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575 Pa. 447

836 A.2d 893

Commonwealth v. Hughes

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Decided November 25, 2003

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · decided 2003-11-25

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“Although the language utilized in Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution is similar to that in the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the decisions of the United States Supreme Court are not disposi-tive of questions regarding the rights guaranteed to citizens of this Commonwealth pursuant to the Pennsylvania Constitution. We are not bound to interpret the two provisions as if they were mirror images, even where the text is similar or identical.”

quoted by 3 later decisions, including 2009 Pa. Super. 67 - Commonwealth v. Basking, 2007 Pa. Super. 207 - Commonwealth v. Moore

“(1) the parole officer had reasonable suspicion to believe that the parolee committed a parole violation; and (2) the search was reasonably related to the duty of the parole officer.”

quoted by 2 later decisions, including State of Tennessee v. Janet Michelle Stanfield, Tony Alan Winsett and Justin Bradley Stanfield, 2008 Pa. Super. 294 - Commonwealth v. Hunter

Relies on Commonwealth v. Williams · Commonwealth v. Pickron

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 2003-11-25

How this case has been cited

Cited by 50 later decisions — most recently December 2023 · most notably In the Interest of L.J. (2013), United States v. Williams (2005)

3 federal appellate · 46 state decisions

330200320102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

Justice SAYLOR

¶1concurring.

¶2I agree with Mr. Chief Justice Cappy’s analysis regarding the majority’s application of the apparent authority exception under the present circumstances. See Dissenting Opinion at 470-72, 836 A.2d at 907-08. I nevertheless concur in the majority disposition, as I agree with Mr. Justice Lamb that the warrantless search of Appellant’s approved parole residence in order to locate him was valid under the parole exception. I write only because I would treat the two aspects of that exception distinctly.

¶3As a threshold matter, in the absence of consent or a statutory framework, the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the warrantless search of a parolee’s residence based upon reasonable suspicion. See Commonwealth v. Pickron, 535 Pa. 241, 249-50, 634 A.2d 1093, 1098 (1993). The Court subsequently addressed the issue of consent in Commonwealth v. Williams, 547 Pa. 577, 692 A.2d 1031 (1997), and held that, where a parolee signs a parole *468agreement giving his parole officer permission to conduct a warrantless search, the search will be deemed reasonable if the totality of the circumstances demonstrates that: (1) the parole officer had a reasonable suspicion that the parolee committed a parole violation; and (2) the search was reasonably related to the parole officers duty. See id. at 588, 692 A.2d at 1036. In addition, the General Assembly added Section 27b to the Probation and Parole Act,1 which authorizes, inter alia, the search of real property in the possession of or under the control of a parolee where there is reasonable suspicion to believe that such property contains “contraband or other evidence of violations of the conditions of supervision.” 61 P.S. 331.27b(d)(2) (emphasis added). Thus, Williamsand Section 27b provide alternate bases for upholding a search under the parole exception.

¶4In my view, the search of Appellant’s approved parole residence was valid under both. Initially, there is no dispute that Officer Vines had reasonable suspicion to believe that Appellant violated his parole. See Majority Opinion, at 458, 836 A.2d at 899. I am, therefore, of the view that the officer’s conduct, in searching Appellant’s residence to locate him and discuss those violations, was “reasonably related to the parole officer’s duty” of confirming those violations. In addition, I would hold that the search was statutorily authorized, since, as observed by Mr. Justice Lamb, it was based upon reasonable suspicion that the residence contained “evidence of violations of the conditions of supervision,” namely, evidence that could be obtained by speaking to Appellant himself.

¶5. Act of Aug. 6, 1941, P.L. 861, No. 323, § 27.2, added by Act of Nov. 17, 1995, P.L. 1139, No. 35 (Spec. Sess. No. 1), § 1 (codified at 61 P.S. § 331.27b).

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