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575 So. 2d 756

Docket No. 90-2427.

Braden v. State

Michael D. BRADEN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

District Court of Appeal of Florida · decided 1991-03-05

Cited by 7 later decisions — most recently July 2000

7 state decisions

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“(1) CRITERIA.—A person may be involuntarily placed for treatment upon a finding of the court by clear and convincing evidence that: (a) He is mentally ill and because of his mental illness: 1.a. He has refused voluntary placement for treatment after sufficient and conscientious explanation and disclosure of the purpose of placement for treatment; or b. He is unable to determine for himself whether placement is necessary; and 2.a. He is manifestly incapable of surviving alone or with the help of willing and responsible family or friends, including available alternative services, and, without treatment, he is likely to suffer from neglect or refuse to care for himself, and such neglect or refusal poses a real and present threat of substantial harm to his well-being; or b. There is substantial likelihood that in the near future he will inflict serious bodily harm on himself or another person, as evidenced by recent behavior causing, attempting, or threatening such harm; and (b) All available less restrictive treatment alternatives which would offer an opportunity for improvement of his condition have been judged to be inappropriate.”

quoted by 2 later decisions, including Jones v. State, 681 So. 2d 296 - Archer v. State

“non-dangerous individual, capable of surviving safely in freedom by herself or with the help of others, should never be involuntarily committed.”

quoted by 2 later decisions, including 724 So. 2d 1241 - Lyon v. State, 651 So. 2d 795 - Ozbourn v. State

Relies on In Re Beverly · State v. Wardlow · Williams v. State

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1991-03-05

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1*757 Louis O. Frost, Jr., Public Defender, James T. Miller, Asst. Public Defender, Jacksonville, for appellant.

¶2Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Kathleen E. Moore, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

¶3CAWTHON, Senior Judge.

¶4Appellant seeks reversal of an order for involuntary commitment. We reverse the order based on the insufficiency of evidence that appellant posed a real and substantial threat of harm to himself or others. To support a finding of involuntary placement, the evidence must establish that appellant posed a real and present threat of substantial harm to himself or others. Welk v. State,542 So.2d 1343 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). Even if the other criteria for involuntary placement are met, a nondangerous individual, capable of surviving safely in freedom by himself or with the help of others, should never be involuntarily committed. In re Beverly,342 So.2d 481 (Fla. 1977); Williams v. State,522 So.2d 983 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). The mere need for treatment alone is insufficient to commit an individual. Williams; Neff v. State,356 So.2d 901 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).

¶5The experts in the instant case, like the experts in Welk v. State, found the appellant at times verbally and physically aggressive towards others, unpredictable, and in need of a structured environment with supervision. However, just as the experts in Welk, the instant experts did not identify the serious nature of the injury that appellant would sustain if not incarcerated, and did not present any testimony of serious injuries as a result of past episodes. In the instant case, both appellant's psychologist and psychiatrist recommended that appellant be put in a voluntary residence program. They both testified that appellant did not need to be involuntarily placed in the state hospital. Appellant's history likewise establishes that appellant can survive safely outside of involuntary placement and will not be a threat to himself or others. Accordingly, the order of involuntary placement is reversed.

¶6JOANOS and ZEHMER, JJ., concur.

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