¶1concurring.
¶2I agree with Mr. Chief Justice Cappy’s analysis regarding the majority’s application of the apparent authority exception under the present circumstances. See Dissenting Opinion at 470-72, 836 A.2d at 907-08. I nevertheless concur in the majority disposition, as I agree with Mr. Justice Lamb that the warrantless search of Appellant’s approved parole residence in order to locate him was valid under the parole exception. I write only because I would treat the two aspects of that exception distinctly.
¶3As a threshold matter, in the absence of consent or a statutory framework, the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the warrantless search of a parolee’s residence based upon reasonable suspicion. See Commonwealth v. Pickron, 535 Pa. 241, 249-50, 634 A.2d 1093, 1098 (1993). The Court subsequently addressed the issue of consent in Commonwealth v. Williams, 547 Pa. 577, 692 A.2d 1031 (1997), and held that, where a parolee signs a parole *468agreement giving his parole officer permission to conduct a warrantless search, the search will be deemed reasonable if the totality of the circumstances demonstrates that: (1) the parole officer had a reasonable suspicion that the parolee committed a parole violation; and (2) the search was reasonably related to the parole officers duty. See id. at 588, 692 A.2d at 1036. In addition, the General Assembly added Section 27b to the Probation and Parole Act,
¶4In my view, the search of Appellant’s approved parole residence was valid under both. Initially, there is no dispute that Officer Vines had reasonable suspicion to believe that Appellant violated his parole. See Majority Opinion, at 458, 836 A.2d at 899. I am, therefore, of the view that the officer’s conduct, in searching Appellant’s residence to locate him and discuss those violations, was “reasonably related to the parole officer’s duty” of confirming those violations. In addition, I would hold that the search was statutorily authorized, since, as observed by Mr. Justice Lamb, it was based upon reasonable suspicion that the residence contained “evidence of violations of the conditions of supervision,” namely, evidence that could be obtained by speaking to Appellant himself.
¶5. Act of Aug. 6, 1941, P.L. 861, No. 323, § 27.2, added by Act of Nov. 17, 1995, P.L. 1139, No. 35 (Spec. Sess. No. 1), § 1 (codified at 61 P.S. § 331.27b).