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575 F.2d 237

Docket No. 75-1285.

Lewis v. Transamerica Corp.

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

Decided April 19, 1978.

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals · decided 1978-04-19

2 counsel of record

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“implication of a private right of action for injunctive relief and damages under the Advisers Act in favor of appropriate plaintiffs is necessary to achieve the goals of Congress in enacting the legislation.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis

Applies 15 U.S.C. § 80B · 28 U.S.C. § 1331

Relies on Singleton v. Wulff · Cort v. Ash · J. I. Case Co. v. Borak

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Opinion by William G. East · Decided 1978-04-19

How this case has been cited

Cited by 15 later decisions (3 by the Supreme Court) — most recently April 2013

8 federal appellate · 1 state decisions

9019781980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1Lester L. Levy, New York City (argued), of Garry, Dreyfus, McTernan, Brotsky, Herndon & Pesonen, San Francisco, Cal., for plaintiff-appellant.

¶2Louis E. Walcher (argued), and John M. Anderson (argued), Landels, Ripley & Diamond, San Francisco, Cal., for defendants-appellees.

¶3Before BROWNING and WALLACE, Circuit Judges, and EAST,* Senior District Judge.

¶5EAST, Senior District Judge:

¶6The plaintiff-appellant Harry Lewis (Lewis) appeals from an order entered by the District Court on November 21, 1974 dismissing the action with prejudice on the grounds “Section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. § 80b-6) [Advisers Act] affords no private right of action, and that consequently the Court has no jurisdiction of the plaintiff’s claims . .” We vacate the order and remand.

¶7Lewis’ Complaint:

¶8Lewis is a shareholder of the defendant-appellee Mortgage Trust of America (Trust), and his complaint presents three shareholder derivative and three class actions for violation of the Advisers Act and common law fiduciary duties. He alleges in substance:

¶9The Trust was organized as a California business trust and is qualified as a real estate investment trust under the Internal Revenue Code. It invests primarily in construction and development first mortgage loans. None of its investments have been listed on any national or local securities exchange or offered for trading in any over-the-counter market. The original officers and employees of the Trust were for*238merly associated with the defendant-appel-lee Transamerica Land Capital, Inc. (TALC), a “first tier” subsidiary of the defendant-appellee Transamerica Corp. (Transamerica). The Trust purchased from TALC its original portfolio of mortgages. The defendant-appellee Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. (Mortgage Advisors), a Delaware corporation and a “third tier” subsidiary of Transamerica, is retained as the Trust’s mortgage adviser. It advises the Trust on various real estate investments and administers its day-to-day operations. The Trust is and always has been Mortgage Advisors’ only client. Transamerica is the parent of Mortgage Advisors and the sponsor of the Trust. Nine individual defendants-appellees are trustees of the Trust.

¶10Lewis’ Issue on Review:

¶11Does the Advisers Act give rise to an implied private right of action for injunc-tive relief and damages on behalf of persons injured by violations of its provisions?

¶12Defendants-Appellees’ Issues on Review:

¶13In view of the naked holding of a lack of jurisdiction, the District Court did not reach the following issues which the defendants present for review:

(1) Whether the several defendants fall within the scope of the Advisers Act.
(2) Whether the class action claims are proper.

¶14(3) Whether Lewis has standing to maintain a derivative action without having made a demand upon the trustees to act.

¶15DISCUSSION:

¶16Since the District Court did not first consider and adjudicate those issues raised by the defendants, we decline to now do so. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976); Hector v. Wiens, 533 F.2d 429, 433 (9th Cir. 1976).

¶17At the time of the District Court’s consideration of its ultimate order of dismissal of the action for lack of jurisdiction, the circuit case law on the issue was nil. At that time only the following District Court decisions were available for consideration: Bol-ger v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwarth & Horwarth, 381 F.Supp. 260, 263 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (recognizing an implied private right of action). Greenspan v. del Toro, No. 73-638 CIV JE (S.D.Fla. May 17, 1974), appeal dismissed for want of prosecution, No. 74-2943 (5th Cir. Sept. 5,1974); and Gammage v. Roberts, Scott & Co., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed.Sec.L.Rep. (CCH) 194,761 (S.D.Cal.1974) (no private right of action).

¶18We now have the benefit of the decisions of the Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Second Circuits finding an implied private right of action under the Advisers Act. Wilson v. First Houston Investment Corp., 566 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir. 1978); Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862 (2d Cir. 1977).1

¶19*239Without reiterating their able discussions, we adopt the rationale of the majorities in Abrahamson and Wilson. Accordingly, we hold that the implication of a private right of action for injunctive relief and damages under the Advisers Act in favor of appropriate plaintiffs is necessary to achieve the goals of Congress in enacting the legislation. The District Court holds subject matter jurisdiction to entertain such actions and pendens state claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.2

¶20The District Court’s order of dismissal is vacated and the cause remanded to the District Court for further proceedings consistent herewith.

¶21ORDER OF DISMISSAL VACATED AND CAUSE REMANDED.

¶26WALLACE, Circuit Judge,

¶27dissenting:

¶28This case presents an issue of first impression in our circuit on which reasonable minds may differ. I recognize the strength of the opinions and the articles cited by the majority. I am persuaded, however, by the analysis of Judge Gurfein in Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862, 879 (2d Cir. 1977) (concurring and dissenting), and therefore respectfully dissent.

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