Volume 589 — United States Reports

Thompson v. Hebdon, 589 U.S. 1 (2019), is a United States Supreme Court decision concerning campaign finance. The Ninth Circuit's decision was vacated and remanded by the Supreme Court.

Rotkiske v. Klemm, 589 U.S. 8 (2019), was a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States involving the statute of limitations under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act of 1977. The Court ruled that the statute of limitations begins one year after the alleged FDCPA violation took place, not one year after the violation was discovered by the plaintiff. This ruling affirmed a decision by the 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals. It is noteworthy for being the first signed opinion released from the 2019 term. It is also noteworthy for resolving a circuit split regarding a major consumer protection law.

An appeal of right lies from “fnal judgments, orders, and decrees” entered by bankruptcy courts “in cases and proceedings.” 28 U. S. C. § 158(a). Held: A bankruptcy court's order unreservedly denying relief from the automatic stay constitutes a fnal, immediately appealable order under § 158(a). Pp. 41–48. (a) This Court's application of § 158(a)'s fnality requirement is guided by the opinion in Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, 575 U. S. 496.

This Court held in Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 573 U. S. 409, 428, that “[t]o state a claim for breach of the duty of prudence” imposed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974… Held: The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded. The Court declines to consider arguments not addressed by the Court of Appeals. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S. A., 542 U. S. 155, 175.

Decided February 24, 2020 Active and retired school employees fled complaints seeking injunctive relief in the Puerto Rico Court of First Instance based on their allega-… Held: The Court does not reach the merits arguments presented because the Court of First Instance lacked jurisdiction to issue the payment and seizure orders at issue. Once a notice of removal is fled, “the State court shall proceed no further unless and until the case is remanded.” 28 U. S. C. § 1446(d).

The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduc- tion (Hague Convention or Convention), implemented in the United… Held: A child's habitual residence depends on the totality of the circum- stances specifc to the case, not on categorical requirements such as an actual agreement between the parents. Pp. 76–83. (a) The inquiry begins with the Convention's text “and the context in which the written words are used.” Air France v. Saks, 470 U. S. 392, 397.

constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.

Hernandez v. Mesa was a pair of United States Supreme Court cases (582 U.S. 548 (2017) and 589 U.S. 93 (2020)) in which the court held that the precedent established under the 1971 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents decision did not extend to claims based on cross-border shootings.

An Arizona jury convicted petitioner James McKinney of two counts of frst-degree murder. Held: A Clemons reweighing is a permissible remedy for an Eddings error, and when an Eddings error is found on collateral review, a state appellate court may conduct a Clemons reweighing on collateral review.

Held: “Just as the State may not by statute preclude the sentencer from considering any mitigating factor, nei- ther may the sentencer refuse to consider, as a matter of law, any relevant mitigating evidence.” Id., at 113–114. 150 McKINNEY v. ARIZONA Ginsburg, J., dissenting evidence the posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) McKin- ney suffered as a result of his horrifc childhood.

The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) mandates a 15-year minimum sentence for a defendant convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm who has at least three convictions for “serious drug… Held: Section 924(e)(2)(A)(ii)’s “serious drug offense” definition requires only that the state offense involve the conduct specified in the statute; it does not require that the state offense match certain generic of- fenses.

The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) requires plaintiffs with “actual knowledge” of an alleged fduciary breach to fle suit within three… Held: A plaintiff does not necessarily have “actual knowledge” under § 1113(2) of the information contained in disclosures that he receives but does not read or cannot recall reading. To meet § 1113(2)'s “actual knowledge” requirement, the plaintiff must in fact have become aware of that information. Pp. 184–190.

tion,” Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 559 U. S. 633, 647, elsewhere in ERISA. When Congress has included both actual and constructive knowledge in ERISA limitations provisions, Congress has done so explicitly. But Congress has never added to § 1113(2) the language it has used in those other provisions to encompass both forms of knowledge. Pp. 184–187.

regulation of information required as a precondition of employment. In arguing that the State's statutes require proof that the accused engaged in the prohibited conduct for the purpose of getting a “beneft,” respond- ents confate the beneft that results from complying with the federal employment verifcation system with the beneft of actually getting a job.

(2) The Limited Review Provision's immediate statutory context belies the Government and the dissent's claim that “questions of law” excludes the application of law to settled facts. The Provision is part of § 1252, which also contains § 1252(b)(9), the “zipper clause.” The zipper clause is meant to “consolidate `judicial review' of immigration proceed- ings into one action in the court of appeals.” INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U. S. 289, 313.

constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co. , 200 U.S. 321 , 337, 26 S.Ct. 282 , 50 L.Ed. 499 . 1 The CRCA served as the model for the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Clarification Act (Patent Remedy Act), passed two years later (and repudiated by this Court in Florida Prepaid , see supra, at 989 - 999).

Kahler v. Kansas, 589 U.S. 271 (2020), is a case of the United States Supreme Court in which the justices ruled that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution do not require that states adopt the insanity defense in criminal cases that are based on the defendant's ability to recognize right from wrong. It was argued on October 7, 2019 and decided on March 23, 2020.

Held: a plaintiff must only plead facts plausibly showing that race played “some role” in the defendant's decisionmaking process. 743 Fed. Appx. 106, 107 (2018); see also National Assn. of African American-Owned Media v. Charter Com- munications, Inc., 915 F. 3d 617, 626 (CA9 2019) (describing the test as whether “discriminatory intent play[ed] any role”).

Petitioners (collectively CARCO) sub-chartered the oil tanker M/T Athos I from tanker operator Star Tankers, which had chartered the tanker from respondent Frescati Shipping Company. Held: The plain language of the parties' safe-berth clause establishes a warranty of safety. Pp. 355–365. (a) The Court's analysis begins and ends with the text of the safe-berth clause. As CARCO acknowledges, the clause imposes on the charterer a duty to select a safe berth.

warranties, regardless of their label. See, e. g., Davison v. Von Lingen, 113 U. S. 40, 49–50. Here, it is plain on the face of the contract that the safe-berth clause sets forth a statement of “material” fact regarding the condition of the berth selected by the charterer. The charterer's assurance of a safe berth is the entire root of the safe-berth clause, and crucially, it is not subject to qualifcations or conditions.

A Kansas deputy sheriff ran a license plate check on a pickup truck, dis- covering that the truck belonged to respondent Glover and that Glover’s driver’s license had been… Held: When the officer lacks information negating an inference that the owner is driving the vehicle, an investigative traffic stop made after running a vehicle’s license plate and learning that the registered owner’s driver’s license has been revoked is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Pp. 3–10.

Petitioner Noris Babb, a clinical pharmacist at a U. S. Department of Veterans Affairs Medical Center, sued the Secretary of Veterans Af- fairs (hereinafter VA) for, inter alia, age discrimination in… Held: The plain meaning of §633a(a) demands that personnel actions be untainted by any consideration of age.

Held: Halprin's fling was a second or successive petition under federal law be- cause, “even if ” Cunningham's prejudice were “unknown to Hal- prin at the time,” the judicial-bias claim would have been “ripe” during the jury trial. Id., at 943. The Fifth Circuit then con- cluded that Halprin could not satisfy § 2244(b)'s “ `strict' ” require- ments for authorizing a second or successive § 2254 application. Id., at 945.