Commonwealth v. Uderra

¶1concurring.

¶2I join the Majority Opinion, but write separately to dissociate myself from Mr. Justice Saylor’s adoption, albeit via *535footnote, of the view of the Third Circuit in Holloway that our procedural requirements for the development of a full and complete record to establish ,a prima facie case of a Batson violation are an unreasonable application of federal law. Compare Holloway v. Horn, 355 F.3d 707, 728-29 (3d Cir.2004) with Commonwealth v. Spence, 534 Pa. 233, 627 A.2d 1176, 1182-83 (1993). As Mr. Justice Saylor properly recognizes in the text of the Opinion: “A majority of this Court is of the view that it would represent dictum to undertake in this case to reconsider the validity of the Spencerequirements in light of the Third Circuit’s Holloway decision.” Op. at 86. Nevertheless, in a footnote of the same Opinion, Mr. Justice Saylor explains that he “is of a contrary view” and would prefer to undertake a reconsideration of our time-honored procedural requirements for establishing a prima facie case under Bat-son. Id.at 86 n. 12. As Mr. Justice Saylor acknowledges, however, the Commonwealth in this case has neither specifically addressed nor defended the validity of the Spencerequirements before this Court. Therefore, absent an adequate presentation of adversarial arguments, we should at least temporarily delay the reconsideration of our precedent. Because the decisions of the Third Circuit regarding federal law are merely persuasive authority for this Court to contemplate and weigh, see Hall v. Pa. Bd. of Probation and Parole, 851 A.2d 859, 863 (Pa.2004),1 we should not abandon our long-established jurisprudence until all parties involved in the proceedings have had an equal opportunity to develop and present meaningful arguments before us on this significant issue.