the execution of a municipal contract for the introduction of water, the point of connection with the city pipe system was left to be designated by the mayor of the city. Held, not to be a delegation of legislative power.</p> <p>5. The provisions of article 1, section 19, of the constitution of New Jersey are not violated by the contract under consideration.</p> <p>6. Where a contract for a water-supply is silent as to the source from1 which the water is to be taken, an illegal execution of the contract will not be presumed in aid of the argument that it would be unlawful to go outside of the state for such supply.</p>

<p>1. Where a justice of the peace has been'ruled to return whether a certain motion was made in the course of a trial before him in the court for the trial of small causes, and has certified that no such motion was made at any time, recourse cannot be had to affidavits for the purpose of contradicting him.</p> <p>■2. A judgment in the small cause court, entered in figurés instead of in words at length, is, unless amended, reversible for error. It may, however, be amended by the court below. Practice in such cases.</p>

<p>On certiorari.</p>

<p>On rule to show cause.</p>

<p>“An act concerning appeals from District Courts in this state” {Pamph. L. 1892, p. 257) authorizes an appeal from a judgment rendered by the-First District Court of the city of Newark for a sum in excess of §200.</p>

On error to the Supreme Court. The executors of John C. Wene brought suit against Margaret Woolverton and Sylvester G. Woolverton, her husband, on a promissory note, of which the following is a copy: “$200.

<p>Lease to A for five years, with a covenant that A shall have a further-term of five years from the expiration of the term thereby created, if lessee gives three months’ notice of his intention to take such further-lease, and with the further covenant that if A desires to purchase the demised premises, the lessor will at any time during the tenancy thereby-created or agreed upon convey said premises to A for the sum of $7,000. A gave due notice of his election to take a second term, and remained in possession, and during such second term demanded a deed, which, the lessor refused to give. Held, that A was entitled to damages arising from the loss of his bargain by the refusal of the lessor to convey.</p>

<p>On error fo the Supreme Court.</p>

<p>On error to the Supreme Court.</p>

<p>On error to the Supreme Court.</p>

On error to the Supreme Court. Eor opinion of Supreme-Court, see ante p. 32. The action was begun in the Monmouth Circuit by Harriet Roffsell, administratrix of Joseph Roffsell, deceased, against Robert D. Bradner, as builder and owner, upon a claim under the Mechanics’ Lien law.

<p>1. A broker, employed to sell the business and. property of a mercantile-corporation, by a writing whereby his principal agreed to pay him a. commission of five per cent, on the price the principal might agree to. receive, when actually received, communicated to a proposing purchaser the principals offer to sell at a certain price and on certain, terms of payment. The proposing purchaser cabled the principal, “Accept 370 half cash half debentures contract mailed.” The price- and terms thus described substantially agreed with those named in the offer. Held—</p> <p>1. That the cablegram did not constitute an unqualified acceptance of the offer, but one qualified by the contents of the contract therein said; to have been mailed.</p> <p>2. Upon receipt of the cozztz-act it was found that it did not contain an. agreement to purchase by the proposing purchaser,' but only gave him. an option to purchase- at the price and terms named. The principal; thereupon withdrew his offer. Held—</p> <p>2. That upon this evidezice there was nothing to submit to a jury, becazzse the broker had not brought the parties together in a completed! contract of sale and purchase or produced to his pz-incipal a purchasez: able and willing to buy at the price and on the terms fixed.</p>

<p>Where the proper municipal board advertises in good faith for proposals for paving streets, and specifies the employment of the material deemed by it to be for the best interest of the municipality, the city is not debarred by any rule of law from contracting for what it wants merely because the desired material is the subject of private ownership or the product of exclusive manufacture.</p>

<p>Mere delay by one party in the execution of an executory contract, whose terms would be satisfied by performance within a reasonable time, does not of itself entitle the other party to rescind. To have this effect, in the absence of express repudiation, the implication arising from the non-performance of the contract must be inconsistent with its being still in force.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court.</p>

<p>, On error to the Hudson Circuit. The two writs of error-were heard together.</p>

<p>1. A delivery of a promissory note is necessary to its transfer by endorsement.</p> <p>2. The fact that an endorsement in blank is made by the payee on a. promissory note is not evidence that he has transferred the note or that he is not the owner of it, if the note still remains in his possession and is produced by him.</p> <p>3. The fact that the endorsement of the payee is left uncanceled on a promissory note will not, ipso facto, prevent his recovery, but from his-possession and production of the note it will be presumed that the-note was not delivered under the endorsement, or that if it was so delivered that it was taken up by him.</p> <p>4. If a person who endorses a bill or note to another, whether for value- or for the purpose of collection, comes again to the possession thereof, he is to be regarded, unless the contrary appears, as the bona fide holder and owner of such bill or note, and is entitled to recover thereon-without producing any receipt or endorsement back to him, and lie-may strike the subsequent endorsements and his own from the bill or note, or not, as he may think proper.</p> <p>5. Whilst parol evidence is admissible in a suit by the payee to recover of the maker, to establish between them a contemporaneous agreement as to the mode and manner of the payment of the bill or note, which, if executed, will be in satisfaction and payment, yet the offer by the-maker of such an agreement, when it is made in the form of an offer to prove such an agreement, must be full and specific, and it should so-state the facts that it will not be doubtful what is intended to be- , proved, and the object and purpose for which the proof is intended, so-that if objection be made the court may ascertain if the evidence proposed be material and relevant, and act understandingly in relation tor its admission.</p>

<p>On error to the Supreme Court. For opinion of Supreme Court, see 26 Vroorn 230.</p>

<p>On error to the Essex Circuit Court. See opinion of Supreme Court on case certified, 27 Vroom 361.</p>

<p>On error to the Supreme Court. For opinion of Supreme Court, see ante, p. 86.</p>

The following - case was certified to this court by the Oyer and Terminer of the county of Hudson, viz.: • Paul Genz was indicted by the grand inquest of the county of Hudson, summoned for the September Term, A. D. 1894, of the Court of Oyer and Terminer and General Gaol Delivery of said county, for the alleged murder of Clara Arnim, on the 28th day of August, a. d. 1894, at- the city of Hoboken, in said county.

<p>1. It is tbe duty of street railway companies to prevent children from entering into their cars except under proper safeguards.</p> <p>2. A boy of ten years old entered a car upon tbe invitation of its conductor, and was thrown from the front platform by the carelessness of the driver. Held, that the company was liable.</p>

<p>The declaration showed that plaintiff was in a subway beneath the track of the defendant, both defendant and plaintiff knowing that the earth on the sides and top of the subway was liable to cave in when jarred by the passing trains. The plaintiff was doing work beneficial to the defendant, but it did not appear that he was in the employ of the company. Under these circumstances, the defendant promised to give plaintiff notice of the approach of its trains, which .it failed to do, and, consequently, the plaintiff was injured. Held, in this statement a legal cause of action was shown.</p>

<p>This was an action for breach of covenants in a conveyance. On case certified from the Essex Circuit.</p>

<p>1. Where a person agrees to take clay from beds, to be paid for at a certain rate, according to the quantity and quality of the clay so to be raised, and has stripped off the surface earth, but before he has raised any clay is stopped in his work by the owner of the beds, ■ with whom he has contracted, a suit will not lie on the common counts for the cost of such stripping.</p> <p>2. If such contract has been illegally terminated, the remedy of the injured party is to sue on the contract, laying his damage for the loss of such profits as he would have made by the completion of the contract.</p>

<p>The board of water commissioners of New Brunswick had legislative authority to employ necessary assistants, officers and agents, and under this power employed the plaintiff as general superintendent for a term of years at a fixed salary; being discharged before the end of his term, he brought this suit for an installment of his salary. Held, that he did not hold a public office and that he could not be so discharged, and that his actions were well brought.</p>

In tort. On demurrer to plea. Certified case. This action was' brought to recover damages for the alleged destruction by the defendant of certain shade trees of the plaintiff, while constructing its trolley road.

<p>In attachment. On case certified from the Hudson Circuit.</p>

This was an ejectment suit, to which the statutory plea. The plaintiff moved to strike out the defence on the ground that the suit was on a mortgage to which, under the circumstances, there could be no legal opposition, and presented affidavits to that effect. The sole contention of the defendant was that the only action that a mortgagee could take on his bond and mortgage was to foreclose the latter.

<p>A mortgagee is entitled to the possession of the mortgaged chattels, and if the sheriff has taken them under an execution against the mortgagor and refuses, on demand, to deliver them to the mortgagee, replevin will lie.</p>

<p>On rule to show cause, the cause having been tried in the Hudson Circuit.</p>

<p>A motion in a criminal case to withdraw a plea of guilty and to substitute therefor one of not guilty, is addressed to the discretion of the court, and, consequently, the court’s action is not the subject of error.</p>

In replevin. On case certified from the Passaic Circuit. The questions to be determined in this case are presented by the following certificate: Paterson, N. J., May 3d, 1894. This suit relates to the title of ten silk looms which, about August 1st last, were in the possession of the defendants, and were then replevied by the plaintiff, and returned under bond to the defendants.

<p>1. A replication which merely alleges a conclusion of law, without disclosing facts upon which such conclusion can be based, is demurrable.</p> <p>2. A replication which sets up a new and independent promise, different from that laid in the declaration, is a departure in pleading.</p>

<p>The plaintiff was not a competent witness under the act of 1880 to contradict evidence produced on the part of the defendant of a conversation between the plaintiff and the testatrix.</p>

<p>1. The Passaic Rolling Mill was employed by defendant to do the work of erecting a bridge. No price was agreed upon other than that skilled workmen were to be furnished by the rolling mill to do the work, the defendant to pay the rolling mill for their work at a price stated in the contract. The plaintiff, while working on the bridge in the performance of the contract of the rolling mill, was injured by the carelessness of the engineer of the railroad company in running a train of cars over the bridge. Held, that it should have been left to the jury to say who the plaintiff’s employer was.</p> <p>2. To constitute the relation of fellow-servants, the service must be not only under the same master, but the employment must be one having a common object.</p>

<p>An action at law may be maintained in this state upon a decree for alimony made in New York if the New York court had jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the person of the defendant.</p>

<p>1. Under the statutes of this state, school districts are political organizations possessing the power of taxation.</p> <p>2. Whether or not the action of the county school superintendent in defining the territorial boundaries of a school district will of itself, under our laws, constitute the district and its inhabitants a political organization, if the inhabitants of the district so defined assent to such organization and assume the functions thereto appertaining, the corporate entity becomes complete.</p> <p>3. The school laws are not rendered special or local, or otherwise unconstitutional, by the fact that under them a higher grade of education may be afforded to the children in one district than that offered to those in another. ■</p> <p>4. By virtue of the act of April 8th, 1887 (Pamph. L., p. 149), women may vote at school meetings for all purposes except the election of officers.</p>

<p>1. The act providing for the licensing of dogs, approved March 15th, 1893 (Pamph. L., p. 328), supersedes any power of exacting license fees for dogs which the city of Newark possessed under its charter.</p> <p>2. The act mentioned confers the licensing power as a means of raising revenue.</p>

<p>On certiorari.</p>

<p>On certiorari.</p>

<p>1. Under the act of March 9th, 1893 (Pamph. L., p. 157), the board of street and water commissioners of Jersey City is thp proper municipal authority to enter into contracts with railroad companies whose roads enter or lie within the city, and said board may make such contracts by resolution, without the concurrence of any other board, and notwithstanding the veto of the mayor.</p> <p>2. The mere vacation of a public street by a municipal board does not involve the infringement of any private rights.</p>

<p>1. In an action for violating an ordinance which forbids an unlicensed person to sell liquor, it is not incumbent on the prosecutor to prove, affirmatively, that the defendant was not licensed.</p> <p>2. J'2 there is an exception in the enacting clause of a statute or ordinance, the plaintiff in an action on that clause must show that his adversary is not within the exception; but if the exception is in a subsequent clause of the same section, or in a subsequent section of the same statute or ordinance, or in a subsequent enactment, that is a matter of defence, and the plaintiff need not show that the defendant is not within the exception.</p>

<p>On rule.</p> <p>Notice having been given of the taking of testimony under the rule to show cause heretofore made herein, the attorneys of the respective parties hereto agreed upon the following as the true state of facts :</p> <p>The defendant, Alexander Smith, had been for many years previous to 1893 principal of the public school then known as District No. 8, of Guttenberg, in the county of Hudson, and from September 1st, 1893, to July 31st, 1894, said Smith performed the duties as such by virtue of a certain contract in words following:</p> <p>“ It is hereby agreed between the Trustees of School District No. 8 of Guttenberg, county of Hudson, that Alexander Smith, a qualified teacher possessing a license in full force and effect, that the said Alexander Smith is to teach in public schools in said District as principal for the term of eleven months for the sum of ninety dollars per calendar month, commencing on the first day of September, eighteen hundred and ninety-three and ending on the thirty-first day of July, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, and for such services properly rendered said Trustees are to pay the said Alexander Smith monthly the amount that may be due according to this Contract.”</p> <p>Pursuant to such contract, the said Smith performed the duties as the principal of the public school during the school years of 1893 and 1894.</p> <p>The board of education of the town of Guttenberg consisted at that time of three members, and on June 29th, 1894, by a resolution passed by two affirmative, against one negative, votes, R. M. Fitch was engaged as principal to teach in said school for ten calendar months, commencing September 1st, 1894, at a salary of $90 per month, and subsequently a contract was signed by two of the trustees, with said Fitch, for the performance of such duties on his part. The following is a copy of the contract:</p> <p>“ It is agreed by and between the Trustees of School District No. 8 of the Town of Guttenberg, county of Hudson and State of New Jersey, and E. M. Eitch, a qualified teacher possessing a diploma in full force and effect that the said E. M. Fitch is to act as principal of public school District No. 8 for the term of ten months for the sum of $90.00 commencing on the first day of September, 1894, A. D. and for such services properly rendered the said Trustees are to pay the said E. M. Fitch the amount that may be due according to this Contract.</p> <p>“ Dated this 29th day of June, 1894.</p> <p>“A. Y. Hill,</p> <p>“Andrew Gersham,</p> <p> “Trustees School District No. 8. </p> <p>“E. M. Fitch,</p> <p> “Principal.” </p> <p>Previous to July 1st, 1894, the trustees oi the district were three in number, and the term of office of these trustees expired on the 1st day of July, by virtue of the provisions of chapter 335 of the laws of 1894. Pamph. L., p. 506. Under this act of 1894 a new board of education was elected in the month of July, 1894, and on July 26th, 1894, Mr. Smith was appointed principal of the Guttenberg school, at a salary of $90 per month, for ten calendar months, by a vote of five ayes and four nays, and on the opening of the term of the school in September he entered upon the discharge of his duties as principal of said school, by virtue of said appointment from the board of education, and has continued to perform such duties since.</p> <p>Mr. Fitch has never performed any of the duties as principal, and states himself to be willing to perform such duties, and that he reported for that purpose, but was prevented by the clerk of the board of education, a Mr. Lutz, from so doing; and he also received a letter from the said clerk stating that he did not wish his services, and that Mr. Lutz ordered him out of the building. He also states that he applied to the board of education of Guttenberg to put him in charge of the public school, by means of a letter, before the term of school commenced; he has never gone before them as a body, sitting as the board of education and demanded his rights, but has written to them to that effect and through his counsel.</p> <p>. He also procured the opinion of the state superintendent of education and the county superintendent of education as to his right to teach under his contract, and both of said opinions were presented to the board of education of the town, and are hereto annexed.</p> <p>“ Hoboken, N. J., Nov. 15th, 1894.</p> <p> “Frederick Behrens, Esq., Collector, Town of Guttenberg: </p> <p>“ Dear Sir — In the case of the disputed school principal-ship of Guttenberg, I believe that it would be best for you to refrain from paying out money which you may be obliged to make good at your own expense. I have already given an opinion that Mr. Fitch is the principal of your school, and as such, entitled to the honors and the salary of the position. In this opinion I have been sustained by the state superintendent, and he gave his opinion after consultation with the attorney-gen eral.</p> <p>“ It will be best in my judgment for you to defer payment until the matter is settled beyond peradventure.</p> <p>“Yours truly,</p> <p>“G. C. Houghton.”</p>

<p>1. Á certiorari was directed to a judge of the Common Pleas who had received a petition for an election under the Borough act of 1878 (Rev. Swp., p. 44), and made an order thereon to the county clerk, who had filed the order, and to the petitioners who had presented the petition. No command was addressed to petitioners. Held, that a return by petitioners was irregular and not to be noticed, but that the writ should not be quashed because thus directed to them.</p> <p>2. When the certiorari was allowed before the day fixed for election, and by a special allocatur the election was allowed to be held, but all subsequent proceedings were stayed — Held, that an order which substantially departed from the requirements of the act, in that it required the polls to be open for one hour less than prescribed, was fatally defective, although the result of such election may not have been affected thereby.</p>

<p>Commissioners appointed in any city under the provisions of the “Act providing for the formation and establishment of wards in cities of the first class in this state,” passed May 16th, 1894 (Pcmph. L., p. 387), are required to make division of the city into wards with regard to equality of population. Held, that a division which appears to have been made with regard to the equality of the average total vote of the new wards is not in compliance with the requirements of the act.</p>

<p>On certiorari.</p>

<p>1. The “Act to incorporate the city of Burlington,” approved March 4th, 1851, created a municipal corporation over territony lying within the township of Burlington and not including the whole of that township. Meld, that a legislative intent is shown thereby to create a dual municipal government over such territory, and that, if there was a debatable question as to such construction of the act, the contemporaneous and long-continued exposition exhibited in the usage and practice under it would require such construction to be given to it.</p> <p>2. The act above cited empowered the city of Burlington to regulate and keep in repair the streets and highways therein. Meld, that the city was thereby given the exclusive power and charged with the exclusive duty of maintaining and keeping in repair such highways therein; but the township of Burlington retained power to maintain and keep in repair the highways of the township outside of the city limits and remained charged with that duty.</p> <p>3. Since the voters within the township continued to have a voice in the determination of the amount to be raised for township roads, and the township assessor remained charged with the duty of assessing the sum so determined upon all the property within the township — Meld, that an assessment of such a road tax may lawfully be made upon property within the limits of the city of Burlington, the act being capable of such a construction and the contemporaneous and continuous exposition of the acts in that respect justifying and requiring such construction to be adopted by the court.</p>

<p>On rule to show cause.</p>

<p>On certiorari.</p>

<p>On certiorari.</p>

<p>An absconding debtor is one who, with intent to defeat or delay the demands of his creditors, conceals or withdraws himself from his usual place of residence beyond the reach of process. It is not necessary that he depart from the limits of the state in which he has resided. If one eludes his creditors, then he intends to delay and defeat them, and he can be held to the intent of evading process, and all the law requires, in order to constitute an absconding debtor, is that he shall put himself in such a position that he can and does successfully evade the service of process. It may be by concealment in his own house. It may be by going from place to place so quickly as to evade meeting with service of process.</p>

<p>On certiorari.</p>

<p>1. The act of the legislature entitled “An act authorizing the lighting of public streets and places in the cities, towns, townships, boroughs and villages of the state, and to erect and maintain the proper appliances,” approved May 22d, 1894 (Pamph. L.,p. 477), confers upon the township committees of the respective townships of this state general power over the matters of the lighting of streets and public places in said townships, and under this act the township committees are authorized to enter into contracts to light the streets with gas, electric lights or otherwise, for a term not exceeding five years, and to cause the annual expense thereof to be raised by taxation the same as the expense for the working and repairing of roads and streets is raised.</p> <p>2. This act of May 22d, 1894, is applicable to the town ship of Kearney, in the county of Hudson, which was created and incorporated by an act entitled “An act to set off from the township of Harrison, in the county of Hudson, a new township to -be called the :township of Kearney,” approved March 14th, 1867 (Pamph. L., p. 253), and upon which, under the corporate name and title of “ The Board of Township Committee of the Township of Kearney,” additional powers were conferred by virtue of the provisions of an act entitled “An act for the improvement of the township of Kearney, in the county of Hudson, and to increase the powers of the township committee in said township,” approved April 4th, 1871 (Pamph. L.,p. 1371), and under these laws and the act of May 22d, 1894, the board of the township committee of the township of Kearney is the municipal authority authorized to act in the matter of lighting the streets and public places of that township with gas, electric lights or otherwise.</p> <p>3. In the exercise of the power of lighting the streets of the township under these laws, the board of township committee is not bound to award a contract, where the street lighting is done by contract, to the lowest bidder for such work, but they are bound to exercise the power in a bona fide manner, and with reasonable discretion and judgment for the benefit of the township, basing such reasonable discretion upon a rational basis of fact in its support. When the determination of the board is upheld by such rational basis of fact, the court will not decide disputed facts or weigh evidence in order to review the action of the board in awarding contracts of the class in question.</p>

On certiorari. This writ of certiorari brings up a resolution of the board of excise revoking a certain license theretofore granted to the prosecutor. The resolution was passed on July 5th, 1894. The license revoked was granted on February 1st, 1894. It seems to have a third renewal, such renewal being made under color of the act. Pamph. L. 1891, p. 12.

On certiorari. On August 22d, 1894, the board of education of the township of Cranbury, in the county of Middlesex, ordered the district clerk and president of the board to prepare and post notices to call the legal voters of the school district of the township of Cranbury together, at a special school meeting, at three o’clock oh September 15th, 1894.

<p>Where a plaintiff had testified upon direct examination that, defendant’s cattle had committed several trespasses upon his land, and injured his crops, his damage amounting to a certain amount of money, it was proper to ask him upon cross-examination whether, during the period covering these trespasses, the cattle of other persons had not also trespassed and injured his crops.</p>

<p>This writ brings up an assessment of the cost of grading Sylvan street from Park avenue to Pierpont avenue, within the borough of Rutherford.</p>

<p>This writ brings up a judgment entered by John C. Edwards, a justice of the peace.</p>

<p>Demurrer to declaration. Case certified.</p>

<p>1. An indictment charges a sale, by retail, of intoxicating liquor contrary to law. .Held, on motion to quash, that the indictment contains no description of any legal offence.</p> <p>2. The supplement to the Crimes act (Paraph. L. 1893, p. 193) provides that where the offence of keeping a disorderly house consists wholly in the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquors, the indictment- shall be “in form for the sale of intoxicating liquors contrary to law,” and not in that for keeping a disorderly house. 'Held, that the recital of the words of the statute did not constitute, in any reasonable completeness, a description of a legal offence.</p>

<p>1. A school teacher who has litigated successfully before the state superintendent the controverted questions upon which her right to compensation depends, is entitled to a writ of mandamus to enforce a decision in her favor.</p> <p>2. In such case the only burden upon the relator is to show that the jurisdiction of the state superintendent extended to the matter in dispute and over the parties in controversy.</p> <p>3. The state superintendent having been given authority to hear and determine certain matters, his determination thereupon has the conclusive quality of a judgment pronounced in a legally created court of limited jurisdiction acting within the bounds of its authority.</p> <p>4. There is no distinction in point of conclusiveness between the decisions of special tribunals and the judgments of courts of record. The difference is solely in the presumption of jurisdiction.</p>

<p>On certiorari.</p>

<p>The complaint of the overseer of the poor, under section 5 of the “Act concerning disorderly persons,” must aver that the township may become chargeable.</p>

<p>The act of 1893 {Pamph. L., p. 280), which provides for the assessment of taxes on official mortgages to the person having the beneficial interest therein, is unconstitutional, because of its special character, in that it fails to extend its provisions to all mortgages of like nature made to officers of the several courts of this state.</p>

<p>1. Under the act concerning the taking of property for public use, approved March 9th, 1893 (Pamph. L., p. 161), a defined plan of crossing another railway by a condemning railroad company may be amended upon appeal, by the appellate court, before trial, so as to facilitate the operation of both railroads.</p> <p>2. Where a crossing through the right of way of another railroad company is sought by a condemning company, future demands upon that right of way, which are 'fairly and reasonably certain, are to be regarded by the tribunal which determines the just compensation to be awarded in reaching its conclusion.</p>

<p>When the question is whether a surrender of a lease has occurred by operation of law, the statement of the landlord that he should look to the substituted tenant for a certain item of rent that would not be due from him as assignee, is competent evidence, and, if overruled, will constitute error in law.</p>

<p>Conway was employed as watchman in the unfinished store building of Furst, and was injured by falling down the elevator-shaft. Conway knew that the elevator was not finished, and that mechanics were still at work upon it. Held, that Conway could not recover damages from Furst, for two reasons—</p> <p>1. Because he knew of the danger which attended his employment, and he assumed, as part of his contract obligation, the risk which was incident to.such service.</p> <p>2. Because the elevator, at the time of thj injury to Conway, was in the course of construction by contractors who were exercising an independent employment.</p>

<p>1. Under the testimony in this ease (see Roll v. Rea, 21 Vroom 264), the question whether a certain deed had heen delivered, was one of fact for the jury.</p> <p>2. There is not, in favor of persons who have themselves never exercised ownership, any presumption of law that the title conveyed by a deed to another person, under which no entry was made during more than twenty years, had been extinguished.</p> <p>3. After a cause has been summed up to the jury, it is too late to object that secondary evidence of the contents of a deed was admitted without sufficient proof of search for the original.</p> <p>4. The proviso in section 56 of the Chancery act (Rev., p. 113) applies to decrees for deficiency in foreclosure suits.</p> <p>5. In order to avail themselves of the statutory provision, that an unrecorded deed shall be void against judgment creditors not having notice thereof, persons interested in decrees in Chancery, to which the proviso in section 56 of the Chancery act extends, must comply with that proviso.</p> <p>6. The court need not charge the jury on a legal proposition which is not pertinent to the issues of fact submitted to the jury.</p>

<p>1. According to the charter of the city of Elizabeth {Pamph. L. 1863, p. 109), a person in whose favor an award is made for -damages caused by opening a street through his land, may sue the city for the sum awarded and interest from the date of the award.</p> <p>2. By force of the supplement to the charter, approved April 4th, 1873 {Pamph. L., p. 778), if an assessment for benefits accruing from the opening of a street be levied upon the land of an owner, in whose favor an award for damages caused by the opening had previously been made, .the amount of the assessment becomes at once a payment pro tanto of the award, and the assessment is thereby extinguished, if it did not exceed the sum awarded and interest.</p> <p>3. Under section 17 of the supplement above cited, the city comptroller cannot defeat a lawful claim against the city, without the claimant’s consent, beyond the amount of the city’s lawful counter-claim.</p>

<p>On error to the Supreme Court. In tort.</p>

<p>When a certificate of the discharge of a mortgage, duly executed by the executors of the mortgagee, is presented to a county clerk, he is not bound to search for assignments of the mortgage before he makes the statutory entry of discharge on the record.</p>

On error. In May, 1891, the plaintiff bought at par, from the defendant, ten shares of the capital stock of the Noble Coal Company, a Pennsylvania corporation which had been organized by the defendant and others. The purchase was induced by a statement made by the defendant to the plaintiff that the company owned mines in Pennsylvania for which it had paid $400,000 in cash. This statement was false and fraudulent.

On error. This action was brought by Brabban, defendant in error, against the New Jersey Traction Company, plaintiff in error, to recover damages for the loss of one foot occasioned by its being run over and crushed by a car of the company. A judgment in his favor was removed to the Supreme Court and there affirmed without any opinion being delivered. By this writ the judgment of the Supreme Court has been brought here for review.

<p>1. The supplement to the “Act concerning railroads and canals” (Rev. Sup.,p. 824, § 9), which requires every action for injuries caused by the wrongful act, neglect or default of a railroad corporation to be commenced within two years after the cause of action shall have accrued, does not apply to street railway companies.</p> <p>2. j'Vhere a cause, which has been commenced in the Circuit Court, is sent to the Court of Common Pleas to be tried, by virtue of the provisions of the act of March 23d, 1892 (Pamph. L., p. 224), and the trial, actually takes place in that court, without.objection being made by either party, the losing party cannot thereafter challenge the jurisdiction of the Pleas, provided that court had jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the suit, for, by going to trial without objection, he has submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court.</p> <p>3 A nonsuit should be ordered when it appears, from the plaintiff's own showing, that he contributed by his own carelessness to the happening of the accident by which he was injured, or when it appears that the accident was not the result of any wrongful or negligent act on the part of the defendant or of its employes.</p>

On error to the Supreme Court. William Roufosse was employed by the Alexander Dye Works to hang silk in the drying-room. The silk was festooned over rails near the ceiling, about sixteen feet from the floor. For this work the company furnished a ladder ten feet high, the platform of which was guarded, upon three of its sides, by a low wooden railing. From this platform Roufosse fell and injured himself.

<p>On error to the Supreme Court. For opinion of the Supreme Court, see ante p. 362.</p>

<p>1. / The regulation of a railroad company that a monthly commutation ' ticket shall be surrendered by the passenger to the conductor on the last trip taken, during the period for which it is issued, is a reasonable regulation of the railroad company Sn the conduct of its business as a common carrier of passengers; aim if this regulation be endorsed on the ticket, and the passenger holding said ticket fails or refuses to surrender it on his last trip, or pay his fare to the conductor, according to the legally-established rates of the company, he can be ejected from the car.</p> <p>2. This regulation becomes a part of the contract of the passenger with his carriel', and lie forfeits his right-to be carried further by his refusal to comply with its terms.</p> <p>3. If, by any carelessness, inadvertence or casualty, the ticket of the passenger has been lost by him, so that he cannot produce it, the legal fare may be exacted from him, and the conductor is not bound to investigate the excuse of the passenger for its non-production, and determine whether it is made in good faith or not; he has the right to have the ticket produced and surrendered or the fare paid, and if neither event occurs he can expel the passenger.</p>

<p>On error to the Supreme Court.</p>

<p>On error to the Supreme Court. For opinion of that court, see 27 Vroom 449.</p>

<p>On error to the Supreme Court.</p>

<p>On error to the Supreme Court. For opinion of Supreme Court, see 27 Vroorn 431.</p>

<p>On error to the Supreme Court.</p>